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WORLD WAR II

A Brief History

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES
Office of The Provost Marshal General
Washington 25, D. C.

15 January 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL B. M. BRYAN,
THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL:

This volume is an abridgment of the official history of the Office of The Provost Marshal General. The complete official text, together with basic supporting documents, constitutes a quantity so great as to make reproduction impractical. The purpose of the abridged history is to make immediately available, between the covers of one book, an accurate account of the operations of The Provost Marshal General. It is believed that the preparation of this volume now, though in limited quantity, and though lacking in uniformity of style, is preferable to waiting until a finished product can be completed and published. The text of the abridgment is identical with the official history except for certain deletions and minor editorial changes. Citations to the major basic documents have been retained.

The Provost Marshal General had no professional historical staff. Supervision of the preparation of historical material was a function of the Control Division. Major Warren D. Chandler of that Division had, as one of his duties, the responsibility for supervising the preparation of the official history. Captain Melvin C. McGee assisted in the planning and review of those parts relating to training. Major Chandler did the major portion of the editorial work incident to the preparation of the abridged history. The typing and reproduction were supervised by Mrs. Alma Bowman.

Following is a list of the officers who were responsible for the preparation of the official history from which, except for the changes described above, this volume has been compiled. Copies of the official history are located in the Office of The Provost Marshal General and in the Historical Division of the War Department Special Staff.

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Major Charles Woods
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Military Clearance Program (Screening Personnel of Japanese Ancestry for Military Service)

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Criminal Investigations Program

Apprehension of Absentees Program

PRISONERS OF WAR

Prisoner of War Operations

Prisoner of War Information Bureaus

Prisoner of War Reorientation

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
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PROGRAMS
of the
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
in
WORLD WAR II

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INTRODUCTION

The Provost Marshal General in World War II was the police arm of the military forces. He supervised the internment within the United States of a half million prisoners of war, and provided staff supervision over the training of 200,000 military police, the apprehension of absentees, deserters, and escaped military prisoners, and the investigation of crime within the Army. In addition, he trained personnel for military government duties and supervised the War Department's internal security programs for the protection of war production.

When the Office of The Provost Marshal General was activated 31 July 1941, the scope of its operations was limited to "matters within the jurisdiction of the War Department relating to control of aliens." 1/ The office was created shortly after Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson sent a memorandum to the President stating his desire to appoint Major General Allen W. Gullion, The Judge Advocate General, as The Provost Marshal General "in addition to his other duties." 2/

The Secretary told the President that there was a "pressing need for an administrator to vitalize and coordinate" the planning which had already been done concerning potential enemy aliens. The Secretary stated also that The Provost Marshal General would have general charge of inclosures for confining prisoners of war and would be responsible for the training of the Army's Military Police.

From the date of its inception until the Army reorganization of 2 March 1942, the Office of The Provost Marshal General functioned as one of the War Department's Special Staffs. Shortly after the 2 March creation of the Services of Supply, many different branches and bureaus were consolidated into four major elements, to one of which, the Chief of Administrative Services, The Provost Marshal General reported. 3/ In May 1943, when the

1/ War Department, The Adjutant General's Office, AG 370.81 (7-31-41)OD, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Orders."

2/ Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of War, undated.

3/ Staff Divisions, Supply Services, Administrative Services, and Corps Areas, see Chart I in the Appendix.

title Army Service Forces was substituted for Services of Supply. The Provost Marshal General was placed under the Director of Administration. 4/

The Office of the Director of Administration was abolished on 12 November 1943, 5/ and The Provost Marshal General was directed to report to the Commanding General, ASF, through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands. 6/

This arrangement continued until 25 June 1945, at which time the Office of The Provost Marshal General was made a full fledged staff division of the Army Service Forces, reporting to the Commanding General through the Chief of Staff. 7/

The many-fold expansion of the office which took place in the months after Pearl Harbor made advisable changes in the organizational structure. Originally, The Provost Marshal General made his first assistant the Deputy The Provost Marshal General. 8/ In December, 1942, the office of deputy was abolished and two positions were created, titled Assistant The Provost Marshal General, the one Assistant to be concerned with prisoners of war and military police, and the other with matters pertaining to internal security. 9/ A third position of Assistant The Provost Marshal General was created in June, 1944, which embraced all offices concerned with administration. 10/ This structural pattern continued until December, 1945, when the positions of Assistants The Provost Marshal General were abolished to be replaced by one Deputy The Provost Marshal General. 11/

The functions of The Provost Marshal General during the first two years following the activation of the office, were concerned largely with measures for the protection of war production. A considerable number of programs were initiated, such as the Auxiliary

4/ See Chart II.

5/ See ASF Cir 118, dated 12 November 1943.

6/ See Chart III.

7/ See ASF Cir 238, dated 25 June 1946, Chart IV.

8/ Colonel Archer L. Lerch was the first Deputy The Provost Marshal General. He was relieved 1 June 1942 to take charge of The Provost Marshal General's School Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, and was succeeded by Colonel J. V. Dillon.

9/ See Chart V. Brigadier Generals Archer L. Lerch and B. M. Bryan were the first Assistants The Provost Marshal General.

10/ See Chart VI. In June 1944, Major General Lerch was designated The Provost Marshal General. The Assistants The Provost Marshal General were Brigadier General Bryan, Colonel L. F. Parmley and Colonel A. B. Johnson.

11/ See Chart VII. Brigadier General Bryan succeeded Major General Lerch as The Provost Marshal General. Colonel A. B. Johnson was designated Deputy The Provost Marshal General.

Military Police Program and the Alien Employment Program, which were designed to prevent losses to production through fire, sabotage, or other means. At the same time emphasis was placed upon the development of a Corps of Military Police and the initiation of a program of training for Military Government.

After the victory in North Africa, and the shipment to the United States of many thousands of enemy prisoners in the summer of 1943, functions relating to the internment of prisoners became of paramount importance. In May, 1945, The Provost Marshal General supervised the internment and labor of almost a half million prisoners scattered in approximately 600 base and branch camps throughout the United States.

During the later stages of the war, there was a deemphasis upon problems of internal security. The reductions incident to this deemphasis were offset, however, by the assignment to The Provost Marshal General of additional functions pertaining to the investigation of crime within the Army, and to the apprehension of deserters and escaped military prisoners. The Provost Marshal General was assigned also the wholly novel and unprecedented task of establishing a reorientation program for prisoners of war.

The chapters which follow give in some detail an account of the various programs for which The Provost Marshal General was responsible, either as the operating agency (e. g., the Prisoner of War Information Bureau) or as the agency exercising staff supervision (e. g., Military Police). The organization of the volume follows the structural pattern previously described, i. e., the programs pertaining to Internal Security which were under one Assistant The Provost Marshal General and of first importance in the early years of the war are placed first, with Military Police, Prisoners of War, and Military Government following in order.

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INTERNAL SECURITY

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THE WAR DEPARTMENT
INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Objective

Internal Security, broadly stated, denoted the home-front protection of all facilities, installations, utilities, services, materials, resources, and personnel essential to the prosecution of the war. It did not encompass hazards which could be combatted only by organized military offensive action.

National Organization For Internal Security

The most important of the principal security missions was that established by Executive Order 8972, 16 December 1941, which authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, whenever such action appeared to be necessary or desirable, to establish and maintain military guards and patrols and to take other appropriate measures to protect from injury or destruction national-defense material, premises and utilities. That order, by express language, did not limit or modify another authorized principal security mission -- the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage and suspected acts of subversive activity -- which was charged by law to the Department of Justice and delegated thereby to its agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Navy's internal security responsibility under Executive Order 8972 was limited by Executive Order 9074, 25 February 1942, which specifically charged the Secretary of the Navy with the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities, except such waterfront facilities as were under the direct operation of the War Department. On 29 February 1942, the Navy Department delegated the major portion of its remaining internal security responsibility to the U. S. Coast Guard, retaining for itself, however, responsibility for the internal security of Naval Shore Establishments, major ship-building and ship repair facilities, and a limited number of other specific facilities of particular procurement interest to the Navy. The delimitation of the Navy's internal security responsibility, as mutually agreed upon by the War and Navy Departments, and a clarification of the character and scope of U. S. Coast Guard protective functions were outlined in a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, 11 June 1942. To eliminate even further the possibility of any conflict in jurisdiction, the Navy Department, by letter dated 29 August 1942, specifically restrained the U. S. Coast Guard from engaging in internal security activities at any facility appearing on a War Department Inspection Responsibility List or revision thereof. Active, harmonious liaison was maintained between

the Army, the Navy and the U. S. Coast Guard, in all echelons, throughout the war, and resulted in little pre-emption of the other's security prerogatives and in a complete protective coverage of all facilities of importance to the prosecution of the war.

Another principal security mission -- provision for the protection of vital power supply against hostile acts -- had been charged to the Federal Power Commission by presidential direction on 14 June 1940 and remained legally unaffected by Executive Order 8972. By agreement, however, the War Department and the Federal Power Commission, with respect to those power facilities of particular importance to the war effort, established a joint protection program, subject to War Department policies and procedures, in which the Army performed those internal security functions which peculiarly were its own (such as establishing guard forces and making loyalty investigations) and the Federal Power Commission's experts handled the technical aspects of protective inspections. This arrangement remained in effect throughout the war. The Provost Marshal General, through active liaison, exercising indirect supervision over all Federal Power Commission's protection activities.

Still another principal security mission, but of lesser comparative importance than those referred to above, was established by Executive Order 9165, 19 May 1942, which directed the Office of Civilian Defense, in conjunction with and subject to approval of the Secretary of War, to establish a Facility Security Program. That program was subordinate to and correlated with the protective programs of the Army, Navy, and the Federal Power Commission and was designed to provide for the protection of important facilities not of direct military interest but essential to civilian security and health. Nine designated Federal departments and agencies already exercising administrative or regulatory control over various types and classes of facilities were directed to effect, under the supervision of the Office of Civilian Defense, the development and execution of the Facility Security Program as it specifically related to the facilities in which they respectively maintained predominant interest.

As a result of the integration and voluntary subordination, in whole or in part, of the authorized internal security activities of all other agencies with those of the War Department, the predominant and controlling Internal Security Program of the continental United States was that which was developed, established and operated by the War Department. Because of the assumption by the War Department (with the consent of the other principals involved) of responsibility for supervising, coordinating, and conducting all but a few specifically excepted internal security activities, over-all control became more centralized than otherwise possible, duplication of security functions was eliminated, economy and efficiency was realized, and, even more important, specific responsibility for the protective coverage of each of the various types and classes of facilities, installations and services vital to the war effort definitely was established.

War Department Organization For Internal Security

The internal security responsibility of the Secretary of War, as established by Executive Order 8972, was delegated by him to appropriate military commanders; chiefly, the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and the Commanding Generals of Defense Commands. The Commanding General of the Army Service Forces was charged with both the emergency and continuing protection of installations, facilities, and commodities important to the prosecution of the war, except where such responsibility, or any part thereof, specifically was charged to commanders of other Army components or to the Secretary of the Navy. The Commanding General of the Army Air Forces was charged with the internal security of his installations and also of those private facilities engaged in direct and usually exclusive production for the Army Air Forces except where such responsibility, or any portion thereof, was assumed by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, upon agreement with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The Commanding Generals of Defense Commands were charged with the defense of frontiers, which entailed, among other things, responsibility for executing passive defense measures and for restricting access to and movement within areas determined to be of vital military importance.

Specific responsibility for executing the Army's various component security missions referred to above was delegated, as necessary, to those commanders best adapted to perform them. The Provost Marshal General was charged, under the direction of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, with the supervision of the Internal Security Program of the Army Service Forces and with the coordination of the internal security activities of other agencies both within and without the War Department. Under similar direction, commanding generals of service commands and chiefs of certain technical services were charged, in varying degrees, with the operation of the Internal Security Program in the field. Commanding generals of service commands, in turn, delegated much of their authority to their district commanders, each of whom acted for and in behalf of their service commanders within a limited area such as a state.

The Army Air Forces' organization for internal security, to the extent that its lesser-scope security activities made it feasible, was similar to that of the Army Service Forces. Under the direction of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, the specific internal security functions with which he was charged were supervised and coordinated by the Air Provost Marshal and were executed in the field by Army Air Forces' procurement districts (which corresponded to but were not coterminous with the service commands of the Army Service Forces.) The internal security activities of the Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces were coordinated closely.

Commanding generals of defense commands, in recognition of the predominant "on-the-ground" internal security responsibility of commanding generals of service commands, delegated to the latter commanders certain responsibilities which were of an internal security nature, such as responsibility for (1) restricting access to production areas and (2) determining compliance with passive defense measures.

Character and Operation of the War Department Internal Security Program

The War Department Internal Security Program was a composite program comprised of several subordinate correlated programs in two main categories, namely: Production Security Programs, which concerned the protection of vital facilities, installations, commodities, and the like against physical threats and hazards, whether natural or enemy-inspired, and Personnel Security Programs, which concerned the protection of similar facilities, installations, commodities, and the like against the disruptive efforts of disloyal, subversive or otherwise undesirable individuals.

The fundamental premise of the War Department, during the establishment and execution of its Internal Security Program, was that primary responsibility for the protection of all properties, excluding military installations, rested upon the operators, owners, and local and state governments. The War Department's responsibility for internal security was supplementary to that basic responsibility. However, though its responsibility was supplementary, the War Department's internal security activities served the important purpose of assuring that the primary responsibility of operators, owners, and local and state governments was, in fact, observed and carried out. Primary responsibility for internal security at military installations, such as arsenals and storage depots, appropriately rested upon the local commanding officers.

War Department internal security activities fall into three main categories, namely: (1) Plant Protection - provision for the adequate protection, against all calculable hazards, of facilities, installations and commodities which were of such outstanding importance that their damage or destruction would have had a substantially adverse effect upon the prosecution of the war, such provision including measures to protect operating personnel from harm or injury, whether deliberate or accidental, by production hazards, carelessness, contamination of food, water or drugs, or from any other causes; (2) Emergency Protection - provision for furnishing required additional protection to all facilities, civilian communities, and installations in emergency situations, including civil disorders, natural or war disasters, and extensive activities of organized Fifth Column groups; and (3) Passive Protection - provision for a form of defense designed to impede enemy attack by land, sea or air, and to protect

facilities, installations, services and personnel from such attack, by practical strategic measures not requiring organized military offensive action to insure effectiveness. All three categories were closely related and had the same general purpose -- that of assuring a continuous flow of war materials to the armed forces.

Production and personnel security inspections, conducted by qualified representatives of designated inspection agencies (usually a service command), were the chief means by which the Army endeavored to aid the owners and operators of selected facilities and the commanding officers of certain installations in carrying out their primary responsibility for protecting their properties and personnel. A production security inspection was conducted to determine the adequacy of protective and preventive measures taken against the continuing hazards of fire, explosion and accident, to assure continuity of operations, and to provide for emergency situations. It included a personnel security inspection, the purpose of which was to determine the adequacy of measures taken to safeguard information, to prevent unauthorized entry, and to protect the production or service of the facility or installation from sabotage. At certain types of facilities where the production security aspects of protection were of little import, such as facilities engaged solely on highly classified research work, a personnel security inspection alone was performed.

Facilities and installations designated to receive security inspection services were selected by The Provost Marshal General who periodically published, and distributed to those agencies authorized to receive them, classified lists of all such facilities and installations. (The lists were based quite largely on the findings of the Resources Protection Board which was a part of the War Production Board but on which the Army and Navy were represented. The Army and Navy never were organized to evaluate completely the importance of facilities, services and commodities.) Security inspectors occupied a military or a civilian status and normally were individuals with previous technical or investigative experience who further had been trained, under the supervision of The Provost Marshal General, in counter-sabotage, personnel investigations, fire protection, and industrial accident prevention. When a security inspection uncovered unsatisfactory security conditions, recommendations for attaining a more satisfactory security status were submitted to facility management, approval of all recommendations involving governmental expenditures first having been obtained from the procurement (contracting) agency having a major interest in the product produced or service rendered by the facility. The procurement agency was responsible for obtaining compliance, through its contractual authority, with all recommendations it approved. The War Department made every reasonable effort to assist owners and operators to improve the security of their facilities, rendering investigative and technical assistance and aiding them in obtaining allocations of critical protective

material and devices in an order of priority appropriate to the importance of the facility under consideration. The inspection services rendered by the War Department were welcomed almost universally. Benefits to industry were manifold. In addition to facilities achieving a more satisfactory war-time security status because of the military inspection activities, management discovered many attendant improvements resulted which otherwise were very important to their operations; namely, better housekeeping, fire protection and safety and, with respect to employee relations, excellent morale, greater cooperation, and more easily tolerated discipline.

Assistance by Civilian Federal and Private Agencies

Soon after the War Department had assumed responsibility for executing the bulk of the Nation's internal security responsibilities, it became apparent that the fulfillment of that obligation required a tremendous outlay of manpower which, if drawn wholly from the Army itself, would leave very little of a fighting force in the field. Furthermore, efficient and worthwhile protective inspections normally required the services of experienced technicians, particularly those possessing an expert knowledge of highly complex machinery and processes. Since production-conscious industrial facilities, as well as federal and private agencies, were competing strongly for those experts in a rapidly dwindling civilian manpower pool, the Army found itself hard-pressed to commission, recruit, employ or otherwise engage a sufficient number of trained personnel to conduct competent inspections of all the vital war production facilities warranting such services. Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General, to conserve the army's manpower for strictly military duties to as great an extent as possible and to assure the adequate discharge of the War Department's over-all internal security responsibility, effected a partial -- but not inconsiderable -- reduction in the Army's security workload by enlisting the aid of certain civilian federal agencies which he found capable of providing competent production security inspection services at specific types or classes of facilities. Precedent for this action already had been established by the earlier cooperative arrangement under which the War Department and the Federal Power Commission, each contributing its special talents, successfully operated a joint protection program with respect to the security of the Nation's electric power supply. The civilian federal agencies which were requested to participate, as inspection agencies, in the implementation of the War Department's Internal Security Program were those which, in the execution of their normal peacetime or newly-created wartime responsibilities, maintained staffs of trained technicians fully experienced in the peculiar problems and operations of the facilities or services under their immediate administrative or regulatory jurisdiction. The internal security policies and procedures of the War Department governed in those cooperative arrangements, the

participating agency acting as an agent of, for, and in behalf of the War Department in its conduct of security inspections at facilities specifically designated by The Provost Marshal General. Inclusive internal security responsibility for the most important facilities normally was retained by the War Department.

The more important of the cooperative arrangements, which followed the general pattern of the agreement with the Federal Power Commission and became, in effect, integral components of the War Department Internal Security Program, were those entered into with the Petroleum Administration for War (with regard to the protection of the petroleum industry); the Bureau of Mines (with regard to the protection of vital mines and related facilities); and the Defense Supplies Corporation (with regard to the protection of certain designated storages of government-owned critical supplies).

Another wide-spread use of civilian inspection services, but applying only to those essential facilities whose relative importance did not warrant their receiving inspection services by an already over-extended Army security inspection staff, was made possible by and resulted from the Facility Security Program which, as previously noted, was operated by appropriate civilian federal agencies under the supervision of the Office of Civilian Defense and was subordinate to and coordinated with the War Department Internal Security Program. In June 1944, the Facility Security Program was terminated and the States War Inspection Service Program, a somewhat similar program except for its implementing agencies, was established by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in cooperation with the Office of Civilian Defense. That program utilized the voluntary services of insurance company personnel throughout the United States, was expressly subordinate to the War Department Internal Security Program and was coordinated therewith by The Provost Marshal General. Its purpose was to provide inspection services for facilities important to the prosecution of the war or civilian economy which were not included in the security inspection programs of the War Department, Navy Department, Federal Power Commission or any agency to which the War Department had delegated security inspection responsibility under a cooperative inspection agreement.

Certain commercial and trade organizations maintained private protection programs which were patterned after, closely coordinated with, and supplementary to the War Department Internal Security Program. In some instances, such as with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, those programs included security inspection services which were found to be so competent that The Provost Marshal General authorized the substitution, at specifically designated facilities, of certain private security inspection services for those of the War Department. As another example of private agency cooperation, the National Bureau for Industrial Protection furnished

the War Department with inspection reports covering facilities and commodity storages inspected by its member insurance companies, the War Department utilizing those reports as a check against its own inspection services. Other commercial and trade organizations contributed immeasurably to the development and maintenance of internal security by furnishing the War Department with requested advice on security standards and proposed policies; by providing technical and other assistance both to the War Department and industry; and by disseminating to member companies or other associates currently clarified instructions concerning War Department internal security policies. Particular assistance in this connection was rendered the War Department by the Association of American Railroads and by the Petroleum Industry War Council's Committee on Protection of Petroleum Facilities.

The Provost Marshal General's solicitation and full utilization of the services of qualified civilian agencies to assist the War Department in discharging its internal security responsibility resulted in a considerable lessening of the workload and problems of the Army's internal security organization, permitted a large number of military personnel to be diverted from protective to strictly military functions, eliminated considerable duplication of security activities, effected a conservation and more complete utilization of trained manpower, and promoted greater economy and efficiency in over-all internal security operations.

* * * *

The sections which follow explain in detail the development and operation of the various correlated security programs which together comprised the War Department Internal Security Program.

FEDERAL COORDINATION

One of the principal internal security responsibilities charged to The Provost Marshal General was that he coordinate, on a national level, the internal security activities of all agencies, military or civilian, federal or private, with those of the War Department.

The national organization for internal security was not unlike a closely-woven gigantic web which spread its all-enveloping protective canopy over the entire country. The main radial members of the integrated structure of that organization were predominately military in character, excepting only those identified with the Federal Power Commission and the Office of Civilian Defense, whereas the important interconnecting transverse members were as predominately civilian. The national organization for internal security, because of the many ramifications and inclusive scope of its over-all mission, necessarily was complicated in structure, but, as a result of effective coordination which brought about a clear-cut delineation and delimitation of the respective functions and responsibilities of the various elements thereof, it proved not unduly complicated in operation. Anticipated conflicts in jurisdiction arising from a similarity or an overlapping of the respective internal security responsibilities of various agencies (such as at certain water-front facilities where the Army, Navy, or Coast Guard each might have respective security interests) were prevented by coordination and resultant agreement whereby sole responsibility was delegated to and accepted by but one of the interested parties. Unforeseen conflicts in jurisdiction were resolved, after the fact, by similar coordination and agreement.

The Provost Marshal General, in his capacity as authorized coordinator of internal security affairs, performed a major role in preventing or resolving conflicts of jurisdiction, in eliminating duplication of security activities on one hand and hiatus on the other, in achieving a greater economy and efficiency in nation-wide internal security operations, in effecting a conservation and more complete utilization of competent security personnel, and in welding the several military and civilian components of the national organization for internal security into a smoothly-operating integrated whole. The end result was a comprehensive protection program for all facilities, installations, services and commodities vital to the prosecution of the war.

The coordination functions performed by The Provost Marshal General included many important activities which extended far beyond the scope of those normally associated with coordination. In addition to "coordinating" the authorized security activities of other agencies with those of the War Department, The Provost Marshal General often participated, with the consent or upon the specific request of certain of the

agencies concerned, in the actual development and establishment of their security activities and, thereafter, in the indirect supervision thereof. Examples were the active participation of The Provost Marshal General in the security activities of the Federal Power Commission, the Petroleum Administration for War, the Bureau of Mines, the Defense Supplies Corporation, the Public Roads Administration, the Association of American Railroads, the Petroleum Industry War Council's Committee on Protection of Petroleum Facilities, and many other federal and private agencies. In other instances, "coordination" meant solving the internal security problems presented by various interested agencies or facilities, serving as intermediary or conciliator between those agencies whose own liaison was deficient or whose respective prerogatives appeared to infringe upon each other, and acting as morale builder for certain industrial groups conducting private security activities of assistance to the War Department.

The Provost Marshal General's responsibility for national-level coordination of internal security matters was discharged in large part by the Federal Coordination Branch (Internal Security Division) which, because of certain of its other important internal security activities, had assigned to it personnel particularly qualified, in various fields, to execute the coordination functions delegated to it.

Listed below are many of the principal agencies with which the Federal Coordination Branch (or its successor, the Coordination Branch) maintained coordination, together with brief references to certain of the subjects requiring coordination:

AGENCY

MAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATION

MILITARY:

War Department, including:

Office of The Secretary of War -	(Planning, establishment and coord-
	(ination of internal security
Office of the Under Secretary	(policies and procedures; liaison
of War -	(with top-echelon agencies out-
	(side the War Department
War Department General and	(
Special Staffs -	(
War Department Traffic Secu-	(Security of communications
rity Board	(

AGENCY

MAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATION

MILITARY: (Cont'd)

War Department (Cont'd)

Army Air Forces, including:

Various Staff Divisions -

Office of the Air Provost
Marshal -

(Procurement agency action on secu-
(rity recommendations; resolu-
(tion of security problems;
(passive defense; coordination
(of internal security policies
(and procedures of AAF with
(those of ASF; facility eval-
(uation; etc.

Army Service Forces, including:

Various Staff Divisions -

(Establishment and coordination
(of certain internal security
(policies and procedures.

Technical Services -

(Procurement agency action on
(security recommendations;
(supervision of certain in-
(ternal security activities
(of Ordnance Department, Trans-
(portation Corps and Chemical
(Warfare Service; facility eval-
(uation; etc.

Service Commands -

(Supervision and coordination
(of parts of internal secu-
(rity and related matters.

Defense Commands -

(Passive defense; designation of
(prohibited and restricted zones;
(general internal security
(matters.

Navy Department, particularly:

Internal Security Section,
Base Maintenance Division,
Office of The Chief of
Naval Operations

(Procurement agency action on
(security recommendations;
(coordination of internal
(security and related matters;
(evaluation of vital facil-
(ities.

AGENCY

MAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATION

MILITARY: (Cont'd)

U. S. Coast Guard, particularly:

Port Security Division

(Coordination of internal secu-
(rity and related matters and
(resolution of any problems
(relating thereto.

Joint Army-Navy Boards,
particularly:

Army-Navy Petroleum Board -

(Security of production and
(storage of vital petroleum
(products, and components
(thereof, required by the
(armed services; military
(petroleum requirements of
(the United States and its
(allies.

Army-Navy Munitions Board -

(Expedition of release of
(critical plant
(protection materials re-
(quired by the most important
(war facilities.

Army-Navy Board for Production
Awards -

(Security status of war facili-
(ties appearing on Master
(Inspection Responsibility
(List nominated for Army-
(Navy "E" Award.

Joint Army-Navy Ammunition
Storage Board

(Protection of storages of
(ammunition.

GOVERNMENTAL (Civilian)

Office of Civilian Defense -

(Facility Security Program and
(States War Inspection Service;
(coordination of internal secu-
(rity and civil defense (in-
(cluding passive defense)
(policies.

AGENCYMAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATIONGOVERNMENTAL (Civilian) (Cont'd)

Petroleum Administration for War,
including:

Facility Security Division -

Production, Refining, Pipe-
line and other Divisions -

(Supervision of inspection pro-
(gram covering vital petro-
(leum refineries, pipelines,
(storages, oil fields, etc.;
(security of the petroleum in-
(dustry and related industries;
(domestic and foreign petro-
(leum production and require-
(ments; technical problems;
(evaluation of petroleum facil-
(ities.

Federal Power Commission -

(Supervision of inspection pro-
(gram for electric power and
(gas systems; security of elec-
(tric power and gas utilities;
(evaluation.

Bureau of Mines -

(Supervision of inspection pro-
(gram covering vital mines and
(related facilities; evaluation
(and security of such facilities;
(problems relating to administra-
(tion of the Federal Explosives
(Act.

War Production Board, including:

(Expedition of release of critical
(plant protection materials,
(small arms and ammunition,
(etc., required by important
(war facilities; coordination
(of security policies and opera-
(tions of WPB with those of the
(War Department.

Resources Protection Board -

(Evaluation of the importance of
(war facilities, services,
(storages, commodities, etc.

Storage Division -

(Security of commodity storages;
(establishment of storage
(specifications.

AGENCYMAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATIONGOVERNMENTAL (Civilian) (Cont'd)

Reconstruction Finance Corporation, including:

(Security of commodity storages
(and manufacturing plants owned
(or controlled by its subsidiary agencies.

Rubber Reserve Company -

(Security of manufacturing and
(storage facilities for crude,
(synthetic and scrap rubber
(and latex.

Metals Reserve Company -

(Security of storages of critical
(metals and minerals.

Defense Supplies Corporation -

(General security of critical
(commodities owned and stored
(by Defense Supplies Corp.;
(supervision of inspection
(program covering designated
(DSC storages.

Defense Plant Corporation -

(General security of new war
(plants, emergency pipelines
(and other projects built and
(operated by DPC.

Office of War Information -

(Safeguarding of military in-
(formation; security of prop-
(aganda broadcasting facilities;
(etc.

Federal Communications Commission -

(Safeguarding of communications.

Public Roads Administration -

(Operation of inspection pro-
(gram covering vital highway
(bridges, viaducts, tunnels,
(etc.; evaluation of such
(facilities.

U. S. Treasury Department,
including:

Procurement Division -

(Security of government-owned
(commodity storages.

Lend-Lease Division -

(Security of Lend-Lease materials.

AGENCYMAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATIONGOVERNMENTAL (Civilian) (Cont'd)

Office of Scientific Research and Development -	(Security of research projects; (policy matters in regard to (anti-biological warfare; (evaluation of research facilities.
National Research Council -	(Research concerning anti- (biological warfare.
Department of Commerce, particularly:	
Civil Aeronautics Association -	(Security of airway communication (facilities; air traffic control.
Interstate Commerce Commission -	(Protective measures relating to (explosives, poisonous gases (and chemicals, etc.
Bureau of Reclamation -	(Security of dams, power projects, (etc.
Office of Defense Transportation -	(Security of commodity storages.
Public Buildings Administration --	(Security of public buildings; (passive defense.
War Emergency Pipelines, Inc. -	(Security of "Big Inch" and "Little (Big Inch" pipe line systems.
Foreign Economic Administration --	(Security of commodity storages.
Surplus War Property Administration -	(Security of commodity storages.
Department of Agriculture, including:	
Commodity Credit Corporation -	(Security of commodity storages.
War Food Administration -	(Security of foodstuffs, fibers, (naval stores and vegetable (oils.
U. S. Public Health Service -	(Protection against industrial (hazards; problems relating (to anti-biological warfare.

AGENCYMAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATIONGOVERNMENTAL (Civilian) (Cont'd)

National Institute of Health -	(Problems concerning industrial (hazards and anti-biological (warfare.
Pure Food and Drug Administration -	(Matters concerning anti-biological (warfare.

PRIVATE

Association of American Railroads -	(Security of vital railroad (facilities.
American Petroleum Institute -	(Fire and accident prevention (in the petroleum industry.
Petroleum Industry War Council, particularly: -	(Security, production and other (matters concerning the petro- (leum industry.
Committee on Protection of Petroleum Facilities -	(Security of the petroleum in- (dustry.
National Bureau for Industrial Protection -	(Insurance inspection reports (covering facilities and (commodity storages.
National Fire Protection Asso- ciation -	(Fire prevention and protection (problems.
Council of Electric Power Operating Companies -	(Security of electric power (facilities.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company	(Security of communication (facilities.

FOREIGN

British Security Coordination -	(Security of facilities in the (United States manufacturing (or storing equipment and (materials for Great Britain.
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AGENCYMAJOR SUBJECT OF COORDINATIONINTERAGENCY

Air Traffic Control Board -	(Security of vital war facil-
	(ities endangered by low
	(flying aircraft, etc.
Railroad Security Committee -	(Security of vital railroad
	(facilities; evaluation of
	(railroad facilities.

Although the scope and character of the activities of the Federal Coordination Branch established it as one of the chief coordinators of internal security activities, both in the War Department and in the nation, large scale coordination also was effected by the Personnel Security Division with regard to internal security matters specifically of a "personnel security" nature. In addition to maintaining coordination with certain of the agencies indicated above, the Personnel Security Division (sometimes in conjunction with the Internal Security Division) worked closely with several other agencies, particularly:

- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- War Relocation Authority
- Treasury Department (Secret Service and Intelligence Divisions)
- Department of Labor
- Selective Service System
- International Association of Chiefs of Police
- U. S. State Department
- U. S. Employment Service
- War Shipping Administration
- Immigration and Naturalization Service
- Alien Property Custodian

The Internal Security and Personnel Security Divisions acted jointly or in close coordination on matters of evident or possible mutual interest.

EMERGENCY PROTECTION

Under Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution of the United States, it is the duty of the federal government, at the request of the legislature of any state (or of the governor if the legislature cannot be convened) to protect the state against domestic violence; Article II, Section 3, makes it the duty of the President to see that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed; and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution forbids any state to deny equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction. In implementation of these constitutional provisions, Congress has authorized the President to intervene with federal troops in emergencies when (a) the state requests aid against domestic violence,^{1/} (b) unlawful obstructions, combinations, assemblages of persons, or rebellion, in the judgment of the President make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States within any state or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,^{2/} and when (c) insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in any state so obstruct or hinder the laws of that state, and of the United States as to deprive any of the population of that state of rights, privileges, and immunities named in the Constitution and secured by laws, and the authorities of that state are unable, fail, or refuse to provide such protection with the result that it may be deemed a denial by that state of the equal protection of the laws.^{3/}

These constitutional and statutory provisions, plus the government's inherent right to protect, in an emergency, government property or private property vital to the national defense, have made it essential for the War Department to be prepared at all times for prompt and vigorous action in the event of domestic emergencies. This has required (1) the formulation from time to time of emergency plans designed to meet various types of emergencies that might reasonably be contemplated, (2) the maintenance of intelligence information regarding possible emergency situations and forces available in defense thereof, and (3) a staff of officers well acquainted with legal principles, War Department policies and approved procedures for the intervention of federal troops in domestic emergencies. Immediately prior to the fall of 1941, the War Department's planning and operating in these matters were conducted from the General Staff level.

^{1/} R.S. 5297; 50 U.S.C. 201; M.L. 1939, Secs. 502, 1296

^{2/} R.S. 5298; 50 U.S.C. 202; M.L. 1939, Secs. 503, 1297

^{3/} R.S. 5299; 50 U.S.C. 203; M.L. 1939, Secs. 504, 1298

War Department Emergency Plans

In October 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, transferred to The Provost Marshal General three emergency plans: The Counter Fifth Column Plan, the Emergency Plan White, and the Disaster Relief Plan. ^{4/} To administer these plans, an Emergency Operations Division was established in the Office of The Provost Marshal General.

In the discharge of its responsibility for the custody, revision and supervision of these three emergency plans, the Emergency Operations Division maintained operation maps, plotted critical areas and sensitive points, and kept a running log of situations which might develop into emergencies requiring the use of federal troops. Among the outstanding operational problems, in which the Emergency Operations Division functioned during this early period, were the taking over of Air Associates Incorporated, Bendix, New Jersey, and the threatened take-over of the bituminous coal mines affected by the so-called captive mine strike in November 1941.

The far-reaching reorganization of the Army in March 1942, had, as one of its results, the formation of the Internal Security Division in the Office of the Provost Marshal General. By the reorganization, the Under Secretary of War was relieved of many of his operating functions, the Services of Supply were created and The Provost Marshal General placed within it under the Chief of Administrative Services. The functions and much of the personnel of the Plant Protection Division of the Under Secretary's Office were transferred to the Office of The Provost Marshal General where the Plant Protection Division was merged with Emergency Operations Division, the two becoming the Internal Security Division. The Provost Marshal General was charged with responsibility for planning and supervising the internal security program by a War Department directive dated 30 March 1942 ^{5/}

The Emergency Protection Branch of the Internal Security Division was assigned jurisdiction over emergency operations matters. Many gaps were found in the Counter Fifth Column Plan of 1940 and, consequently, in the fall of 1942, a revised Counter Fifth Column Plan was prepared which clearly defined the mission of defense commanders and service commanders, and stressed the necessity of close cooperation and coordination of activities between all responsible agencies. ^{6/} Defense and service commanders were directed to develop subordinate plans for utilization in their respective commands, copies of which were provided The Provost Marshal General for review and comment. Maps, charts, and statistics bearing on all phases of emergency protection were prepared and maintained in the Emergency Protection Branch.

^{4/} WD letter, file AG 312-33 (9-30-41) MB-C-M, dated 1 November 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Certain Current General Staff activities to The Provost Marshal General"

^{5/} WD letter, file AG 381 (3-26-42), dated 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{6/} War Department Fifth Column Plan, 1942 Revision

In early 1942, because of the possibility of enemy air raids, "commando" raids, and organized fifth column activity, that might cause extensive damage, a study was made of the Disaster Relief Plan contained in Army Regulations 500-60.7/ This study indicated that the plan was adequate for natural disasters, but that there had been no adequate planning by the War Department or in the lower echelons for operations in the event of large scale war disasters. Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General issued the so-called War Disaster Relief Plan which ordered corps and zone commanders to prepare similar plans and to furnish copies to The Provost Marshal General for review and custody.8/

During 1943 and early 1944, the exigencies of operations within the actual theaters of war required that all possible personnel in the Zone of Interior, fit for overseas combat service, be sent to the theaters of operation. At the close of 1942, there had been approximately 86 military police battalions, Zone of Interior, assigned within the continental United States for security purposes. As the war passed from the defensive to the offensive stage, internal security activities were curtailed and the doctrine of calculated risk was applied, resulting in the reduction of these battalions to 18. This was a substantial change in the forces available for possible emergency operations and made it necessary in early 1944 completely to revise the Emergency Plan White which covered intervention with Federal troops in the event of domestic disturbances. Accordingly, the Emergency Protection Branch prepared a new War Department Emergency Plan White, Basic 1944, dated 1 April 1944 (WD-EPW-44), which was published on 20 April 1944 as a confidential registered document (copies are on permanent file in The Provost Marshal General's Office). Service commanders were directed to prepare new Emergency Plans White in keeping with the basic War Department Plan. Copies were furnished to The Provost Marshal General who maintained custody of them and analyzed them to determine their adequacy and consistency with basic War Department policies.

As an adjunct to proper emergency operations and to make possible more extended use of available security personnel, The Provost Marshal General, in June 1944, initiated the publication of an ASF letter providing for the transportation by air in emergencies of certain military police units.9/ The procedures established by this letter covered the moving of these units over long distances by means of air transportation furnished by the Army Air Forces. The Provost Marshal General was given staff supervision over this activity.

7/ AR 500-60, dated 1 December 1939, Employment of Troops and Supplies - War Department Activities in Connection with Disaster Relief

8/ Restricted SOS letter, file SPMG 381, 9 April 1942, subject: "War Disaster Relief Plans". See also Military Police Operations.

9/ ASF letter, file SPX 581.1 (22 Jun 44) OB-S-SPMGS-M, dated 30 June 1944, subject: "Transportation by Air of Military Police Units in Emergency Situations"

By July 1944, The Provost Marshal General had begun to receive EPW's from the nine service commands within the United States, their subordinate security districts, and the Military District of Washington. Each such plan was carefully studied by the Emergency Protection Branch to ascertain that it was in conformity with applicable statutes and with the policies and procedures established in WD-EPW-44. Letters of comment were written which included, in many instances, constructive criticism offered for the improvement of the plan in question. It is estimated that approximately 60 such plans were considered during the first year after the issuance of WD-EPW-44.

In November 1944, after consideration of the progress of the war and the fact that the defensive stage had been passed, it was determined that the then current situation warranted the discontinuance of the War Department's Counter Fifth Column Plan,^{10/} and the War Disaster Relief Plan.^{11/} Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General, after securing the concurrence of all interested War Department agencies and of the American Red Cross, prepared and obtained approval for the publication of directives suspending each plan. The object and effect of these letters was not to rescind but merely to suspend these two plans. Both plans are subject to immediate reactivation should the necessity arise.

In late 1944 and early 1945, as the end of the war in Europe approached, The Provost Marshal General became concerned that the official announcement of the defeat of Germany might be the signal for numerous and widespread celebrations among the civil population which, if uncontrolled, could lead to rioting and looting (such as actually took place in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on V-E Day). He was also concerned that such announcement might add burdens to the problems of control of military personnel. Accordingly, a directive was published,^{12/} which required the commanding generals of service commands and the Military District of Washington to supplement their respective EPW's to the extent necessary in the light of various stated factors involved. The letter further provided that a copy of each supplemental plan should be forwarded to The Provost Marshal General. The ten supplemental plans were duly received and carefully studied to ascertain (1) whether War Department policies and procedures were being followed, (2) that appropriate preventive steps were being taken, and (3) that adequate measures were instituted to meet all probable contingencies.

^{10/} WD letter, file AG 381 (15 Nov 44))E-S-B-M, dated 22 November 1944, subject: "Suspension of War Department Counter Fifth Column Plan"

^{11/} ASF letter, file SPX 400.38 (11 Nov 44) OE-C-SPMGS-MP-M, dated 18 November 1944, subject: "Suspension of War Disaster Relief Plans"

^{12/} ASF letter, file SPX 387 (9 Feb 45) OE-S-SPMGJ, dated 18 February 1945, subject: "Prevention of Domestic Disturbances and Control of Military Personnel Following Defeat of Germany"

Prior to the summer of 1944, under the War Department's so-called "Black Plan", certain infantry divisions in this country were allotted to the various service commanders for use in the event of an emergency requiring the utilization of troops in excess of the number under the control of the service commands involved. However, by the late summer of 1944, all such divisions had been shipped overseas and were no longer available for the purpose. Moreover, the Zone of Interior military police battalions, which had been activated and trained to discharge the War Department's internal security mission, and which had at one time numbered 89 battalions, had been reduced to 18. A study of the situation was made and an analysis^{13/} of the ability of the War Department to carry out its internal security mission under then existing circumstances was prepared. In this study, the conclusion was expressed that in the light of increasing tension within the United States, which reasonably might be expected to continue to increase until well after the defeat of Japan, the forces available were not adequate for the accomplishment of the mission. This conclusion was predicated upon four factors: (1) the reduced number of military police battalions, (2) the physical defects of personnel making up the battalions, many of whom were unfitted for the duty expected of them, (3) the state of training within the battalions, which had suffered because of the utilization of personnel of the battalions for static and routine missions and for guarding prisoners of war, and (4) the non-availability of ground force or other troops that could be called upon by the service command for assistance in an emergency situation.

This problem received the personal attention of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, who initiated steps to increase the number of military police battalions assigned to the service commands to 29, to weed out unfit personnel from the battalions, and to replace them with men physically qualified for the work that might be expected of them.^{14/} As a necessary corollary, an amendment to WD-EPW 44 was prepared and published to prevent the use of military police battalions on static and routine duties or for guarding prisoners of war without express War Department approval in each instance. This amendment was later revised to prevent the use of the battalions in any duty which, in the opinion of the Commanding General, ASF, interfered with their readiness to perform their primary mission with efficiency and promptness.^{15/} The Provost Marshal General acted for the Commanding General, ASF, in determining the extent and kind of duties other than security missions permitted to these battalions.

^{13/} PMGO memorandum, file SPMGS 319.1, dated 21 October 1944, subject: "Ability of the War Department, under current conditions, to accomplish its mission, under War Department Emergency Plan White, Basic 1944"

^{14/} WD memorandum, file WDOCT 322 MF (31 Oct 44), dated 31 October 1944, subject: "Accomplishment of Mission under War Department Emergency Plan White, Basic 1944"

^{15/} WD letter, file WD 381 (15 Feb 45) OB-S-SPMGS-M, dated 19 February 1945, subject: "WD-EPW-44"

Subsequent to the amendment of WD-EPT-44, numerous requests were received from service commanders for approval of the use of various details from military police battalions on duties which might be classified as static or routine and to guard prisoners of war. Each such request was weighed and the approval of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for such use was granted for limited periods of time or refused in accordance with the necessities of the case.

The issue of Army Regulations 500-50 entitled, Employment of Troops - Aid of Civil Authorities, 5 April 1937, was considered to be incomplete, inadequate, and, in some parts, confusing and misleading. This regulation contained no reference to the right of intervention to protect federal property, or to protect national defense utilities, premises, or material under Executive Order 8972, 12 December 1941. It dealt with constitutional and statutory provisions merely by verbatim quotations of these provisions, the legalistic language of which was considered as not readily understandable to many officers without legal training who might be called upon to take action under the regulations. It also contained a basic ambiguity in par. 5b, regarding the right of a commanding officer to take action in an emergency when time did not permit obtaining instructions from higher authority, inasmuch as it indicated the officer should be able to justify his actions under a specific law. A complete revision of these regulations, designed to supply the omitted material and to set forth current policies and statutes applicable to government intervention with federal troops in aid of the civil authorities in simple narrative so as to enable any officer to ascertain what action could be taken in an emergency situation by a quick reference to the regulations, was prepared and published.^{16/} The new regulation also established for emergencies a channel of communication to the War Department through The Provost Marshal General.

In March, 1945, Emergency Protection Branch received for comment or concurrence a draft of a new field manual (FM 19-15, Domestic Disturbances), proposed to rescind and to take the place of FM 27-15, entitled Military Law - Domestic Disturbances. This draft prepared under the supervision of the Military Police Division consisted, in large part, of tactical principles for overcoming domestic disturbances and similar matters not properly within the scope of the staff supervision exercised by Internal Security Division, but also included, particularly in the first chapter, substantial material dealing with legal and policy questions involved in intervention with Federal troops in aid of civil authorities. This latter material was studied and revised in the light of the new Emergency Plan White (WD-EPT-44) and the revision of AR 500-50. Subject to the inclusion of the revised legal and policy material, the Director, Internal Security Division, returned the draft to Military Police Division concurring in its publication. Thereafter, the revised manual was considered and concurred in by The Judge Advocate General, Army Ground Forces, and Army Air Forces and was published on 30 July 1945 as FM 19-15, Domestic Disturbances.^{17/}

^{16/} AR 500-50, dated 17 July 1945, "Employment of Troops - Aid to Civil Authorities"

^{17/} FM 19-15, July 1945

Forest Fire Protection

In the fall of 1944, it was discovered that the Japanese were launching paper balloons into the stratosphere where they would be carried by prevailing winds to the United States. The balloons were equipped with automatic ballast dropping devices to keep them in flight until they reached this country where incendiaries and occasionally high explosives were to be dropped automatically, after which another device would destroy the balloon. After numerous sightings and some recoveries of the balloons, which appeared in increasing numbers in the early months of 1945, it was established that the "pay load" of a majority of the balloons was incendiary bombs. The War Department consulted the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and was advised that these bombs from balloons constituted a grave threat of serious forest fires in the vast wooded areas of the Western United States, where, because of a manpower shortage, an unusually low precipitation in 1945, and a large accumulation of slash on the ground in the forests (due to the emphasis on lumber production in the war effort) the natural hazards were already unusually great. The Forest Service, which, with the State and local forest agencies, was primarily responsible for the prevention and control of forest fires, requested the War Department to assist it in the formulation of plans, and to furnish manpower, supply, and equipment, so that during the summer months of 1945 (the forest fire season) a trained force could be ready to combat the expected forest fires. The internal security responsibility as regards forest fires started from the balloons was a responsibility of The Protect Marshal General, who was authorized by the War Department to coordinate forest fire protection matters.¹⁸ The Emergency Protection Branch, working in close cooperation with the Forest Service, the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, and all other interested War Department agencies, accomplished the following:

(1) Secured the assignment of the 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion to Pendleton Army Air Field, Oregon, where it received specialized training (under the technical supervision of the Forest Service) in advanced methods of combatting forest fires as "smoke jumpers". When the battalion completed its training it became an initial striking force for use in fighting forest fires. Incidental, but necessary, to this assignment was considerable planning and work in regard to special equipment necessary for this battalion, for "spotting" planes, and for transport aircraft.

(2) Secured the activation of ten Provisional Engineer Fire Fighting Companies (269 enlisted men and four officers, each)

¹⁸/ WD letter, file AG 452.4 (19 Apr 45) OE-S-E, dated 7 May 1945, subject: "Japanese Balloons - Emergency Forest Fire Fighting Plan"

to be specially earmarked for duty in fighting forest fires.^{19/} Considerable time was devoted to the problem of equipment necessary for these companies and the equipment, which was finally authorized,^{20/} was considered adequate for their mission. However, as activation and training of these companies was accomplished, other needs became apparent and at the request of the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, steps were initiated to secure an enlargement of this authorization.^{21/}

(3) Formulated an over-all forest fire fighting plan for the War Department which was published in two separate War Department letters.^{22/}

Seizure and Operation of Private Plants

From the beginning of its operation, one of the important functions of the Office of The Provost Marshal General was in connection with the seizure and operation by the Secretary of War of private plants and facilities under executive order of the President where the production of plants vital to the war effort was threatened by strike or other disturbances. In all such seizures the interest of The Provost Marshal General has been two-fold:

(1) Security measures in the event of violence; and

(2) To act as a channel of communication from the War Department representative to all interested War Department agencies.

In discharging this latter function, it was necessary, in each instance, to obtain by telephone, process, and distribute to the interested agencies, reports from the War Department representative at the facilities. In each seizure, reports were received daily until it was determined that operations had become routine and that no further threat to security existed.

There have been several instances where plants or facilities of private operators have been seized by the government through agencies other than the War Department, but where the executive order directing seizure provided that requests could be made to the Secretary of War for troops for security purposes if necessary.

^{19/} WD letter, file AG 322 (16 May 45)OB-S-SPDD-L-M, dated 19 May 1945, subject: "Organization of Engineer Fire Fighting Units (Provisional)"

^{20/} ASF letter, file SPX 400 (15 May 45)OB-S-SPDD-L-M, dated 17 May 1945, subject: "Special Authorization of Equipment for Engineer Fire Fighting Companies (Provisional)"

^{21/} ASF letter, file SPX 400 (2 Jul 45)OB-S-SPDD-L-M, dated 3 July 1945, subject: "Change 1 to Special Authorization of Equipment for Engineer Fire Fire Fighting Companies (Provisional)," and ASF letter file SPX 400 (24 Jul 45)OB-S-SPDD-L-M, dated 24 July 1945, subject: "Change 2 to Special Authorization of Equipment for Engineer Fire Fighting Companies (Provisional)"

^{22/} WD letter, file AG 452.4 (19 Apr 45)OB-S-E, dated 7 May 1945, subject: "Emergency Forest Fire Fighting Plan," and WD letter, file AG 452.4 (19 Apr 45)OB-S-E, dated 7 May 1945, subject: "Japanese Balloons Emergency Forest Fire Fighting Plan"

Such operations required an analysis of the situation to ascertain if sufficient troops were available in the locality for any required operations, and, if they were not, to make proper arrangements for obtaining such troops if needed. In instances where it was thought likely that troops not under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, would be required, coordination with the Operations Division, WDGS, was necessary so that troops of Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, or the Defense Commands could be made available.

The principal operations where troops have been employed in substantial numbers have been the Detroit race riot in June 1943, the Philadelphia Transportation Company strike in August 1944 when the War Department seized and operated the facilities of the company, and the truck drivers' strike in Chicago in June 1945 when approximately 1200 trucking lines were seized by the Office of Defense Transportation, who called upon the War Department for troops to operate the trucks and to guard persons and property during operations. A brief statement of each of these operations follows:

a. On the night of 20 June 1943 a fist fight, between a white man and a negro at Belle Isle amusement park in Detroit, set off disturbances which quickly spread to the negro section of war-crowded Detroit. Widespread rioting by gangs of white hoodlums and groups of negroes ensued resulting finally in 31 dead, more than 600 injured and tremendous property damage in looted stores, wrecked automobiles, and similar acts of vandalism. It was soon apparent that the situation had gone beyond the control of state and local authorities and that a request for federal aid was likely.

At 1100, 21 June 1943, The Provost Marshal General was informed by the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, that two military police battalions had been alerted but that he desired authority to call for additional ground force troops. The Provost Marshal General informed the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and through the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, arranged for the alerting of the 2nd Division at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. The Provost Marshal General, in coordination with The Judge Advocate General, prepared a proclamation for the President's signature to be signed in the event the governor of Michigan requested federal assistance in quelling the disorders, and a proclamation to be issued by the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, only if the Presidential Proclamation was issued.

The governor of Michigan having requested the aid of Federal troops, these proclamations were duly issued and federal troops moved into the affected areas quelling the disorders efficiently and quickly. The troops actually employed were the 728th Military Police Battalion which was already at Detroit, the 701st Military Police Battalion and later the 792nd Military Police Battalion from Fort Custer, Michigan, a provisional battalion made up of three 21

military police companies from Fort Custer and Selfridge Field and later the 9th Infantry (of the 2nd Division) from Fort Custer. By 8 July 1943, all disorders had subsided and all Federal troops were ordered out of Detroit except two military police battalions (728th and 792nd) which remained in Detroit on an alert status.

b. On 1 August 1944, a general strike of the operators of the Philadelphia Transportation Company occurred, as car and bus operators refused to work in protest against the company's employment and training of eight negro street car operators, which action the company had taken in compliance with a series of directives from the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the War Manpower Commission. Appeals to the strikers to return to work having failed, acts of violence being feared, and continued operation of this transportation system being vital to the war effort, the President, by Executive Order, directed the Secretary of War to take possession of and operate the Philadelphia Transportation Company. Major General Hayes, Commanding General, Third Service Command, was designated as the War Department Representative. The seizure was effected immediately without the necessity for the use of any force.

The conditions existing at the time of the seizure indicated the necessity for troops to guard the properties and facilities of the company and the probable need for military transportation and troops possessed of the requisite skill to act as operating personnel. Accordingly, troops consisting of the necessary operating units, overhead units, and field forces, as well as military vehicles adaptable for action in the company's transportation system, were secured. Officer observers were assigned to the seventeen car barns and garages and a system of hourly reports from these observers to the commander of troops was established.

General Hayes issued an order on 4 August to all employees to report for duty at their first regular assigned runs on 7 August, or suffer immediate dismissal. They were informed that selective service would be requested to cancel deferments for those not reporting and that the War Manpower Commission would be requested to refuse certificates of availability to strikers, thus making it impossible for them to obtain employment elsewhere. Full publicity from newspapers and radio stations was given these orders. On 5 August, the Department of Justice obtained warrants for the arrest of four of the principal strike leaders for alleged violation of the War Labor Disputes Act. These men were arrested and later released on bond. By 7 August, normal operations had been resumed, although armed guards were assigned to every car, bus and subway train to prevent acts of violence. A total of 2665 were so assigned with 375 held in reserve.

On 9 August, the company and the union involved reached an agreement covering wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, and normal operations continued until 17 August 1944, when possession, control and operation by the War Department of the transportation system were terminated.

a. At 0001 on 16 June 1945, pursuant to Executive Order of the President, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation took possession of and began operating the strike bound trucking industry in Chicago. Upon refusal of the strikers to return to work, the Office of Defense Transportation, in accordance with provisions of the Executive Order which authorized it, requested military assistance. This was granted and responsibility for the military forces was delegated to the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command. Numerous personnel was necessary in order to drive the trucks and to provide adequate protection for drivers, trucks and cargo. After utilizing three of his four military police battalions, the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, procured two additional battalions from the Fifth Service Command, and requested The Provost Marshal General's assistance in obtaining two more. The Provost Marshal General, by telephone, arranged for the movement of one battalion (the 804th) from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and one (the 722nd) from Fort DuPont, Delaware. In addition to the personnel of the military police battalions the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, was furnished by the War Department with drivers and guards from Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces from all parts of the country. The total troop strength as operations progressed approximated 16,000. The Provost Marshal General sent the Chief of the Emergency Protection Branch to Chicago to observe Army operations, and, at the request of the service commanders, sent two safety officers to assist the Sixth Service Command in organizing an adequate motor vehicle safety program. At the direction of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, the Commanding General, Sixth Service Command, provided The Provost Marshal General with a daily report of operations, which was processed in Emergency Protection Branch, and distributed to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and to all interested War Department agencies. This report was terminated with the report of 27 June when it became apparent that the truck drivers' strike was over and that the military personnel could be released for return to their permanent stations.

Some of the instances where seizure was effected by other Government agencies, but the War Department was required to be ready to furnish security troops if called upon were the seizure (a) by the Department of the Interior of numerous coal mines in November 1943 and again in April 1945, (b) by the Department of Commerce of the Chicago properties of Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc. in April 1944 (this was first seizure and is to be distinguished from later seizure by the War Department), (c) by the Petroleum Administration for War of the Texas Company at Port Arthur, Texas, in June 1945 and of Cities Service Refinery, Lake Charles, La., in May 1945 (one company of military police was used as security troops during this latter operation), and (d) by the Navy of 5 plants of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in Akron, Ohio, in July 1945.

Takeovers by the War Department which did not actually involve the use of troops, but which required the receipt and processing of reports from the War Department representative, were as follows:

- a. Thirteen plants (leather tanneries) in Salem and Peabody, Mass., in November 1943.
- b. Western Electric Company, Point Breeze, Md., in December 1943.
- c. Ten textile plants in and around Fall River, Mass., in February 1944.
- d. Ken-Rad Tube & Lamp Corp., Owensboro, Ky., in April 1944.
- e. Hummer Mfg. Co. (subsidiary of Montgomery Ward, Inc.) Springfield, Ill., in April 1944.
- f. International Nickel Co., Huntington, W. Va., in August 1944.
- g. Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., Cleveland, Ohio, in September 1944.
- h. Twentieth Century Brass Co., Minneapolis, Minn., in September 1944.
- i. Farrell Cheek Steel Co., Sandusky, Ohio, in September 1944.
- j. Hughes Tool Co. (2 plants), Houston, Texas, in September 1944.
- k. Eight separate plants and facilities in Toledo, Ohio, shut down by the strike of Mechanics Educational Society of America, in November 1944.
- l. Cudahy Bros. Co., Cudahy, Wisc., in December 1944.
- m. Various stores and mail order houses of Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., in December 1944.
- n. Bingham & Garfield Railway Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, in January 1945.
- o. American Enka Corp., Enka, North Carolina, in February 1945.
- p. Gaffney Mfg. Co., Gaffney, South Carolina, in May 1945.
- q. Cocker Machine & Foundry Company, Gastonia, North Carolina, in May 1945.
- r. Mary Leila Cotton Mills, Inc., Greensboro, Ga., in June 1945.

s. Diamond Alkali Company, Painesville, Ohio, in June 1945.

t. Springfield Plywood Co., Springfield, Oregon, in July 1945.

u. U. S. Rubber Co., Detroit, Michigan, on 30 July 1945.

The emergency operations which have been described in the foregoing paragraphs, are those where The Provost Marshal General was called upon actively to participate in some measure. In addition to those specific situations, the Branch necessarily maintained sources of intelligence to keep abreast of all situation which might require the use of federal troops in aid of the civil authorities. Through the receipt of spot reports and weekly intelligence summaries from the service commands, coordination with other War Department intelligence agencies, and statistical information on the location and movement of troops within the United States, The Provost Marshal General remained continuously prepared to take appropriate action in the event of an emergency within the scope of any of the plans over which he exercised staff supervision.

The activities of the Emergency Protection Branch, which have been described, made it necessary to formulate various standard operating procedures for use within the office. From time to time, changed conditions have required the revision of these standard operating procedures which include procedure for use of troops under WD-EPW-44 and procedures for action on (1) receipt of a request for authority to use federal troops, (2) request for additional troops for an emergency operation, (3) request for the movement of military police battalions by air, (4) receipt of report from the War Department representative operating a plant seized by the War Department and general procedure relative to War Department operation of a seized plant, and (5) on receipt of request for clearance, from a security standpoint, of an installation for the establishment of a prisoner of war camp. Duty officers remained on duty in The Provost Marshal General's Office to handle any emergency situation which might arise.

In addition to standard operating procedures for use in The Provost Marshal General's Office, the Emergency Protection Branch has received, from time to time, various standard operating procedures from service commands, ports of embarkation, and other installations covering action to be taken in the event of particular emergencies. These standard operating procedures were studied from the standpoint of adequacy, legality, and conformity with War Department policy and were kept in the files for consultation, in the event of an emergency at such an installation.

AUXILIARY MILITARY POLICE PROGRAM

Internal security in the continental United States - the security of our ability to produce - is always a prime mission of the War Department - particularly in time of war, when to protect war industry from all hazards is a matter of the highest importance. To "protect" means to use all available methods and means of protection - fences, floodlights, visitor control, fire prevention, accident prevention and many others, including plant guards with which this chapter is primarily concerned.

When responsibility for internal security was charged to The Provost Marshal General in March, 1942, immediate attention was given to increasing the authority, responsibility, and efficiency of plant guard forces. This effort culminated in the Auxiliary Military Police program which required that guard forces at all War Department plants, posts, and stations controlled or operated by the supply services or by the Army Air Forces, and at all important war plants were "to be organized, drilled and instructed as military units subject to the Articles of War."^{1/}

The mission assigned to these civilian auxiliaries to the military police was to provide internal and external protection to the plant against sabotage, espionage, and natural hazards, and to serve with the Army in providing protection to the plant and its environs in emergency situations.^{2/}

Service commanders, under the staff supervision of The Provost Marshal General, were made responsible for the conduct of this activity.

Plant Guard Forces in World War I

After the entry of the United States into the First World War, the problem of providing quickly a substantial number of dependable guards was sought to be met by the organization of an element of the Army known as the United States Guards - men from the Army, mostly individuals rejected for overseas service, assigned to protect war plants, bridges, air fields, and other important production and transportation facilities. At the peak, there were more than 100,000 on

^{1/} WD letter, file AG 231.43 (7-2-42)MS-SPAAM-M, dated 2 July 1942, subject: "Military Organization of Plant Guard Forces."

^{2/} SOS Circular No. 52, dated 26 August 1942, "The Military Organization of Plant Guard Forces."

duty. These men relieved combat Army personnel earlier assigned to this duty and supplemented civilian guards deputized as United States Marshals.

Large scale deputization of guards as U. S. Marshals had bad results. Many were improperly trained and with poor background, and with the sudden increase in authority there were numerous instances of misuse of power that brought discredit upon the office of United States Marshal. This experience was a factor in developing a solution to the question in the present war.

The utilization of United States Guards was also unsatisfactory. The men - rejects, many of them - were not of good quality. The very nature of the assignment had its effect upon their morale. There were problems of quarters, maintenance, medical care and organization.

Plant Guard Forces Prior to Pearl Harbor

From the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 the importance of American production grew constantly as European nations fell. Plant managements were impressed with the necessity for security and more guards were employed - many of them in large groups of well drilled, uniformed men under the command of a chief with military or police experience - most of them, however, were nondescript men, hired as guards because they were unfit for other work, doing their job in a haphazard, hit or miss manner.

To build up their prestige and authority, there was considerable increase in the deputization of guards as constables and sheriffs. The Department of Justice consented to a limited deputization as United States Marshals on request of the Army, but, remembering the experience of the last war, limited the deputization to one guard per shift - regardless of the size of the force. Shortly after Pearl Harbor even this limited deputization was terminated.

Guard Forces After Pearl Harbor - Prior to the Auxiliary Military Police

With the outbreak of the war, combat troops were used to a considerable extent to guard vital facilities, but there was continuing pressure from G-1 to use military personnel only for combat training, and, of course, there was as yet no substantial military police organization. Fifty-five military police battalions, Zone of Interior, were in process of activation, but it was contemplated that these would be maintained as a mobile reserve force at critical areas throughout the United States and not employed to guard specific plants. State Guard units were being organized as rapidly as possible to take the place of the National Guard, (which had been called into service), and, while some of these State Guard units were being used to guard bridges and other similar installations in a few localities, it was realized that this was very temporary, because this

personnel was intended only for short-time emergency duty.

In the meantime, the newly organized Internal Security Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office devised a plan under which the Under Secretary of War would issue certain "regulations" concerning existing guard forces employed by War Department contractors or subcontractors in the production of munitions. The immediate object of this plan was to avoid plant guards walking off duty in the event of a strike at the installation. Organized labor gave its approval to the plan. Each member was obliged to execute an oath of allegiance to the United States, which stated specifically that he would not permit any activity or occurrence to interfere in any way directly or indirectly with the performance of his duty to protect war material, war premises, and war utilities. In addition, the guard had to be physically fit to perform his duties; properly uniformed, provided with a badge approved by the War Department; carry an identification card authenticated by the War Department; and, if required by local War Department representatives, be trained in the use of firearms and be armed. The regulations were issued on 18 April 1942,^{3/} and were made considerably more specific on 4 June 1942,^{4/} which, as a result of experience, cleared up many of the problems left unsettled by the earlier directive. The legal basis for this plan was considered to be the Under Secretary of War's procurement authority, specifically given him by Congress,^{5/} and his power to enforce compliance was based upon his contractual authority. The War Department would not deal with contractors who would not follow these instructions. However, there was the fullest cooperation on the part of all contractors.

It was felt that an even more efficient plant guard force might be established, taking advantage of the existing plant guard organizations, by attempting again to deputize such guards, thus specifically making them federal instrumentalities, and extending the program to War, Navy, and Maritime Commission contractors and subcontractors. The support of the War Production Board and the Maritime Commission, as well as of the Army and Navy, was obtained to a proposed joint circular. In the first part of June 1942, Mr. Ralph Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. R. P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, Colonel Pelham D. Glassford, Director, Internal Security Division, Office of The Provost Marshal General and other representatives of the War and Navy Departments, personally presented to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the problem of deputizing plant guards as deputy marshals. Mr. Hoover was favorably inclined, and agreed to take the matter up with the Attorney General.

^{3/} SOS Circular No. 2, 18 April 1942.

^{4/} SOS Circular No. 17, 4 June 1942.

^{5/} 10 U.S.C. 1193

The Auxiliary Military Police Program

Although the guard forces at contractors' plants were operating much more efficiently under the Secretary of War's regulations, it was still believed necessary to increase military control over these guards. A thorough study of the Article of War which gives military jurisdiction over civilians serving with the Army in the field convinced The Provost Marshal General that in a great many instances plant guards were subject to military law.^{6/}

After a series of conferences with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Social Security Board, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the National Labor Relations Board, and others, The Provost Marshal General obtained the informal approvals of The Judge Advocate General, the War Department's labor representatives, the Commanding General, Services of Supply,^{7/} and the Under Secretary of War. A War Department order was prepared which was approved by the Secretary of War and issued on 2 July 1942.^{8/} This was the basis for the Auxiliary Military Police. The issuance of the instructions undoubtedly was accelerated by the news of the capture of the eight Nazi saboteurs, which was widely publicized at that time.

A great many questions were at once presented. Clarifying instructions were issued from time to time, and these eventually were consolidated into a complete circular concerning the Auxiliary Military Police.^{9/} Subsequently, this circular was further revised and enlarged to incorporate all of the policies relating to the program that had been developed by experience since its inception, but the basic plan was in no way changed.^{10/}

The basic operational administration of the Auxiliary Military Police program was entrusted to the service commanders, under the staff supervision of The Provost Marshal General.^{11/} Commanding generals of service commands were made responsible for military organization, training, and command of guard forces at all facilities and installations within their respective commands, except those under the continuing protection of the Navy, ports of embarka-

^{6/} Par d, Article of War No. 2.

^{7/} PMGO memorandum, file SPMG 324.5, dated 29 June 1942, subject: "Military Organization of Plant Guard Forces."

^{8/} WD letter, file 231.43 (7-2-42)MS-SPAAM-M, dated 2 July 1942, subject: "Military Organization of Plant Guard Forces;" and Bureau of Public Relations Press Release, dated 2 July 1942, subject: "Military Organization of Plant Guard Forces."

^{9/} SOS Circular No. 52, dated 28 August 1942, subject: "The Military Organization of Plant Guard Forces."

^{10/} ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943, subject: "Auxiliary Military Police."

Par 4a, ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943

tion, and others which The Provost Marshal General determined should be exempted.12/ Ports of embarkation, because of the special and important nature of the activities conducted, were made the responsibility of the local commanding officer of the port, and the service commander was furnished, on his request, with data regarding the strength and equipment of the guard forces and the state of their training. The service commander was authorized to inspect the forces and to make appropriate recommendations for their improvement.13/

Reporting to the service commander was the "commanding officer having jurisdiction over the guard forces," - ordinarily the district commander. If, however, the facility or installation had a local resident commanding officer he was made the commanding officer having jurisdiction.14/

The next echelon of command, reporting to the commanding officer having jurisdiction over the guard forces, was the plant guard officer, placed in command of the militarized guard force at each plant or group of plants.15/

Activation of guard forces as Auxiliary Military Police was accomplished by assembling them, reading and explaining designated articles of war, and informing them that the government was directly interested in the security and protection of the facility or installation and that its production was essential to the prosecution of the war.16/ The guards were required to give a pledge of loyalty, and to execute a specified form of agreement, acknowledging that they would obey military orders and that they were subject to military discipline and to articles of war. Each militarized guard was issued a certificate of enrollment evidencing his membership in the Auxiliary Military Police.17/

Orders and regulations were issued by the commanding officer having jurisdiction, after, in civilian operated facilities, consultation with, and, if possible, concurrence by the plant management.18/

Every effort was made to assure the continued civilian status of the Auxiliary Military Police. 19/ They functioned much as formerly, except for the military command and their training and instruction

12/ Par 4b(1), ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.

13/ Par 4b(2), " " " " " " "

14/ Par 4c, " " " " " " "

15/ Par 4d, " " " " " " "

16/ Par 5a, " " " " " " "

17/ Copy of the pledge and agreement appears as an inclosure to ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.

18/ Par 5c, ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.

19/ Par 6, " " " " " " "

with a view to service with the Army in an emergency. Control continued to be exercised through the plant management except at drill and in emergencies. In the normal situation the plant guard officers exercised their authority through the civilian guard officers and the chain of command established by the plant management.20/

The militarization program did not change basically the existing systems of hiring, compensation and dismissal; all remained primarily a matter between the guards and the plant managements. 21/ However, a member of the Auxiliary Military Police could not be employed or dismissed or permitted to resign if the plant guard officer believed the efficiency of the force would be impaired and declined to give his approval.22/

Employee benefits, such as social security, workmen's compensation, and employers' liability, were not changed.23/ Auxiliary Military Police were permitted to bargain collectively and to join labor unions for that purpose, but it was preferable that they belonged to a bargaining unit, and be represented by a bargaining agency, different from those concerned with the production employees of the same facility.24/ These principles were upheld by the National Labor Relations Board,25/ although questioned in certain federal circuit courts of appeal on the basis that the guards, being under military control, should not be permitted collective bargaining activities since they conflicted with the primary protective obligations of the guards.26/

This was believed to go beyond reasonable requirements in the zone of interior, and that in view of the civilian status of the Auxiliary Military Police, their rights as workers should be recognized, with but one qualification: no outside activity - whether it be state guard work, work as air raid wardens or as a member of a labor union - should be tolerated which would interfere with their obligations as members of the Auxiliary Military Police.27/

The Auxiliary Military Police were required to be physically fit to perform their duties in a proper and efficient manner - the plant guard officer determining such physical fitness.28/

20/ Par 6a, ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.

21/ Par 6b(1), " " " " " "

22/ Par 6b(2), " " " " " "

23/ Par 6f, " " " " " "

24/ Par 6h, " " " " " "

25/ In re Lord Manufacturing Co. and United States Rubber Workers, National Labor Relations Board, Case R-4826, February 1943.

26/ NLRB v. Atkins & Company, 147 F(2d)730.

27/ Par 6h(2), ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.

28/ Par 7a, " " " " " "

Auxiliary Military Police were uniformed by the employer, the plant guard officer determining in each case, with due regard to the circumstances, whether the force was "properly uniformed,"^{29/} insignia consisting of an armband or a shoulder patch with the words "Auxiliary Military Police," was required,^{30/} capable of recognition at a distance to prevent the men from being regarded as guerrillas in the event of engagement with the enemy, and to symbolize their authority.

Arms, provided by plant management, were compulsory, the plant guard officer determining the type of weapon most appropriate in the protection of the individual plant.^{31/} Where necessary, the plant guard officer could require the plant to give proper training in the use of the weapon furnished. Permits, licenses, or bonds required by state laws did not apply to the Auxiliary Military Police ^{32/} and the practice of making them deputy sheriffs or special police no longer provided much additional advantage^{33/} and was largely discontinued.

Training in military subjects was given by military personnel, in addition to the training in normal protective duties supplied by the plant. The military training was designed to enable the man to serve effectively with the Army if emergencies so required. The scope of the training was largely within the determination of the plant guard officer, and usually did not exceed one hour per week,^{34/} the policy being to give training only to the extent necessary for each force, giving consideration to such things as character, experience, previous training, locality and geography of the plant, and its relative war time importance.^{35/} The subjects included articles of war, military courtesy and discipline, defense against air and parachute attack, personal encounters, interior and special guard duty, use of weapons, military police organization, duties and powers, riot formations and approach marches.^{36/}

Court martial jurisdiction over Auxiliary Military Police was given to service commanders.^{37/} Plant guard officers had the summary disciplinary authority of a company commander under Article of War 104,^{38/} but in all cases prior approval of the War Department to a court martial was required. That procedure was resorted to only in

<u>29/</u>	Par 7b, ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.					
<u>30/</u>	Par 7c, "	"	"	"	"	"
<u>31/</u>	Par 7e(1), "	"	"	"	"	"
<u>32/</u>	Par 7e(2), "	"	"	"	"	"
<u>33/</u>	Par 7f, "	"	"	"	"	"
<u>34/</u>	Par 7g(1), "	"	"	"	"	"
<u>35/</u>	Par 7g(2), "	"	"	"	"	"
<u>36/</u>	Par 7g(3), (4) and (5),	"	"	"	"	"
<u>37/</u>	Par 8a(1),	"	"	"	"	"
<u>38/</u>	Par 8a(2)	"	"	"	"	"

exceptional cases, where no other form of punishment was effective. 39/

At the beginning of the program, some doubt existed as to whether the Auxiliary Military Police had been effectively brought within military jurisdiction. The second Article of War gave jurisdiction over civilians "serving with the Army in the field," and while there was no doubt that the Auxiliary Military Police were serving with the Army, it was not certain that they were "in the field" while in the zone of the interior. That the Auxiliary Military Police were subject to military law was held by a federal court in the case of Goins vs The State of Ohio, 40/- the facts of which are worthy of special consideration in view of the importance of the results.

Goins, a civilian guard employed by the Air Service Command, and a member of the Auxiliary Military Police, was on duty at headquarters in the Third National Bank Building, Dayton, Ohio. An elevator boy, colored, refused to obey the rules Goins was instructed to enforce, and in the altercation that resulted, attempted to seize Goins' gun. Goins stepped back, drew his gun and fired, killing the operator. Goins was indicted by the local Ohio court for murder in the second degree. He was represented by civilian attorneys, but, in view of the importance of the case, The Provost Marshal General designated an officer to observe the case, in which there seemed to be considerable local prejudice. It was suggested to the civilian attorneys that Goins might remove his case to the Federal Court under Article of War 117, which permitted such removal when "an officer, soldier, or other person in the military service" was prosecuted in a state court for an act claimed to be done under color of his position.

Goins' attorneys effected the necessary removal, whereupon the State of Ohio moved in the Federal District Court to have the case remanded. The Provost Marshal General obtained permission from the court to appear, through his representative, as "friend of the court" and filed a brief and participated in the oral argument.

The court decided against the State of Ohio and retained jurisdiction, necessarily deciding that a member of the Auxiliary Military Police (who was neither an officer nor a soldier) was a "person in the military service," and that the program was on a sound legal basis. Incidentally, at the subsequent trial, in which Goins was acquitted, the court in its charge to the jury expounded principles of law applicable to persons in the military service acting in accordance with military orders valid on their face.

39/ Par. 8a (3) and 8b, ASF Circular 15, 1943; WD memorandum W(25-2-43), 2 June 1943, subject: "Trial by Court Martial of Auxiliary Military Police" In fact the only court martials authorized involved death or injury to another in the course of duty, where the guard desired court martial and where an acquittal seemed probable.

40/ USDC, So. D. of Ohio, Western Division, 1944, Unreported.

The legality of the organization, once questioned by former Attorney General Biddle and by the Judge Advocate General,41/ is now regarded as satisfactorily established.

At the beginning, the Auxiliary Military Police program operated by the Army Service Forces included the guards at all War Department Class I, II, and IV installations and at all privately operated facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, including those facilities assigned to the Army Air Forces for security inspection services. In August 1943 the responsibility for the Auxiliary Military Police at such Army Air Forces inspected facilities was transferred to the Army Air Forces, where the staff supervision was performed by the Air Provost Marshal.42/

A member of the Auxiliary Military Police continued as such until he was released from his obligation,43/ which was accomplished when competent military authority approved of his dismissal or resignation,44/ or when he was discharged without honor.45/ A member who served creditably was given, on termination of his membership, a Certificate of Meritorious Conduct but if his termination was under circumstances other than honorable, the certificate was withheld.46/

A "discharge without honor" was issued in those exceptional cases when the guard quit his employment without military approval and was not available for dismissal, suspension, or reprimand.47/ It involved suitable communication to the guard, with a copy posted on the bulletin board and copies furnished to The Provost Marshal General and the Selective Service System.

Auxiliary Military Police, employed by civilian facilities, discharged without honor or dismissed at the request of the military were permitted, on their request, reconsideration by higher authority.48/

Militarized guards employed at War Department installations continued as government employees under civil service,49/ and the local commanding officer, for Auxiliary Military Police purposes, was in the position of the plant management in civilian operated facilities. No difficulties were experienced in following this procedure.

41/ Judge Advocate General File SPJGA 324.5, 11 August 1942.

42/ WD memorandum No. W95-21-43, dated 26 August 1943, subject: "Plant Guards at Army Air Forces Facilities."

43/ Par 5b(2), ASF Circular No. 15, dated 17 March 1943.

44/ Par 6b, " " " " " "

45/ Par 6c, " " " " " "

46/ Par 6g, " " " " " "

47/ Par 6d, " " " " " "

48/ Par 6e, " " " " " "

49/ Par 6b, " " " " " "

The Auxiliary Military Police increased very rapidly during 1942 and reached a maximum of about 200,000 in the summer of 1943. They unquestionably removed the pressure for use of combat troops for internal security duties. The only objections were practical ones, and Army Service Forces Circular No. 15, 1943, remained, throughout the war, a sound working document containing all basic rules in satisfactory form. The increased efficiency of the guard force after organization and training as an Auxiliary Military Police unit has been universally recognized. The program gained the popularity of management as well as the guards themselves. They earned, through their drilling and training, the respect of their fellow employees, and a correspondingly increased ability to control them. The program was outstandingly successful.

As the armed forces of the United States progressed in carrying the fight to the enemy, it became apparent from time to time that certain plants originally considered vital to the war effort were no longer of sufficient importance thereto to justify their retention on the Master Inspection Responsibility List. Accordingly, such plants were deleted from time to time. On deletion from the Master Inspection Responsibility List it became a matter of the service commander's discretion whether the Auxiliary Military Police at the facility would be retained in their militarized status. However, in most cases, the plant guard organizations were demilitarized. During the fall of 1943 and 1944 and in the spring of 1945, the Master Inspection Responsibility List was drastically reduced and, as a result, there was a sharp decrease in the total number of Auxiliary Military Police. Statistics for Army Service Forces installations and facilities under the security inspection responsibility of, or permitted to retain Auxiliary Military Police by, the Army Service Forces show, for the month of May 1945, approximately 46,000 Auxiliary Military Police on duty at these installations and facilities. As a result, there was a corresponding decrease in the amount of supervision and training required in this activity and for the month of May 1945 only 16 man-months of military personnel were devoted to this function.

With the capitulation of Japan in August, 1945, all facilities were deleted from the Master Inspection Responsibility List, and service commanders were directed to demilitarize all Auxiliary Military Police at deleted facilities prior to 16 November 1945. At installations, it was necessary to procure War Department instructions which were requested, and War Department Circular No. 278 was issued directing full demilitarization of all guards by 16 November 1945, and announcing the rescission, as of that date, of all applicable directives.^{50/} At the same time the Secretary of War, in an open letter to the Auxiliary Military Police, acknowledged the value of their

^{50/} WD Circular No. 278, dated 15 September 1945.

services and expressed to each of them the gratitude of the War Department. 51/

51/ WD open letter to the Auxiliary Military Police, dated 5 September 1945.

LISTS OF FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS RECEIVING SECURITY INSPECTIONS

One of the missions of The Provost Marshal General was to prepare general policies and procedures and to exercise staff supervision over the War Department Internal Security Program. In accomplishing this mission, The Provost Marshal General:

- a. Maintained currently, and published periodically, lists of all privately owned and operated facilities and Army Service Forces installations vital to the prosecution of the war in a Master Inspection Responsibility List and an Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List, respectively;
- b. Assigned such facilities and installations to War and Navy Department agencies for security inspection services and designated the agency responsible for effectuating the recommendations of the inspection agency concerning privately operated facilities; and
- c. Promulgated policies for approving commercial reproducers of classified film, blueprints, and other materials, and maintained currently and published periodically lists of such approved reproducers.

The Master Inspection Responsibility List was the official list of the War and Navy Departments designating private facilities to be inspected by War or Navy Department agencies responsible for conducting production security and personnel security inspections.

The Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List was the official list of Army Service Forces installations designated to receive production security and personnel security inspections by Army Service Forces agencies.

The List of Commercial Facilities Approved for Reproduction of Classified Materials was a list, authorized by paragraph 18, AR 380-5, of commercial facilities approved for reproduction of classified materials.

Development of Inspection Responsibility List

Plant inspection activities by the Army to insure continuity of production for war were initiated in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, on 13 November 1940.^{1/} During the emergency period preceding the war, evaluation of production facilities had been based mainly upon the recommendations of contracting officers of the procurement and technical services. Compilation of a list of privately owned and operated facilities considered important in the production of military supplies was initiated in May 1940.

Early in 1941, the Office of the Under Secretary of War was created and the Plant Protection Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War was transferred to the new office. The plant inspection service was established by order of the Secretary of War on 12 May 1941. Procurement districts of the supply arms and services reported contracts with facilities to the Plant Protection Division. This automatically created lists of facilities which were consolidated into a master list known as the Inspection Responsibility List. In forming this list, the Plant Protection Division assigned each facility for security inspections to the supply arm or service with which contracts were held. In the event a facility had contracts with more than one arm or service, the supply arm or service with the principal procurement interest was assigned inspection responsibility. The first list of facilities prepared by the Plant Protection Division was titled "Partial List of Extremely Important Facilities Exclusive of Electric Facilities." This list indicated only names of facilities and the interested supply arms and services. The first Inspection Responsibility List was published 24 June 1941. On 27 August 1941, Inspection Responsibility List No. 2 was published and this was followed by two supplemental lists, 2A and 2B, published 1 November 1941 and 15 December 1941, respectively. These lists indicated the relative importance of the facilities by priority ratings of P-1, P-2, P-3, and P-4. Inspection Responsibility List No. 3, published 1 February 1942 included only P-1, P-2, and P-3 ratings. P-1 underlined ratings were used in some lists to designate very important facilities, particularly those rated AA by the Resources Protection Board. Facilities designated by an asterisk were to continue operations during blackouts.

^{1/} Office Memorandum, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, dated 13 November 1940

In the reorganization of the Army in March 1942, the Under Secretary of War was relieved of many operating functions, and the Plant Protection Division was transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office where it was merged with the Emergency Operations Division to form the Internal Security Division.

The Provost Marshal General was charged with initiating and promulgating, for the Commanding General, Services of Supply, general policies and instructions relative to the protection of facilities, installations, utilities, and materials vital to the war effort.^{2/} He was further charged with coordination and general supervision over all matters pertaining to protective surveys and inspections of production plants and facilities made by representatives of the chiefs of the supply arms and services. The records of the Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, were transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office and the maintenance of the inspection responsibility list was continued.

Inspection Responsibility List No. 4 was published by The Provost Marshal General's Office on 12 May 1942. This list was similar to the lists previously published by the Office of the Under Secretary of War with the exception that a fingerprint code number was assigned to each facility.^{3/} These code numbers were to be indicated on cards bearing fingerprints of employees of plants designated and the cards were to be forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the inspecting agency.

Development of Master Responsibility List

On 22 July 1942, the internal security program was modified by a change in agencies to which facilities and installations were assigned for inspection. The Provost Marshal General was charged with the function of assigning plant inspection responsibility to the commanding generals of service

^{2/} WD letter, file AG 381(3-28-42), dated 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{3/} SOS Memorandum, dated 17 March 1942, subject: "Instructions for the Fingerprinting of all Persons Engaged in Producing Munitions"

commands in those cases in which inspection of facilities and installations engaged in production for the Army Air Forces had been assumed by the Commanding General, Services of Supply. Plant protection inspections in facilities and installations engaged exclusively in production for the Army Air Forces were to be conducted by personnel under the command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The Chief of Ordnance was charged with the responsibility for inspection of facilities and installations manufacturing, processing, or storing explosives, propellants, or explosive ingredients; the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service was charged with the responsibility for the inspection of facilities and installations manufacturing, processing, or storing explosive, incendiary, poisonous, or irritant products under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service. Service commanders also were charged with inspections of all other facilities except those under construction.4/

Master Responsibility List No. 5, published on 1 August 1942, was the first list to contain War Department installations. It differed from previous lists also in that it indicated the agency responsible for conducting inspections (in a column captioned "RA"), and also the procurement agency formerly having responsibility (in a column captioned "F"). Two other column entries preceded each listing: "PR" indicating "priority rating" (i.e., the relative degree of importance of the facility or installation), and "CN" indicating fingerprint code number. The policy and procedure for continuing protection assignments was summarized in a directive, dated 9 August 1942, as follows:5/

- "a. The C.G., Service Commands will maintain complete lists of all plants and facilities vital to the war effort within their geographical boundaries.
- "b. The Provost Marshal General will maintain a Master Responsibility List."

Revised instructions issued late in August 1942 required supply service contracting officers to recommend to service commanders, from a supply point of view, the priority to be assigned to each facility and installation at the time of noti-

4/ SOS Circular No. 31, dated 22 July 1942

5/ Sec II, SOS letter, file SPMGS 381, dated 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

fication of the award of a contract or of a new production activity.6/ Comparatively minor changes were made in instructions issued during the following months.7/

On 4 February 1943, The Provost Marshal General requested all interested agencies to submit to him recommendations upon which to base reclassification of facilities and installations on the Master Responsibility List.8/ The purpose was to reduce the number of facilities and installations on the list through a more accurate evaluation of the importance of each facility and installation to the prosecution of the war. New definitions of priority ratings were established and provision was made for a newly established P-4 priority group.9/

Earlier in 1943, extensive changes were made in the procedure for establishing and maintaining the Master Responsibility List.10/ The Provost Marshal General was charged with the responsibility for determining the facilities and installations which were to be assigned on the Master Responsibility List and any changes in rating, assignment, or priority pertaining to them. The recommendations of the service commanders, the chiefs of technical services, and the Resources Protection Board, War Production Board, were to be given due weight by The Provost Marshal General in making assignments on the Master Responsibility List.

To assist in the discharge of this responsibility and to assure that the requirements of the technical services were fully considered, a Master Responsibility List Advisory Board was established on 27 February 1943. This board was composed of a supply services liaison group and representatives of the Air Provost Marshal and The Provost Marshal General. Master Responsibility List No. 7, 15 June 1943, was the first list published after the new plan was put into effect.

6/ SOS Circular No. 51, dated 27 August 1942

7/ SOS Circular No. 66, dated 22 September 1942

8/ PMGO letter, file SPMGS 381, dated 4 February 1943, subject: "Master Responsibility List"

9/ Preface to Master Responsibility List No. 6, dated 1 December 1942

10/ Par 7b, SOS Memorandum S380-4-43, dated 18 February 1943, subject: "Responsibility for Internal Security"

To secure more complete information concerning facilities and installations designated to receive security inspections a form for use by agencies requesting additions to, deletions from, and changes in the Master Responsibility List was established 1 September 1943.^{11/} In order that the Master Responsibility List might be of maximum value to internal security, the service commands were requested to give continued consideration to the possibilities of limiting the facilities on the Master Responsibility List to those considered most important to the prosecution of the war. At this time, provision was made for certain facilities to receive "personnel inspections" only for prevention of sabotage and espionage.^{12/}

Transition from the Master Responsibility List to the Master Inspection Responsibility List

The number of facilities and installations on the Master Responsibility List reached a peak of 16,007 on 31 May 1943 and declined to 13,887 by 30 September 1943. This was due, among other things, to the progress of the war supply program.

In connection with developments in the military situation by June 1943, the Deputy Chief of Staff requested the Bureau of the Budget to study the internal security program and to make appropriate recommendations. The effect of the recommendations made in the Bureau of the Budget report dated 21 September 1943 was primarily the accomplishment of "delimitation of operations to the minimum, consistent with the present offensive phase of the war."^{13/} Insofar as the listing of facilities to receive security inspections was concerned it was recommended that standards be devised for establishing the importance of facilities by objective means. When the study was submitted, the Deputy Chief of Staff, in collaboration with the Navy Department, appointed a joint staff of three officers, two generals representing the Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces, respectively, and an admiral representing the Navy Department, to formulate a new internal security policy. The policy formulated was set forth in a joint War and Navy Departments circular approved by the Under Secretaries of War and Navy.^{14/} The new policy was one of assuming certain "carefully calculated risks" whereby guard and other security personnel were to be reduced to the minimum consistent with security, so that such personnel could be diverted to production efforts. It was considered that a large number of privately operated facilities important to Army and Navy procurement had achieved a satisfactory security status so that further security inspections were deemed unnecessary except in those facilities of outstanding importance to the war effort which were to be included on a list to be known thereafter as the Master

^{11/} Par 8, ASF Circular No. 68, dated 1 September 1943

^{12/} Par 6, ASF Circular No. 68, " " " "

^{13/} Extract from Bureau of the Budget report, dated 21 September 1943, subject: "Standards for Rating Facilities"

^{14/} Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, dated 3 November 1943, subject: "Internal Security"

Inspection Responsibility List. War Department installations were not included in the Master Inspection Responsibility List. However, Army Service Forces installations of vital importance were listed in an Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List.

Development of the Master Inspection Responsibility List

Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1 established four categories of facility ratings, P-1, P-2, Px and PS. The criteria for P-1 and P-2 ratings for facilities were "(a) the importance to the conduct of the war of the product furnished or the service rendered, (b) the relationship between the available supply of the product or service, to include scheduled production, and the military and essential civilian requirements, and (c) the proportion of the capacity of available like product or service."

Products were classified as vital, critical or essential depending upon their relative importance to the war effort and the percentages of national production of those products required for P-1 and P-2 ratings were established.^{15/} Px ratings were to be assigned to facilities of lesser importance handling explosives, irritant or incendiary products. Facilities not meeting the criteria or requirements for P-1, P-2 or Px ratings but important from the standpoint of risk of espionage or sabotage were to be assigned for personnel security inspections only and were to be designated as "PS" facilities.

Facilities assigned ratings of P-1, P-2 or Px were to receive production security inspections. A production security inspection was defined as a visit by a competent inspector to a facility for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the protective measures taken against the continuing hazards of fire, explosion, accident, sabotage, and unauthorized entry, including all phases of personnel security inspections. Facilities assigned a rating of "PS" were to receive personnel security inspections only. A personnel security inspection was defined as a visit by a competent inspector or investigator to a facility primarily for the purpose of determining the adequacy of the measures taken to prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining important information and to safeguard against sabotage.

The number of facilities to be included on the Master Inspection Responsibility List was limited to approximately 2,000 P-1 and 3,000 P-2 facilities, plus a limited number of Px and PS facilities.

The joint circular provided that The Provost Marshal General, assisted by an authorized representative of the Secretary of Navy

^{15/} Par 9a, Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, 3 November 1943, subject: "Internal Security"

and of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, would make all determinations regarding additions to, deletions from, and changes in the Master Inspection Responsibility List. The Provost Marshal General was to consider for addition, change in rating, or deletion all facilities added to, changed in rating, or deleted from the List of Facility Ratings published by the Resources Protection Board, War Production Board.

The Resources Protection Board classified products and services as "vital", "critical" or "essential". For rating purposes, "essential" products and services were classified further into two groups which were (1) "of highest importance to the conduct of the war, but for which the supply situation is very satisfactory" or (2) were "important but not of the highest importance to the conduct of the war, and for which the supply situation is reasonably satisfactory." The classification of ratings assigned by the Resources Protection Board may be summarized as follows:

Percent of Total Supply	Classification of Product or Service			
	<u>Vital</u>	<u>Critical</u>	<u>Essential</u>	
			<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>
25% plus	AA	AB	AC	B
10-25%	AB	AC	B	C
5-10%	AC	B	C	
2½-5%	B	C		
1-2½%	C			

Facilities rated in the "A" categories by the Resources Protection Board were included on the Master Inspection Responsibility List with a rating of P-1; those rated lower than "A" were assigned a rating of P-2.

Joint Circular No. 1 required that recommendations resulting from inspections of facilities involving no government expenditures be forwarded directly to the owner or operator of the facility and that a copy be forwarded to the chief of the procurement agency designated in the Master Inspection Responsibility List as having the principal procurement interest. Recommendations involving government expenditures, directly or indirectly, were to be accompanied by an estimate of the total cost of compliance and were to be forwarded to the appropriate field representative of the designated procurement agency. In the event a facility was rated for more than one product, the agency having the greatest procurement interest in the highest rated product was designated in the Master Inspection Responsibility List as the agency to pass upon and to obtain compliance with inspectors' recommendations. 16/

16/ Par 3, WD Circular No. 309, 25 November 1943

Procedures were established for interested agencies to request additions to, changes in, and deletions from the Master Inspection Responsibility List.^{17/} These requests were considered by a so-called "Junior Master Inspection Responsibility List Advisory Board" of three officers representing the Director of the Internal Security Division acting for The Provost Marshal General, and the authorized representatives of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and of the Navy Department. The Director of the Internal Security Division, the Air Provost Marshal, and the officer-in-charge, Security Section, Base Maintenance Division, Office, Chief of Naval Operations, constituted the "Senior" Master Inspection Responsibility List Advisory Board. The Senior Board periodically reviewed criteria and considered special cases referred to it by the Junior Board. The substance of requests submitted by procurement agencies and service commands for changes in the Master Inspection Responsibility List were made available to the Resources Protection Board for information and evaluation.

Provision was made for all changes necessitated by the transition to the revised internal security program.^{18/} Master Inspection Responsibility List No. 8, 1 November 1943, compiled in accordance with provisions of Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, listed 4,649 facilities as compared with the 13,887 facilities assigned to receive inspections on 30 September 1943.

The number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List fluctuated downward between November 1943 and August 1944, the highest number being 4,921 on 30 November 1943 and the lowest being 3,374 on 31 August 1944. Between 31 August and 31 October 1944 the number was reduced to 1,231 facilities. This reduction was accomplished by a re-evaluation of all facilities by The Provost Marshal General, with the assistance of the Resources Protection Board. All facilities rated P-2, with the exception of those engaged in explosive, incendiary or dangerous chemical operations and those rated for gasoline or components thereof were deleted unless the re-evaluation justified their retention with ratings of P-1.

The number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List increased slightly between 1 October 1944 and February 1945. During February 1945, emphasis was placed on procurement of certain products, particularly heavy ammunition, military dry cells, assault wire, and tires, because of increased requirements for the war in Europe. As a result, a number of facilities rated P-2, as well as some rated P-1, were added and the total number of facilities assigned

^{17/} Par 2a, Sec IV, WD Circular No. 327, dated 16 December 1943; and ASF Circular No. 152, dated 16 December 1943

^{18/} Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 2, dated 3 November 1943

for inspection increased to 1,437. Re-evaluations as a result of V-E Day reduced the number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List to 992 on 30 June 1945.

Lists of Facility Ratings assigned by the Resources Protection Board were published at intervals of about two months. These lists were checked and facilities rated therein, but not already included on the Master Inspection Responsibility List were considered for addition. Facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List but not included in the Resources Protection Board lists were not deleted immediately from the Master Inspection Responsibility List. All interested agencies were notified that the facilities were no longer rated by Resources Protection Board, that inspections by Army Service Forces agencies were suspended, and that the facilities would be deleted 40 days from the date of notification unless information justifying retention on the Master Inspection Responsibility List was submitted to The Provost Marshal General within 30 days and approved prior to the expiration of the 40 days. Requests were given consideration by The Provost Marshal General, with the assistance of the Resources Protection Board. The last Resources Protection Board list contained data up to 1 August 1945.^{19/} Altogether 13 lists, plus seven supplements, were published, the last on 31 July 1945.^{20/}

With the end of the Japanese war, service commanders, the chiefs of Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Transportation were notified by telegram dated 15 August 1945 that security inspections of all facilities and installations by Army Service Forces agencies were suspended but that notification to facilities would be withheld pending further instructions.

On 21 August a telegram was transmitted to the commanding generals of all service commands and the Military District of Washington, and the chiefs of all technical services, with information copies to the Navy Department, Army Air Forces and the U. S. Coast Guard, stating that all facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List were deleted and that such facilities, regardless of the classification of their contracts, would be notified of the discontinuance of security inspection service.

On 13 October 1945, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy, Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1, 2, and 3, dated 3 November 1943, were rescinded and the Master Inspection Responsibility

^{19/} The Resources Protection Board was abolished on 17 August 1945 by War Production Board Order No. 2-205.

^{20/} Master Inspection Responsibility List no. 13, dated 31 July 1945

List was abolished.21/

Development of the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List

While important War Department installations were included on the Master Responsibility List,22/ Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1 provided only for internal security of privately owned and operated facilities.23/ Shortly after the issuance of the joint circular, therefore, provision was made for internal security at War Department operated installations (exclusive of AAF installations, security for which was undertaken by the Air Provost Marshal).24/ Internal security inspections of installations were to be held to the minimum consistent with the importance of the installation and the personnel available. Normally inspections were to be confined to War Department installations of such importance as to warrant their being assigned a P-1 or P-2 rating, on the basis of the same criteria used for evaluation of privately owned and operated facilities.25/ The Provost Marshal General was charged with notifying the commanding generals of service commands of Class I, II, and IV War Department installations to receive inspections.

On 20 December 1943, a list of Class I, II, and IV installations to receive inspections was prepared by The Provost Marshal General.26/ Responsibility for such inspections was assigned on the basis of type of products manufactured, processed or stored. The Chief of Ordnance was assigned inspection responsibility for installations handling explosives; the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service for installations handling incendiary, poisonous or irritant chemicals or explosives; and the Chief of Transportation for ports of embarkation, including staging areas and subports. Other installations were assigned to commanding generals of service commands.

In March, 1944, responsibility for determining Army Service Forces installations to receive security inspection services was charged to The Provost Marshal General. 27/ Commanding generals of service commands were limited with respect to installations to (a) providing emergency protection within their command; (b) security inspection service of certain installations; and (c) enforce-

21/ WD Circular No. 315, dated 13 October 1945

22/ SOS memorandum No. S360-4-43, dated 18 February 1943, subject: "Responsibilities for Internal Security"

23/ Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, dated 3 November 1943

24/ ASF letter, SPX 323.361 (11 Nov 43)OB-P-SPAAM-MB-A, dated 12 November 1943, subject: "Internal Security at War Department Operated Installations"

25/ Par 9, Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, 3 November 1943

26/ ASF letter, file SPX 323.361 (16 Dec 43)OB-S-SPMGS-M, 20 December 1943, subject: "Internal Security at War Department Operated Installations"

27/ Sec II, ASF Circular No. 71, dated 9 March 1944

ment of compliance with approved recommendations. Chiefs of technical services were limited to security inspection services at installations assigned to them on the Installations Security Inspection Responsibility List maintained by The Provost Marshal General.^{28/}

In June 1944, The Provost Marshal General was charged with the responsibility of acting for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, in coordinating and supervising the Army Service Forces Internal Security Program.^{29/} The Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List, as well as the Master Inspection Responsibility List, was to indicate procurement agencies to approve recommendations involving expenditures of government funds. However, the policy of separating inspection agency and procurement agency responsibility for Army Service Forces installations was changed in July 1944.^{30/} The change resulted in the inspecting agencies being charged with securing compliance with recommendations.^{31/} The responsibility of service commanders at installations inspected by technical services was limited to emergency protection.

In the last quarter of 1944, as a result of the re-evaluation of all facilities and installations, a number of changes in ratings of installations were made by The Provost Marshal General. The number of installations on the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List, however, increased to 194.^{32/} The last list of installations to receive security inspection services was published in January 1945.^{33/}

28/ PMGO letter, file No. SPMGS 004, dated 14 April 1944, subject:

"Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List"

29/ See IV, ASF Circular No. 167, dated 2 June 1944

30/ Sec V, ASF Circular No. 227, dated 21 July 1944

31/ PMGO letter, file SPMGS 004, dated 12 Sep 1944, subject: "Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List"

32/ The number of facilities and installations assigned to receive security inspections, on the dates indicated, was as follows:

24 Jun 1941	2,826	31 Dec 1943	4,980	(69)
31 Jan 1942	6,628	30 Jun 1944	3,795	(165)
30 Jun 1942	11,520	31 Dec 1944	1,457	(184)
31 Dec 1942	14,417	30 Jun 1945	1,185	(193)
30 Jun 1943	15,245	31 Jul 1945	1,181	(194)

(The numbers in parentheses indicate Army Service Forces installations on the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List.)

33/ PMGO letter, file SPMGS 004, dated 22 January 1945, subject: "Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List"

Following the Japanese surrender, a telegram was transmitted on 15 August 1945 to the commanding generals of all service commands and the Military District of Washington and the Chiefs of Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service and Transportation, stating that security inspections of all facilities and installations by Army Service Forces agencies were suspended, but that notification to facilities would be withheld pending further instructions.

Section VI, Army Service Forces Circular No. 329, 31 August 1945, abolished the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List.

Development of List of Commercial Facilities Approved for Reproduction of Classified Materials

Prior to 16 February 1943, there were no specific provisions for the safeguarding of information in classified materials reproduced in commercial establishments. Army regulations provided that photographs of classified features of military equipment or other classified items would be made by members of the military service or by civilian employees of the War Department only when necessary to the conduct of their official duties and, if made, would not be developed or printed in commercial establishments or retained in their personal possession. 34/

It was not intended that the regulation cited in the preceding paragraph be interpreted to prevent military agencies from having certain materials such as color film or reversible black and white film processed in commercial establishments, the processing of which in military establishments was, in some instances, not practicable. It was the practice of several Army agencies to have a representative accompany classified material and supervise its processing in civilian reproduction establishments. This procedure proved unsatisfactory in many instances because some agencies were not located within reasonable proximity to commercial establishments equipped for certain special reproduction processes. Furthermore, supervision by a representative of the using agency of the processing of materials, particularly those bearing low classification, did not appear necessary in establishments which had established adequate security measures.

In addition to the necessity of using other than military facilities for the reproduction of materials by special processes, the increasing military requirements for all types of reproductions made the need for additional capacity urgent.

34/ Paragraph 13b, AR 380-6, 28 September 1942

On 16 February 1943, Army Regulations were amended to provide that photographs of classified materials could be developed or printed in commercial establishments that had established specified procedures for handling classified film, approved by The Provost Marshal General. 35/ The Provost Marshal General was to establish the minimum security measures on the basis of personnel security programs under his jurisdiction and direct the commanding general of the appropriate service command to:

1. Survey the plant, or part thereof, to be engaged in reproduction of classified material, to ascertain safeguards against espionage.
2. Institute the following personnel security programs to be applied to all employees having access to the material:
 - a. Fingerprint program
 - b. Alien program
 - c. Key personnel security program
 - d. Removal of subversives program
3. Obtain a secrecy agreement, as provided in Army Regulations 380-5, 28 September 1943, from the official designated by the plant management to be responsible for the safeguarding of classified materials. 36/

Minimum requirements for approval were changed from time to time to conform to changes in the personnel security programs.

The procedure was established whereby War Department agencies would inform The Provost Marshal General of those commercial reproduction facilities whose services were required. 37/ The Provost Marshal General assigned to each facility a code number for use on fingerprint cards which were submitted by the commanding generals of service commands to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and requested the service commanders to survey the facilities and determine whether or not the requirements for approval were fulfilled. 38/ Commanding generals of service commands notified the requesting agency and The Provost Marshal General of the result of each survey and stated the type of reproductions for which the facility had been approved.

Although army regulations and directives pertaining to the approval of classified reproduction facilities were binding upon War Department agencies, facilities were surveyed, as a matter of comity, upon request

35/ Changes No. 6, 16 February 1943, to AR 380-5, dated 28 Sep 1943

36/ FMGO letter, file SPMGS 413.56, dated 30 Mar 1943, subject:

"Reproduction of Classified Film and Other Materials"

37/ WD Memorandum No. W380-9-43, dated 8 April 1943, subject:

"Reproduction of Classified Film and Other Materials"

38/ Sec VII, Par 15, SOS letter, file SPMGS 381, dated 9 August

1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

from certain agencies not within the War Department, for example, the Navy Department.^{39/}

To maintain uniformity of surveys and approvals by the various service commands, requirements were restated and certain points clarified in a memorandum issued in August 1943.^{40/} Provision was made for reinspections of facilities at intervals, not exceeding 90 days, as deemed necessary by the commanding generals of the service commands. Further, it was provided that if, upon reinspection, it was determined that (a) a facility was not maintaining adequate security measures, or (b) did not desire to continue as an approved facility, or (c) had not engaged in reproduction of classified materials for a period of 180 days and was not under contract or consideration for the reproduction of classified materials, notification of withdrawal of approval would be forwarded immediately to the facility and to The Provost Marshal General.

By November 1943, the number of facilities approved for reproduction of classified materials had become so large and the number was increasing at such a rate that the inspection and reinspection work load was a real burden on the inspection agencies. In view of this fact and the indication that there were facilities approved for most types of reproductions, requesting agencies were required to justify their requests by stating reasons facilities already approved could not be used.^{41/} If the justification for requests were not sufficient, commanding generals of the service commands were to decline to make the surveys. The discontinuance, in November 1943, of the War Department fingerprinting program eliminated the necessity for The Provost Marshal General to assign code numbers to facilities;^{42/} therefore, agencies were directed to send requests directly to commanding generals of the appropriate service commands.

On 21 June 1944, army regulations were changed to permit reproductions other than photographs and to provide that The Provost Marshal General would maintain a list of all approved facilities.^{43/} These provisions had been included in the previous War Department directives, but had not been incorporated in the Regulations.

^{39/} PMGO letter, file SPHGS 413.56, dated 3 April 1943, subject: "Facilities Engaged in the Reproduction of Classified Film and Other Materials"

^{40/} ASF Memorandum No. 6380-10-43, dated 6 August 1943, subject: "Reproduction of Classified Film and Other Materials"

^{41/} WD Memorandum W380-9-43, Changes No. 1, dated 5 November 1943, subject: "Reproduction of Classified Film and Other Materials"

^{42/} WD letter, file AG 200.2 (16 Nov 43)OB-P-FMG-MB-A, dated 25 November 1943, subject: "Fingerprinting"

^{43/} Changes No. 1, dated 21 June 1944, to AR 380-5, dated 15 March 1944, subject: "Safeguarding Military Information"

Near the end of 1944, the increased requirements for reproduction work, particularly printing, and the burden of surveying and approving facilities necessitated the removal of the requirement that restricted material be reproduced only in commercial facilities included on the approved list. Accordingly, army regulations were changed to provide that confidential, secret, and top secret material could be reproduced only in approved commercial facilities.^{44/} Agencies having restricted materials reproduced at commercial facilities not approved were made responsible to insure that the material was safeguarded at such facilities in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulations 380-5. Regulations did not preclude the reproduction of restricted materials by approved facilities if they were available. At the same time, all outstanding directives were consolidated in one paper.

The Provost Marshal General maintained a current list of all facilities approved pursuant to existing regulations, and published at frequent intervals lists, and supplements thereto, of all approved facilities. He also maintained a card file of all facilities approved including a chronological record of the report of approval and any changes in status of approval reported by commanding generals of the service commands. The lists were reproduced by offset process by The Adjutant General.

With the end of the Japanese conflict, a telegram was transmitted on 15 August 1945, to the commanding generals of all service commands and the Military District of Washington and the Chiefs of Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Transportation stating that security inspections of all facilities and installations by Army Service Forces agencies were suspended but that notification to facilities would be withheld pending further instructions.

As a result of the cessation of hostilities, the volume of photographs and other reproductions of classified film and other materials had been reduced so markedly that government reproduction facilities were able to handle virtually all such work. Accordingly, the list of approved commercial reproducers of classified films and other materials, which had been maintained by The Provost Marshal General, and security inspections of commercial reproduction facilities by the service commands were discontinued. Agencies of the War Department may now have photographs and other reproductions of classified materials developed, printed, processed or otherwise reproduced in commercial facilities if adequate government facilities are not available, but in such event are responsible to insure that material is safe-

^{44/} Changes No. 3, dated 5 February 1945, to AR 380-5, dated 15 March 1944, subject: "Safeguarding Classified Information"

guarded at such facilities in accordance with provisions of Army Regulations 380-5.

FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION ACTIVITIES

The War Department, long before Pearl Harbor, recognized that modern war was total war and that total war required the utmost in war production. America, as the arsenal of democracy, needed every ounce that could be produced by her magnificent industrial organization. Protection of our capacity to produce was of paramount importance and in 1940 was made the direct concern of the Assistant Secretary of War. Protection meant complete protection from all things that would interfere with maximum production - including protection from preventable conflagrations.

The Production Branch, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, was created on 11 July 1940 and was charged with the supervision of "all matters concerning the accomplishment of the procurement program after contracts have been let and orders placed, with special reference to elimination of conditions which might lead to retarding of production." Its efforts were "directed to shortening, by all possible means, the time which must elapse between the award of contracts and the delivery of finished goods. * * *." The Production Branch was further charged, on 13 November 1940, with the responsibility, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, for all matters pertaining to the protection of commercial plants manufacturing material for the army. 1/

The mission of the Production Branch was to assure uninterrupted production of materials necessary for the national defense, including the physical features, installations and equipment, fire prevention, guard systems, and control of personnel engaged in the protection of plants, operating either as primary contractors or subcontractors, against accidental or intentional damage and the protection of production schedules against stoppage, interruption, or retardation. On 21 April 1941, pursuant to authority contained in the Act of 16 December 1940, the duties and responsibilities placed upon the Secretary of War by Section 5a of the National Defense Act, as amended, were assigned to the Under Secretary of War.2/ The chiefs of the supply arms and services were charged with the responsibility of inspecting the facilities which came under their jurisdiction

1/ Office Memorandum, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 13 November 1940

2/ U.S.C. tit. 5, Sec 181a; 54 Stat. 1224, Public Law No. 891 - 76th Congress

to ascertain whether the facilities had taken the necessary protective measures against fire, sabotage, and other hazards.^{3/}

A memorandum from the Under Secretary of War, dated 12 May 1941, to the chiefs of the supply arms and services gave complete information on the operation and functions of the Plant Protection Inspection Service.^{4/} This memorandum stated that (1) it was necessary that the scope of the plant protection program be expanded without delay, using commissioned officers as supervisors and responsible civilians as plant protection inspectors, and that (2) standards and report forms were to be prepared by the Production Branch, Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War. The operation of the plant protection program was delegated to the procurement districts and initial allotments were made for the plant protection personnel to operate under the chiefs of the supply arms and services.

One officer of the Plant Protection Division specialized on the prevention of interruption of manufacturing production caused by fire, explosion, or related hazards. This officer maintained close liaison with the National Bureau for Industrial Protection, a private organization supported by fire insurance interests of the country underwriting industrial plants, for the purpose of assisting the national defense effort with whatever resources were available from the insurance interests.^{5/} This arrangement made available for the benefit of the War Department, without cost, the experience and expert advice of all major insurance organizations of the country.

The Plant Protection Division prepared an inspection report form for the field inspectors to use when making plant protection inspections.^{6/} To aid in the preparation of this form, and to secure uniformity of reporting throughout the War Department, an inspection manual was prepared and issued.^{7/} In February 1942, a pamphlet was issued for the purpose of providing manufacturers with a statement of what the War Department expected in the way of plant protection.^{8/} Changes in policy necessitated revisions of the above publications, but the general outline continued the same. The following revised editions were in use on V-J Day: Internal Security

^{3/} WD letter, AG 004 (4-22-41)M-B-M, dated 7 May 1941, subject: "Interior Protection of Plants and Utilities"

^{4/} CUSW memorandum, dated 12 May 1941, subject: "Plant Protection Inspection Service"

^{5/} CUSW letter, dated 15 November 1941, subject: "National Bureau for Industrial Protection"

^{6/} Plant Protection Inspection Report Form 16-22713

^{7/} Plant Protection Inspection Manual, Office of the Under Secretary of War, January 1942

^{8/} Plant Protection for Manufacturers, Office of the Under Secretary of War, February 1942

Inspection, War Department Pamphlet No. 32-2; Plant Protection for Manufacturers, War Department Pamphlet No. 32-1; and Security Inspection Report No. 530, 27 May 1944. Plant Protection for Manufacturers proved particularly popular. Over 200,000 copies were distributed to industrial facilities.

In 1940 and 1941 the Federal Bureau of Investigation made plant protection surveys, including surveys of physical protection measures of important plants and facilities manufacturing war materials and storing critical commodities, under its general responsibility for investigation of sabotage and espionage.^{9/} The Plant Protection Division of the Office of the Under Secretary of War received requests for these surveys from the chiefs of the supply arms and services and forwarded the requests to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, for transmission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, maintained close liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation received requests from the War Department to survey 1747 plants, from the British Purchasing Commission 139 plants, and from other sources 26 plants. The Federal Bureau of Investigation completed 934 surveys for the War Department, and 44 for the British Purchasing Commission and others. The survey reports made for the War Department were retained by the supply arms and services. The National Bureau for Industrial Protection also forwarded copies of its reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for distribution to the Office of the Under Secretary of War through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

After Pearl Harbor, the Federal Bureau of Investigation decided that its agents should be confined to the regular activities of the Bureau, and on 3 January 1942, the War Department, by agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, published a letter to the commanding generals of all corps areas and to the chiefs of the supply arms and services, stating that the War Department had assumed the responsibility for the conduct of plant protection surveys beginning 4 January 1942.^{10/} The transfer of this responsibility for plant protection surveys in civilian manufacturing facilities did not change the primary responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in cases involving sabotage, espionage, and other subversive activities in these plants. Where subversive activity was suspected, procurement representatives of the War Department continued to be charged with reporting such cases to the local field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the appropriate Corps Area G-2.

^{9/} Memorandum of the President, file 02/9794-186, dated 26 June 1939
^{10/} WD letter, file AG 004 (12-30-41)MSC-B-M, dated 3 January 1942,
subject: "Plant Protection Surveys"

Organization, Duties, and Responsibilities

As a result of the reorganization of the Army in March 1942, the functions, and many of the personnel, of the Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, were transferred to the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General. The Internal Security Division was formed in his office to carry out these and other internal security functions.

The Inspection Section of the Internal Security Division was charged with the responsibility of determining and promulgating policies pertaining to fire and accident prevention, reviewing specific cases of planned fire protection, studying and disseminating information derived from reports of the National Bureau for Industrial Protection, and collaborating with the War Production Board in the determination and evaluation of vital plants.

Within three months (on 24 June 1942), because of increased responsibilities, the War Production Security Branch (later called the Production Security Branch) of the Internal Security Division was established, with Fire Protection supervised by a separate section thereof. The functions and responsibilities of the Fire Protection Section were to render technical assistance on fire protection and engineering matters to commanding generals of service commands, other sections of the division, and other War Department and federal agencies, including evaluation of facilities in conjunction with the War Production Board; and to review, analyze, and disseminate fire protection reports received from the field and other agencies.

In October 1943, the Production Security Branch was dissolved, and the Fire Protection Branch set up separately. The duties and responsibilities of the Fire Protection Branch at that time were to: 11/

- a. Exercise staff supervision within the Army Service Forces over the fire, explosion, and technical aspects of security at privately-operated facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List.
- b. Keep informed of fire prevention and protection activities at Army Service Forces installations and coordinate these activities with the internal security program.
- c. Review reports of investigations of important fires, explosions, and similar occurrences to determine adherence to or need for change in fire protection policy.

11/ Section 201.07c(9)(d), Army Service Forces Manual M 301

d. Render professional advisory engineering service, when requested, to federal and other War Department agencies in connection with the prevention of loss or delay in the war effort from fire and related hazards.

e. Inspect production security inspection activities in service commands, the Military District of Washington, the Ordnance Department, the Chemical Warfare Service, and the Transportation Corps to determine adherence to established policies and procedures.

f. Maintain liaison with all federal and civilian fire protection agencies for the purpose of furthering the security program.

g. Act for the Army Service Forces on matters pertaining to findings of the Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board.

h. Represent the War Department on the Resources Protection Board and the Fire Protection Committee of the War Production Board.

i. Prepare publicity material, including posters, pamphlets, training films, and other educational material, on the prevention of loss or delay in the war effort from fires and related hazards.

A new basic statement of internal security procedures, issued in November 1943, restated the protective services to be rendered by the War Department and the method of selection and the types of facilities to be inspected.^{12/} A standard operating procedure applicable to the security inspection and procurement agencies, to implement this policy, was published.^{13/} As Army Service Forces agencies were rather slow in adopting the new procedures, the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, by a series of identical individual letters, dated 22 January 1944, reminded service commanders and chiefs of technical services of their respective responsibilities of making security inspections and recommendations and of approving or disapproving recommendations of the inspection agency made for the purpose of improving the security of the facility. The letter further stated that the chiefs of the technical services were warranted in accepting such recommendations as being practical, workable, economical, and in the best interest of the government.^{14/}

^{12/} Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, 3 November 1943

^{13/} WD Circular No. 309, 25 November 1943; amended by Section IV, WD Circular No. 327, 16 December 1943

^{14/} ASF Immediate Action letter, dated 22 January 1944, subject: "Fire Protection Policies and Procedures"

In January 1944, the Inspection Branch of the Internal Security Division was abolished and specialists from each branch thereafter conducted inspections. The inspection program of the Fire Protection Branch included inspections of activities and a determination of the technical qualifications of the security inspectors of the service commands and technical services, and, in addition, those of the Defense Supplies Corporation and the Bureau of Mines of the Department of the Interior, to which agencies The Provost Marshal General had delegated the conduct of certain specialized types of production security inspections. The facility security program of the Office of Civilian Defense, which was supplementary to and coordinated with the War and Navy Departments security programs was also supervised and inspected. A report covering visits to the nine service commands, submitted to the Director, Internal Security Division, on 16 June 1944, stated that:^{15/}

a. A considerable number of inspecting and supervising personnel engaged in production security inspection activities did not possess necessary qualifications.

b. Recommendations were frequently of no practical value.

c. There had been an incomplete transition to the curtailed production security inspection service inaugurated by Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, 3 November 1943, which restricted security activities to plants vital to the war effort and established the policy of "carefully calculated risk."

The organizational relationships within Army Service Forces, with regard to fire prevention and protection and internal security were clarified by a directive issued in June, 1944, which set forth the respective fire prevention and protection responsibilities of the Chiefs of Engineers, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Transportation and stated that: "The Provost Marshal General will keep himself informed of the fire prevention and protection activities at these [all Class I, II, and IV War Department] installations and, without duplicating [the] activities [of those chiefs of technical services], will insure that they are coordinated with the internal security program."^{16/} The establishment of a new basic policy on automatic sprinklers and the activities of the Under Secretary of War's Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention assisted The Provost Marshal General in carrying out the intent of the Army Service Forces circular that internal security at Army Service Forces installations receive adequate protection.^{17/}

^{15/} FMGO Summary of Visits to the nine service commands, 16 June 1944

^{16/} ASF Circular No. 167, 2 June 1944

^{17/} WD Circular No. 15, 12 January 1945

Staff supervision of the fire, explosion, and technical aspects of security, except accident prevention, at privately operated facilities, on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, inspected by Army Service Forces agencies, was the responsibility of the Fire Protection Branch. Whenever it was ascertained that a facility had an unsatisfactory security status and that efforts to correct this condition were unavailing a special effort was made through the appropriate security inspection agency, the designated procurement agency, or the National Bureau for Industrial Protection to improve conditions. Fire protective equipment, when critical, was available to facilities (through the War Production Board) only if they had a high essentiality rating on the Master Inspection Responsibility List. Through most of 1943, it was necessary to screen each case thoroughly to determine and justify to the War Production Board the need for this equipment. The War Production Board set up a Fire Protection Committee, at the request of the War Department, which made it easier for the essential facilities to receive fire protective equipment.^{18/} As a more satisfactory balance was established between supply and requirements of material, fire protective equipment became available to most facilities through the War Production Board. The cessation of hostilities in Europe resulted in the removal of a large number of War Production Board restrictions and in reduced necessity for assistance in securing priority for fire protection equipment.

Spot reports on fires were received from the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department and were reviewed. Where conditions warranted, appropriate field agencies were requested to submit detailed reports. On 20 October 1943, a restricted War Department letter was issued, requiring a detailed report to be submitted to The Provost Marshal General concerning all fires causing over \$5,000 property damage at facilities important to the war effort.^{19/}

Fire reports received by The Provost Marshal General were carefully studied and analyzed to provide a basis for the further improvement of internal security and the safeguarding of important war production.

Professional advisory engineering service, when requested, was rendered to other War Department and federal agencies in connection with the loss or delay in the war effort from fire and related

^{18/} General Program Circular No. 22, WPB, dated 9 August 1943, subject: "Fire Protection Policy"

^{19/} WD letter, file AG 800.913 (13 Oct 43)OB-S-SPACS-M, dated 20 October 1943, subject: "Internal Security Reports of Serious Fires and Explosions"

hazards. Special fire protection and prevention inspections were made of the Columbus, Ohio, Army Service Forces Depot and other Army Service Forces and Ordnance depots and War Department installations at the request of chiefs of technical services, service commanders, and the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention of the Office of the Under Secretary of War. The Nicaro Nickel Company, Nicaro, Oriente Province, Cuba, was inspected at the request of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

Advisory Committee

The Provost Marshal General, desiring to develop further the usefulness and effectiveness of the fire protection activities formed, in October 1942, a War Department Advisory Committee on Fire Prevention. This committee included three civilians of the highest national standing in the fire protection field. They met one or two days each month to review the fire prevention work being carried on by the War Department in connection with war industry and to suggest how this work could be organized better or made more effective. The following served on this committee: Messrs. Percy Bugbee, Managing Director, National Fire Protection Association; Harold L. Miner, Manager, Safety and Fire Protection Division, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company; and Curtis Pierce, President, Factory Insurance Association. Several meetings of this committee and other interested parties were held, from October 1942 to October 1943, concerning the following: 20/

- a. The effect of the shortage of critical materials upon the installation of fire protective equipment.
- b. The employment of a full-time fire prevention educational advisor for the development and use of fire prevention posters, pamphlets, and other educational material.
- c. The operation of schools for plant protection inspectors.
- d. The need for simplification of fire protection procedures and a definite determination of responsibility.

The committee did not meet after October 1943 because it had completed its prime objectives and because the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention of the Office of the Under Secretary of War took its place.

20/ Report and Recommendations on the Plant Fire Protection Program of the War Department by the Advisory Committee on Fire Prevention, 13 December 1942

Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention

The Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention of the Office of the Under Secretary of War was established on 8 February 1944.^{21/} Separate fire and accident panels met from time to time. Meetings of the fire panel were open to members of the National Bureau for Industrial Protection and representatives of War Department, Navy Department and civilian governmental agencies officially interested in fire protection and prevention. The functions of the board were to analyze the War Department fire and accident prevention program; to review periodically factual data with reference to the incidence of fires and accidents at privately operated facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and at War Department installations, and to make inspections of such facilities and installations as the Board deemed necessary to carry out its duties; to make recommendations to the appropriate staff agencies of the Army; and to report quarterly to the Under Secretary of War factual data on important trends of fires and accidents, both in actual number and as related to exposure, making necessary recommendations where other agencies of the War Department had previously refused or neglected to take action. The minutes of the meetings and the reports to the Under Secretary of War were distributed to all interested agencies of the War Department.^{22/} Following the surrender of Japan, the War Department's fire prevention and protection activities were sharply curtailed and the Under Secretary of War approved the abolition of the board.^{23/}

Resources Protection Board of the War Production Board

In May 1942, the War Production Board established the Resources Protection Board which was charged with the responsibility for determining "the relative importance of plants, facilities, installations, utilities, materials, and other economic resources from the point of view of protection against all hazards, including, but not limited to, injury and destruction by enemy activity, accident, fire, sabotage, subversive activity and espionage and other efforts to obtain secret information regarding economic resources and the war program."^{24/} The War Department was represented on the Resources Protection Board by an officer from the Fire Protection Branch. The evaluations

^{21/} WD Memoranda W850-44, 8 February 1944; W850-44, 11 March 1944; and 850-45, 19 May 1945, subject: "Fire Protection and Safety Measures"

^{22/} Minutes of meetings of the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention, dated 27 September 1944, 18 January 1945, 1 March 1945, 28 March 1945, and 22 May 1945; and Report of Fires, Second Quarter 1945, dated 31 August 1945

^{23/} WD Circular No. 305, 5 October 1945

^{24/} General Administrative Order No. 2-38, War Production Board, 8 May 1942, subject: "Resources Protection Board"

of the Resources Protection Board were of inestimable value in the determination of the relative degree of importance of facilities included on the Master Inspection Responsibility List.

National Bureau for Industrial Protection

The private insurance interests of the country had indicated a willingness to make available to the War Department the reports and engineering services of their experienced technical engineers and inspectors concerning industrial facilities. In February 1941, the Insurance Committee for the Protection of American Industrial Plants was established, with the operating staff located in Washington, for the purpose of obtaining reports and technical assistance from the various fire, casualty, and indemnity insurance companies, when requested by the War Department and other government agencies, on facilities important to the procurement of national defense material. This organization was supported by the private insurance companies, without cost to the government and without regard to the keen competitive situation existing between stock, mutual, reciprocal, and factory mutual insurance interests.

In June 1941, the operating staff of the Insurance Committee for the Protection of American Industrial Plants became the National Bureau for Industrial Protection. The insurance companies' reports on fire protection, as well as the factual recordings of physical conditions, were studied, reviewed, and condensed by the operating staff of the National Bureau for Industrial Protection in Washington before being forwarded to the War Department.^{25/} The chiefs of the supply arms and services, charged with the responsibility for making plant protection surveys, considered every plant, within their respective jurisdiction, important. Plans, regular and special reports, and fire and accident reports, furnished through the National Bureau for Industrial Protection to the procurement agencies, were of considerable aid to the plant protection inspectors. From February 1941 to March 1942, the assistance of the National Bureau for Industrial Protection to the War Department was rendered to the chiefs of the supply arms and services through the Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War. After March 1942, when supervision over plant protection was transferred from the Under Secretary of War to The Provost Marshal General, this service was furnished to the War Department through The Provost Marshal

^{25/} Form Fl, "Summary for Fire Prevention" and Form S-1, "Summary for Sabotage and Malicious Mischief Prevention"

General. Whenever the War Department desired information, regarding industrial properties, which might be in the possession of the insurance interests, the National Bureau for Industrial Protection supplied the material without cost.

On 6 July 1945, the National Bureau for Industrial Protection signified its intention of discontinuing its previous practice of furnishing to The Provost Marshal General data concerning plants on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and desired to confine its activities to specific requests in individual cases. The Washington office of the National Bureau for Industrial Protection was closed on 31 August 1945. During the period of its existence, this bureau supplied to the War Department approximately 63,000 reports on physical conditions at properties engaged in war production, together with recommendations for avoiding interruption of war production by fire, explosion, or accident. In addition, over 8,000 plot plans of important industrial properties were loaned to the War Department. Photostatic copies of these plot plans were forwarded to the appropriate security inspection agencies.

Automatic Sprinkler Program - War Department Operated Installations

Early in the war, "greater need for critical materials" for other uses caused the War Department, the Army-Navy Munitions Board, the Defense Plant Corporation, and certain divisions of the War Production Board to promulgate policies which prevented the installation of automatic sprinklers in many War Department installations and in private plants, warehouses, and piers manufacturing and storing materials vital to the war effort. The lack of sprinklers resulted in many fire losses of critical materials, which could and should have been prevented. Private industrial interests, rather than the Army operated installations, received the largest percentage of the automatic sprinklers authorized by the War Production Board.

The War Department, in a memorandum issued in September 1942, had drastically curtailed the installation of automatic sprinkler systems in practically all projects under construction.^{26/} This order prohibited the installation of automatic sprinkler protection in depots, port facilities, and storage projects. Sprinklers were permitted in certain hospital areas, aircraft modification centers, and in portions of facilities and bomber assembly plants

^{26/} SOS Memorandum S30-2-42, dated 9 September 1942, subject: "Policy Governing Installation of Automatic Sprinkler Systems and Fire Alarm Systems"

used for storage of paint and other flammable mixtures. This decision was the result, in part, of the policy adopted by the Defense Plant Corporation of eliminating steel and other critical materials wherever possible in the design of factory buildings and other Defense Plant Corporation projects in compliance with various requests received from the War Production Board. 27/ The Army-Navy Munitions Board, on 29 June 1942, stated the policy on the permitted uses of steel and iron, as follows: "Sprinkler systems, only where equipment, strategic and dollar value of product, and availability of local fire fighting equipment makes minimum sprinkling necessary." 28/

The policy that critical materials intended for automatic sprinklers should be used for the manufacture of other materials if the need was more urgent in the overall picture was sound. However, The Provost Marshal General did not favor the adoption of a blanket policy prohibiting the installation of automatic sprinklers in facilities and installations important to the prosecution of the war and urged that each case be reviewed individually and decision made in the light of the importance of the plant, its construction, occupancy, and other protection. The position of The Provost Marshal concerning the policy of providing fire protection in war production plants, including the installation of automatic sprinkler systems, was that; 29/

a. Requirements for fire protection equipment involving the use of critical materials, new construction for war production, and for the concentration or storage of important war supplies, should be confined to relatively small fire areas and unit values.

b. No installation of new fire protection equipment involving the use of critical material should be made except for the protection of property, the loss of which by fire would have an adverse effect on the war effort.

c. Where the requirements make large concentrations of critical materials unavoidable, the relative value of critical material for various uses in the war production program should determine the extent to which critical material should be used for fire protection installations.

d. In order that production of critical war supplies may not be delayed as a result of fire, it is frequently advisable

27/ Defense Plant Corporation letter to Office of Chief of Engineers, dated 27 May 1942, re: Elimination of Critical Materials in Defense Plant Corporation Projects.

28/ Army-Navy Munitions Board's "List of Prohibited Items for Construction Work", item 46 (Steel and Iron; Permitted Uses), dated 29 June 1942.

29/ FMGO Memorandum, file SPMGS 004, dated 23 July 1942, subject: "Policy on Providing Fire Protection in War Production Plants Including the Installation of Automatic Sprinkler Systems"

to provide automatic fire protection even though the use of critical material may be involved.

e. Buildings constructed as "bare essentials" should be provided with fire protection equipment commensurate with their importance in the war production program.

On 23 March 1943, a revised statement of policy was issued.^{30/} It broadened the types of property where automatic sprinkler protection could be installed in storage properties, but 15 months later many such locations were not yet protected against loss by fire. A typical example was an unsprinklered combustible radio and radar equipment warehouse which, 15 months after the revised statement of policy, was destroyed with a monetary loss of \$12,500,000.

Following the destruction of the unsprinklered Fourth Echelon Motor Repair Shop of the Atlanta Ordnance Depot, on 20 January 1944, and of the unsprinklered combustible warehouses of the Fort Wayne Ordnance Depot, on 24 January 1944, with combined physical damage and resulting loss of critically needed facilities and supplies amounting to at least \$7,000,000, the Chief of Engineers recommended to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, that exception to the existing policy be made to permit the installation of automatic sprinklers in similar important depots.^{31/} This was authorized on 4 March 1944.^{32/}

Previously, on 28 April 1943, upon the initiative of the Requirements Division, Army Service Forces, the Chief of Engineers and The Provost Marshal General had been directed to make separate surveys, avoiding duplications, to determine the need for fire protection in existing and contemplated construction.^{33/} These surveys were for the purpose of compiling information to be used as a basis for appropriate action to insure the most advantageous distribution of automatic sprinkler protection and were not to be construed as a departure from the current policy regarding these facilities.

Several disastrous fires occurred at large Quartermaster laundries during the last half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 with a total physical damage of at least \$1,500,000. These losses made it imperative that another exception to the policy be made which would permit the installation of automatic sprinkler equipment in such laundries. On 17 June 1944, the Director of Plans and Operations,

^{30/} ASF Memorandum S100-2-43, dated 23 March 1943, subject: "Policy Governing Installation of Automatic Sprinkler Systems and Fire Alarm Systems"

^{31/} Chief of Engineer's Memorandum, file CE SPENM, dated 10 February 1944, subject: "Automatic Sprinkler Installations in Motor Repair Shops"

^{32/} ASF Memorandum, file SPRMC 671.3 (8 Feb 44), dated 4 March 1944, subject: "Automatic Sprinkler Installations in Motor Repair Shops"

^{33/} ASF Memorandum S100-4-43, dated 28 April 1943, subject: "Survey of Major Existing and Proposed War Department Installations in View of Providing Fire Protection"

Army Service Forces, authorized the installation of automatic sprinkler protection "in laundries which are of combustible construction and of large undivided areas and which are scheduled for continued use during 1944."34/

On 21 September 1944, the Director of Plans and Operations, Army Service Forces, limited the installation of automatic sprinkler protection to:35/

"a. Those installations previously selected jointly by the Chief of Engineers and The Provost Marshal General.

"b. Storage depots recommended for protection by the chiefs of the technical services and approved by the Storage Division, Army Service Forces, in order of relative priority.

"c. Fourth Echelon motor repair shops, where future planned activity justified.

"d. Laundries of combustible construction where future planned activity justified."

The foregoing action was taken within the Army Service Forces. The Supply Division, G-4, of the War Department General Staff, as a result of recommendations submitted to the Under Secretary of War by his Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention, on 5 October 1944, directed the Commanding Generals of the Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces to:36/

a. Expedite installations of automatic sprinklers under the then existing policy.

b. Intensify the campaign to educate personnel in fire prevention principles.

c. Provide reasonable safeguards to prevent extensive losses by fire during the construction period. This action was to be accomplished by the Chief of Engineers through insertion of suitable provisions in contracts.

d. Review policy covering automatic sprinkler protection at military installations and, if a revision was considered necessary, to collaborate and submit appropriate recommendations to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff, on or before 1

34/ Seventh Indorsement to Chief of Engineers, file SPRMC (7 April 1944), dated 17 June 1944

35/ First Indorsement to Chief of Engineers, file SPOMC 300.5 (5 Sep 44), 21 September 1944

36/ WD Memorandum, file WDQDS 3643, dated 5 October 1944, subject: "Fire Protection"

November 1944.

The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, forwarded the memorandum to the Chief of Engineers for appropriate action. This resulted in a conference on 30 October 1944 which was attended by representatives of the Chiefs of Chemical Warfare Service, Ordnance, Transportation, and Engineers and The Provost Marshal General. A draft of a more liberal policy covering the installation of automatic fire protection was presented by the representative of the Chief of Engineers. The representative of The Provost Marshal General agreed in principle but did not concur in the proposed draft. However, as time did not permit further study and submission of a revised draft to meet the deadline of 1 November 1944, the draft proposed by the Chief of Engineers was forwarded to Headquarters, Army Service Forces. The proposed draft, as submitted, was not favorably considered by the Director of Plans and Operations, Army Service Forces, with the result that a meeting of representatives of the Army Air Forces, technical services, and The Provost Marshal General was called on 10 November 1944 to revise the paper. A revised draft was then forwarded by Headquarters, Army Service Forces, to the War Department General Staff, recommending publication as a War Department circular. The War Department General Staff disapproved the revised policy and returned it to Headquarters, Army Service Forces, for revisions and resubmittal. Headquarters, Army Service Forces, then undertook to revise the sprinkler policy, conferring frequently with the representative of The Provost Marshal General. Another draft was prepared, submitted to, and approved by the War Department General Staff and published, on 5 December 1944, as War Department Circular No. 460.^{37/} This circular stated that sprinklers might be provided where the lack of such systems would result in conditions exceptionally hazardous to human life, or where stored material, property, or processes were of such high monetary value or importance to the war effort as to justify installation of such protection as determined by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Circular No. 460 was amended to include the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, on 12 January 1945.^{38/} For the purpose of implementing policy in reference to installation of sprinkler systems at Class I, II, and IV installations, an Army Service Forces circular was published on 28 April 1945.^{39/}

^{37/} WD Circular No. 460, dated 5 December 1944, subject: "Fire Protection - Automatic Sprinklers"

^{38/} WD Circular No. 15, dated 12 January 1945, subject: "Fire Protection - Automatic Sprinklers"

^{39/} ASF Circular No. 152, dated 28 April 1945

Plant Protection Officers and Inspectors

On 7 May 1941, The Adjutant General published a letter stating: 40/

a. "Present conditions within the United States make it necessary that the scope of the plant protection program of the War Department be expanded without delay to include frequent protective inspections of civilian and military manufacturing plants, arsenals and depots which are present or potential producers of War Department materials vital to the National Defense, as well as warehouses and those utilities serving these plants."

b. " * * * To assure the uninterrupted production of materials necessary for the National Defense, an inspectorate will be organized by, and operate under the direct control of, the Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services, and will be coordinated by the Under Secretary of War."

c. "The inspectorate will consist of a maximum of 100 retired officers or reserve officers not now on active duty, and 700 qualified civilians. * * *"

Military officers were procured from the reserve officers list and later by commissioning civilians who had the necessary qualifications.

Civilian inspectors, to operate under military control or to assume administrative direction under military control, were procured through procedures established by the United States Civil Service Commission through its various district offices. These inspectors were classified first in the Defense Production Protective Service, Examination No. 180, 1941. 41/

Most plant protection activities, including necessary security inspection personnel, were transferred from the technical services to the service commands in July 1942. 42/

Reports from the security inspection agencies, which were later substantiated by field inspections, indicated that many of the civilians and some of the officers did not have the proper qualifications for the plant protection work. The officers who

40/ WD letter, file AG 004 (4-22-41)H-B-M, dated 7 May 1941, subject: "Interior Protection of Plants and Utilities"

41/ U. S. Civil Service Examination No. 180 (unassembled), issued 15 December 1941

42/ SOS Circular No. 31, 22 July 1942

lacked adequate qualifications were usually reserve officers and had not been properly screened. Civilian inspectors were selected by Civil Service Commission. The Chief Examiner of the Civil Service Commission, after reviewing the personnel data questionnaires of one service command, stated informally that these civilian inspectors were not qualified. Representatives of the Fire Protection Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, suggested to the Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War, and the Civil Service Commission that the qualification standards of plant inspection personnel be changed from Inspector, Defense Production Protective Service, CAF service, to Production Security Engineer, Professional service. Late in 1943 the Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War approved the transfer. New standards with copies of the job description for technical positions in the professional service were distributed by the Civil Service Commission.^{43/} Civilian personnel procedures, which were to be followed in each service command, in recruiting and classifying personnel under the new standards, were published in an Army Service Forces circular.^{44/} The transfer was completed in June 1944. The number of plants vital to the prosecution of the war had decreased markedly by that time so that only about one hundred inspectors were necessary; this number decreased rapidly thereafter. The quality of the plant protection inspectors was improved greatly by this re-evaluation.

Crude Rubber

Government stockpiling of crude rubber started in 1939. Concern for proper fire protection for the stored rubber was first manifested in the summer of 1941. Stockpiling of crude rubber at War Department operated installations included an estimated 15,000 tons at the Curtiss Bay Ordnance Depot, a like amount at the Schenectady Quartermaster Depot, and 59,000 tons at the Columbus General Depot (later the Columbus Army Service Forces Depot). In addition, a large volume of crude rubber was stored at private facilities, owned either by Rubber Reserve Company or private interests.

In September 1941, particular interest developed in the crude rubber storage at the Firestone Rubber and Latex Products Company, Fall River, Massachusetts. On 26 September 1941, the plant protection survey of this property, by the Boston Chemical Warfare Service Procurement District, contained the following statements:

"* * * about 11½ million dollars worth of crude rubber * * * is stored in some 20 odd buildings, all very old, grouped in one corner of the property. These buildings are in a

^{43/} Form CP-118, War Department Civilian Personnel Division, Office, Secretary of War, dated 6 November 1943, subject: "Production Security Engineers"

^{44/} ASF Circular No. 53, dated 19 February 1944

congested area. The majority have common brick or masonry walls, which makes this group of buildings the equivalent of one large building having several rooms. Most of the fire doors separating buildings and areas are in poor condition. Many of them have no automatic closing device, and some cannot be closed at all due to the shifting of rubber stacks. Many elevator shafts are not closed between floors, so that the floor out-offs are bad. * * * The buildings are sprinklered, but many of the heads are at least twenty years old and many are 210° heads. The entire system will not stand 150 lbs. hydraulic test. * * * The present plan is to lock the buildings up and dispense with the inside watchmen, keeping everyone out as soon as the storing of rubber is completed."

In a letter to the Fire Protection Section of the Under Secretary of War's Office, dated 8 October 1941, the National Fire Protection Association made the following statement in connection with the crude rubber storage at Fall River:

"The large quantity rubber storage * * * appears to us to be subject to serious danger of complete destruction by fire. * * * The quantity stored in these closely grouped buildings at Fall River is far too great to subject to the risk of destruction by a single fire. Under the conditions of storage described, it appears probable that a fire once well under way in any of the sections of the storage would very likely spread to and destroy the entire group of buildings. The result would be the same irrespective of whether the fire were due to sabotage or were of accidental origin. While the buildings used for this storage are equipped with automatic sprinklers, the system is reported to be old and of questionable efficiency * * *. Even with well arranged automatic sprinkler protection the values exposed to a single fire in this case are much too large. We strongly recommend that the great bulk of this rubber be removed to some safe location * * *. It is our opinion that the present storage facilities at this location are so seriously deficient as regards fire safety that removal of the entire storage to some properly safeguarded location is the only feasible solution of the problem."

The situation at Fall River was discussed with the Rubber Reserve Company on 11 October 1941. A representative of the Production Branch, Office of the Under Secretary of War, left Washington to examine the conditions at Fall River first hand. On his arrival at Fall River, the next morning, 12 October 1941, the fire that was feared had broken out and 13,000 tons of crude rubber was destroyed by fire.

This shocking loss of a crude rubber stockpile emphasized the need of fire prevention and fire protection in connection with

stockpiles of critical materials and other items essential to the successful conduct of a war of major proportions.

On 26 November 1941, the Fire Protection Section, Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, issued a set of specifications "governing the safe storage of stocks of crude rubber." It became a guide for the production security inspectors of the War Department in connection with crude rubber storage both at government owned installations and at private facilities. These specifications had minor revisions on 12 December 1941 and 20 April 1942, after discussions with nationally prominent industrial fire protection engineers, and were used as a basis of the War Production Board's "General Storage Specifications for Critical and Strategic Materials," April 1943, and Addendum No. 3, "Rubber and Rubber Products," issued 31 August 1943.

The largest single stockpile of crude rubber was at the Columbus General Depot (later the Columbus ASF Depot), Columbus, Ohio. The storage in two buildings at this depot reached a total of 59,000 short tons in March 1942 and continued for three years without change. The rubber storage at Columbus was well cared for from a security standpoint but, as time went on and the stockpiles at other locations were moved to consumption, the percentage of the total volume of crude rubber in the United States, represented by the stockpile at Columbus, increased until it became a matter of most serious concern in the summer of 1944.

The rubber storage at Columbus was visited by a sub-committee of the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention of the Office of the Under Secretary of War. The sub-committee's report stated:

"In buildings 6 and 7 of the Columbus ASF Depot we saw what is said to be one-third of the natural crude rubber in the United States in one relatively small area subject, under adverse conditions, to a single fire." 45/

The meeting of the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention on 22 December 1944 considered a previous report by The Provost Marshal General concerning the storage of crude rubber at the Columbus ASF Depot. The Provost Marshal General had recognized that this concentration was excessive and had attempted to solve this problem by dispersing the rubber. The principal difficulty was that no other location or locations offered as much protection. The Provost Marshal General concluded that no change should be made in the storage of the crude rubber at the Columbus

45/ Memorandum for the Advisory Board, 25 October 1944, subject: "Findings from the Inspection Trip to the Fifth Service Command Week of 16 October 1944"

Army Service Forces Depot. As a result, the Board recommended that the "Under Secretary of War direct The Provost Marshal General to institute immediately every possible feasible additional measure to increase the protection of the rubber now stored at Columbus." * * * and to "direct the Army Service Forces Storage Division to try to find suitable storage space in which to make some dispersion of the rubber now stored at Columbus." 46/ A representative of the Under Secretary of War at the meeting suggested withholding action until 26 December 1944.

During a meeting on 26 December 1944, in the Office of the Under Secretary of War, The Provost Marshal General was directed by a representative of the Under Secretary of War to inspect the crude rubber at the Columbus Army Service Forces Depot and to submit a technical report covering all phases of security. 47/ Thereupon, representatives of The Provost Marshal General inspected the depot and submitted to The Provost Marshal General a report in which they concluded: "The present provisions of security for the storage of crude rubber at the Columbus Army Service Forces Depot are tolerable. Further dispersion within this depot is not practicable. Dispersion beyond this depot, with equal security maintained, is desirable, but not essential and may be found to be impracticable." During a meeting on 5 January 1945, a representative of the Under Secretary of War directed that:

a. The 37,500 short tons of rubber stored in Warehouse No. 6, Columbus Army Service Forces Depot, be dispersed, 20,000 short tons of the crude rubber to be stored in suitable Army Service Forces installations and 17,500 short tons to be stored by the Rubber Reserve Company in suitable commercial storage warehouses.

b. The Provost Marshal General determine whether satisfactory security measures were provided at the locations to be selected and recommend any appropriate additional measures.

The Provost Marshal General inspected four Army Service Forces installations proposed by the Storage Division, Army Service Forces, for the storage of rubber and found three of these installations suitable, subject to compliance with minor recommendations. In cooperation with the appropriate service commands, approximately twenty commercial warehouses, proposed by the Rubber Reserve Company for the storage of this crude rubber, were inspected. The movement of the crude rubber from Columbus Army Service Forces Depot to the

46/ Report of Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention, covering meeting of the Advisory Board held 22 December 1944, dated 18 January 1945

47/ PWGO Memorandum, file SPWGS 004, 8 January 1945, subject: "Crude Rubber Storage - Columbus ASF Depot"

approved installations and private warehouses was started by the Rubber Reserve Company on 20 April 1945 and continued until 11 August 1945, by which date approximately fifteen of the locations had been found suitable, subject to compliance with recommendations. On 1 August 1945, approximately 50% of the 37,500 short tons of rubber had been moved from the Columbus Army Service Forces Depot to approved Army Service Forces depots, commercial warehouses, or to consumption.

On 11 August 1945, in anticipation of the surrender of Japan, the Under Secretary of War instructed the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, that "in view of changed conditions, * * * further movements of rubber from the Columbus ASF Depot to other War Department storage installations will be discontinued * * *." The Under Secretary of War forwarded a copy of this memorandum to the Office of Rubber Reserve (formerly the Rubber Reserve Company) and informed it that, under the existing conditions, further movement of rubber was not justified.

Fire Prevention and Protection Schools

To provide better trained security inspection personnel for the service commands and technical services having security inspection responsibility, The Provost Marshal General made arrangements with the Illinois Institute of Technology, in November 1942, to establish a two and one-half week course in Plant Protection Engineering. The purpose of this training was to provide an intensive systematic study of the methods of maintaining security in industrial plants.

The instruction was supervised by members of the teaching staff of the institute. Individuals who were authorities in their particular fields were utilized as guest lecturers to implement the instruction. The students were officers and civilians, selected by service commands and technical services. Classes averaged 30 to 40 students each.

The courses were supported by federal funds, made available under the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training Program of the U. S. Office of Education.

The need for additional schools to conduct similar courses resulted in the establishment of a course at New York University in December 1942. In January 1943 it was decided to divide the instruction, transferring that portion pertaining to fire protection to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and retaining that portion pertaining to safety at New York University. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology course was established in January 1943.

The course at Illinois Institute of Technology was discontinued in March 1943. The course at Massachusetts Institute of Technology continued until January 1944 when sufficient fire protection men had been trained.

The extent of the program, the instructors, and the courses given were approved by representatives of The Provost Marshal General.

Fire Prevention Educational Material

Considerable difficulty was experienced in publishing educational material on fire prevention. The Provost Marshal General was charged with the staff supervision over Army fire prevention and protection measures at privately owned and operated facilities. The Publications Division of The Adjutant General's Office was of the opinion that such facilities received sufficient educational material from insurance companies. When the status of the war changed from the defensive to the offensive, with a large reduction in the number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, publication of educational material became even more difficult. However, with the establishment of the Under Secretary of War's Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention, and upon its recommendation, The Provost Marshal General prepared and had published 100,000 copies each of a poster and a pamphlet designed to impress upon employees the importance of fire prevention safeguards. This material was distributed to all War Department installations and to important privately operated facilities.^{48/}

Period of Recession

With the capitulation of Japan, and the elimination of War Department inspection activities at privately owned and operated facilities, The Provost Marshal General directed that the Fire Protection Branch be abolished. An Army Service Forces circular was published stating that The Provost Marshal General was divested of all responsibility for fire prevention and protection and that the Chief of Engineers was charged with the responsibility of coordination of all phases of fire prevention and protection measures within the Army Service Forces.^{49/}

^{48/} Poster "Home Front Fires are Enemy Victories," and WD pamphlet 32-3, 1944, "Your as a Plant Operator"

^{49/} ASF Circular No. 326, 1945

SAFETY PROGRAM

The Services of Supply Safety Program, now the Army Service Forces Safety Program, was established on 31 August 1942.^{1/} The policies and procedures governing the Internal Security Program at that time were expanded to include specifically accident prevention activities.^{2/} All Services of Supply safety activities were placed under the staff supervision of The Provost Marshal General, and the commanding generals of the service commands, the Chiefs of Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Transportation were made responsible for accident prevention activities, as a part of the "Internal Security" program, at those facilities and installations charged to them for security inspections. The Chief of Engineers was made responsible for accident prevention at new military construction projects. The Provost Marshal General was further charged with the responsibility for coordinating the Services of Supply accident prevention program with safety activities of other governmental and civilian agencies.

Prior to the directive which formally established the accident prevention program, safety activities as a part of plant protection had been carried on in varying degrees by several of the supply services.

During 1939, inspections relating to plant protection were being made by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Division, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. In these very early days of the country's preparation for war production, plant protection was thought of principally in the light of possible subversive activity or sabotage; accident prevention as such was not given much prominence.

In the fall of 1940, the Production Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War was made responsible for all matters pertaining to the protection of commercial plants manufacturing for the Army.^{3/} While accident prevention was receiving only passing attention in this War Department program, the suppliers of important munitions were largely of that group of plants wherein accident prevention was attaining ever increasing importance as a matter of sound business.

^{1/} SOS Cir No. 55, dated 31 August 1942, subject: "Internal Security - Accident Prevention"

^{2/} SOS Cir No. 31, dated 22 July 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{3/} Office Memo by the Executive of the ASofW, dated 13 November 1940

There was little change within the War Department in the status of accident prevention until early 1941. On 21 April 1941, pursuant to authority contained in the Act of 16 December 1940 (Public No. 891 - 76th Congress), the duties and responsibilities which included procurement and safe guarding of material placed upon the Secretary of War by Section 5a of the National Defense Act, as amended, were assigned to the Under Secretary of War.

An Insurance Committee for the Protection of American Industrial Plants had been established in February, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining reports and technical assistance from the various insurance companies already inspecting and rendering "plant protection" service to War Department suppliers. In the summer of 1941, the operating staff of this committee became the National Bureau for Industrial Protection. The insurance companies' reports on accident prevention were reviewed by the Bureau and transmitted to the War Department for the use and guidance of the supply arms and services. The utilization of the services of the Bureau was predicated on the War Department's policy of holding to a minimum the number of inspectors visiting plants and of curtailing duplication of inspection effort.

In August, 1942, the security inspection agencies of the Army Service Forces were directed by the Director of Procurement, Army Service Forces, to establish, immediately, aggressive accident prevention programs to further the Army's efforts to prevent avoidable interruption or delay in the production and delivery of war material, caused by any of the hazards inherent to manufacturing, not only at private plants supplying the procurement agencies but at military manufacturing plants, arsenals, and depots.^{4/}

To assure further the uninterrupted production of necessary materials, an inspectorate was organized to operate under the direct control of the chiefs of supply arms and services and to be coordinated by the Under Secretary of War.^{5/} On 12 May 1941, a memorandum from the Under Secretary of War to the chiefs of the supply arms and services implemented this expansion of the scope of plant protection within the War Department.^{6/} This directive covered the responsibility for inspection, inspection personnel ceilings, organization of the inspectorate, inspection standards, forms to be used, and reporting.

^{4/} FMGO Interoffice Memo, dated 10 August 1942, subject:

"Report of Industrial Safety Conference"

^{5/} WD letter to the USofW and Chiefs of supply arms and services, file AG 004 (4-22-41)M-B-M, dated 7 May 1941, subject:

"Interior Protection of Plants and Utilities"

^{6/} Memo from the USofW to the supply arms and services, dated 12 May 1941, subject: "Plant Protection Inspection Service"

While no specific reference was made to accident prevention in either the initiating directive of 7 May 1941, or the implementing directive of 12 May 1941, it was appreciated immediately that accident prevention, as an important factor in production interruptions was not to be neglected. The Quartermaster General and the Chiefs of Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Engineers set up inspectorates and in general initiated accident prevention activities.

However, accident prevention in the War Department was still of minor interest, due principally to the belief that the major plant protection problems were fire, espionage, and sabotage, and that most plants were receiving adequate safety inspection service from their own insurance carriers. At this time, too, there was the feeling that overlapping or duplication of inspection might affect the cooperative relationship between the War Department and private plant operators. The extreme hesitancy to request reports from plant managers delayed collection of accident experience data, an essential element for a directed safety effort.

The accelerated construction program throughout 1941 marked the first definite change in the War Department's attitude relative to accident prevention. Into the design of new plants (particularly those for the manufacturing and processing of explosives and allied products) the Corps of Engineers put every known safety device and appliance to assure maximum safety. In addition, the Chief of Engineers insisted that each contract for new military construction contain a clause requiring that the contractor conduct his activities to minimize the danger of accidental injury to personnel.

After 7 December 1941, accident prevention in the War Department and among suppliers to the War Department took on a new and more important aspect. Manpower became a critical commodity overnight. All work schedules were stepped up. The normal eight-hour day suddenly expanded into three eight-hour shifts. New plants were activated. The largest construction program in history was accelerated tremendously. All of these activities made staggering demands upon manpower, and upon uninterrupted operations - two factors which are aided substantially by accident free operations. To complicate the problem to a greater extent, came the sharp upturn in drafting of personnel for the largest army in the history of our country. This removed from war plants many of the most physically fit and experienced men. The supply program operated with older men, more women, inexperienced personnel, and less people. Each of these items helped to focus more and more attention on accident prevention activities within the War Department and its suppliers.

Available statistics showed that in 1940 and 1941 injury rates to workers engaged in defense work increased considerably.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which in 1940 and 1941 made voluntary plant protection surveys of important facilities manufacturing national defense material and storing critical commodities, on 3 January 1942 stepped out of the plant protection picture, turning the entire job over to the War Department.^{7/}

In March, 1942, the reorganization of the War Department was effected. The Services of Supply was created as a major command.^{8/} Consolidated within the Services of Supply were the supply arms and services, the corps areas, and certain administrative services of the War Department, including The Provost Marshal General's Office. The Services of Supply was made responsible for the development, procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies to meet all military requirements, except those peculiar to the Army Air Forces.

Steps were soon taken to integrate and coordinate plant protection responsibilities, functions, and activities of the component Services of Supply services.

The first step was the issuance, in March 1942, of a War Department directive giving official recognition to the creation of a centralized Internal Security Program, including accident prevention activities.^{9/} The Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, was transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office, and combined with the Emergency Operations Division to form the Internal Security Division. The directive, creating the Internal Security Program, was important to accident prevention in the Services of Supply for many reasons. It was the first indication of official recognition of accident prevention as an important part of internal security. It centralized supervision of the entire program - an extremely important step, due to the varied safety programs in operation throughout the Services of Supply. It expanded the activities of security inspectors to include posts, camps, and other installations in the corps areas, ports of embarkation, sub-installations of ports and new military construction projects.

^{7/} WD letter to the commanding generals of all corps areas; and chiefs of supply arms and services, file AG 004 (12-30-41) MSC-B-M, dated 3 January 1942, subject: "Plant Protection Surveys."

^{8/} HQ, SOS letter to chiefs of supply arms and services, corps area commanders, and other offices, agencies, boards, and committees of the War Department coming under the jurisdiction of Services of Supply, dated 9 March 1942, subject: "Initial Directive for the Organization of the Services of Supply"

^{9/} WD letter to Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Defense commands, corps areas, Washington Provisional Brigade, and chiefs of operating divisions of Services of Supply, file AG 381 (3-28-42), 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

This in itself was an important forward step, as it recognized that such installations were of equal importance to the war effort with the private plants supplying materiel. Finally, this directive placed policy making responsibilities in the hands of The Provost Marshal General.

While the security program showed considerable progress, accident prevention remained a subordinate part, receiving secondary attention. It was limited, with few exceptions, to cursory inspections and suffered seriously from lack of administrative accident statistics to serve as a guide in directing educational training activities and inspection activities in an efficient manner.

While The Provost Marshal General had staff supervision of accident prevention along with all other phases of internal security, no one on his staff was sufficiently experienced in accident prevention to interpret inspection reports, to develop much needed policy, and to keep higher authority advised of progress or lack of progress and current needs.

By mid-1942, the Services of Supply took cognizance of the need for a well implemented safety program that would actively contribute to the conservation of man-power and to the reduction of work interruptions in that critical period in the country's history. Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General was directed to establish such a program within the Services of Supply.^{10/}

Numerous conferences were held during the summer of 1942, each intended to ascertain the status of accident prevention activities by the security inspection agencies of the Services of Supply, and in this way to establish an efficient workable program for the entire Services of Supply.

One additional change which occurred at this time had a far-reaching effect on the future of accident prevention in the War Department. A further reorganization of the Army resulted in changing corps areas to service commands and certain supply services to technical services.^{11/} The important feature of the reorganization (from an accident prevention standpoint) pertained to the reassignment of responsibilities. Prior to this change, the supply services (Ordnance Department, Chemical Warfare Service, Signal Corps, Corps of Engineers, Quartermaster Corps, Medical Department, and Transportation Corps) had authority and responsibility in connection with safety at their field installations and at facilities under their procurement responsibility. This was

^{10/} Transmittal letter from Chief of Administrative Services, file SPAAM 004.003, 20 July 1942, subject: "Industrial Safety Program and Operations of the Services of Supply"

^{11/} General Orders No. 35, War Department 1942

changed, and, in the change, most of the administrative functions were transferred from the procurement services to the service commands, among them internal security, of which accident prevention was a part. Assignment was determined on the basis of activity. As technical services were, in effect, specialists, it was determined that the Chemical Warfare Service and Ordnance Department should have responsibilities for continuing protection of field installations and facilities, manufacturing, storing, and processing explosives, and allied substances; that the Chief of Engineers should be responsible for new military construction; and that ports of embarkation and sub-installations of ports should be the responsibilities of the Chief of Transportation. As the Chief Signal Officer, The Quartermaster General, and The Surgeon General procured only "inert" items, they were assigned no responsibility for continuing protection. As a result, the service commands entered upon security activities on a large scale, with continuing protection responsibilities for all facilities and installations within their geographic limits (except those "exempted" above).

This important forward step eliminated duplication of inspection effort and definitely allocated responsibilities.

The major features of this internal security re-organization were published in July 1942.^{12/} In August, 1942, an accident prevention directive was issued paralleling the policies the internal security circular and the re-organization of the Army outlined in AR 170-10, as revised on 10 August 1942.^{13/}

Organization of the Safety Program

Many problems confronted The Provost Marshal General in implementing the accident prevention program. With manpower and time the controlling factors, it was necessary to determine what types of facilities and installations should be given priority--the private plant group (which was to reach almost 16,000 units), the War Department installation group (which was fast growing), or military personnel. A second problem was personnel--personnel to supervise the program and personnel to operate it in the field. Other problems were training of the inspection personnel, accident reporting, and reporting procedures, forms, and policies.

^{12/} SOS Circular No. 31, 22 July 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{13/} SOS Circular No. 55, 31 August 1942, subject: "Internal Security - Accident Prevention"

As the primary problem of the War Department at that time was procurement of war material, privately-operated war production plants were of primary importance. To assist in obtaining "enough and on time," the first efforts of the program were directed to those facilities.

To make the most progress in the shortest period of time, several important short-cuts were effected. Accident prevention had been carried on in industry for many years, and this large reservoir of knowledge could be drawn upon in formulating accident prevention policies in the War Department. Accordingly, one of the first acts of The Provost Marshal General, with the establishment of an Accident Prevention Section in his office was to appoint an "Advisory Council on Accident Prevention," composed of one representative of each of the three major fields of accident prevention--the National Safety Council, the insurance companies, and private industry. Dr. Ned H. Dearborn, President of the National Safety Council; Mr. E. W. Beck, Safety Director, U. S. Rubber Company; and Mr. H. W. Heinrich, Engineering Division of the Travelers Insurance Company; were selected to comprise this Council and rendered yeoman service in setting up the War Department program.^{14/}

As some eight hundred internal security inspectors were already visiting private industrial plants, it was decided to utilize this personnel to encourage and assist plant safety programs.

Work was immediately begun on accident reporting policies, procedures, and forms, but to prevent too great a time-lag, and to make control statistics immediately available to The Provost Marshal General to assist in directing the program, the existing facilities of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor, were utilized.

The Accident Prevention Section started with one officer and two civilians. However, safety personnel in Washington was soon increased to four officers and two civilians and the expanded section became the Safety and Health Branch.

Another important organizational change in the Army Safety Program was the establishment, in November, 1943, of a Statistical and Research Section in Chicago, as a Class IV installation of The Provost Marshal General's Office.^{15/} This enabled the Safety and Health Branch to obtain and analyze data for compiling a single accident statistical release for the Army Service Forces, supplanting various individual publications of the technical services, and making uniform the evaluation of progress being made by the service commands and technical services.^{16/}

^{14/} Letter to Mr. Ned H. Dearborn, file SPMGS 095, 11 September 1942

^{15/} ASF Admin. Memo No. 8-84, 10 November 1943, RE: Statistical and Research Section, PMGO

^{16/} Memo for the Chief of Ordnance, file SPICY, from Chief of Staff ASF, 5 April 1944, subject: "Accident Prevention Progress Statistical Tabulations and Publications"

This permitted the assumption by the Army Service Forces of responsibility for completeness and accuracy of data formerly tabulated for the War Department by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor.

Originally, compilation of all statistics was centralized in the Statistical and Research Section in Chicago because installations, service commands, and technical services exercising safety supervision were not familiar with accident reporting techniques and determination of the various cause factors. It was necessary, therefore, to have them submit Individual Injury Reports to the Statistical and Research Section which analyzed the reports and compiled statistical data therefrom. After eight months, the field, as a result of a vigorous educational campaign, had been familiarized to a great extent with the necessary techniques. Therefore, on 1 June 1944 much of the accident compilation and reporting was decentralized to the field and the Class IV installation in Chicago was transferred to Washington.^{17/}

This transfer was a part of a plan to expedite the publication of accident statistics to the field. Thereafter individual accident reports were retained at post level, and post summaries of each month's experience forwarded to responsible service commands and technical services, where over-all summaries were prepared and sent to The Provost Marshal General in Washington. This permitted the publication of accident statistics in the month following that in which the accidents occurred.

Late in 1942 the War Department Safety Council was organized.^{18/} It consisted of representatives of the technical services and staff divisions of the Army Service Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Navy. It was organized for the purpose of exchanging safety information pertinent to the various services and keeping interested agencies informed of safety activities, thus avoiding duplication. It met once a month for discussion of War Department safety problems. In addition annual meetings were held and were attended by representatives of civilian safety organizations, such as the National Safety Council, the National Conservation Bureau, the National Bureau for Industrial Protection, the American Standards Association, the U. S. Public Health Service, and other governmental organizations.^{19/} About fifty persons attended these special meetings which proved excellent public relations media and assured increased cooperation.

^{17/} ASF Cir. No. 118, 28 April 1944, Section VII

^{18/} SOS Memo, 5 December 1942, subject: "Accident Prevention Program Coordination Committee"

^{19/} ASF letter to Mr. Paul Hardesty, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, from Chairman, War Department Safety Council, 9 June 1943

In February, 1944, an Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention was formed in the Office of the Under Secretary of War.^{20/} It consisted of fire prevention and accident prevention panels and gave Army safety work increased prestige and the advantage of supervision by a higher echelon. In January, 1945, the War Department Safety Council was made responsible to the Advisory Board of the Office of the Under Secretary of War and its membership increased to include G-3 (Training) of the War Department General Staff, Military Training Division, Army Service Forces, and others. However, the affairs of the Council continued to be administered by The Provost Marshal General.^{21/}

Civilian safety organizations cooperated generously with The Provost Marshal General in an effort to control accident frequencies in key war plants. Assistance was received from the American Society of Safety Engineers and other technical societies, and from the casualty insurance companies, through the National Bureau for Industrial Protection. All insurance companies' safety inspection reports needed by the War Department were made available without cost through a specially established Washington office.^{22/} Some 50,000 safety reports were received from this source. Federal and state governmental bodies and various trade associations assisted. The National Safety Council and local safety councils helped. In all, a tremendous cooperative accident prevention effort was organized and saved the War Department much time and effort.

Considerable work had been undertaken in cooperation with the American Standards Association. This organization already had done much to standardize safety procedures. A representative of The Provost Marshal General acted as chairman for the American Standards Association committee which wrote specifications for the manufacture and testing of safety shoes. A color code for industrial painting and standards for personal protective clothing were devised at War Department request.^{23/} Members of the War Department Safety Council served on many American Standards Association committees.

Training

At the inception of the Army Safety Program, its greatest need was for trained personnel. With the many thousands of important war plants asking for help in their safety work, and only a few of the Internal Security inspectors qualified in this field, there was urgent need for a short course, not to produce safety engineers, but

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- ^{20/} WD Memo No. W 850-44, 8 February 1944, Subject: "Fire Protection and Safety Measures"
- ^{21/} WD Memo No. 850-45, 22 January 1945, Subject: "War Department Safety Council"
- ^{22/} National Bur. for Industrial Protection Report Form A-1, "Summary for Accident Prevention and Safety"
- ^{23/} ASF letter to Dr. P. G. Agnew, American Standards Association, file SPUPC, 13 May 1944

to give inspectors a working knowledge of safety organization. The first 10-day courses were organized at the Illinois Institute of Technology and at New York University in the fall of 1942. In a short time, the course at Illinois Institute of Technology was discontinued and the Center for Safety Education, New York University, continued, training thirty students, military and civilian, each month. Approximately 1,200 had been trained as of 5 October 1945.

The nature of the instruction changed considerably. In 1942 and 1943, course graduates spent a major part of their time on accident prevention in private plants - where interruption of vital war production would have been disastrous. By 1944, however, with most production problems solved, there was time for greater concentration on the Army's own safety problems, and during that year the course was directed to a greater extent toward military safety problems.

Financing of instruction for Army personnel was first arranged through the courtesy of the U. S. Department of Education but, upon the withdrawal of its support in May, 1945, the War Department, at the request of The Provost Marshal General, undertook the financing as a joint project of the Military Training Division and Civilian Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, which were the agencies handling Army training courses.24/

Films

Visual aids were used widely for educational and promotional purposes. "Safety Sleuth," a "Pete" Smith short which won the National Safety Council award as the best safety picture of 1944, was the most spectacular of the safety films, but it was primarily a publicity of general educational film produced by Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios with technical advisors furnished by The Provost Marshal General. A number of War Department training films were prepared. Twelve sets of glass slides, 175 slides to each set, were prepared and supplied to the service commands with appropriate scripts for lecture work. Ten film strips on the more common subjects, such as "Office Hazards," "Material Handling," and "Fire Prevention" were prepared by the Signal Corps and were in great demand. A thirty-minute sound moving picture "Shop Safety" for personnel in Army machine shops received a most favorable response as has a thirty-minute sound movie, with a German sound track, prepared for showing to German prisoners of war engaged in lumbering operations.

24/ ASF Cir. No. 289, 30 July 1945.

Publications

By the use of various educational and promotional publications, the Safety Branch assisted service commands and technical services in conducting safety activities at facilities and installations for which they are responsible.

"Conserve Manpower for Warpower," a leaflet prepared for the 1942 National Safety Congress, was the first publication in connection with the Army Service Forces safety program. The "Minimum Safety Program" was the second of such documents. It was a short pamphlet, directed primarily toward private industry. It proved very popular and more than 200,000 copies were distributed as a result of unsolicited requests. "Phantom Armies Do Not Win Wars," and "Stop Accidents" were leaflets for public interest and were prepared for initial distribution at the National Safety Congress. Instructions for completing the section on "Accident Prevention and Health," of the Internal Security Inspection Report, were prepared and included in the "Internal Security Inspection" pamphlet. A guide for standards and requirements for manufacturers, to provide for the security of plants and facilities against the hazard of accidents, was written and included in the pamphlet "Plant Protection for Manufacturers."

As the scope of the Army safety activities changed from private industry and the production of war materials to safety within the Army, the nature of publications changed. A manual on safe work practices for prisoners of war in German was published in September, 1944, and a companion manual for Italian prisoners was published in October, 1944.^{25/}

An undue number of accidents were occurring to soldiers on furlough, leave, or pass. A test made in the Sixth Service Command indicated that a 60 percent decrease in such accidents resulted from the distribution to soldiers going on furlough, leave, or pass, of a pamphlet entitled "Private Droop Has Missed The War." The pamphlet pointed out common dangers occurring on furlough, leave, and pass and ways to avoid them. It was published as a War Department pamphlet in June, 1944, and over a million copies were distributed.^{26/} Although exact statistics were not compiled, appreciable reductions in such accidents were accomplished.

^{25/} ASF Manual M 805, 22 September 1944, subject: "Safe Work Practices for Prisoners of War (German)"

ASF Manual M 806, 18 October 1944, subject: "Safe Work Practices for Prisoners of War (Italian)"

^{26/} WD Pamphlet 21-10, 5 June 1944, subject: "Private Droop Has Missed the War"

During the fall of 1944, a General Safety Manual was prepared.^{27/} Prior to the writing of this manual each technical service and many individual installations had prepared and were issuing various sets of safe practice rules. Some of these were printed, as in the case of the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers, but the majority was a miscellaneous collection of rules based on accident experience developed during the war. As each set of rules was an individual effort, there was considerable variance in the regulations governing similar situations. This was particularly evident in regard to that group of safe practices common to all industrial operations and, therefore, normally referred to as "general safety rules." As this group comprised the bulk of all safety regulations, The Provost Marshal General prepared, for general use, a set of established rules to replace the multitude of costly individual sets of rules and to assure the adoption of one authoritative rule or practice to cover each general situation. This War Department manual was called TM 20-350 and was transmitted to The Adjutant General's Office for publication in September, 1945.

As the Ordnance Department, Chemical Warfare Service, Transportation Corps, and Corps of Engineers have technical operations of a highly specialized nature, safety manuals of each were made supplements to the General Safety Manual by the inclusion of the necessary specialized items and the removal of all rules and regulations of a general nature.

An Employee's Safety Handbook was also prepared by The Provost Marshal General and was forwarded to The Adjutant General's Office for publication in September, 1945. It is an abbreviated pocket edition of the General Safety Manual, for distribution to each employee, and contains those rules and regulations most closely associated with the individual employee's everyday activity. This publication, like the General Safety Manual, was designed to eliminate several hundred separate publications, many of them dealing with the same subject, each in a slightly different manner.

There had existed a need for a recurring publication that would serve as a clearing house for new and helpful ideas on accident prevention as there was no way in which safety lessons learned in one service command or technical service could be brought to the attention of others. In the fall of 1944, this need was recognized and approval for a publication, "Safety Information" was granted. The first issue appeared in October, 1944. The magazine proved popular in overseas as well as in domestic commands. It was written specifically for Army safety personnel and five bi-monthly issues were published. On 1 September 1945, publication was suspended temporarily.

Statistical publications have played an important part in Army safety work. Through them, commands have been kept informed and progress in accident prevention measured. The first reports were prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor and consisted of an industrial classification breakdown by service commands and technical services.^{28/} The Statistical and Research Section published "The Safety and Health Digest," which contained the private plant and Army Service Forces civilian accident experience for January, 1944.^{29/} Starting with February, 1944, Army Service Forces statistics were all carried in Monthly Progress Report, Section 16, which included complete statistical covering.^{30/} Monthly Report, Section 16, was discontinued in April, 1945, and thereafter statistics have been published in Monthly Progress Report, Section 11, ^{31/} and in "Safety Information" until its suspension in September, 1945.

A number of safety posters for general distribution to War Department installations and privately operated facilities were published. The first, in four colors, entitled "Make Haste Safely," was issued in October, 1942. Then followed, in 1943, the "Army Safety Program Seal," "O. So-glow posters 1, 2, 3, and 4", "I Need You on the Job," "It May Cost His Life," and "Get Yourself a 'Zero' Too." In 1944, the following posters were published: "Don't be a Dope" and War Department posters 1 and 2, "How Not to Win the War" and "Speaking of Fires." In 1945, War Department posters 3 and 4, "The Pedestrian Problem" and "Physical Straining," and a joint Army-Navy poster "Fork Truck Safety Tips" have been published. A traffic safety poster was also in process of preparation. (November 1945)

Public Relations

The success of any safety program depended, to a large extent, upon the amount of "safety consciousness" that it created and on the awareness of hazards established in the minds of personnel who might have been injured or who might have been responsible for the safety of others. Also, safety had long been recognized as an excellent medium for good public relations.

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- ^{28/} Industrial-Injury Frequency Rates for Government and Privately Operated Facilities by Industry and by Service Commands, prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor
- ^{29/} Safety and Health Digest, Hq, ASF, Volume 1, No. 1, March 1, 1944
- ^{30/} ASF Monthly Progress Report, Section 16, "Safety," 30 November 1944
- ^{31/} ASF Monthly Progress Report, Section 11, "Accident Prevention Program," August 1945

The Army Safety Program participated in the National Safety Congresses of 1942, 1943, and 1944. It presented many noteworthy speakers, including Assistant Secretary of Air, Mr. Robert A. Lovett; Major General Allen W. Cullion and Major General Archer L. Lerch, successively The Provost Marshals General; Major General Norman T. Kirk, The Surgeon General; Major General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., Commanding General, Armored Forces, Army Ground Forces; Major General T. H. Harrison, Assistant Chief Signal Officer; Lieutenant General William S. Knudsen, Director of Production, Office of the Under Secretary of War; Major General Henry S. Aurand, Commanding General, Sixth Service Command; Lieutenant General Levin H. Campbell, Chief of Ordnance; Lieutenant General Barton K. Yount, Commanding General, Air Training Command, Army Air Forces; and Major General Jonathan W. Anderson, Commanding General, XXXVI Army Corps. Army safety exhibits were shown and attracted thousands of visitors.

In 1943, in cooperation with the Washington Junior Board of Commerce, the Safety Branch promoted a safety rally in the auditorium of the Department of Interior, Washington, featuring the Marine Band, current War Department moving pictures and a national broadcast including Mr. Clifton Fadiman, noted radio commentator and literary critic; Mr. Paul V. McNutt, Director, War Manpower Commission; Mr. D. W. Tracy, Assistant Secretary of Labor; Mr. W. M. Jeffers, Rubber Director; Major General H. S. Aurand, Commanding General, Sixth Service Command; and Colonel P. D. Glassford, Director, Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office. A letter from President Roosevelt to the Director of the Internal Security Division urging greater safety effort, was read over the air.^{32/}

In 1943 and 1944, the Army participated in the Greater New York Safety Conference by sending exhibits and providing feature speakers. Army safety speakers appeared at scores of safety meetings in most of the larger cities.

On two successive occasions, the National Safety Council has given the Army Service Forces its highest war time award, the Distinguished Service to Safety Award.^{33/} It was received first, at the 1944 National Safety Congress banquet, by The Provost Marshal General and the second time at a meeting of the Service Commanders, by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.^{34/} In both instances, the presentation ceremony was carried by national radio hook-ups and wide publicity was given in newspapers and magazines.

^{32/} Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, 14 July 1943, to Colonel Pelham D. Glassford

^{33/} National Safety Council Award of Honor for Distinguished Service to Safety to Army Service Forces, October 4, 1944

^{34/} National Safety Council Second Award of Honor for Distinguished Service to Safety to Army Service Forces, June 1945

Posters were published by many private sources, including insurance companies, manufacturing concerns, trade associations, and local safety councils. Opportunity was offered to these organizations to include the seal of the Army Safety Program on their posters.^{35/} A large number of publishers accepted and the safety seal has appeared on thousands of safety posters, distributed all over the world.

Statistics

The first accident frequency data were tabulated in January, 1943.^{36/} They covered private plants accorded security inspections. The January rates were high and continued to increase for six months. However, the cumulative effort of the War Department Safety Program and the help of civilian agencies soon took effect and, by December, 1943, July rates had been reduced by 30 percent. This represented a saving in production time of 216,000 man-days a month, the time of 8,000 workers. The exposure, at its peak, was over 1,500,000,000 man-hours a month, the largest on which accident statistics were ever collected. Sixteen thousand plants were involved, employing more than 6,000,000 workers. All accident reporting by private plants assigned to the service commands for safety supervision was discontinued in January, 1944; accident reporting of private plants assigned to the Chemical Warfare Service and Ordnance was discontinued in May, 1945.

The second phase of the Army Safety Program included civilian workers in War Department installations. A million such employees were involved, in approximately 1,000 installations. Their overall accident frequency was 13.9 in January, 1943. This rate was lowered 56 percent to 5.0 for June, 1945, two and one half years after inception of Army Service Forces statistics. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (United States Department of Labor) published a private plant accident frequency of 18.2 for the year 1944. This was 300 percent higher than the current Army Service Forces rate. Hazards of exposure were comparable.

Reporting of injuries to military personnel was established late in 1944, by adapting the morbidity reports program of The Surgeon General.^{37/} This proved of little value to accident prevention since all data were based on reports prepared by medical personnel with little or no consideration of causes or prevention. A new program was, therefore, established late in 1945.^{38/}

^{35/} PMGO letter RE Use of Safety Emblem

^{36/} WD Memorandum 850-45, 18 January 1945, subject: "Progress made in Accident Prevention in Privately-Operated Plants Under Army Safety Program - 1943"

^{37/} WD Circular No. 438, 1944

^{38/} Sections I, II, and III, ASF Circular No. 360, 1945

Reporting of motor vehicle accidents was inaugurated on 6 April 1944. Motor vehicle accident figures were not too significant as they were handicapped by two adverse conditions--incomplete reporting during the early months of the program and a variation in the interpretation of what constituted a reportable motor vehicle accident. Steps were taken to correct both of these factors by the establishment of a new accident reports system.^{39/} The revised procedure incorporated a broader and clearer interpretation of a reportable motor vehicle accident resulting in more uniform and complete reporting.

Beginning early 1944, maintenance of motor vehicle accident figures at post level developed an alertness to the problem among local commanding officers and their staffs and resulted in their making a concerted effort on the training of drivers, maintenance of equipment, traffic control and other engineering, educational, and enforcement features.

Statistical detail was covered completely in monthly publications, first by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, then in "The Safety and Health Digest," Monthly Progress Report, Sections 16 and 11, and in "Safety Information."

Motor Vehicle Safety

The organized effort to study military traffic for the primary purpose of safe and efficient operation began early in 1941. At that time the War Department issued detailed instructions to the Engineer Board and the Infantry Board to conduct a series of studies, using an entire infantry division as a "guinea pig," to establish doctrines and standards on the correct application and techniques of military traffic control and motor transport.

For four months, during the summer of 1941, these two boards conducted many experiments, using scientific instruments developed by the Public Roads Administration, to obtain exact data concerning traffic volumes, roadway capacities and speed of movement. Other studies were conducted on traffic control techniques, traffic planning, logistics, traffic control equipment and organization, safe driving techniques, and driver testing and training. The findings were published in two separate reports in the fall of 1941.^{40/}

As a result of this concentrated effort, Army regulations and pertinent publications were revised and rewritten.^{41/} These publications were based on the most effective techniques of traffic control and motor movement from the standpoint of safe operation and accident prevention.

^{39/} Sections I, II, and III, ASF Cir. No. 360, 1945

^{40/} Infantry Board Report 1252, October, 1941, and Engineer Board Report 640, December, 1941

^{41/} AR 850-15, "Motor Vehicles," FM 29-5 "Military Police," FM 25-10 "Motor Transport," and SOPM 101-15, "Traffic Circulation and Control."

By early 1942, the Corps of Military Police had been organized and a Military Police officers training school had been established at Arlington Cantonment (now South Post, Fort Myer) Virginia. Several of its courses gave military police officers specialized instruction in traffic control and motor transport. The basic doctrine for the course was expressed in simple language; i.e., "KEEP TRAFFIC MOVING SAFELY." As the school expanded, the course became more comprehensive, and more time was added for automotive training and the three E's of Safety--Enforcement - Engineering - Education. Since a large percentage of student graduates were assigned to Class I, II, and IV installations in this country, motor vehicle accident prevention was well under way by the latter part of 1942, largely through the efforts of provost marshals and the Military Police.

By the middle of 1942 a parallel effort to establish sound principles and techniques of driver selection, testing, and training was well under way at Camp Lee, Virginia. An immediate result of this effort was publication of two important technical manuals for the driver.^{42/} Thus, the activities of motor transport supervisors at posts, camps, and stations also were part of the concentrated effort to place a skilled driver behind the wheel of every Army vehicle.

The winter of 1942-1943 marked the first concentrated effort to establish and operate a motor vehicle safety program in an overseas theater. The Provost Marshal General of American troops in the British Isles, recognizing the need for accident prevention--particularly in view of the "change-over" from right to left-hand driving - assigned one of his staff officers to devote his full time to the problem. The work of this staff division resulted in many directives and an educational campaign designed to bring the alarming accident rate to the attention of all military personnel in the theater. The automotive safety program established there carried over into France after D-Day, and was used as the basis for an over-all theater automotive and industrial safety program.

In 1943 and 1944, the automotive safety program in the United States was expanding rapidly, largely through the efforts of The Provost Marshal General, The Quartermaster General, and the Chiefs of Engineers, Ordnance, and Transportation. Safety was being stressed in the year-round maneuver areas where large bodies of troops were given extended periods of combat training.

In November, 1944, the Army Service Forces program was expanded to include organized efforts toward motor vehicle accident prevention.^{43/}

^{42/} TM 21-300, "Driver Selection and Training," and TM 10-460, "Driver's Manual."

^{43/} Section V, ASF Cir. 360, 1 November 1944, "Accident Prevention - Extension of training at New York University"

The course at New York University was lengthened to provide more instruction in motor vehicle safety and later a four-day motor vehicle safety seminar was prepared for service commands.

The Sixth Service Command was the first service command to hold such a seminar and called in from each major installation the safety officer, motor transport supervisor, and provost marshal for detailed discussions on problems of mutual interest at post level. This seminar was held in March, 1945. In August, 1945, the Third Service Command conducted a similar seminar, and other service commands are expected to follow as the program develops.

An effort was made to devise a standard qualification test for the non-combat driver, both military and civilian, to fill the gap left by development of combat driver tests without counterpart tests for the non-combat driver. These standards were prepared by the Safety Branch of The Provost Marshal General's Office and were submitted to The Adjutant General's Office for publication as a "trade knowledge" test on 15 November 1945. The test will be given to motor vehicle operators and paragraph 24, AR 850-15, which deals with motor vehicle operation will be amended to require the test.

Army publications and training films on automotive safety provided post safety directors and unit safety officers with sources of information which assisted them materially in the automotive phase of their post safety programs. In addition, a six-point post motor vehicle safety program was published and disseminated through the medium of "Safety Information" as a guide to an effective accident prevention program. Other material assistance to safety personnel in the field was produced through the medium of posters, articles, directives, and miscellaneous literature.

From the inception, in 1941, of the motor vehicle safety program the Army relied heavily on doctrines, techniques, and practices developed over a period of years by civilian safety organizations. By using these principles as a foundation, and adapting them to meet military requirements, a sound program was placed in effect as an integral and important part of the permanent Army Safety Program.

Post V-J Day

The Army Service Forces Safety Program was substantially unaffected by the reductions in Army activities accomplished upon the defeat of Japan.

The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, directed that accident prevention activities be discontinued at private plants and that efforts be concentrated on safety for Army personnel and Army installations.

At that time (August 1945) additional impetus was given the program by a restatement of purpose, scope, and responsibilities in a War Department circular which outlined the responsibilities for safety within each of the three major commands - Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces.^{44/}

In line with the elimination of all but essential publications after V-J Day, publication of "Safety Information," the official publication of the Army Service Forces Accident Prevention Program, was discontinued.^{45/} Safety personnel were informed, however, that The Provost Marshal General would continue to serve as a clearing house for information pertaining to safety, and were urged to forward to him details of unusual safety ideas or problems encountered. They were further cautioned that the discontinuance of this publication made it increasingly important that personnel qualified by previous experience or training in safety be selected as key safety officers.

Along with other reductions, the training school at New York University was discontinued.^{46/}

A lasting contribution to the entire safety movement in the United States was made when Minimum Standards for Civilian Safety Training were released.^{47/} This publication, initiated by The Provost Marshal General, was prepared by a committee of the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention, Office of the Under Secretary of War, and had the concurrences of the members of the Advisory Board and the Director of the Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces. It served as a guide to individual plant operators in developing industrial safety programs.

Coincident with the ending of hostilities, a revision of the accident reporting program and restatement of the policy and organization of the Army Service Forces Safety Program was published.^{48/} This new program was the result of an entire year's research and is exceptionally well adapted for post war use. Completely new and simplified Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces accident reporting procedures, and delineation of authority and responsibility for accident prevention within the

^{44/} WD Cir. 263, 31 August 1945, Section I, "Army Safety Program"

^{45/} ASF Cir. 337, 7 September 1945, Part Two, Sec. II, "Suspension of Safety Information"

^{46/} ASF Cir. 337, 7 September 1945, Part III, Sec. X, "Quotas for Courses"

^{47/} WD Cir. 276, 13 September 1945, "Civilian Safety Training"

^{48/} ASF Cir. 360, 25 September 1945, Part I, "ASF Safety Program"

Army Service Forces, were included. It outlined the purpose, scope, and responsibilities for staff supervision and field operation of the program; prescribed the use of new accident report and summary forms and directed the method by which they would be prepared and processed to higher authority; provided definitions, instructions, and interpretations for use in connection with the accident reporting procedures; and rescinded all previous Army Service Forces directives on accident reporting and responsibilities.

This new directive omitted from the scope of the Army Service Forces Safety Program the assignment of responsibilities for accident prevention at privately owned and operated facilities. It placed added emphasis upon aggressive accident prevention activities to reduce the frequency of disabling injuries to military and civilian personnel at Class I, II, and IV installations, military personnel of the Army Ground Forces, prisoners of war (including members of Italian Service Units), and accidents involving Army motor vehicles.

The new reporting procedures were effective 1 November 1945. Medical personnel of The Surgeon General's Office were removed from accident reporting channels. One new "Report of Injury" form for use in recording accidental injuries to all types of personnel; and three new forms for summarizing accident frequency and cause data at posts and at service command and technical service headquarters were provided to replace the six forms previously in use. All accident data were to be routed, through the safety personnel of each echelon, to The Provost Marshal General and he was to furnish summaries of accident experience to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

In September 1945, the Under Secretary of War approved a recommendation of The Provost Marshal General that the Advisory Board on Fire and Accident Prevention of the Office of the Under Secretary of War be abolished. This action was taken as a result of the cessation of hostilities and was in accordance with the policy of the War Department to streamline and eliminate certain functions performed during the war.

In October 1945, the War Department Safety Council, which had coordinated safety activities of the Army and Navy, was abolished.^{49/} This action was recommended by The Provost Marshal General, concurred in by the Council, and approved by the Under Secretary of War, because the new directives, referred to above, provided ample means of coordination between the major commands,

^{49/} WD Cir. 305, 5 October 1945, Section VIII, Advisory Board Discontinued.

thereby eliminating the necessity for the Council. Section I, WD Circular 273, 31 August 1945, referred to above, charged the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, with responsibility for safety activities covering Army Service Forces military and civilian personnel and for furnishing technical advice and assistance to and administering accident reporting procedures for the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces. Thus, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, became the only other staff officer within the War Department with safety responsibilities and, therefore, the need for coordination of safety activities within the War Department was minimized. Many of the safety activities within the Army Air Forces dealt with aircraft and flying operations and were not precisely comparable to those of the Army Service Forces and Army Ground Forces.

Prompted by many Congressional inquiries as to why military personnel were being injured and killed in training accidents, particularly since hostilities had ceased, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff, directed the Commanding Generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces to maintain, in their respective headquarters, complete information regarding accidents which resulted in fatal or serious injuries to military personnel in training.^{50/} Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General prepared instructions directing that, effective 22 October 1945, commanding officers of Class I, II, and IV installations forward to The Provost Marshal General, by air mail within twenty-four hours after the injury or death, one copy of each Report of Injury concerning a fatality or a reportable disabling injury to military personnel in training.^{51/} The purpose of this directive was to permit the immediate correction of the causes of training accidents.

^{50/} Memo from Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, WDGS, dated 11 October 1945, subject: "Training Accidents"

^{51/} ASF Cir. No. 381, 18 October 1945, Part I, Sec. I, Training Accidents

ASF SECURITY ACTIVITIES AT POSTS, CAMPS AND STATIONS

Responsibility for "the establishment of policies of the Army Service Forces as they pertain to Army Service Forces security activities at posts, camps and stations" was formally assigned to The Provost Marshal General on 3 December 1943. At the same time he was also charged with the preparation of "uniform policy for all service commands to follow with regard to the maximum utilization of personnel in the internal security measures * taken by Army Service Forces posts, camps and stations". 1/

The local commanding officer is primarily responsible for the security of his post. 2/ Although economical utilization of available guard personnel to provide necessary security is the responsibility of the commanding officer, wide variances existed in interior guard systems and security measures. The degree of security accorded depended in large measure upon the opinion of the local commanding officer as to the potential dangers from espionage, sabotage, or theft, the need for protection against fire, and the importance of the installation.

Representatives of the War Department Manpower Board, WDSS, made periodic inspections, from the standpoint of personnel utilization, of all activities and operations of the Army Service Forces. A yardstick for measuring personnel requirements for Army Service Forces station complement functions and activities was established by obtaining and evaluating information from a representative number of installations. This yardstick was largely a ratio of station complement personnel to the total military population of a post. Surveys by the War Department Manpower Board were primarily for the purpose of determining whether military personnel was utilized properly and were one means of determining Army Service Forces bulk allotments for military personnel. Measurement of the workload and interior guard activities was admittedly difficult and the yardstick was applied with due consideration of all circumstances. Excerpts from War Department Manpower Board reports on interior guard activities at several posts, camps, and stations were sent to The Provost Marshal General, from time to time, for appropriate action or remark and recommendation. These reports were used by The Provost Marshal General to expedite the elimination of excessive guard activities at posts, camps and stations.

1/ ASF Memorandum, SPICY 2-12, 2-13, 3 Dec 43, subject: "Establishment of Army Service Forces Internal Security Policies."

2/ Para. 4b(1) AR 210-10, 20 Dec 40, subject: "Posts, Camps, and Stations;" para. 6, AR 35-6520, "Finance Dept.," 16 Feb 45; FM 26-5, Interior Guard Duty, 1942; Para. 7, Section IV, ASF Circular No. 167, 2 June 1944.

A Bureau of the Budget report, dated 21 September 1943, to the War and Navy Departments pointed out that, since the nation had transferred from defensive to offensive warfare, security measures should be reduced at privately-operated facilities. As the findings of the Bureau of the Budget were equally applicable to Army installations, it was deemed necessary to promulgate policies and procedures for the reduction of security measures and personnel at posts, camps and stations. 3/ Accordingly, the Chief of Staff, War Department, on 22 October 1943, appointed a War Department committee, representing the Commanding Generals, Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces, to: 4/

- (1) Ascertain what reduction could be effected in security measures at posts, camps and stations.
- (2) Recommend to the Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, policies and procedures to reduce security measures and personnel at posts, camps and stations.

The final report of this committee to the Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, dated 30 December 1943, emphasized the following factors: 5/

- (1) Under the bulk allotment personnel system employed by the Army Service Forces, neither the major commands nor posts, camps and stations received specific allotments for security personnel.
- (2) The assumption by the War Department of certain calculated risks, by decreasing security measures, would assist the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to obtain further reductions.
- (3) Guides for the economical utilization of security personnel had been prepared by The Provost Marshal General, as a result of a preliminary report of the committee, and should be furnished to the three major forces (Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces) as War Department policy.

3/ Ltr fm Chairman, Temporary Joint Committee on Plant Protection, to Deputy Chief of Staff, WD, 20 October 1943.

4/ Memorandum fm Office of the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, file WDOSA, 350.05 (22 Oct 43), subject: "Security Measures at Posts, Camps, and Stations," dated 22 October 1943.

5/ Memorandum fm Chairman, Committee on Security Measures at Posts, Camps and Stations, to Deputy Chief of Staff, subject: "Security Measures at Posts, Camps, and Stations Within the Continental United States," dated 30 December 1943.

- (4) The Provost Marshal General had been assigned specific responsibility for staff supervision over guard forces within Army Service Forces operated installations, including the task of assuring compliance with the established policy of reducing guard personnel to the minimum.

In the meantime a definitive statement of War and Navy Department policy on security activity, based upon the Bureau of the Budget's study, was published on 3 November 1943, and read in part as follows: 6/

"* * * The present crucial stage of the war requires the directing of all available resources and manpower into an increased effort in direct support of the present offensive phase of the war. This necessitates a policy that more carefully calculated risks will have to be assumed than during the early stages of this war. It is essential that guard and other security personnel at facilities be reduced to minimum standards of security so that such excess personnel can be diverted to production efforts.* * *

This policy was likewise applicable to military installations. Accordingly, an ASF memorandum to the chiefs of technical services, dated 6 November 1943, stated that: 7/

- (1) Guard and other security personnel at military establishments should be reduced to minimum standards consistent with security so that personnel could be diverted to production efforts.
- (2) Security measures and personnel should be reduced at War Department installations in a manner similar to the action taken by the War and Navy Departments at privately-operated facilities.

An Army Service Forces letter, dated 12 November 1943, referred to the new basic policy of the War Department for guard and other security personnel at privately-operated facilities and directed the commanding generals of the service commands and chiefs of technical services to effect maximum reduction of security measures and personnel. 8/

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- 6/ Joint War and Navy Departments Circular #1, dated 3 November 1943.
7/ ASF Memorandum, SPAAM 381, 6 Nov 43, subject: "Reduction of Internal Security Measures."
8/ Army Service Forces letter, SPX 323/361 (11 Nov 43), OB-P-SPAAM-MB-A, 12 Nov 43, subject: "Internal Security at War Department Operated Installations."

Guides for Utilization of Guard Personnel

The Provost Marshal General, on 13 December 1943, forwarded to chiefs of technical services, Army Service Forces, a tentative list of suggested general guides for local commanding officers to secure a uniform reduction in guard forces throughout the various technical services and requested recommendations for additional guides and comments on those suggested. The Chemical Warfare Service and Ordnance Department did not concur in the use of firemen in place of guards to make "spot checks" of certain areas. The Ordnance Department suggested that the use of guard "post write-ups" should be made at all installations having several guard posts.

As a result of this study by The Provost Marshal General and the recommendations contained in the final report by the War Department Committee on security measures at posts, camps, and stations, Army Service Forces Circular No. 31 was published in January 1944.^{9/} This circular set forth 17 specific guides for the economical utilization of guard personnel and stated that:

- (1) The policy in Joint War and Navy Departments Circular No. 1, 3 November 1943, on internal security measures at privately operated facilities was made applicable to guard activities at Army Service Forces installations and activities.
- (2) The War Department had assumed its full share of responsibility for the risks inherent in a reasonable application of this policy, and had established and furnished to the three major forces a list of guides for the utilization of civilian and military guard personnel.
- (3) It was essential that any excess manpower now engaged in guard activities be made available for other duties more directly contributing to the war effort.
- (4) The Provost Marshal General had been assigned staff supervision over the adequacy of guard forces at installations and activities under the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces.
- (5) The Inspector General had been requested to determine, in the course of routine inspections, the extent to which these guides were being applied at Class I, II, and IV installations and activities.

^{9/} Section I, Army Service Forces Circular No. 31, 1944.

The 17 guides published in the Army Service Forces circular were incorporated in a memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, who distributed them, within his command to Armies, Commands, Replacement Depots, the Maneuver Area, the Tank Destroyer Center, and Divisions.10/

Late in December 1943, a list of guides to effect reductions in guard personnel at Class III installations were published in Army Air Forces Regulations.11/

A War Department circular of 28 January 1944 stated that the acute shortage in personnel required a readjustment of policies in order to release men for overseas duty.12/ Two points mentioned in the circular were of particular importance:

- (1) At schools and replacement training centers, service by station complements was to be continued but reduced to the minimum necessary for the service of the installations.
- (2) Field force units at other installations were required to provide personnel for interior guard duty.

The War Department Technical Manual on Sabotage, prepared by The Provost Marshal General, incorporated the substance of the guides contained in Army Service Forces Circular No. 31.13/

A War Department memorandum on 9 February 1944 referred to the guides published in the Army Service Forces Circular, Army Ground Forces letter, and Army Air Forces Regulations and required inspectors general to examine local guard systems, study the need for proper protection against hazards, and make recommendations for corrective action.14/

Upon the capitulation of Germany in May 1945, the possibility of sabotage by German agents could be largely discounted. In view of the necessity for increased effort in direct support of the remaining phase of the war, Army Service Forces security activities were reviewed with a view toward effecting further reductions. The

- 10/ WD Memorandum, file WDSCSA S50.05(30 Dec 43), 6 January 1944, subject: "Economies in the Utilization of Guard Personnel Within the Continental United States," as indorsed by Hdqs., Army Ground Forces, in 1st Ind., file 320.2/7001 (6 Jan 44) GNAGS, 12 January 1944
- 11/ AAF Regulations No. 46-6, 24 December 1943, subject: "Guard Personnel Regulations and Security Policies", and amendments thereto, AAF Regulations No. 46-5A, 10 March 1944
- 12/ Section IV, War Department Circular No. 36, 28 January 1944
- 13/ Paragraph 75, "Protection Force", TM 19-225, subject: "Sabotage", February 1945
- 14/ WD Memorandum No. W20-44, 9 February 1944, subject: "Economy in Guard Personnel"

Provost Marshal General prepared and published additional guides for the utilization of guard personnel, supplementing those in Army Service Forces Circular No. 31, 1944. 15/ In general, the new guides stated that security and guard personnel utilized solely as a wartime security measure should be eliminated at personnel and vehicular control gates and normal peacetime measures should be applied at all installations at which Army Service Forces exercised jurisdiction over security activities, except at (1) prohibited zones, (2) special research or classified projects, (3) areas containing dangerous explosives or gases, and (4) areas housing general prisoners or prisoners of war. The new guides were designed to eliminate a large number of guards at the majority of Class I, II, and IV installations, as they were not in the excepted categories. The circular was soon amended to include in the excepted categories facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, and installations on the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List. 16/

The new guides were not being carried out fully due to a misinterpretation that security and guard personnel should not be eliminated at installations housing general prisoners and prisoners of war. As practically all Class I, II, and IV installations had sub-installations housing some prisoners of war or general prisoners, little or no saving in guard personnel was being effected. In order to carry out the intent of the original circular, the statement referring to general prisoners and prisoners of war was changed to read: "Which are prisoner of war base camps, branch camps, United States disciplinary barracks and rehabilitation centers, or other places of confinement for army military prisoners." 17/

Defense Commands

The War Department Manpower Board, WDSS, reported in March 1944 that excessive guard personnel was being utilized at installations designated as Prohibited Zones in the First, Second, and Fourth Service Commands. 18/ The designation of these installations as

15/ Section II, Army Service Forces Circular No. 199, 1945.

16/ Section I, Army Service Forces Circular No. 220, 1945. (Class I installations: installations under command of service commanders. Class II installations: installations under command of service commanders with certain activities exempted from such command. Class III installations: installations under command of Army Air Forces. Class IV installations: installations under command of administrative or supply service of Services of Supply.)

17/ Section II, Army Service Forces Circular No. 278, 1945.

18/ Extracts from War Manpower Board's reports on service command installations submitted to The Provost Marshal General on 9 February 1944.

prohibited zones by the Eastern Defense Command were interpreted by the service commanders as warranting no further reductions in guard personnel. Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General initiated the dispatch in April 1944 of War Department letters to the commanding generals of the Eastern, Southern, and Western Defense Commands, 19/ emphasizing that the nation had passed from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive phase of the war and that the acute personnel shortage made it desirable that every means consistent with safety be taken to reduce the number of military personnel engaged in guard duty. The defense commands were directed to review the provisions of their public proclamations in order to effect maximum reductions in guard forces and other security personnel at all military installations. They were also instructed that, if appropriate, prohibited zones should be redesignated as restricted zones and as many prohibited and restricted zones as possible should have such classifications removed entirely.

The Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command, called this War Department letter to the attention of the commanding generals of the service commands within his command. 20/ At some military installations, military personnel were being used as guards to enforce the provisions of Public Proclamation No. 2, requiring that individual permits be held by all persons "entering, remaining in, or leaving any prohibited zone." 21/ Accordingly, the defense commander's letter stated that the existence of a prohibited zone did not make it mandatory that such zone be guarded by military personnel. Service commanders were requested to review all zones within their command which embraced military installations. The letter emphasized that the commanding officer of any military installation which included a prohibited zone might, if he deemed advisable, recommend the cancellation of its prohibited status and, if appropriate, its designation as a restricted zone. Such action, if approved, would make it unnecessary to issue permits for persons desiring access to the area but would provide the safeguards applicable to restricted zones as set forth in Proclamation No. 2, which required that any person entering upon or found in a restricted zone should satisfactorily establish his identity and explain his presence and intention in the zone.

19/ War Department letter, file AGWB-C-E 384 (13 April 44), 17 April 1944, subject: "Restricted and Prohibited Zones in Defense Commands."

20/ Eastern Defense Command letter, file GB 384-4, 4 May 1944, subject: "Restricted and Prohibited Zones."

21/ Public Proclamation No. 2, Eastern Defense Command and First Army, 7 September 1942.

The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, reported, in response to the War Department letter, that public proclamations by his headquarters had been continuously reviewed with a view to further modification whenever the military situation so indicated and that further study was in progress. 22/ He concluded that "in general, the effect of the Western Defense Command's proclamation prescribing restricted or prohibited areas had been to reduce the total number of personnel required to guard various installations within the area."

The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, reported that no restricted zones or areas had been proclaimed and that the only prohibited area was a small area in Roane and Anderson Counties, Tennessee. 23/

By V-E Day the Eastern Defense Command had absorbed the Southern Defense Command and the Central Defense Command. The Eastern Defense Command's V-E Day instructions to service commanders authorized them to review designations of prohibited zones and to make appropriate recommendations.

In December 1944, the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, informed The Provost Marshal General that several War Department Manpower Board surveys showed that: (1) enlisted men were not required to perform guard duties eight hours a day, six days a week, as was habitually performed by civilian guards, (2) military guards were given light duties which were only theoretically guard duty, (3) the guides in Army Service Forces Circular number 31, 1944, did not go into enough detail and that (4) The Provost Marshal General should make a detailed study of this problem with particular reference to the total number of hours of guard duty performed by each guard during each week.

This subject was discussed at a conference on military discipline at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in January 1945 by a panel consisting of representatives of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Army Service Forces, The Provost Marshal General's Office, and the service commands. It was agreed that each post, camp and station should be considered separately and that additional detailed instructions, other than the guides then contained in Army Service Forces circular, should not be issued.

22/ Western Defense Command letter, file 384.4 (C-3), 1 May 1944, subject: "Restricted and Prohibited Zones in Western Defense Command."

23/ Southern Defense Command letter, file 384.4-SDCA, 23 May 1944, subject: "Restricted and Prohibited Zones in Defense Commands."

During the latter part of January 1945, the Director, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, formed several survey teams from the staff divisions to visit selected installations, and in February 1945, suggested assembly of personnel control units to spend considerable time in the field. A personnel control conference was held at Columbus, Ohio, in March 1945, to discuss the utilization of personnel. At this conference it was indicated that military guard personnel should perform at least 48 hours of guard duty per week, as 48 hours was the standard for civilian guard personnel. As a result of this conference, The Provost Marshal General decided to make "spot inspections" of posts in coordination with representatives of the service commands.

Field Inspections :

Inspections of three representative Class II installations in the Third Service Command 24/ and two representative Class II installations in the Fourth Service Command 25/ were made by representatives of The Provost Marshal General and the Security and Intelligence Division of the service commands between April and July, 1945. The Security and Intelligence Divisions of the service commands supervised the adequacy of measures for guarding installations at which the service commander exercised jurisdiction.

The purpose of these inspections was (1) to determine the extent of the security measures needed for proper protection against hazards, (2) to study the guard systems being used, and (3) to make proper recommendations for corrective action. Rosters and assignment sheets were reviewed to determine whether guard personnel were being utilized properly and for at least 48 hours each week. Special conditions, peculiar to each installation, requiring guards, were also reviewed.

It was concluded that the installations visited had accomplished reasonable applications of the standards for guarding promulgated in Army Service Forces Circular No. 31, 1944. Much had been done to reduce guard personnel to minimum standards consistent with security but further reductions were possible. Existing guard personnel, it was found, was being utilized the maximum number of hours per week.

Accomplishments

On 31 January 1944, the Deputy Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, directed the commanding generals of the service commands and Military District of Washington and the chiefs of technical services to submit a report by 10 March 1944 of personnel savings effected or con-

24/ PMG Memorandum, file SPMGS 004, 10 April 1945, subject: "Army Service Forces Security Activities at Posts, Camps, and Stations."

25/ PMG Letter, file SPMGS 231.4, 13 July 1945, subject: "Army Service Forces Security Activities at Posts, Camps, and Stations."

templated as a result of compliance with the guides listed in the Army Service Forces circular. 26/ The reports submitted were summarized and a summary published in the Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report showing a reduction of 3,484 guard personnel in Class I and II installations under the jurisdiction of the commanding generals of the service commands and the Military District of Washington and 10,212 guard personnel at Class IV installations.

On 19 September 1944, an Army Service Forces Circular, prepared by The Provost Marshal General, directed that a further report be made by 20 November 1944 of personnel savings in guard forces accomplished between 1 March 1944 and 31 October 1944 as a result of compliance with the guides listed in Army Service Forces Circular 31. 27/ A summary of these reports included in the Monthly Progress Report, 28/ showed that 44,187 civilian and military guard personnel were being used on 31 October 1944, a reduction of 7,519 or 14.5% from the number on 1 March 1944. Military guard personnel, during this period, decreased 5,043, or 17.9%, and civilian guard personnel decreased 2,476, or 10.5%. The reduction shown in that report cannot be added to the reductions shown in the report submitted on 10 March 1944, listed in the preceding paragraph, because the report made on 10 March 1944 showed actual and contemplated reductions in guard personnel, and the "contemplated reductions" were, for the most part, shown as accomplished reductions in the November report.

26/ Memorandum, 31 January 1944, subject: "Civilian and Military Guard Personnel."

27/ Section III, Part Two, Army Service Forces Circular No. 313, 19 September 1944.

28/ Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report, Section No. 11, November 1944.

THE LOYALTY INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM

The Loyalty Investigations Program, supervised by The Provost Marshal General, encompassed the loyalty investigation of civilians employed by the War Department and in war industry and certain loyalty investigations of military personnel. The program was comprehensive in scope and interrelated with other Provost Marshal General personnel security programs, i.e., Key Personnel, Industrial Employment, Personnel Security Inspection, Alien Employment, Suspension of Subversives, Japanese-American and Military Clearance (Japanese) programs. The investigations program was the fact finding program. The interrelated programs were policy and action programs.

The mission of The Provost Marshal General, in connection with the "Loyalty Investigations Program," was to form and maintain an efficient investigative organization to conduct loyalty investigations for the War Department and other authorized agencies, and to exercise staff supervision over the program.

On 31 July 1941 the Office of The Provost Marshal General was created by order of the Chief of Staff.^{1/} A skeleton organization had just been formed when, on 29 October 1941, certain operating functions were transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to The Provost Marshal General.^{2/} The Investigations Division was activated by The Provost Marshal General on 17 November 1941. Our entry into the war in December, 1941, increased the demand for action. It was imperative that organization, expansion and production be expedited in order for The Provost Marshal General properly to discharge his responsibilities under strain of a challenging work load resulting from our actual participation in total war.

Origin and Development of Investigations Division

The transfer of certain operating functions from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, to The Provost Marshal General was first initiated by a memorandum for the Chief of

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- 1/ Adjutant General's Orders to The Judge Advocate General, detailing the latter as The Provost Marshal General, file AG 370-81 (7-31-41), dated 31 July 1941
 - 2/ WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (9-10-41)MC-B, dated 29 October 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Operative Functions, Counter Intelligence Branch, M.I.D."

Staff from Brigadier General Sherman Miles, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated 30 August 1941.^{3/} This paper recommended that a new organization be created to take over certain operating functions of G-2 or, alternately, to transfer these functions to an existing agency. Although The Provost Marshal General was not suggested by name in General Miles' memorandum, the Chief of Staff in a memorandum for The Provost Marshal General, dated 10 September 1941, suggested that The Provost Marshal General consider taking over of these functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.^{4/} The Provost Marshal General replied to the Chief of Staff in a memorandum, dated 12 September 1941, and stated that he could efficiently relieve the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of certain operating functions, such as Corps of Intelligence Police, Investigations, Plant Intelligence Operations, Passport and Visa Control, and Espionage Services.^{5/} The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in a memorandum for The Provost Marshal General, dated 18 September 1941, then recommended that The Provost Marshal General take over the investigative activities of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, except those dealing with the Counter Subversive System.^{6/} The Provost Marshal General on 22 September 1941, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, requested the immediate assignment of certain functions, including G-2 investigations, not directly concerned with the counter subversive system.^{7/} On 25 September 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, again recommended to the Chief of Staff that counter-intelligence activities be not transferred to The Provost Marshal General.^{8/} He followed this with a memorandum on 21 October 1941 recommending the transfer of certain functions which resulted in the publication of a War Department directive, on 29 October 1941.^{9/} This directive transferred from the Military Intelligence

- ^{3/} Memorandum from Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, file MID 321.19 (G-2), dated 30 August 1941, subject: "Transfer of Operating Functions from the Military Intelligence Division",
- ^{4/} Memorandum from Chief of Staff, file 15435-39, dated 10 September 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Counter-Intelligence Activities"
- ^{5/} PMGO memorandum, dated 12 September 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Certain Current General Staff Activities to The Provost Marshal General"
- ^{6/} Memorandum from Acting Chief of Staff, G-2, file MID 320.2-MID, dated 18 September 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Counter Intelligence Activities"
- ^{7/} PMG Memorandum, dated 22 September 1941, subject: "Duties of The Provost Marshal General"
- ^{8/} Memorandum from the Acting Chief of Staff, G-2, file MID 320.2 MID, dated 25 September 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Counter Intelligence Activities"
- ^{9/} Memorandum from Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, file MID 323.11, dated 21 October 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Operative Functions, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID"; and WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (9-10-41)MC-B, dated 29 October 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Operative Functions, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID"

Division, War Department General Staff, to The Provost Marshal General, the following investigative jurisdiction:^{10/}

- a. Investigations of applicants for employment in the military establishment.
- b. Investigations of civilian employees and individuals where, in the interest of national defense, an investigation appeared necessary, prior to release to them of classified information.
- c. Investigations in the Civilian Conservation Corps.
- d. Investigations of scientists for the National Defense Committee.

On 17 November 1941, The Provost Marshal General created the Investigations Division to carry out the above investigative functions. Two officers and thirteen clerks were transferred from Military Intelligence Division to The Provost Marshal General's Office, and provision was made for transfer of 90 members of the Corps of Intelligence Police to The Provost Marshal General, to form the nucleus of The Provost Marshal General's investigative organization in the field.^{11/}

Within five months, the personnel of the Investigations Division increased from 2 officers and 13 clerks to a total of 954 persons. On 17 April 1942 there were 23 officers and 87 clerks in Washington, and 27 officers, 575 sergeant investigators and 242 clerks in the Corps areas.^{12/} The actual investigations were conducted by the enlisted investigators in the Corps areas.

On 1 March 1943, a new Division, the Personnel Security Division, was organized, and the Investigations Division was made a branch thereof.^{13/} By this time decentralization of most operations to the service commands had been accomplished and the investigative organization within the Provost Marshal General's Office which exercised staff supervision over the investigations conducted in the field and checked records of other intelligence agencies in each case investigated, was considerably reduced in military and civilian personnel.

^{10/} Memorandum from Executive Officer, G-2, file MID 321.19 C.I.B.

10-31-41, dated 6 December 1941, subject: "Transfer of Certain Operative Functions of the Military Intelligence Division to the Office of The Provost Marshal General"

^{11/} Memorandum from Acting AG of S, G-2, file MID 321.1902 Counter Intelligence, dated 10 November 1941, subject: "Transfer of Certain Counter Intelligence Activities"

^{12/} History of Investigations Division, PMGO, from 17 November 1941 to 17 April 1942

^{13/} PMGO Office Memo #2, dated 20 February 1943, subject: "Reorganization of Internal Security and Investigations Divisions"

On 1 June 1945, the Personnel Security and Internal Security Divisions of the Provost Marshal General's Office were consolidated and designated Security and Investigations Division.^{14/}

On 18 August 1945, staff supervision over all loyalty investigations, except of civilians outside the military establishment, was transferred to the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces. The Investigations Branch was discontinued and most of its military and civilian personnel were also transferred to the Office of the Director of Intelligence.^{15/}

The original investigative jurisdiction of the Investigations Division was set forth in War Department directive of 29 October 1941.^{16/} It provided for loyalty investigations of civilian personnel employed or to be employed in the War Department or the military establishment and civilians employed in facilities working on classified projects, the contracts for which required that the employees be acceptable to the War Department. Although investigations for the Civilian Conservation Corps were also provided, no investigations of this type were ever made by The Provost Marshal General. Investigations of military personnel and of alleged subversive personnel within the military establishment remained with the Military Intelligence Division, pursuant to the delimitation agreement between Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division.^{17/} Later these latter investigations were also transferred to the Provost Marshal General's Office.

The delineation of jurisdiction was agreed to by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence Division, and Office of Naval Intelligence with respect to investigative duties pursuant to a Presidential order dated 26 June 1939, which stated in part as follows.^{18/}

"It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department.

^{14/} Provost Marshal General's Office Order No. 47, dated 29 May 1945

^{15/} Army Service Forces Circular No. 314, dated 18 August 1945

^{16/} WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (9-10-41)MC-B, dated 28 October 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Operative Functions, Counter Intelligence Branch, M.I.D."

^{17/} WD letter, file AG 383.4 (7-5-40)M-B-M, dated 8 July 1940, subject: "Delineation of Investigative Duties of the FBI, ONI and MID"

^{18/} Presidential Memorandum, file G2/9794-186, dated 26 June 1939

"No investigation should be conducted by any investigative agency of the government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above."

On 6 September 1939, the President had instructed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take charge of all investigations in matters relating to espionage, sabotage and violations of the neutrality regulations.^{19/}

On 9 February 1942, representatives from Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division entered into a new delimitation agreement concerning investigations to be performed by each service.^{20/} It was agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage be delimited as follows:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was responsible for:

- a. All investigations of cases in the categories named that involved civilians in the United States and its territories with certain listed exceptions (some islands and Alaska).
- b. Investigation of cases from foreign countries requested by State, War or Navy Departments.
- c. Jointly with Office of Naval Intelligence, the coverage of Japanese activities in above categories.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was to keep Military Intelligence Division and Office of Naval Intelligence informed on:

- a. Developments affecting vital utilities and plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts and critical points of transportation and communication systems.
- b. Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage.
- c. All other important developments.

^{19/} Presidential Statement issued 6 September 1939.

^{20/} Delimitation Agreement - Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division, 9 February 1942

The Military Intelligence Division was responsible for:

- a. Investigation and disposal of all cases in the above categories in the military establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control.
- b. Investigation of civilians in certain listed island possessions excepted from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Naval Intelligence jurisdiction.
- c. Informing the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Office of Naval Intelligence of any other important developments.

The Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for:

- a. Investigation and disposal of all cases in above categories in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval employ or control, and civilians in certain listed island possessions excepted from Military Intelligence Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation jurisdiction.
- b. Jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories listed above.
- c. Informing the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division of any important developments.

The agreement also included delimitations of certain activities during periods of martial law and periods of predominant military interest, not involving martial law.

On 22 February 1942, the War Department published a letter for the field setting forth the terms of the delimitation agreement.^{21/}

Although the basic agreement between Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division remained unchanged, the War Department published a directive on 13 March 1944 which authorized and directed certain commanders, having jurisdiction over activities in continental United States and its possessions,

^{21/} War Department letter, file AG 383.4 (2-20-42)MSC-B-M, dated 22 February 1942, subject: "Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the FBI, ONI and MID"

to discharge the responsibility of Military Intelligence Division as set forth in paragraph 3 of the 22 February 1942, Adjutant General's letter.^{22/} The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, was designated as responsible within the continental limits of the United States, except for those investigations specifically assigned to the Army Air Forces.

An Army Service Forces letter was published to clarify the reasons for the 13 March 1944 directive.^{23/} It stated that the revision in the 13 March 1944 letter was made to conform with provisions of War Department Circular No. 324, 14 December 1943, which transferred counter-intelligence investigations within the Zone of the Interior to The Provost Marshal General.

Although direct communication between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and The Provost Marshal General was authorized as early as 26 November 1942, to provide for the administrative procedure of making direct requests for record checks to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, instead of channeling through G-2, no written understanding was consummated between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and The Provost Marshal General concerning the extent and conduct of loyalty investigations of civilians for employment in privately operated facilities important to Army or Navy procurement until after the transfer of counter-intelligence investigations within the Zone of Interior from Military Intelligence Division to The Provost Marshal General.^{24/} An agreement was made and the field was notified on 18 April 1944 by Army Service Forces directive, which inclosed a copy of the agreement.^{25/} This agreement provided in the main, that:

22/ War Department letter, file AG 383.4 (2 March 44)OB-S-B, dated 13 March 1944, subject: "Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the FBI, ONI and MID"

23/ ASF letter, file SPX 383.4 (18 March 44)OB-S-SPDC, dated 24 March 1944, subject: "Delimitation of Responsibility for the Investigation of Espionage, Sabotage and Subversion in the United States and Possessions"

24/ On 26 November 1942, a memorandum from the Office of Chief of Staff to the AC of S, G-2, file WDOSA 230(11-26-42), authorized direct communication between The PMG and FBI for making of loyalty checks and discovery and discharge of plant subversives. On 14 December 1942, The PMG informed the Deputy Chief of Staff by memorandum, file SPMGS 321.195, that the Liaison Section, Personnel Security Branch, Internal Security Division, had been created within PMGO, to focalize requests within the office to FBI and receive and distribute all information from FBI for PMGO

25/ ASF letter, file SPX 230.741 (14 Apr 44)OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 18 April 1944, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of Civilian Employees of Privately Operated Firms of Importance to War Effort"

a. If, in the course of an investigation by The Provost Marshal General it appears that the subject may be subversive or disaffected, The Provost Marshal General is entitled to pursue the investigation only so far as is necessary to establish the balance of probability. If it appears probable that subject is subversive or disaffected, the investigation will be terminated and all results turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. When the Federal Bureau of Investigation transmits to The Provost Marshal General closed reports of investigations, no further investigation is to be made by The Provost Marshal General, except to verify certain facts regarding the employment of the individual. In cases which The Provost Marshal General determines further investigation necessary the Federal Bureau of Investigation is to be informed and asked whether it has any objection.

c. The Provost Marshal General refrain from investigating any organization of a potentially subversive nature and of approaching any known or suspected subversive individuals or organizations in the course of an investigation.

It is to be noted that this agreement did not apply to those subversive investigative functions transferred from G-2 to the Army Service Forces under War Department Circular 324, 14 December 1943, as the existing delineation agreement between Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division was not intended to be amended in any particular.

Directives were issued at various times to insure the proper channeling of communications with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^{26/}

On 8 May 1942, the Navy transferred to the Army responsibility for Personnel Security.^{27/} This resulted in the Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, assuming the responsibility for investigations of personnel in private plants of importance to Navy procurement. This transfer was made because, prior thereto, the

^{26/} WD letters, file AG 312.3(4-1-42)MC-B-M, dated 2 April 1942; AG 312.3(10-9-42)OB-S-B-M, dated 13 October 1942; AG 312.3 (22 May 44)OB-S-B-M, dated 24 May 1944; all on the subject: "Channels of Communication with Federal Bureau of Investigation"; and Memorandum from the Chief of Staff, file WDOSA 230 (11-26-42), dated 26 November 1942, subject: "Change in Administrative Procedure Involving the Military Intelligence Service, the Office of The Provost Marshal General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation"

^{27/} Secretary of Navy letter, file 01152716, dated 8 May 1942, subject: "Personnel Security - Transfer to Army Responsibility For"

Army and Navy had separate personnel security programs for facilities important to War and Navy Department procurement, which caused confusion and duplication of work.

The transfer of routine investigations from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to The Provost Marshal General was considered as early as 31 March 1942, although complete transfer of jurisdiction was not made until 1 November 1942, when the responsibility for alien loyalty investigations was taken over in its entirety by The Provost Marshal General.^{28/} For complete information, see "The Alien Employment Program."

The 29 October 1941 directive, supplemented and clarified by directives issued on 17 December 1941, 3 February 1942, and 28 June 1942, authorized The Provost Marshal General to conduct investigations of the following personnel:^{29/}

a. Applicants for employment and employees in the military establishment. Included under this jurisdiction are the following classes of investigations:

- (1) Applicants and employees who are citizens.
- (2) Applicants for Womens' Army Corps.
- (3) Applicants for Enlisted Reserve.
- (4) Applicants from civilian life for commission in the Army of the United States.
- (5) Applicants and employees of the American Red Cross.
- (6) Personnel of U.S.O. shows.
- (7) Newspaper reporters, photographers, radio commentators, and other newsmen, desiring access to various theaters of operations.^{30/}

^{28/} MID memorandum, file MID 014-31, dated 31 March 1942; PMGO memorandum, file PMG 333.6 Gen, dated 8 April 1942; MID memorandum, file MID 014.31 Policy, dated 7 September 1942; PMGO memorandum dated 18 September 1942; PMGO memorandum, file SPMGS 014.3114, dated 14 October 1942; and MID memorandum, file MID 014.31 Policy (3-31-42), dated 23 October 1942, all on the subject of alien investigations.

^{29/} WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (9-10-41)MC-B, dated 29 October 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Operative Functions, Counter Intelligence Branch, M.I.D."; WD letter, file AG 321.19 M.I.D. (12-15-41)MSC-B-M, dated 17 December 1941, subject: "Transfer of Certain Operative Functions from the M.I.D. to P.M.G."; WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (1-29-42)MSC-B-M, dated 3 February 1942, subject: "Interpretation of Adjutant General letter December 17, 1941"; and WD letter, file AG 029 (6-24-42)MS-SPMGI-M, dated 28 June 1942, subject: "Investigational Functions of the Office of the Provost Marshal General"

^{30/} PMGO letter, dated 1 January 1942, subject: "Investigations of Newsmen and Photographers"

- (8) Reserve Officers on inactive status.
- (9) Flying cadets.
- (10) Air Corps Technicians.
- (11) Applicants for employment by AGO, PMGO, OD, CWS, MC and COR.

b. Civilian employees and applicants for employment in the war production plants.

c. Scientists for National Defense Research Committee, and the National Research Council.

Radar Personnel

The Secretary of War, by a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, accepted for the Army, on 7 September 1942, the responsibility of conducting all loyalty investigations of employees of shipbuilders in private shipyards where radar was installed.^{31/} It became the responsibility of the service commands under the agreement to investigate such employees and communicate the results to the Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding for appropriate action. Investigations were conducted under authority of the 29 October 1941 War Department letter, providing for loyalty scrutiny of persons receiving access to classified information. Because of the importance and absolute necessity for protecting information regarding radar equipment from compromise, it was necessary to publish War Department directive, dated 30 June 1944.^{32/} It provided for clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of commercial establishments having Signal Corps or Office of Scientific Research and Development contracts and for Navy clearance of companies having Navy contracts. Key personnel and persons who were to have access to classified information were to be investigated by the service commands which informed the agency concerned which personnel were to be or not to be used in connection with the projects.^{33/} A later directive, dated 16 April 1945, rescinding the 30 June 1944 letter, included the "Top Secret" classification which had come into being and provided specifically that persons having access to restricted information only were not to be investigated.^{34/}

^{31/} Letter from Secretary of Navy, file (SC)PL-7-LL, dated 24 August 1942, and Secretary of War's letter, dated 7 September 1942, concerning security measures in connection with installation of radar in ships building in private shipyards

^{32/} WD letter, file AG 230.741 (29 June 44)OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 30 June 1944, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of Employees of Private Contractors Engaged in the Development, Manufacture, Installation or Maintenance of Radar and IFF Equipment"

^{33/} SOS letter, dated 22 April 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Form NNI-140 to be Executed by Key Personnel in Facilities of Importance to Army Procurement"

^{34/} WD letter, file AGMP-M 230.741 (9 Apr 45), dated 16 April 1945, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of Employees of Private Contractors Engaged in the Development, Manufacture, Installation, or Maintenance of Radar and IFF Equipment"

Technical Observers and Service Specialists

On 21 May 1942, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was authorized by War Department directive to clear civilian experts going abroad in War Department interests. It became desirable to extend this check to civilian technical observers and service specialists serving with troops within the continental limits of the United States. This was accomplished by War Department directive, dated 7 November 1942, which delegated the authority to The Provost Marshal General to check all civilian experts including those going abroad.^{35/} The Provost Marshal General was ordered to provide the necessary check and promptly advise the agencies concerned of the acceptability or undesirability of each individual. The central files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and The Provost Marshal General's Office were checked in each case. The 7 November 1942 directive was revised on 16 January 1943, ordering The Provost Marshal General to provide a check of the files of his office and of other governmental agencies and to report to the requesting agency any derogatory information disclosed thereby (instead of passing on the acceptability of the individual). It also provided that no field investigations be conducted unless specifically requested.

Investigation of Enlisted Men for Investigators

The authority to make investigations of military personnel to determine their suitability for assignment as sergeant investigators, was provided in War Department directive, dated 16 October 1942.^{36/} This directive was necessary in order that The Provost Marshal General's Office could investigate applicants for its corps of sergeant investigators, since The Provost Marshal General's Office previously had no authority to investigate any military personnel.

Applicants for the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (Women's Army Corps)

Arrangements were made by The Provost Marshal General with the approval of the Director, Personnel, Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, for the investigation of applicants for enrollment in the WAAC by the Retail Credit Company, under contract with The Provost Marshal General.

^{35/} WD letter, file AG 230 (10-9-42)OB-S-B-M, dated 7 November 1942, subject: "Clearance of Civilians Acting as Technical Observers or Service Specialists with United States Troops on Field Duty"

^{36/} WD letter, file AG 321.19 (10-12-42)OB-S-B-M, dated 16 October 1942, subject: "Transfer of Certain Operative Functions from the Military Intelligence Division to The Provost Marshal General"

The service commands were accordingly notified by The Provost Marshal General on 12 January 1943, that control and management of this plan would remain in the Investigations Branch of the service command, defense command or military district having jurisdiction.^{37/} The recruiting officer accepting the application for enrollment was made responsible for screening the application, preparation of a Personnel Security Questionnaire (WD, PMGO, ID Form No. 58), the review of case reports and for decision as to the applicant's suitability. Applications were to be separated into the following classifications:

a. Those not requiring a field investigation to verify their loyalty because: (1) The application reveals the applicant not qualified for enrollment, or (2) The applicant has satisfied the recruiting officer of her loyalty by interview, local references and other means.

b. Those requiring a field investigation to verify loyalty. In connection with applications requiring field investigations, one copy of the Personnel Security Questionnaire was to be prepared by the recruiting officer and transmitted directly to the Retail Credit Corporation which would make the investigation and return the report to the recruiting officer. In the event a special investigation was deemed necessary, the service commands were required to conduct it.

On 22 February 1943, an Army Service Forces letter was published which modified The Provost Marshal General's letter dated 12 January 1943.^{38/} It provided that reports from the Retail Credit Company would normally be returned direct to the local recruiting officer requesting the investigation but might, if the service command so desired, be returned through its headquarters. This directive also provided that no member of the WAAC could be called to active duty until a favorable report had been received. On 6 March 1943, an Army Service Forces letter was published which provided that the Retail Credit Company could investigate all applicants for enrollment in the WAAC, as agent for The Provost Marshal General.^{39/} No other change in previous instructions was made. On 19 August 1943, an Army Service Forces letter changed

^{37/} PMGO letter, dated 12 January 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of Applicants for the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps"

^{38/} ASF letter, file SPX 341 WAAC (2-17-43) PR-I, dated 22 February 1943, subject: "Character and Loyalty Investigations of Applicants for Enrollment in the WAAC"

^{39/} ASF letter, file SPX 341 WAAC (3-6-43) PR-I, dated 6 March 1943, subject: "Change in Procedure for Character Investigations, WAAC"

the requirements to provide that investigations would be made only when specifically deemed advisable by the local recruiting officer.^{40/} Provisions for direct relations between Army Recruiting Stations and the Retail Credit Company were revoked by a War Department directive, dated 27 December 1943, which provided further that investigations deemed necessary would be conducted by the appropriate service command.^{41/} Subsequently all investigations of applicants for the WAC were conducted by the service commands.

War Department Civilian Personnel

War Department Administrative Memorandum No. 4, dated 19 January 1943, added the investigation of Civil Service Employees in the War Department to The Provost Marshal General's investigative functions.^{42/} Although the primary responsibility for determining the suitability of applicants for Federal service ordinarily is vested by statute in the Civil Service Commission, after our entry into the war the War Department recognized a dual responsibility for this function because of the close connection between the internal security of the Department and the character and loyalty of its employees. In view of the tremendous increase in the War Department's civilian component and the inability of the Civil Service Commission to make these investigations within a reasonable time, the War Department assumed from the Civil Service Commission the responsibility for these investigations and delegated it to The Provost Marshal General. This resulted in a large increase in the number of investigations to be processed by The Provost Marshal General. War Department Administrative Memorandum No. 4 set forth the investigative requirements concerning civilian employees of the War Department but did not prescribe the procedures to be followed. The minimum requirements for investigation of each civilian employee of the War Department consisted of (a) preliminary character review, (b) routine investigations for applicants in certain listed positions, and (c) special investigations for applicants for positions providing them access to vital information, and for certain listed categories of persons.

Secret Research and Development Personnel Dealing with Communications

On 10 April 1943 a War Department directive was published which provided for investigation of commercial establishments handling

^{40/} ASF letter, file SPX 341 WAC (17 Aug 43)PR-I, dated 19 August 1943, subject: "Change in Procedure for Character and Loyalty Investigations, WAC"

^{41/} WD letter, file AG 341 WAC (24 Nov 43)PR-I, dated 27 December 1943, subject: "Change in Procedure for Character and Loyalty Investigations of Applicants for WAC"

^{42/} WD Administrative Memorandum No. 4, dated 19 January 1943, subject: "Character Investigation of Civilian Employees"

secret research and development dealing with communications.^{43/} Although the Chief Signal Officer was charged with the responsibility of effecting clearance of the company concerned, it was provided that investigations of personnel be made by contracting commercial investigative agencies made available by The Provost Marshal General to the Chief Signal Officer. These were limited to five investigative agencies that The Provost Marshal General had retained to conduct certain routine loyalty investigations.

Transfer of Counter-Intelligence Functions Within Zone of Interior from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to The Provost Marshal General

As a result of a study made by The Inspector General, dated 6 November 1943, the Deputy Chief of Staff recommended that staff supervision over the functions and activities of the Counter-Intelligence Corps within the zone of the interior, except for general staff supervision, be transferred from G-2 to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.^{44/} This transfer was accomplished by a War Department Circular effective as of 1 January 1944.^{45/} This circular provided that investigative functions hitherto performed by the Counter-Intelligence Corps agents and The Provost Marshal General's sergeant investigators be consolidated and performed by a single staff agency in each service command. The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, delegated to The Provost Marshal General supervision of all service command loyalty and counter-intelligence investigative functions and activities transferred by the War Department circular.^{46/} On 20 December 1943, the Internal Security Divisions and Intelligence Divisions in the service commands were dissolved and a new staff agency to be known as the Security and Intelligence Division was established in each service command.^{47/} The Security Intelligence Corps was the name designated for the new consolidated investigative corps.^{48/} The new organization was authorized to conduct the following types of investigations:

^{43/} WD letter, file AG 004.4(4-5-43)OB-S-SPSRD-M, dated 10 April 1943, subject: "Security of Research & Development Dealing with Communications"

^{44/} Memo from The Inspector General to the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 6 November 1943, subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands"; and Memorandum from Asst. to Deputy Chief of Staff, file WDOSA 333(6 Nov 43), subject: "Intelligence Activities in Service Commands"

^{45/} War Department Circular No. 324, dated 14 December 1943

^{46/} Army Service Forces Circular No. 149, dated 14 December 1943

^{47/} ASF letter, file SPX 020 ASF(10 Dec 43)OB-S-SPICY-M, dated 20 December 1943, subject: "Consolidation of Internal Security & Intelligence Divisions & Activities"

^{48/} ASF letter, file SPX 333.6(1 Jan 44)OB-S-3PMG-M, dated 10 January 1944, subject: "Consolidation of Investigations"

a. Loyalty investigations of certain civilians employed in vital war industry, and of certain civilian and military personnel within the military establishment or under military control, including persons being considered for such positions.

b. Investigation of military personnel, civilians employed by the War Department or under military control, and incidents within the military establishment where subversion, espionage, sabotage, or disaffection may be suspected and such other investigation as may be directed by higher authority.

c. Investigations of employees in plants and facilities of importance to the Army and Navy procurement.

d. Investigations of disturbances of any kind, which may require the use of troops.

The consolidation thus broadened the investigative jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General, which by January 1944 included loyalty investigations of civilian and military personnel and criminal investigations of military personnel.^{49/} This jurisdiction did not cover Army Air Forces or Army Ground Forces military personnel, unless requested by these organizations as set forth in the War Department directive of 29 December 1943 which stated that any investigative assistance needed by the Army Air Forces or the Army Ground Forces would be provided by the Army Service Forces on request from those organizations.^{50/} The 29 December 1943 letter was rescinded by War Department directive dated 24 May 1944, which provided that investigation of undeveloped leads which extended outside of Army Air Forces channels might be conducted by the Army Air Forces but would be coordinated with the appropriate service command and that all portions of investigations extending outside of Army Ground Forces elements would be turned over to the appropriate service command.^{51/}

American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry

On 20 January 1943 The Provost Marshal General was authorized by War Department directive to make investigations of American citizens

^{49/} See Criminal Investigations Program

^{50/} WD letter, file AG 250.1(22 Dec 43)OB-S-B-M, dated 29 December 1943, subject: "Counter Intelligence Activities", provided that CIC personnel assigned to AAF and AGF be employed to conduct loyalty and subversive investigations and investigations of violations of AR 380-5 within AAF and AGF

^{51/} WD letter, file AG 250.1 (22 May 44)OB-S-B-M, dated 24 May 1944, subject: "CI Investigative Activities"

of Japanese ancestry in order to comply with request of the War Relocation Authority to assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry under its jurisdiction.^{52/} The purpose of the program was to determine (a) the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry to permit their release by War Relocation Authority from War Relocation Centers, and (b) whether those so released might be inducted into the military service or might be available for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort. Subsequent directives vested The Provost Marshal General with authority to conduct investigations of persons of Japanese ancestry for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort, employment in Army posts and establishments, enlistment in the Women's Army Corps, applicants for Airman Identification Cards, attendance or employment at educational institutions important to the war effort and clearance for induction of male citizens into the armed forces.

Cryptographic Investigations

The Provost Marshal General assumed responsibility for clearing personnel for cryptographic duties within the military establishment on 1 January 1944, in accordance with a War Department letter, dated 24 December 1943. This letter provided for a check of local Federal Bureau of Investigation, police, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Security Intelligence Division files. It also provided that requests from overseas commands for record checks should be addressed to the Office of The Adjutant General and should indicate the principal residence of each individual to be investigated. Installations within the Zone of Interior were to forward requests direct to the service commands. Under this arrangement it was found that insufficient information was furnished to permit proper identification of individuals for a record check and instructions were amended to provide that all requests for record checks should give the name, principal residence, race, and date and place of birth of each individual.^{53/}

Since, subsequently, all service commands reported that they were experiencing considerable delay in securing checks from the district office of Office of Naval Intelligence, the 24 December 1943 letter was amended a second time to provide that the requirement for checking Office of Naval Intelligence records was rescinded except

^{52/} WD letter, file AG 291.2(1-9-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Camps"

^{53/} WD letter, file AG 311.5(21 June 44)OB-I-B-M, dated 24 December 1943, subject: "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties"; WD letter, dated 5 April 1944, subject: "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties"

that a check of Office of Naval Intelligence records would be made in cases where there was reason to believe that information existed in that bureau which was not recorded in the files of the other agencies to be checked.^{54/} This resulted in more expeditious handling of cryptographic investigations.

On 21 March 1945 all previous cryptographic letters were rescinded with the publication of a new War Department letter which contained a few minor changes in procedure, one of the principal ones being a provision to insure against duplication of investigations.^{55/} This provision required that results of favorable loyalty investigations and checks be recorded on an enlisted man's service record or an officer's classification card, Form 66-1.

Civilian Technicians

Late in February, 1944, the investigation by the appropriate service command of civilian technicians whose work required visiting war plants, facilities, posts, camps or stations, was required as a prerequisite to the issuance of identification cards, Form 65-6.^{56/}

Press Credentials

The investigation of individuals to whom press credentials were to be issued was initiated in October, 1944, to facilitate and regulate news coverage in the event of enemy action within the continental United States.^{57/}

Classified Reproducers

On 30 March 1943, a Provost Marshal General's Office letter to the numbered service commands and Military District of Washington directed that the Alien, Key Personnel and Removal of Subversives programs be applied to all employees of plants handling classified film, blueprints or other such materials. This in effect, included investigative jurisdiction of such employees under the personnel security programs designated. Requirements were changed by subsequent amendments of AR 380-5 and War Department Circular No. 48, 1945, the latter providing institution of personnel security measures and programs the same as were applicable to facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, which required screening and investigation, when deemed necessary, of all persons having access to

^{54/} WD letter, file AG 311.5(21 June 44)OB-I-B-M, dated 24 June 1944, subject: "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties"

^{55/} WD letter, file AG 311.5(12 Mar 45)OB-I-B-M, dated 21 March 1945, subject: "Clearance of Personnel for Cryptographic Duties"

^{56/} War Department Circular No. 82, dated 24 February 1944

^{57/} War Department Circular No. 417, dated 25 October 1944

confidential, secret and top secret information. 58/

Air Intelligence School Students

The loyalty investigation of students of the Air Intelligence School was instituted in May, 1944, for the reason that the duties of graduates of the school were such as to afford them ready opportunity to seriously injure or impede the war effort. 59/ These investigations were limited to three way checks in the appropriate service commands of Security Intelligence Division, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation files.

Manhattan District, United States Engineers

The Provost Marshal General, on 12 May 1942, by secret letter, informed the service commands and Military District of Washington that the Manhattan Engineers District of the United States Engineers had charge of a very important secret war project and that investigation of civilian personnel employed at such installations should be conducted without delay. This was supplemented by a secret Army Service Forces letter, dated 26 May 1944, which directed the service commands to conduct all investigations requested by the Manhattan District Engineers. It stated further that The Provost Marshal General had been assured by the Manhattan District Engineers that only those investigations which were essential would be requested. 60/

States War Inspection Service Inspections

The investigation of States War Inspection Service Inspectors was requested early in June, 1944, because the War Department, in indorsing the States War Inspection Service program, interposed the restriction that inspectors working under this program, should not visit plants having classified or aeronautical contracts unless such inspectors have been investigated and cleared by military authorities. 61/

58/ War Department Circular No. 46, dated 7 February 1945

59/ ASF letter, file SPX 250.1 Loyalty (6 May 44)OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 10 May 1944, subj: "Loyalty Inves. of Students at Air Intel. School"

60/ PMGO letter, dated 12 May 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of Personnel of the Manhattan District, United States Engineers"; ASF letter, file SPX 230.741(23 May 44)OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 26 May 1944, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of Employees in Private Plants and Facilities Requested by Manhattan District Engineers"

61/ ASF letter, file SPX 333.5(6 June 44)OB-S-SPMGS-M, dated 10 June 1944, subject: "Investigations of States War Inspection Service Inspectors"

Aerial Photographs

Requests from civilian agencies (including private individuals, firms, corporations, federal or state departments, or agencies) and military agencies for permission to make aerial photographs or to obtain existing aerial photographs of areas within the continental United States, were required to be approved by the Commanding General of the defense command concerned, who could in his discretion inquire into the loyalty of the requesting agency.^{62/} Any investigation deemed necessary was conducted by the appropriate service command.

War Crimes Investigations

At the request of the War Crimes Division of The Judge Advocate General's Office, an arrangement was entered into in January, 1945 whereby German prisoners of war held in custody in this country were interviewed by representatives of The Provost Marshal General to secure depositions covering the prisoners' knowledge of war crimes. Depositions were secured by representatives of The Provost Marshal General who visited prisoner of war camps where individuals to be interrogated were located. Linguistically qualified Security Intelligence Corps agents of the service command having jurisdiction of the prisoner of war camp were secured and attended the original interrogations as translators and received training for future interrogations. After the training of Security Intelligence Corps personnel in this manner, subsequent requests received from the War Crimes Division for interrogation were referred to the Director, Security and Intelligence Division in the appropriate service command and the interrogations were conducted and depositions secured by such personnel. It was subsequently discovered by the commanding officers of prisoner of war camps that many German prisoners of war were excellent sources of information concerning war crimes.

Clearance of Telephone Company Personnel for Duties in Connection with Automatic Coding Equipment

An Army Service Forces letter, dated 12 January 1945, prescribed clearance upon completion of satisfactory investigation by the appropriate service command of all telephone company employees having access to automatic coding equipment. The Chief Signal Officer was to be informed of the satisfactory investigation, on the basis of which a duly executed certificate of clearance and identification photograph were issued and filed with The Adjutant General.^{63/}

^{62/} War Department Memo No. 380-44, dated 19 September 1944, subject: "Aerial Photographs"

^{63/} ASF letter, file SPX 311.5(24 Nov 44)CB-I-SPSIC-M, dated 12 January 1945, subject: "Clearance of Telephone Company Personnel for Duties in Connection with Automatic Coding Equipment"

Investigation of the Sale of Military Insignia

Service commanders were responsible, under AR 600-90, for initiating prosecution of individuals, firms or corporations violating the regulations governing the sale of military insignia and decorations. It also required that service commanders make spot checks from time to time to see that holders of certificates of authority were making sales only upon proper identification. Many violations were reported in the sale of military insignia and decorations, and although the assistance and cooperation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had been secured to apprehend persons violating the Federal statutes governing the sale of such articles, service commanders were reminded that it remained their responsibility to initiate prosecutions and make spot checks.^{64/} The use of confidential funds was permitted where necessary, in connection with appropriate investigations made by the Security Intelligence Corps. Although service commanders had from 1942 made periodical spot checks and investigations of the unauthorized sale of insignia, the use of confidential funds in connection with such investigations had not been previously authorized.

Delineation of Responsibilities between Director, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, and The Provost Marshal General

On 3 August 1945, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, in a memorandum to The Provost Marshal General and Director, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, redesignated the responsibilities of these offices.^{65/} Staff supervision over all loyalty investigative programs, formerly exercised by The Provost Marshal General, was transferred to the Director, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, except the investigation of civilians outside the Military Establishment. This included transfer of staff supervision of the Security Intelligence Corps. The field was notified on 18 August 1945.^{66/}

Procedures and Operations

In the first stages of the Investigations Program, operations were centralized in The Provost Marshal General's Office. All requests for investigations were made to The Provost Marshal General,

^{64/} Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 421.4 (16 Mar 45) OB-S-SPMGP-M, 21 March 1945, subject: "Sales of Military Insignia, Decorations, Medals & Badges"

^{65/} Memorandum from Commanding General, Army Service Forces, file SPICY, 3 August 1945, subject: "Delineation of Responsibilities"

^{66/} Army Service Forces Circular No. 314, 18 August 1945

Washington, D. C., where they were processed and forwarded to the corps areas. Results of investigations were returned to The Provost Marshal General's Office where they were reviewed, processed, and forwarded to the requesters. In December 1941, a Tentative Procedures Manual was prepared and distributed for use in the field. This Manual outlined in detail the manner for conducting an investigation and the paper work involved.^{67/}

The Investigations Division originally provided the War Department and other governmental agencies requesting investigations with two types of investigations, a name check or a special investigation. The name check consisted of a check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence Division, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Special investigations included the name check and a field investigation by a sergeant investigator. It soon became apparent that the name check in most instances was inadequate and the special investigation in many cases was too extensive. The result was that the majority of cases were made special and this increased burden as the corps areas developed a large backlog of unfinished cases. To remedy this situation the Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form NNI-140, was adopted in March of 1942.^{68/} This form provided a type of investigation termed routine. This routine investigation included a name check and a check by correspondence and local investigation of the accuracy of the statements made on the Personnel Security Questionnaire, as provided in The Provost Marshal General's letter, dated 21 March 1942.^{69/} Governmental agencies desiring investigations were encouraged to employ the routine investigation wherever possible.

By June 1942, it was apparent from the large backlog of cases in the corps areas and the great volume of investigations being requested that further changes were necessary to complete investigations within a reasonable time. Two solutions to the problem were considered. One was to enlarge the staff of sergeant investigators and the other was to employ civilian investigative agencies. The Investigations Division adopted the latter plan because it was apparent that it would require between three to five thousand sergeant investigators to handle the load. It was found from a study of the existing commercial agencies that loyalty investigations suitable for the purpose of the Investigations Division could be obtained on the average of three dollars per investigation. Five commercial companies, Dun and Bradstreet, Hooper-Holmes, Inc., O'Hanlon Reports, National

^{67/} Tentative Procedures Manual, issued by The PMGO - 15 December 1941

^{68/} Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form NNI-140;

War Department letter, file AG 321.19 MID(2-26-42)MB-M, dated 7 March 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Forms to Accompany Requests to The PMG for Investigations"

^{69/} Provost Marshal General's letter to all Corps Area Provost Marshals, file PMG 315, dated 21 March 1942, subject: "Processing of Security Questionnaire Form NNI-140"

Consumers Credit Corporation, and Retail Credit Company, having facilities for national coverage and for handling a large volume of requests in a satisfactory manner, were retained to make investigations. ^{70/} The Investigations Division then adopted the two types of services, routine and special. Commercial companies were then employed to investigate all routine requests received for investigation. The corps areas also were authorized to use the commercial companies to investigate the cases backlogged. ^{71/} Subsequently, the commercial agencies were used to conduct investigations under the "Plant Level Program," discussed later.

On 20 July 1942, the Inspector General submitted a report on the delay in completion of investigations of civilian employees who were to be employed on secret or confidential work. ^{72/} The report recommended reduction in the number of investigations by elimination of unnecessary investigations, simplification of the Form NNI-140, simplification of the case report, and a reduction in the number of copies, adoption of a plan to insure the immediate check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence Division records prior to the completion of a case in a corps area. On 31 July 1942, the division replied concerning the recommendations as follows:

a. The reduction in the number of investigations requested was a function of the requesting agencies. The Investigations Division only investigated those cases which it received and had no authority to refuse an investigation.

b. The simplification of the Form NNI-140 was under consideration.

c. The case report form had been simplified by eliminating unnecessary information and exhibits. In routine cases where no derogatory information had been disclosed, a one-page report was adopted. In cases where derogatory information was disclosed a special form was forwarded to the requester summarizing the derogatory information. The number of copies of case reports

70/ Memorandum from Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, to The Provost Marshal General, dated 12 June 1942, objected to use of commercial credit agencies for legal and practical reasons. The Provost Marshal General answered in memorandum, file SPMGI 333.5, dated 19 June 1942, stating that there was no legal objection and that he considered the use of such agencies practicable in conducting routine investigations. On 22 June 1942, the Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, withdrew his objections.

71/ War Department letter, file AG 333.9 (7-7-42) MB-SPAI-PS-M, dated 8 July 1942, subject: "Information concerning investigations to be conducted by commercial investigative companies"

72/ Memo from the Inspector General for Control Division, Services of Supply, 20 July 1942, subject: "Inquiry concerning certain activities pertaining to the Office of The Provost Marshal General"

had been reduced from five to three. Distribution of the three copies was as follows; (1) copy for the service command Provost Marshal's Office; (2) copy for the Provost Marshal General's Office; and (3) copy for the requester.

d. From the time of the creation of the Investigations Division, on 17 November 1941, efforts had been made to obtain a check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence Division prior to the completion of the case in the service command. However, Military Intelligence Division and Office of Naval Intelligence were unable to handle the number of requests submitted by this office and the backlog continued to increase in these agencies.

Beginning in September, 1942, requests for investigations of civilians were required to be made directly to the commanding general of the service commands.^{73/} This initiated the decentralization of investigations to service command level. It was desired to decentralize all the procedures to the field and have the Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, exercising only staff supervision.

On 21 September 1942, the Investigations Division issued an "omnibus" directive which informed the field of new policies and procedures under decentralization and changes in procedures superseding the Tentative Procedures Manual issued on 15 December 1941.^{74/} The principal provisions were:

a. Recapitulation of The Provost Marshal General's investigative responsibility.

b. Establishment of two types of investigations for The Provost Marshal General.

- (1) Routine - a thorough check of occupational record of the subject for the past five years, neighborhood loyalty check and a search of the files of government agencies.
- (2) Special - a thorough check of subject's loyalty and background.

^{73/} War Department Memorandum W620-3-42, dated 2 September 1942, subject: "Information and Instructions for Establishments Initiating Requests for Investigations"

^{74/} Provost Marshal General's letter, dated 21 September 1942, subject: "Policies, Procedures, and Instructions for Investigations Sections, Internal Security Division, Service Commands, Investigations Section, Office of Provost Marshal, Western Defense Command, and Investigations Section, Office of Provost Marshal, Washington Military District"

c. Detailed instructions for completing a new type of case report, WD - PMGO - ID Form No. 52, for both routine and special cases. 75/

d. Procedures relative to operations decentralized to commanding generals of the service commands.

e. Instruction that checks of files of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence Division must be requested through the Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office.

f. Monthly statistical reports to be furnished Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office.

g. Instructions regarding completion of the Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form NNI-140.

h. Instructions for submission of requests to the commercial agencies for investigations.

Discontinuance of Check of Military Intelligence Division Files

The investigation procedure included a search of files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence Division. By July 1942, Military Intelligence Division had developed a backlog of 9,000 unsearched cases. 76/ This backlog continued to grow until September, when it reached 70,000. Investigations were delayed until a report from Military Intelligence Division was received or the investigation was closed without the report, subject to being reopened on any derogatory information being received from Military Intelligence Division. On 24 September 1942, The Provost Marshal General notified the Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, that in the future requests for Military Intelligence Division checks would not be made. 77/ It was stated that the quality of the investigation in most cases would not be affected since the files of Office of Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation duplicated those of Military Intelligence Division to a large extent, and the field investigation would pick up the information in most instances. The elimination of the Military Intelligence Division

75/ WD-PMGO-ID Form No. 12, greatly simplified case report writing and eliminated many man-hours of clerical work. The old report form prescribed by the Tentative Procedures Manual was entirely too lengthy and detailed.

76/ Memo from The Provost Marshal General to Chief of Staff, Services of Supply, file SPMGI 321.19, dated 8 July 1942, subject: "Relationship between The Provost Marshal General's Office and the Military Intelligence Division".

77/ PMGO Memo, file SPMGI 321.19, dated 24 September 1942, subject: "Relationship between The Provost Marshal General and Military Intelligence Service".

check was approved by the Secretary of War on 26 November 1942.^{78/}

Late in September, 1942, there was submitted to The Adjutant General a form to be used in place of Form NNI-140. The new form, known as WD PMGO-ID-Form No. 58, was a simplification of the old four-page form into a one-page form. By 28 November 1942, it was ready for shipment to the field.^{79/} Shortly thereafter a directive was issued to the field to further simplify, standardize, and decentralize investigative functions.^{80/} This directive provided for:

- a. Elimination of requirement that non-derogatory investigation reports be sent to Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office.
- b. Destruction of all case material and files in non-derogatory cases except the master index card on which the result of the investigation was noted.
- c. Microfilming of file in derogatory cases.
- d. Transmittal of a copy of the master card of all cases to Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office.

The "Plant Level Program" was initiated on 4 December 1942.^{81/} This program was first installed in Ordnance plants, and later extended to include investigations of most of the large requesting agencies. The program provided an arrangement whereby personnel were investigated by an approved commercial investigative company. It constituted a decentralization of procedures below service command level since security officers (War or Navy Department representatives) at the plants were authorized to make requests for investigations direct to the commercial investigative agencies, thus eliminating the service command as a channel through which requests were sent, except for supervision. Results of investigations were returned to the "plant security officers" at the plants who reviewed them for derogatory information. The plan made possible the investigation of thousands of cases which otherwise would have backlogged in the service commands. One important element of the program was

^{78/} Memo from the Deputy Chief of Staff, file WDOSA 230 (11-28-42), dated 26 November 1942, subject: "Change in Administrative Procedure Involving the Military Intelligence Service, the Office of The Provost Marshal General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation"

^{79/} PMGO letter, file SPMGI 315, dated 28 November 1942, subject: "WD PMGO - ID Form No. 58"

^{80/} PMGO letter, file SPMGI 333.5, dated 23 October 1942, subject: "Decentralization in Investigative Procedures"

^{81/} Provost Marshal General's instructions regarding "Plant Level Program" for Ordnance Explosive Plants, 4 December 1942

that it required the security officer of the plant to "screen" his personnel and to order investigations only in necessary cases. This was the beginning of a concentrated effort to screen personnel for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary investigations, which effort was intensified in late 1943. Although "plant level" later fell into disrepute because it encouraged too many investigations, it made possible a productive nation wide investigative system which allowed the service commands to reduce their backlogs to a minimum and resulted in quick returns from investigations requested.

During March 1943, it was decided to eliminate checks of the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence in all cases, except those of Japanese-Americans, cases for Office of Scientific Research and Development, and such cases where the facts indicated information might be found in the Office of Naval Intelligence. This step was another toward simplification and elimination of paper work, both in the field and in Washington. In June 1943, a further step was made to simplify investigations, by eliminating the local police record check, except where requested specifically.

Activities Increased with Transfer of Counter-Intelligence Functions From G-2

On 6 November 1943, The Inspector General issued his report on Intelligence Activities in the service commands.^{82/} This report recommended:

a. A consolidation of the investigative functions of the Counter-Intelligence Corps and The Provost Marshal General within the zone of the interior, and that a group of investigators be organized and trained as a section of each service command unit, for the purpose of making such investigations as may be required by competent authority.

b. That directives be published emphasizing the fact that the selection of personnel for confidential positions is a command responsibility.

c. That manuals for investigations and report writing be rewritten to restrict investigation to the issue involved.

d. That only one copy of the report and memorandum of information be made.

This report led to the transfer of counter-intelligence functions from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to The Provost Marshal

^{82/} Memo from The Inspector General, file 353.9-Intelligence Activities, dated 6 November 1943, subject: "Intelligence Activities in service commands"

General. As the transfer multiplied the staff supervision activities in the Provost Marshal General's Office, a number of former Counter-Intelligence Corps officer and civilian personnel were assigned to the division for duty in the Investigations Branch.

New Investigation Manual

On 1 March 1944, Part I of a new investigation manual compiled with the assistance and concurrence of The Provost Marshal General, was issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.^{83/} The purpose of this manual was to place in effect the recommendations made by The Inspector General on 6 November 1943 and to furnish all personnel conducting counter-intelligence investigations within the jurisdiction of the War Department an adequate procedural guide to insure: (a) uniformity in preparation of reports of all counter-intelligence investigations conducted either in the zone of the interior or overseas, and (b) to inform all concerned of the general procedural principles governing the submission of reports and the conduct of counter-intelligence investigations in the zone of the interior. The manual divided counter-intelligence investigations into loyalty and complaint investigations. Complaint investigations were subdivided into incident and individual cases and loyalty investigations were subdivided into routine and special. Particular stress was laid on elimination of unnecessary investigations and investigation procedures. Part II of this manual, covering the procedures in the conduct of loyalty investigations and a few changes in Part I, was published on 15 July 1944. Reliance upon the discretion of the service commands to determine the scope of loyalty investigations produced great variations. In some service commands a routine investigation consisted of a record check only, while in others a more extensive investigation was made. There were also considerable variations in the scope of special investigations conducted by the various service commands. Otherwise, the manual was sufficient and comprehensive, except in cases of new or special operations, and in those instances, War Department or Army Service Forces directives were issued giving specific instructions.

Intelligence Report Channels

On 2 January 1944, the Army Service Forces published a directive which provided:^{84/}

^{83/} Counter-Intelligence Investigative Reports Manual, TM 30-218, dated 1 March 1944

^{84/} Army Service Forces directive, file SPX 312.3(1 Jan 44)OE-S-SPINT-M, dated 2 January 1944, subject: "Intelligence Report Channels"

a. That all communications to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, relating to the investigative functions and activities transferred by War Department Circular No. 324, 14 December 1943, and Army Service Forces Circular No. 149, 14 December 1943, will be addressed to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, attention: The Provost Marshal General.

b. All other communications pertaining to counter-intelligence, domestic intelligence and foreign positive intelligence will be addressed to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, attention: Director of Intelligence.

The 2 January 1944 letter also provided that all intelligence communications addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, be channeled through the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, attention: Director of Intelligence or The Provost Marshal General, whichever was appropriate under subparagraphs a and b above. On 25 January 1944, the Army Service Forces published a directive which clarified the terms of the 2 January 1944 letter. 85/ No change in procedure was directed.

On 10 May 1944, the Army Service Forces published a directive providing that all investigative reports, summaries of information, intelligence files, requests for investigation or interview, and correspondence pertaining to counter-intelligence or loyalty investigations to overseas commands be channeled through The Provost Marshal General, attention: Personnel Security Division. 86/ The Provost Marshal General was directed to forward the communications described directly to the appropriate overseas commander. The purpose of this directive was to insure adequate supervision by The Provost Marshal General over communications with, and investigations for, overseas commands and to eliminate misdirection of communications by centralizing control at the Washington level where it was possible to keep better abreast of the frequent changes of the overseas units.

Elimination of Unnecessary Investigations

Requests for investigations continued to increase and in July 1943 reached a peak of 149,555. The report for July showed 100,000 cases on hand. These statistics, along with a general trend towards retrenchment, lead to a change of War Department policy. All emphasis was directed toward the elimination of unnecessary investigations.

85/ Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 312.3 (21 Jan 44) OB-S-SPINT-M, dated 25 January 1944, subject: "Intelligence Report Channels"

86/ Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 250.1 Loyalty (6 May 44) OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 10 May 1944, subject: "Channels of Intelligence Communications with Overseas Commands"

The Provost Marshal General was cognizant in early 1942 that requests were being made for numerous unnecessary investigations. This was also recognized by The Inspector General who submitted a report on 20 July 1942 recommending among other things that the number of investigations conducted by The Provost Marshal General be reduced by eliminating unnecessary investigations and specifically investigations of those individuals not serving or about to serve in positions which involved secret or confidential matters.^{87/} On 29 December 1942, The Provost Marshal General published a letter recommending the use of facility personnel records, where possible, in order to avoid duplications of investigations and eliminate unnecessary investigations.^{88/} It recommended that personnel records in plants and facilities subject to the Key Personnel Security Program be examined by representatives of the service commands and the technical services and that where sufficient favorable information concerning an individual was found, no investigation be made.

A summation of the investigations was made by the Director, Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, in a speech at the Internal Security Conference, Army Service Forces, in St. Louis, Missouri, 20 - 23 April 1943, which is quoted in part as follows:

"May I point out that about a year ago this month there were in the neighborhood of 6,000 investigations in one month, the month of March. That may be a little high but I am not far off. Six months ago, we congratulated ourselves on mastering the 40,000 mark. Might I point out that over 100,000 loyalty investigations were conducted throughout the continental United States in the month of March, 1943. A few of you, six months ago, were predicting that there would be no more investigations in about two or three months. Yet it has grown so rapidly that we can hardly believe that last month there were over 100,000 loyalty investigations. We admit, as the Major stated a minute ago, that 70% of the specials should be routine. We even go further and state that probably 70% routines should require no investigation, but that is for you to determine in the proper conduct of your personnel security program. If you investigate all of those, you will be investigating for the duration of the War. If you apply

^{87/} TAG memo, file IG 321.19-QPMG, dated 20 July 1942, subject: "Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities Pertaining to the Office of The Provost Marshal General"

^{88/} Provost Marshal General's letter, file SPMGS 381, dated 29 December 1942, subject: "Utilization of Facility Personnel Records in Key Personnel Security Program"

some selective method and some means of screening elimination of unnecessary and duplicating investigations then we can see the end of this thing. * * *

As previously mentioned the "Plant Level Program" resulted in too many investigations. It was found from experience that many security officers, when given a free hand, were prone to play safe by promiscuously requesting investigations on a whole-sale basis. Thus, when in July 1943, a peak of 149,555 requests for investigations were received, immediate positive action was necessary, as the increasing case load was becoming prohibitive. Drastic steps had to be taken. Requesting agencies were directed to screen thoroughly all personnel to eliminate unnecessary investigations and to reduce requests from special investigations to routine investigations wherever possible. The service commands were directed to return requests for investigations to the requesting agencies where they had not been properly screened and reduce requests for special investigations to routine where a special investigation was unwarranted.^{89/} Another directive required that requests for investigations be confined to the following:^{90/}

- a. Aliens to be employed on classified and aeronautical contracts.
- b. Persons of Japanese descent employed or to be employed in war industry.
- c. Applicants for enlistment or commission in the Women's Army Corps.
- d. Individuals suspected of disloyalty.
- e. Individuals having unusual opportunities for sabotage.
- f. Individuals whose background was unknown.

The latter directive authorized the service commands to return any case except those enumerated under sub-paragraphs a, b and c above if deemed by the service command to be unnecessary or if classified special where it should have been classified routine. Exceptions to the general rule were to be made only for good and substantial reasons. On 5 August 1943 The Provost Marshal General communicated with each of the service commands and Military District of Washington designating

^{89/} Provost Marshal General's letter, file SPMG 333.5, dated 3 August 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations"

^{90/} War Department Memorandum No. W380-15-43, dated 4 August 1943, subject: "Screening of Internal Security Questionnaires"

dates for conferences to be held in each service command to be attended by representatives of the service commands, requesting agencies and The Provost Marshal General. The purpose of these conferences was to acquaint requesting agencies with the necessity of eliminating all unnecessary investigations, and to explain new policies and procedures which were to be adopted to accomplish this purpose. These conferences were held and the desired effect was evidenced by the immediate falling off of requests during the following months from 149,555 in July 1943 to 66,813 in December 1943.

Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1 and 2 were issued on 3 November 1943 propounding the "calculated risk" doctrine. The Inspection Program was limited by these circulars to plants on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and investigations in these plants were to be limited to a minimum. As applied to the risk of disloyalty of personnel, the doctrine of "calculated risk" required that the extent of the loyalty scrutiny to be accorded employees within the supervisory jurisdiction of the War Department be dependent upon (a) the importance of the plant or facility, and (b) the nature of the information concerning the background of the particular employee. The more important the employment to the war effort, the less suspicious the information required to justify the investigation. Conversely, the less vital the task, the more derogatory the information needed to justify the investigation. Every effort was to be made to eliminate investigations where such employment did not involve the assumption of an unreasonable risk.

Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36 required that no civilian employee be allowed access to secret or confidential information until investigation was completed to the satisfaction of the responsible officer, except in a certain few excepted cases.^{91/} As many unnecessary investigations were being requested under this circular, The Provost Marshal General at this time proposed a revised circular to the Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War to remedy the situation. The Provost Marshal General's recommendations, which were adopted and incorporated in Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36 Revised, dated 18 December 1943, provided that, excepting those employees with long government experience and those previously investigated by other government agencies with favorable results, excepted in the previous regulations, employees in the following categories should be investigated:

- a. Employees whose duties regularly involved secret information;

^{91/} Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36, 3 July 1943, subject: "Character Investigations"

- b. Employees whose duties frequently involved confidential information would be investigated if, in the opinion of the commanding officer or his designated representative, serious consequences would be entailed if such confidential information were divulged to unauthorized persons;
- c. Employees whose duties involved secret or confidential information where such employee's record or background created suspicion of disloyalty;
- d. Employees having access to communications or other information relating to location or movement of troops or combat materiel or ship sailings;
- e. Operators and maintenance personnel on all types of communications equipment transmitting secret or confidential information (including radio, telegraph, telephones and tele type operators);
- f. Patrolmen and guards;
- g. Materiel inspectors;
- h. Employees with criminal records showing conviction for felony or major misdemeanor or repeated conviction for minor offenses if investigation had not been made by the Civil Service Commission prerequisite to employment;
- i. Employees whose Standard Form No. 57 and WD, PMGO-ID Form No. 58 showed disparity evidencing misstatement of material fact on either form; and
- j. Enemy aliens.

The new regulations did not require the investigation of those individuals who had infrequent access to confidential or secret information and allowed a discretionary privilege to the responsible officer or request investigations under category "b" above. As many War Department employees had little access to highly classified information, the revised regulations did much to eliminate unnecessary investigations within the War Department.

The Provost Marshal General in January, 1944, procured the publication of an Army Service Forces letter which again directed all requesting agencies to eliminate unnecessary investigations.^{92/}

^{92/} ASF letter, file SPX 230.741 (18 Jan 44) OS-S-SPMGP-M, dated 25 January 1944, subject: "Elimination of Unnecessary Investigations"

This directive pointed out that security officers were being over-cautious and that a calculated risk must be taken where material damage to the war effort was not likely to result. It further stated that the selection of personnel for confidential positions was a command responsibility, and that the request for a loyalty investigation did not evade that responsibility. This was followed by a War Department directive providing that no investigation would be requested for the purpose of determining the suitability of military personnel for positions of trust, except in unusual cases, where the duties of the person to be investigated were such as to afford him ready opportunity to seriously injure or impede the war effort.^{83/}

To eliminate unnecessary cryptographic investigations The Provost Marshal General on 30 September 1944 wrote the Office of the Chief Signal Officer a letter of clarification concerning the 24 December 1943 cryptographic directive which authorized the investigation of "commissioned, enlisted and civilian personnel now employed in duties connected with, or having access to the prescribed secret and confidential cryptographic systems of the army or who are to be assigned thereto." The Provost Marshal General stated that the phrase quoted above, "duties connected with or having access to," would be construed to include only personnel who actually and necessarily come in contact with secret and confidential cryptographic systems by reason of their duties. This letter of clarification succeeded in eliminating many unnecessary cryptographic investigations.

On 12 September 1944, an Army Service Forces directive authorized the service commands to conduct only such alien investigations as were necessary to establish the loyalty or disloyalty of the alien.^{84/} This reduced investigations under the Alien Employment Program as every alien employed on classified and aeronautical War and Navy contracts had heretofore been investigated.

On 20 September 1944, the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, in a conference with The Provost Marshal General and Director, Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces, ordered further reduction in investigations.^{85/} He recommended that the service commands investigate only persons having access to secret and top secret information, and only then when such personnel were working on

^{83/} War Department letter, file AG 250.1 Loyalty (22 Jan 44)OB-S-B-M, dated 26 January 1944, subject: "Loyalty Investigation of Military Personnel"

^{84/} Army Service Forces letter, file SFA 014.31(9 Sept 44)OB-S-SMGP-M, dated 12 September 1944, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

^{85/} SMGO Memorandum for the Record, 20 September 1944

Manhattan District Engineer Projects, Radar and IFF, Cryptographic work, secret or top secret aeronautical contracts, and that all other investigations must be approved by The Provost Marshal General.

The program to eliminate unnecessary investigations evolved into a program of curtailment of investigations. In accordance with the recommendation of the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, and applying the doctrine of "calculated risk," two War Department directives were published on 4 November 1944, which sharply curtailed the investigations program as applied to persons of Japanese ancestry and the suspension of suspected subversives.^{96/} These directives required that the approval by The Provost Marshal General for employment of persons of Japanese ancestry in plants and facilities important to the war effort and the suspension of suspected subversives be limited to the following facilities:

- a. Facilities included in the Master Inspection Responsibility List;
- b. Facilities engaged on secret or top secret contracts;
- c. Facilities engaged on Army Air Forces research, experimental engineering and development projects;
- d. Facilities approved for the reproduction of classified material under the provisions of paragraph 18, AR 380-5; and
- e. Such other facilities as may be hereafter specifically designated by The Provost Marshal General.

Very few facilities were designated by The Provost Marshal General under paragraph e, above. Although investigation of employees and facilities included in the Master Inspection Responsibility List was still required, it is interesting to note that the number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List was reduced from 4,911 on 1 January 1944 to 1,231 on 1 November 1944. The practical effect of the 4 November 1944 letters was a satisfactory reduction in the investigation of civilians employed in war plants and facilities. Comparison statistics show that in October 1944, 1,630

^{96/} War Department letter, file AG 231.2 (31 Oct 44)OE-S-SPMG-M, dated 4 November 1944, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort"; and War Department letter, file AG 383.4 (31 Oct 44)OE-S-SPMG-M, dated 4 November 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

Japanese cases were received while in December, 1944, 588 were received. The total loyalty investigations received by the service commands were reduced by 2,000 during the same period.

On 5 October 1944, an Army Service Forces directive was published which cited provisions in paragraph 25a of TM 30-218 and War Department letter, 5 February 1944, subject: "Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Military Personnel," providing that no complaint investigation would be initiated to determine whether an officer or enlisted man was subversive or disaffected except upon reliable information of such seriousness that when weighed against the individual's known reputation and record of service, it compelled a grave suspicion that he was engaged in subversive activity or was disaffected.^{97/} This directive stated that the foregoing standards for initiation of complaint investigations were to be fully observed and all commands were ordered to institute measures to insure rigid adherence to the restrictions imposed.

In May, 1945, an Army Service Forces letter was forwarded to the service commands and Military District of Washington requesting each service command to prepare a one-time report for the period 10 May 1945 to 10 June 1945, broken down to show requesting sources and titles descriptive of the authority upon which the requests were based.^{98/} This letter was published for the purpose of conducting a survey to submit an analysis to Control Division, Army Service Forces. Upon receipt of the reports, a staff study was made by The Provost Marshal General for the purpose of determining the necessity for and further curtailment of loyalty investigations.^{99/} The conclusions reached were (a) that substantial and adequate curtailment of loyalty investigations had been accomplished, and (b) that the continuing loyalty investigation program should be based on a vigorous application of existing policies to limit loyalty investigations to those which are essential.

Work Load Statistics

The number of investigations processed under the staff supervision of The Provost Marshal General are statistically divided into three categories, (a) loyalty investigations of civilians, (b) loyalty

^{97/} Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 014.311 (2 Oct 44) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 5 October 1944, subject: "Unnecessary Complaint Investigations"; WD Technical Manual TM 30-218, dated 1 March 1944, subject: "Counterintelligence Investigative Reports"

^{98/} Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 250.1 Loyalty (1 May 45) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 1 May 1945, subject: "Breakdown of Requests for Loyalty Investigations for the Period 10 May 45 to 10 Jun 45"

^{99/} Provost Marshal General's Staff Study, file SPMGR, subject: "Analysis of One-Time Reports for the Purpose of Obtaining Information Concerning Curtailment of Loyalty Investigations"

investigations of military personnel, and (c) complaint investigations, including civilian and military personnel.

The following breakdown represents the volume of loyalty investigations of civilians on an annual basis:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Requests for Investigations</u>	<u>Investigations Completed</u>	<u>Investigations Pending at End of Year</u>
*1941	2,355	43	2,312
1942	392,499	289,668	105,143
1943	1,308,353	1,368,317	45,179
1944	362,881	397,888	10,172
**1945	126,970	131,467	5,675

* From 1 November to 31 December 1941

** From 1 January to 30 June 1945

Investigators

During 1942 and the early months of 1943, The Provost Marshal General experienced a continuing necessity to redistribute allotments of grades and authorized strength among the service commands based on their case load volumes. As all agents were assigned to the service commands, it was necessary for The Provost Marshal General to procure publication of a War Department letter in each instance to make these changes. It was, therefore, deemed necessary to integrate the administrative control of all agents under The Provost Marshal General which was accomplished by War Department directive, dated 10 June 1943. 100/ This directive ordered the transfer of all enlisted investigative personnel to the Detachment of Sergeant-Investigators, Corps of Military Police, Office of The Provost Marshal General. The directive permitted The Provost Marshal General to distribute the allotment of the 930 sergeant-investigators authorized, in accordance with work load of requirements in the service commands, which proved to be an efficient arrangement in this respect.

It was found from experience, however, that the administration of the detachment of Sergeant-Investigators in The Provost Marshal General's Office centralized too great a work load in the Military Personnel Division. It was then decided to reorganize the detachment

100/ War Department letter, file AG 221 (9-30-42)PE-A, dated 20 October 1942, subject: "Allotment of Grades & Authorized Strength"; War Department letter, file AG 221.02 (2 June 43) PE-A-SPGA, dated 10 June 1943, subject: "Allotments of Grades and Authorized Strengths, Corps of Military Police"

into ten detachments, one for each service command and the Military District of Washington. These were attached as units for administrative purposes only to the commands indicated.^{101/} This directive specifically provided, however, that distribution of the allotments to the ten units would remain under direct control of The Provost Marshal General.

In order to implement the consolidation of investigative and counterintelligence activities within each service command, Army Service Forces letter, dated 20 December 1943, directed that investigative personnel assigned to The Provost Marshal General be assigned to the service command in which they were stationed and that they be included in the bulk allotment of such service command.^{102/} On 10 January 1944, an Army Service Forces directive established the Security Intelligence Corps pursuant to the reorganization provided in Army Service Forces Circular No. 149. The Provost Marshal General transferred 930 agents to the new Corps and Counterintelligence Corps transferred 903 agents, making a total of 1833 agents assigned to the new organization.

In January 1944, the policy was established that physically qualified enlisted personnel, with certain exceptions, be redesignated as rapidly as practicable to units or activities which were destined for overseas service. As Security Intelligence Corps agents were not designated as an exception to this policy in the circular, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, published a directive on 14 February 1944 exempting them specifically.^{103/} This exemption was made by the Army Service Forces as a definite policy had been formulated to use Security Intelligence Corps agents, qualified for overseas service, as Counter Intelligence Corps replacements of which there was an urgent need in theaters of operation.

No table of organization was ever authorized for the Security Intelligence Corps. All of its personnel were included in the bulk allotments to the service commands. As a result, not all Security Intelligence Corps personnel transferred to Counterintelligence Corps were replaced. The service commands also lost agents through hospitalization, discharges, officers candidate schools and various other types

^{101/} War Department letter, file AG 322 (5 Nov 43)OB-T-SPHGP-M, dated 10 November 1943, subject: "Sergeant Investigator Detachments"

^{102/} Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 020 (10 Dec 43)OB-S-SPICY-M, dated 20 December 1943, subject: "Consolidation of Internal Security and Intelligence Divisions and Activities"; Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 333.5 (1 Jan 44)OB-S-SPHGP-M, dated 10 January 1944, subject: "Consolidation of Investigations" and Army Service Forces Circular No. 149, dated 14 December 1943.

^{103/} Army Service Forces letter, file SPX 220.3 (8 Feb 44)OB-S-SPGAC-M, dated 14 February 1944, subject: "Exemption of Security Intelligence Corps Personnel of ASF Circular No. 26, 24 January 1944"

of attrition, who could not be replaced with qualified personnel. An effort was made, however, to maintain the strength of the corps in each service command in sufficient numbers to meet work load requirements, although the commands were hard pressed at times because of insufficient personnel. The following statistics reveal the number of agents on duty in the service commands at semi-annual intervals from 1 January 1944 to 1 July 1945.

<u>SIC Agents on Duty</u>	<u>1 Jan 44</u>	<u>1 July 44</u>	<u>1 Jan 45</u>	<u>1 Jul 45</u>
1st Svc	189	159	127	110
2nd "	232	243	211	207
3rd "	226	204	207	201
4th "	124	95	91	89
5th "	173	148	165	142
6th "	197	155	118	135
7th "	151	111	93	104
8th "	186	173	184	182
9th "	199	96	144	166
MDW	98	70	67	67
NW Svc	8	7	1	2
	<u>1833</u>	<u>1461</u>	<u>1398</u>	<u>1405</u>

Transportation Corps Investigative Personnel

On 17 November 1944, a letter from the Office of the Chief of Transportation requested The Provost Marshal General to designate personnel engaged in investigative activities at ports of embarkation as Security Intelligence Corps agents.^{104/} This designation was desired because of (a) the large volume of intelligence and criminal problems at ports of embarkation, (b) the need for closer coordination with inter-related agencies, (c) the need for funds, clothing and equipment for Transportation Corps personnel to properly execute their investigative duties, and (d) the highly technical investigative training afforded members of the Security Intelligence Corps at The Provost Marshal General's School. On 9 January 1945, The Provost Marshal General concurred in the foregoing request and recommended that the Chief of Transportation take necessary steps to form a Security Intelligence Corps organization within the Transportation Corps which would meet Security Intelligence Corps requirements. A representative of The Provost Marshal General was then assigned to temporary duty to assist in the activation of the new organization. The following activities of the Security Intelligence Corps at ports

^{104/} Letter from Chief of Transportation, file SPTOI 246.8 CB, dated 17 November 1944, subject: "SIC Personnel & Confidential Funds"

of embarkation were supervised by The Provost Marshal General:

- Investigations, Conduct of Loyalty and counterintelligence
- Investigations, Criminal
- Investigations, Liaison with service commands
- Investigations, Transmission to other investigative agencies
- Statistical reports of investigations
- Supplies
- Security Intelligence Corps roster
- Security Intelligence Corps qualifications
- Disbursement of funds under Project 416
- Audit of funds under Project 416
- Training of investigators at The Provost Marshal General's School

Activities of Security Intelligence Corps personnel at ports of embarkation were confined to:

- Loyalty investigations, in ports
- Counterintelligence Corps investigations in ports (as directed by Director, Security & Intelligence Division)
- Criminal investigations in ports
- Foreign positive intelligence in ports
- Technical intelligence in ports
- Domestic intelligence in ports

Training of Agents

The first centralized training course conducted for The Provost Marshal General's investigators took place at the National Guard Armory, Washington, D. C., between 4 May and 25 May 1942.^{106/} Six agents from each corps area and Western Defense Command attended the classes which were devoted to instructions in conducting civilian loyalty investigations and general investigative procedures. It was originally planned to conduct a criminal investigative course immediately following the loyalty investigations course. In the interim, however, preparations had been made to move The Provost Marshal General's School, at which the criminal course was to be taught, from Fort Myer, Virginia, to Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. The course was then postponed and rescheduled for 1 July 1942 to be conducted at Fort Oglethorpe. The agents were in the meantime retained on temporary duty at the Washington Field Office, Third Corps Area, until 1 July 1942. They then proceeded to Fort Oglethorpe and were enrolled in the criminal investigative course which was conducted between 6 July and 29 August

^{106/} Provost Marshal General's letter, file PMG 210.691, dated 18 April 1942, subject: "Training of Investigations Division Agents"

1942. War Department letter, dated 28 June 1942 directed that criminal investigation was a command function and was not thereafter to be performed by representatives of the Office of The Provost Marshal General's Investigations Division's agents. As a result, no allotments for sergeant investigators were subsequently made to the criminal investigative courses conducted at The Provost Marshal General's School. Until 1 February 1944, when the Security Intelligence School was established, no central training program was conducted for sergeant investigators. The Provost Marshal General directed, however, in paragraph 16 of the Tentative Manual issued on 1 January 1943, that each service command conduct a training course for sergeant investigators. A suggested outline for the training course was contained in Appendix B of the manual. Each of the service commands conducted investigative training programs during this period. Some of them developed excellent and instructive courses, while other commands devoted their training programs to "on the job" training. Because of large backlogs of cases, some commands determined that the latter training method would interfere less with production. With the consolidation of counterintelligence functions within the zone of the interior, it was felt that there was a need for an efficient centrally operated and standardized training course.^{107/} The Provost Marshal General, on 1 February 1944, established the Security Intelligence School at Chicago, Illinois. A well qualified faculty was assigned to the school and subsequent training of Security Intelligence Corps agents was conducted there. In November, 1944, this school was consolidated with The Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

KEY PERSONNEL PROGRAM

The Key Personnel Program was essentially an investigative program covering employees in private industry employed on government contracts important to War and Navy Department Procurement.

The objective of the Key Personnel Program, revised and modified as the Industrial Employee Security Program, was the collection of information covering employees of facilities important to the war effort, to prevent interruption of production for the War and Navy Departments. The program was designed to screen and investigate employees of private industry, to (1) prevent suspected subversive individuals from being employed on important defense contracts and (2) to identify suspected subversives already employed on important defense contracts so that action could be taken to remove the individual from employment.

Originally, the survey or inspection of facilities of importance to Army or Navy procurement was made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was under way early in 1940, under the provisions of the delimitation agreement between the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division, dated 26 June 1939.1/ To plants having procurement contracts or otherwise important to the defense program, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a manual entitled, "Suggestions for Protection of Industrial Facilities." Recommendations made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as a result of surveys, were furnished, in the case of Army procurement, to the chief executive of the facility concerned and subsequently were furnished also to the local War Department District Procurement officer.

On 12 March 1941 the chiefs of technical services were directed by the Under Secretary of War to determine whether the suggestions contained in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Survey Reports were being followed.2/ It was further directed that the Local District Procurement officer should make this determination so that he would

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- 1/ AD ltr, AG 303.4 (7-5-40)E-B-E, 6 July 1940, subject: "Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence Division"
- 2/ WD memo, dated 12 March 1941, subject: "Report of Progress in Plans for Plant Protection"

be informed of plant protection conditions in the facilities in his district. Copies of the reports were also furnished to Military Intelligence Division which analyzed the reports from the point of view of intelligence and counterintelligence matters.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in its surveys, made detailed inquiries into plant protection matters, generally including matters directly related to personnel security, such as identification of employees, visitor control, safeguarding of military information, maintenance of personnel records, and matters with respect to investigations of employees. Reports of incidents in the nature of sabotage or espionage were, of course, stressed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation inspectors.

So far as the Navy Department was concerned, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made plant protection surveys of plants having Naval contracts only on request of the Navy Department, after recommendation by the technical bureau concerned.

Early in 1941, a study of the plant protection program, by the Office of the Under Secretary of War, resulted in the determination to broaden the scope of the plant protection program to include protective inspections of facilities of importance to War Department procurement by plant protection inspectors of the various supply arms and services. The intention to adopt this plan was announced to the chiefs of the supply arms and services in April of that year, and subsequently a directive was issued under date of 12 May 1941, inaugurating the program. So far as personnel security matters were concerned in this program, standards were laid down in the letter to include personnel records, investigations, identification control, visitor control and the enforcement of the Alien Employment Program.^{3/}

The adoption of a Plant Protection Service by the supply services resulted in the discontinuance of reviews of Federal Bureau of Investigation plant protection surveys by the Military Intelligence Division.^{4/}

The War Department inspection service did not replace the Federal Bureau of Investigation surveys at that time, and such surveys continued until 3 January 1942, at which time, the War Department assumed full responsibility for surveys of plant protection in plants engaged upon War Department contracts.^{5/} The elimination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from the picture served to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort which was necessarily present when both the Army procurement district inspectors and Federal Bureau

^{3/} WD Memo, dated 12 May 1941, subject: "Plant Protection Inspection Service"

^{4/} WD ltr, AG 381 (6-7-41)MC-B-M, 10 June 1941, subject: "Plant Protection"

^{5/} WD ltr, AG 004 (12-30-41)MSC-B-M, 3 January 1942, subject: "Plant Protection Surveys"

of investigation were surveying plants.

Other steps to prevent duplication of effort were made in cases where there was a question as to whether the Army or the Navy should inspect a certain plant, by referring the question to the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Board, which made the decision. In some cases, there was a joint inspection by both Army and Navy personnel.^{6/}

Shortly after the issuance of the instructions to plant protection inspectors by the Under Secretary of War's Office, a manual entitled "Plant Protection for Manufacturers" was issued by that office in February of 1942.^{7/} Upon transfer of functions of the Under Secretary of War's Office to The Provost Marshal General's Office in March 1942, the inspectors' manual and the manufacturers' guide were both automatically adopted as current instructions of The Provost Marshal General's Office.^{8/} The inspectors' manual was revised by The Provost Marshal General's Office in November 1942 and again in September 1943.^{9/} The pamphlet "Plant Protection for Manufacturers" was revised on 1 May 1943.^{10/} The instructions contained in these inspection manuals discussed personnel security matters under the heading of prevention of sabotage and espionage, dealing among other things with visitor control, the alien program, investigation of employees, and fingerprinting of employees as well as the handling of classified information. From the general nature of the plant protection inspection and of the report form, personnel security matters were substantially in the minority and, as a rule, inspections were performed by persons trained or qualified in the matters of physical protection of plants rather than in personnel security matters.

In the early part of 1942 there was no coordinated program for inquiring into employees' records. Some supply services were carrying out adequate employee investigation programs and others were not. Some services were investigating all employees whether or not they had been previously investigated and whether or not the facts of the particular case justified an investigation. The management of privately owned plants and facilities, which had been charged with primary responsibility for determining the loyalty of employees, was directed by the Under Secretary of War to maintain adequate personnel records and to procure investigations of new employees. Some plants

^{6/} WD letter, 16 December 1941, subject: "Coordination of Plant Protection Inspections"; Secretary of the Navy ltr, 22 December 1941, re: letter of 16 December 1941 - "Coordination of Plant Protection Inspections"; WD ltr, 27 February 1942, subject: "Elimination of Joint Plant Protection Inspections with Navy"

^{7/} WD pamphlet, "Plant Protection for Manufacturers" issued in February 1942

^{8/} WD letter, AG 581 (3-28-42), 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{9/} Internal Security Inspection Manual, November 1942; Internal Security Inspection Manual, 1 September 1943

^{10/} Plant Protection for Manufacturers, 1 May 1943

already employed, or immediately developed, excellent employee loyalty programs. The great majority, however, did nothing.

With the transfer of Internal Security functions to The Provost Marshal General in March 1942, it became apparent that a program was required that would supersede all existing employee loyalty programs of the supply services and establish a coordinated investigative effort. Such a program had already been instituted by the Navy Department. Questionnaire Form NNI-140 had been devised by the Personnel Security Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence and district procurement and intelligence officers were securing such questionnaires for the initiation of investigations by Naval Intelligence agents. The responsibility of The Provost Marshal General to conduct loyalty investigations of civilian employees of privately operated facilities, to supervise and coordinate security measures in such facilities, and to effect the suspension of suspected subversives was considered sufficient basis upon which to predicate such a program for the Army.

The Suspension of Subversives Program had been inaugurated with the publication of unnumbered restricted War Department circular dated 5 February 1942, subject: "Removal of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort." The circular provided a procedure by which an employee of a privately operated facility important to the war effort might be removed from employment when adequate grounds for suspecting the employee of subversive activity were disclosed by investigation. Thus, early in 1942, employees were removed under authority of the 5 February 1942 circular after Federal Bureau of Investigation or the supply services had transmitted derogatory investigation reports to the Office of the Under Secretary of War, and after 30 March 1942 to The Provost Marshal General. Most of the suspected subversives were discovered by chance and there was no systematic investigation or transmission of derogatory information to The Provost Marshal General's Office.11/

Operation of the Key Personnel Program by The Provost Marshal General

Accordingly, the Key Personnel Security Program was devised. It was essentially a screening and investigations program, inaugurated to determine potentially subversive and disloyal individuals employed in facilities of importance to War Department procurement. The program was initiated by letter to the technical services and Air Corps Materiel Command, dated 22 April 1942.12/ A supply of Personnel Security Questionnaires (Form NNI-140) was forwarded to each supply service with the request that it be distributed among the services procurement districts. The district procurement officer, in collaboration

11/ SEE "Suspension of Subversives Program"

12/ SOS ltr, 22 April 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Form NNI-140 to be Executed by Key Personnel in Facilities of Importance to Army Procurement."

with the personnel officer of each facility, was directed to determine the key personnel of the facility and secure the execution by such personnel of the questionnaire. "Key Personnel" were said to include;

- a. Employees suspected of disloyalty to the United States;
- b. Employees in positions wherein they could inflict such damage as would cause an appreciable curtailment in production or operation of the facility;
- c. Employees in positions which would enable them to acquire important information of products manufactured or operation performed, and to convey such information to the enemy;
- d. Employees in the more important supervisory positions; and
- e. Employees in positions of particular trust.

Lists of the employees thus determined to be key personnel, as well as their completed questionnaires, were forwarded to the Facility Employment Branch, Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, which screened each questionnaire and secured investigations of employees who were born in enemy countries or otherwise had connection with enemy countries, and checked upon the coverage of each plant involved. A review of the resulting investigation reports was then made in order to determine whether suspension of the employee was justified under the subversive circular.

The establishment of the War Department program immediately raised the possibility of consolidation of Army and Navy activities in this sphere. By an exchange of letters between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in April 1942, it was agreed that the War Department would assume full responsibility for personnel security measures in privately operated facilities important to Navy procurement, including the key personnel programs. 13/

The organization of the service commands in July 1942 produced an immediate change in the administration of the program. Responsibility for the security protection of plants and facilities was shifted from most of the supply services to the Internal Security Divisions of the service commands. Only Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service retained continuing protection functions for a few facilities designated by The Provost Marshal General's Office. In

13/ Ltr from the Assistant Secretary of War, 4 May 1942, requests comment with respect to suggestion that War Department assume responsibility for handling procedures for advancement of personnel security

addition, the volume of requests for investigations received indicated that the selection of "key" personnel was proceeding without due regard for the importance of the position held or the background of the employee. Accordingly, a letter, addressed to the service commands, Air Forces Materiel Command, Chief of Ordnance, and Chief of Chemical Warfare Service provided for the continuation of the program, but limited the classes of employees to be included to the following:

- a. Employees suspected of disloyalty to the United States;
- b. Employees in positions which would enable them to acquire essential information or who are in a supervisory position; and
- c. Employees in positions of particular trust.^{14/}

As objections had been raised to the transmittal of lists of names of key personnel to The Provost Marshal General's Office, the letter provided only for a statistical report by facility, setting out the total number of personnel and the number selected to execute questionnaires. All questionnaires were still forwarded to The Provost Marshal General's Office, however, where they were screened and the appropriate investigations requested.

The re-examination of all security programs in August 1942 produced further changes in procedures under this program.^{15/} The mounting volume of questionnaires clearly indicated the necessity for decentralizing screening operations to the service commands. Accordingly, the August 1942 letter, while preserving the same classification of key personnel set out in the letter of 29 July 1942, provided that questionnaires, after execution, would be turned over to the local representative of the service command.

The prevailing indiscriminate selection of employees and consequent deluge of questionnaires produced a further innovation. To prevent requests for investigation of personnel of relatively unimportant facilities, the service commands were specifically instructed to give priority to screening questionnaires from the more important plants and facilities.

An additional safeguard, added in order to assume impartial action, required that the procurement, examination, and segregation of questionnaires for investigation and the review of reports for suspension must be accomplished by personnel other than those con-

^{14/} SOS ltr, SPY OOL (7-24-42)SPAAI-PS-M, 29 July 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Form NNI-140 to be Executed by Personnel in Facilities of Importance to Army Procurement"

^{15/} SOS ltr, SPWOS 381, 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

ducting the investigations. This requirement was designed to prevent a group of individuals from acting both as prosecutor and judge in any case.

The first six months of operation of the program, however, were disappointing from many standpoints. The unsatisfactory results were primarily due to the following factors:

a. Supervision of the program from the Office of The Provost Marshal General was inadequate due to insufficient personnel and a consequent failure to send inspectors to the field to insure proper application of the program;

b. The transfer of responsibility from the supply services to the service commands placed the program in the hands of new personnel who did not understand the history of the program and were unfamiliar with the action already taken by the supply services;

c. In the latter part of August, such emphasis was placed on the fingerprint program and the militarization of plant guards that other service command responsibilities suffered. Adequate personnel was not assigned to the program by the service commands and reliance was placed on materiel inspectors who had no background on which to base a sound selection of employees. Such inspectors were neither trained for, nor interested in, this type of work;

d. The early directives were general in terms, on the theory that broad discretion in working out details should be lodged in the service commands and reliance placed upon the initiative of field representatives. This policy produced problems instead of results. Among these problems was the use of the program to secure information concerning the employee's trustworthiness, which had no connection with the suspension program and recommendations to employers based thereon; and

e. The cumbersome Form NNI-140 was complicated, difficult to fill out and inspired numerous complaints from management while labor complained that the information contained therein was being used by management to discriminate against employees.

On 10 August 1942 the Internal Security Division was reorganized and the Key Personnel Security Program was placed under the Personnel Security Branch of the Internal Security Division.

Under policies transmitted by a "secret" letter, dated 21 August 1942, copies of which were later ordered destroyed, each service command was directed to examine the questionnaire and to determine which

requests merited special investigation by the service command and which should be subjected only to a record check in Washington. Reports of investigations undertaken were transmitted to the Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, for review under the procedures of the removal program. Where the Army Air Forces, the Chief of Ordnance, or Chief of Chemical Warfare Service was responsible, however, the questionnaires continued to be transmitted to The Provost Marshal General's Office for screening and request of appropriate investigations.

Late in November 1942 an attempt was made to reduce the volume of questionnaires and investigations by a detailed statement of the personnel to be selected and the scope of investigation to be accorded each request.^{16/} These letters emphasized that the success of the program was dependent upon the efficiency of these screening operations. A corresponding set of instructions concerning the type of investigation to be conducted was transmitted to the service commands.^{17/}

The service commands were informed that prior to transmission of the questionnaires to the service command, the local Army Air Forces, Chemical Warfare Service or Ordnance representative responsible for continuing protection would determine the type of investigation and that after investigation by the service command, a copy of the questionnaire and a complete copy of the investigation case report would be returned to such representative.^{18/}

These letters all emphasized the fact that the success of the program depended upon the efficiency of screening operations. Indiscriminate delegation to plant management of the duty of completing questionnaires was curtailed by requiring a personal visit of a representative of the responsible military agency at the time of the selection. To ease the difficulties resulting from the lengthy Form NNI-140, a new short form, WD-PMGO-ID Form No. 58, had been designed and was forwarded to the field to replace the objectionable questionnaire in use.

To emphasize even further the necessity for screening and to prevent duplication of investigations, specific instructions were issued

^{16/} SOS ltr, SPMGS 381, 29 November 1942, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program in Plants and Facilities Privately Owned or Government Owned and Privately Operated which are Important to the War Effort";

SOS ltr, SPMGS 381, 29 November 1942, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program in Plants and Facilities Privately Owned or Government Owned and Privately Operated which are Important to the War Effort"

^{17/} SOS ltr, SPMGS 381, 9 December 1942, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program"

^{18/} PMGO ltr, SPMGS 381, 9 December 1942, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program"

to all interested agencies, concerning the screening of personnel records. This letter pointed out that examination of personnel records by representatives of the agencies concerned would reveal that a considerable number of the employee records contained reports of investigations procured from commercial companies by the management. Only in case information in addition to that possessed by a plant concerning an employee was desired was a questionnaire to be executed by such employees to indicate whether an investigation should be conducted.19/

A special procedure was adopted at government owned, privately operated plants, at which the procurement agency maintained a military representative, by which routine investigations could be requested directly from commercial investigation agencies.20/

In March 1943, the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, was organized and the supervision of the Key Personnel Security Program became a function of the Industrial Employee Branch of that Division.

Authority to effect suspension of subversives was decentralized to the service commands in August 1942. However, a copy of the questionnaire and the investigation report were forwarded in every case to The Provost Marshal General. The volume of questionnaires received prohibited a close review of all case reports to determine the adequacy of investigation, the scope of coverage in any plant, or the aggressiveness of the suspension program pursued by the service commands. Accordingly, it was determined to transmit to The Provost Marshal General's Office only derogatory reports of investigation.21/

The program was the subject of comment and study at the Internal Security Conference in St. Louis, Missouri, from 20 to 23 April 1943, inclusive. The major problem presented to the service commands was the continued urgency of better screening operations. The service commands were encouraged to use trained personnel in this task and sergeant-investigators were suggested as the most likely source of such personnel. The First, Second, and Eighth Service Commands, which had already adopted this type of procedure, reported considerable success in reducing the number of questionnaires.

At this conference several other problems worthy of note were raised. It had generally been the objective of the loyalty program that personnel who applied for positions in war plants should be investigated prior to employment. By April 1943 some 15,000,000 persons

19/ PMGO ltr, SPAGS 381, 29 December 1942, subject: "Utilization of Facility Personnel Records in Key Personnel Security Program"

20/ PMGO ltr, SPAGS 381, 17 February 1943, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program"

21/ PMGO ltr, SPAGP 200, 1 April 1943, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program"

were employed in war industry. The turnover of personnel in this group was such that it was impossible to screen and investigate employees prior to employment without seriously impeding production. It followed that this conception had to be abandoned.

A second problem concerned the reaction of labor to the execution of the questionnaire. Prior to the issuance of WD-PMGO-ID Form 58, national labor leaders had concurred in the use of a questionnaire. However, local labor organizations complained to the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices that items concerning color, nationality, and religion permitted discrimination. They further complained that the information contained in the questionnaire was being used by management to the detriment of labor. The tenseness of the situation was illustrated by the refusal of some members of the United Automobile Workers in the Detroit area to execute questionnaires. They claimed that supervision of the execution was a proper function of labor rather than management. This position was based upon the union's information that one security officer had permitted a local labor organization in one facility to supervise the execution of questionnaires. The solution of such difficulties generally depended upon the tact and initiative of local War Department representatives.

Specific instructions, however, had to be issued to prevent some local War Department representatives from using the program to secure investigations of active labor elements who were disrupting production. The Provost Marshal General constantly emphasized that normal labor activities were not matters of interest to the Key Personnel Security Program or Removal of Subversives Program. Similarly, local War Department security representatives were often over-zealous in the employment of the information received from the investigation. Thus, information insufficient to warrant suspension under the circular was occasionally the basis for informal removal of an employee from a position of trust. Particularly difficult in this realm was the revelation of criminal records of a non-subversive character which occasionally resulted in the employee's informal removal.

On 5 May 1943, by letter to the supply services and service commands, the name of the program was changed to "Industrial Employee Security Program".^{22/} This change was designed to aid screening difficulties by shifting the emphasis from the nature of the employment to the background of the employee. Under prior practice, prominent citizens of indisputable loyalty had been investigated merely because they held important supervisory positions regardless of the unquestionable personal history of the individual. Individuals of national prominence were investigated in some instances under the policy, often adopted by unduly cautious security representatives, of requesting 100% coverage of facility personnel.

^{22/} PMGO ltr, SPMGP 381, 5 May 1943, subject: "Change of Name of Key Personnel Security Program"

The extent of the investigation coverage of industrial employees was indicated by a report dated 1 October 1943, which estimated the quarterly loyalty investigations to be conducted under the Industrial Employment Program. It was estimated that for October, November, and December 1943, 50,809 routine investigations and 15,800 special investigations would be conducted. These estimates by the service commands were based upon the following statistics covering completed investigations during preceding months.

Estimated Quarterly Loyalty Investigations Report
(Routine Cases)
Industrial Employment Security Program
For Oct., Nov., Dec., 1943.

1st Service Command	1190
2nd " "	2625
3rd " "	3759
4th " "	345
5th " "	8581
6th " "	11073
7th " "	2725
8th " "	398
9th " "	20113
MDW	
TOTAL	50809

Estimated Quarterly Loyalty Investigations Report
(Special Cases)
Industrial Employment Security Program
For Oct., Nov., Dec., 1943.

1st Service Command	3745
2nd " "	1125
3rd " "	1604
4th " "	45
5th " "	1677
6th " "	3254
7th " "	1304
8th " "	215
9th " "	2831
MDW	
TOTAL	15800

Facilities Submitting PSQs for the Months
of July, August, September and October
1943 under the Key Personnel Program

1 November 1943

July	1522
August	2854
September	714
October	<u>967</u>
Total	6057

During the period July, August, September, and October 1943, 6,057 facilities submitted Personnel Security Questionnaires and investigations were requested covering selected personnel employed at these facilities.

The tremendous flow of cases was indicated by the fact that between 1 January 1943 and 1 November 1943 a total of approximately 1,168,000 loyalty investigations were completed by The Provost Marshal General, of which a substantial number were investigations of industrial employees under this program. The over-all figures indicate that approximately 5% of the personnel were selected for investigation in facilities in which the program was completed.

By November 1942, the war had progressed from defensive to crucial offensive operations. Increased production activities and conscription produced critical manpower shortages and necessitated the assumption of greater risks in internal security to transfer personnel from protection to production connected with the offensive phase of the war. In July 1943, as a result of a joint Army-Navy meeting, the Bureau of the Budget had been requested to conduct a study of security measures and to make recommendations for their reduction. On 21 September 1943, the Bureau of the Budget reported to Lt. General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Vice Admiral F. A. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. This report emphasized the large volume of investigations and stated:

"Of some significance as an indication of a possible explanation for an apparent over-emphasis on investigations is the fact that investigations are recommended as an incidental and more or less automatic measure by the inspector. Most of the inspectors are fire, safety, and industrial engineers. * * *"

The conclusion stated;

"Prevention of Espionage & Sabotage: The development of an objective standard for rating facilities will assist in curtailing activities under this heading to those of direct importance to the procurement program. The present over-emphasis is the result of momentum arising from the necessity a year ago to take drastic measures directed toward the security of the country. The conclusion that these measures can now be subjected to the control of an objective standard based on consideration of importance to the procurement program is merely a recognition of the changed military status. We can afford to curtail some of our defensive activities now that we are on the offensive."

The report recommended certain specific measures substantially as follows:

"1. Inspections of facilities important to procurement should be conducted by The Provost Marshal General as a service for procurement agencies and should be generally limited to plants vital to the war effort.

"2. Inspection services of plants important primarily from the point of view of espionage or sabotage, apart from their importance to procurement, should be separately established and a separate list of these personnel security plants maintained. Such inspections should be conducted by specially trained personnel."

In accordance with the recommendations of this report, a special committee was created representing the Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, and the Navy. It was instructed to establish criteria for inclusion on the list of plants to receive inspections and to set up the inspection machinery to be employed.

On 3 November 1943, as a result of the deliberations of this committee, Joint Army-Navy Circulars Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were promulgated.^{23/} Although the Industrial Employee Security Program was not discontinued by the Joint Army-Navy Circulars Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of 3 November 1943, the program was included in the Personnel Security Inspection Program and occupied a comparatively minor position along with other personnel security programs.

^{23/} Joint War & Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1, 2, & 3, 3 November 1943, subject: "Internal Security"

Under Joint Circular No. 1, two types of security inspections were defined - a Production Security Inspection and a Personnel Security Inspection. Security inspections were limited to plants included on a Master Inspection Responsibility List. The criteria for admission to this list were extremely stringent. Plants vital to procurement were designated "P-1", "P-2", and "Px" and received a production security inspection. Although the personnel security inspection was separately delineated and constituted a separate service for "PS" plants, it was also included in, and became an integral part of, the production security inspection. Plants dealing with highly classified or easily sabotaged products were designated "PS" and received a personnel security inspection only.

The scope of the personnel security inspection, as defined in Joint Circular No. 1, consisted of the primary personnel security programs. The inspector was to check the functioning of the Fingerprint Program, the Industrial Employee Security Program, the Suspension of Subversives Program, the Alien Employment Program and the Japanese-American Program.^{24/} In cases in which Personnel Security Inspections only were given, the inspection included visitor control, identification systems and guard forces which were normally considered a part of a production security inspection. Such special personnel security inspections were given in all "PS" plants and in facilities assigned to the Navy for inspection responsibility. In this last category, although the Navy was designated as inspection agency, the Army's general responsibility for personnel security activities in Navy facilities dictated the assumption by Army agencies of the obligation to inspect these measures.

The Key Personnel Program was thus limited to the Industrial Employee Security Program and loyalty check within the scope of the Personnel Security Inspection Program. Full utilization was to be made of the personnel records of the facility and management's estimate of individuals to determine loyalty of employees who might endanger the facility. Loyalty investigations were conducted only where necessary and requests for such investigations were held to a minimum.

The doctrine of calculated risk, i.e., that an offensive position in the European conflict permitted the assumption of risks not warranted in a defensive phase of war, was adopted as a standard War and Navy Department policy under the Joint Circular.^{25/}

An inspection report form, WD, AGO Form 530 was devised and employed as a minimum check list in conducting the inspections.^{26/} Part

^{24/} SEE "Fingerprinting Program", "Suspension of Subversives Program", "Alien Employment Program", and "Japanese-American Program".

^{25/} Joint War & Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1, 2, & 3, 3 November 1943, subject: "Internal Security"

^{26/} WD, AGO Form No. 530, 1 January 1944, "Security Inspection Report"

B of the report pertained to personnel security measures and was filled out when completing this portion of the inspection. If the personnel security inspection only were given, the inspector also completed questions under I, Part A, concerning Prevention of Sabotage. This division of the report soon proved unsatisfactory. It was essential to the functions described in Part B of the report that adequate measures be taken to prevent unauthorized entry through judicious employment of plant guards, fencing and floodlighting. Accordingly, on 27 May 1944, the report form was revised, and these elements of the inspection report were transferred to the personnel security part thereof.27/

In a report of Continuing Protection Activities submitted by the service commands for the months of March, April, May, and June 1943, 4,340 facilities submitted questionnaires covering 295,000 employees under the Key Personnel Program.

Illustrative of the extent of loyalty investigations of civilian personnel during the six months period from July to December 1943 is the fact that 564,000 investigations were completed by the commercial credit companies while The Provost Marshal General's sergeant-investigators completed 131,622 special and 10,074 routine investigations during the period. Since these figures included all civilian loyalty investigations, the number of investigations attributable to the Key Personnel Program cannot be determined. However, it was a sizeable figure, probably 50 to 60 percent of the total.

A manual of procedures covering the conduct of Personnel Security inspections was transmitted to the service commands inspecting agencies on 28 February 1944. The manual included instructions for the conduct of inspections of (1) area surrounding the facility, (2) Identification System, (3) Visitor Control, (4) Alien Employment Program, (5) Suspension of Subversives, (6) Fingerprinting, (7) the screening of employment records, and (8) instructions on the preparations of Personnel Security inspection report WD, AGO Form No. 530.

Beginning with January 1944 reports from the service commands covering activities under Joint Circulars Nos. 1, 2, and 3, 3 November 1943, were submitted by the service commands. With reference to the personnel security inspection program these statistics stated (1) the number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, (2) the number of personnel security inspections conducted, and (3) the requests for loyalty investigations of employees of private industrial establishments. On the whole there was a gradual decrease in the number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and the number of inspections conducted. Requests for loyalty

27/ WD, AGO Form No. 530, 27 May 1944, Revised, "Security Inspection Report"

investigations of employees of private industry decreased from approximately 19,000 in January 1944 to 9,000 in January 1945 and 2400 in September 1945. These figures indicate that the efforts of The Provost Marshal General's Office to decrease unnecessary investigations were having a salutary effect on investigative activities in the service commands.

A review of statistical reports of the number of loyalty and character investigations conducted under the staff supervision of The Provost Marshal General's Office from January 1942 to July 1945 indicates that a peak of 149,555 investigations were made during July 1943. From that date there had been a steady decrease in the number of investigations. During December 1944, 19,762 investigations were made; figures available for July 1945 indicate that only 18,000 investigations were conducted. These figures apply to all civilian investigations and include investigations conducted under the Key Personnel Program, the War Department civilian employee investigations and other civilians that the War Department desired to investigate. While separate figures for the Key Personnel Program are not given, it does illustrate the tremendous effort the War Department expended to eliminate disloyal individuals from employment of importance to the war effort. These figures also include the tremendous number of investigations conducted during 1943 by the commercial credit companies (National Consumers Credit, Dan and Bradstreet, Inc., Hooper-Holmes, O'Hanlon and Retail Credit Company, Inc.) as well as the special and routine investigations conducted by War Department investigators assigned to the service commands.

Statutory enactments of various states regarding fair employment practices and policies of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices were frequently at variance with certain security policies promulgated by The Provost Marshal General. In particular, exceptions were taken to certain questions regarding race, color, and national origin included in the Personnel Security Questionnaire Form No. 58 used by the War Department. The Judge Advocate General in response to a request for a decision in this problem expressed an opinion that information obtained by war plant contractors concerning background upon which loyalty of persons engaged in war production may be deduced is considered a prime "occupational qualification" within the meaning of Section 131 (3) of the New York Anti-Discrimination Law. The New Jersey Anti-Discrimination Law is substantially the same as the New York legislation.

In a letter addressed to the Honorable Walter Van Riper, Attorney General of New Jersey, dated 25 July 1945, the necessity for securing background information concerning employees of war contractors and the decision of the Judge Advocate General regarding the legality of this action, was explained.^{28/}

28/ PMGO ltr, SPMP, 25 July 1945

Mr. Van Riper's reply dated 9 August 1945 concurred in the decision of the Judge Advocate General and stated that it seemed clear that the authority of the Federal government was supreme with respect to matters of war in all its phases.29/

Termination of the Key Personnel Program

The Key Personnel Program, with the Suspension of Subversives Program superimposed upon it, was well conceived in theory. It provided for the investigation of any individual about whom there was an element of suspicion employed in a privately operated or government owned privately operated plant of importance to War and Navy procurement. If the investigation disclosed sufficient derogatory information an individual could be removed under the Suspension of Subversives Program.

A great obstacle to efficient operation of the program was the difficulties in defining with more exactness the type of employees who were to be investigated. As a consequence the personnel administering the program requested thousands of investigations which were unnecessary. Generally, these were performed by the commercial credit companies. Attempts to curtail unnecessary investigations and the use of credit companies in the investigations program are covered in the chapter on "Loyalty Investigations Program." The Key Personnel Program reached its proper perspective in the security field when it was made a part of the Personnel Security Inspection Program by Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Numbers 1, 2, and 3, 3 November 1943, and the Master Inspection Responsibility List was reduced to a relatively small number of important plants.

Following the Japanese capitulation and in accordance with the policy of elimination of all unnecessary security activities on 15 August 1945, security inspections of all facilities and installations and the resultant investigations by Army Service Forces agencies were eliminated.30/

On 21 August 1945 all facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List were deleted and Army Service Forces agencies were instructed to notify all facilities of the suspension of security inspections.31/

On 13 October 1945, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy, the basic directives on internal security, Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Numbers 1, 2, and 3, 3 November 1943, were rescinded and the Master Inspection Responsibility List was abolished.32/

29/ Ltr from Hon. W.D. Van Riper, Attorney General of New Jersey, 9 August 1945

30/ Telegram to commanding generals, all service commands, Military District of Washington, Chiefs of Chemical Warfare Service, Transportation Corps, and Ordnance, 15 August 1945

31/ Telegram to commanding generals, all service commands, Military District of Washington, chiefs of technical services, 21 August 1945

32/ War Department Circular No. 315, 13 October 1945

ALIEN EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

The mission of the Alien Employment Program was twofold. The first and primary objective was to preclude damage to or destruction of vital war installations or materiel and to protect the war effort against espionage and subversive activity by aliens. The secondary objective of the program was to make available to the war effort the wealth of labor and technical skills in our loyal alien population.

The alien population of the country contained a large percentage of experienced mechanics and technicians whose skill was greatly needed by the war effort. There was, however, a possibility that more were disloyal or potentially subversive individuals. This condition necessitated careful investigation and proper evaluation in order that the dual mission of security and maximum manpower availability might be accomplished.

In 1940, Congress and the Executive Departments of the government suddenly realized that almost nothing was known about the alien population in the United States except in terms of vague generalities. They also realized that if the United States became involved in the conflict then engulfing Europe, control of our alien residents would be necessary. In order, then, intelligently to plan measures for alien control, it was first necessary to determine the extent and ramifications of the alien problem. The Alien Registration Act of 28 June 1940 (Public Law No. 670, 76th Congress) required the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens over 14 years of age. Each registrant was provided with an identification card bearing personal data and an alien registration number. This information and other data in the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service was of considerable value to The Provost Marshal General's Office. Statistics obtained from the alien registration records disclosed that, as of 31 December 1940, there were 1,981,180 aliens in the United States who were citizens of the United Nations; 435,705 aliens from South and Central America who were not included in the United Nations category as of January 1942; 1,140,407 aliens from neutral and occupied countries in Europe, North Africa, and Eastern Asia; and 1,101,936 aliens from enemy countries, i.e., Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The large number of potentially employable aliens in the United States in 1940 indicated to some extent the problem of the Alien Employment Program and the difficulty of separating the loyal from the disloyal aliens in order that the former could be approved for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts.

Legislation

The basic requirement for the clearance of aliens for employment on aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts was section 10j of the Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926, (44 Stat. 784; 10 U.S.C. 310) which provided that:

"(j) * * * no aliens employed by a contractor for furnishing or constructing aircraft, or aircraft parts, or aeronautical accessories for the United States shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications or the work under construction or to participate in the contracts trials without consent beforehand of the Secretary of the Department concerned.

* * * * *

"(p) * * * any person, firm, or corporation that shall, upon indictment and trial be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this section shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not exceeding \$20,000, or to be imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both, at the discretion of the court."

This legislation marked the first step taken by Congress to protect the aircraft industry from espionage and possible sabotage. However, with this exception, Congress took no action or official notice of problems of alien employment until Europe was engulfed in war and Fifth Column activity and espionage became a topic of current discussion.

Under the Air Corps Act, the Secretary of War was charged with administration of the statute for the War Department, and the Secretary of the Navy for the Navy Department. In addition, even prior to 1940, both the War and Navy Departments inserted secrecy agreements in various contracts requiring the consent of the head of the department concerned prior to the release of classified information to aliens employed by industrial concerns.

By 1940, millions of dollars in War and Navy Department contracts had been awarded to private industry. Congress took official notice of the need for proper safeguards and control of aliens employed on restricted, confidential, and secret government contracts by the passage of the "Act of 28 June 1940, Public Law 671, 76th Congress:1/

1/ Act of 28 June 1940, "Aliens", Sec 11, Public Law 671, 76th Congress; 54 Stat. 680; 50 U.S.C. 1161

"Section 11. Employment of Aliens in Certain Capacities Prohibited; Penalties: Definition of Person

"a. No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contract, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written permission of the head of the Government Department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who wilfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

"b. Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"c. For the purpose of this section, the term 'person' shall be considered to include an individual partnership association, corporation or other business enterprise."

Although this legislation made unnecessary the insertion of contract provisions safeguarding classified information, both the War and Navy Departments continued this practice, in an abundance of caution, during the existence of the Act of 28 June 1940.

The Act of 28 June 1940 expired by its own limitation on 30 June 1942. Despite the absence of legislation, paragraph 51, Army Regulations 380-5, 28 September 1942, now paragraph 61, Army Regulations 380-5, 15 March 1944, set forth for inclusion in all War Department contracts classified secret, confidential or restricted mandatory provisions similar to those set out in the Act of 28 June 1940 with respect to the employment of aliens. The contractual obligation which was thus imposed became the sole authority applying to contractors for the continuation of the requirement that consent be obtained before the employment of aliens on such contracts was granted.

On 14 February 1942 the Navy Department issued a procurement directive which provided for the insertion of provisions, similar to those set forth in Section 11 of the Act of 28 June 1940, in all aeronautical and classified Navy Department contracts.^{2/} These contractual obligations were considered as authority for continuing the requirement that consent be obtained before the employment of aliens on work covered by aeronautical and classified Navy Department contracts.

^{2/} Navy Procurement Directive, dated 14 February 1942, subject: "Contract Provisions Relating to Disclosure of Information, Employment of Aliens, Reports by Contractor, and Other Protective Measures"

With the expiration of the Act of 28 June 1940, additional instructions were issued to all Navy Department contracting agencies, on 8 August 1942, directing the inclusion of agreements for safeguarding classified information in all Navy Department contracts.^{3/}

Prior to the expiration of Section 11 of the Act of 28 June 1940 on 30 June 1942, an effort was made to have the act extended by joint resolution of both Houses of Congress. The resolution was prepared by the Special Legislative and Liaison Division of the Office of the Under Secretary of War and submitted to the Bureau of Budget, which transmitted it to the Navy Department. The Navy Department, at first opposed the extension of the existing act and proposed adoption of a new statute which it believed could more adequately provide the necessary authority for the Alien Employment Program. However, after conferring with the War Department, the Navy Department decided that the possibility of obtaining an extension of the existing act by joint resolution was more favorable than would be the possibility of obtaining passage of a new act and withdrew its counter proposal and agreed to the War Department proposal. The bill was not submitted as a joint resolution, but was attached as a rider (Section 1) to H.R. 6355. It was passed by the House of Representatives on 28 January 1942 and by the Senate on 11 June 1942 with amendments which were agreed to by the House of Representatives on 22 June 1942. H.R. 6355, however, was vetoed by the President on 6 July 1942, because of his objections to the sections other than Section 1.

Following the President's veto, re-enactment of Section 11 of the Act of 28 June 1940 was considered by representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, and the War Production Board. The War and Navy Departments submitted to the Bureau of the Budget drafts of bills proposing to re-enact the provisions of Section 11 of the expired Act of 28 June 1940. At that time, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission interposed objections to the proposed legislation and proposed substitute legislation by letter to the Bureau of the Budget, dated 19 August 1942.^{4/}

In response to a request for the views of the War Department relative to the position taken by the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Secretary of War, by letter to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, dated 24 September 1942, expressed the views of the War Department, re-affirming the position that the re-enactment of the legislation would be in the interest of national security.^{5/} Several conferences between the War Department and the War Manpower Commission

^{3/} Secretary of Navy letter, dated 8 August 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens in National War Industries"

^{4/} Letter from War Manpower Commission to Bureau of the Budget, dated 19 August 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens in National War Industries"

^{5/} Letter from the Secretary of War to the Bureau of the Budget, dated 24 September 1942

resulted in failure to agree on the type of legislation necessary to control the employment of aliens on classified War and Navy Department contracts, and other proposed legislation submitted at a later date by the War Department did not meet with legislative support.^{6/}

To summarize, as a result of the foregoing, from 28 June 1942 to the date of this writing, i.e., 1 September 1945, the sole authority for the Alien Employment Program stemmed from the Air Corps Act (Act of 2 July 1926) and the contract provisions contained in Army Regulations 380-5 and Navy Department Regulations.

Administration of the Program

The Alien Employment Program was administrative in nature. It provided for an investigative procedure and a loyalty determination by the War and Navy Departments before consent was granted for the employment of an alien on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts.

The authority to act for the Secretary of War in the granting or denying of consent for the employment of aliens under the provisions of the Air Corps Act was at first vested in the Assistant Secretary of War.

The administration of the alien employment program under the Air Corps Act was a function of the Current Procurement Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Because of the rapid increase in the activities and functions of the Current Procurement Branch, it was deemed necessary to divide its functions. Consequently, on 11 July 1940, the Current Procurement Branch was abolished and its functions divided between two newly activated branches, the Purchase and Contract Branch and the Production Branch.^{7/} The administration and operations of the Alien Employment Program was assigned to the Alien Section of the Purchase and Contract Branch.

By office memorandum, dated 13 November 1940, the Production Branch of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, was charged with the responsibilities of all matters pertaining to the protection of commercial plants manufacturing material for the Army.^{8/} This included the function of clearances of aliens.

^{6/} PMGO Memorandum for Files, dated 15 November 1944, subject: "Proposed Legislation to Restrict Access by Aliens to War and Navy Department Contracts"

^{7/} Assistant Secretary of War's Office Order, dated 11 July 1940, subject: "Reorganization of Branches to Facilitate Duties of Current Procurement Branch, Assistant Secretary of War's Office"

^{8/} Assistant Secretary of War's office memorandum, dated 13 November 1940, subject: "Responsibilities of Production Branch, Assistant Secretary of War's Office"

Pursuant to authority contained in the Act of 16 December 1940, Public Law No. 891, 76th Congress, the Office of the Under Secretary of War was created.^{9/} All functions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary pertaining to procurement together with all officers and civilian employees were transferred to the Office of the Under Secretary of War on 21 April 1941.^{10/}

The alien Section was operated in the Production Branch, Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, until the reorganization of the War Department effective 9 March 1942, as provided under War Department Circular 59, 2 March 1942, when officer and civilian personnel, records, and functions of the Plant Protection Division were transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office. Specific reference to the Plant Protection Division of the Office of the Under Secretary of War is not found in this order but the transfer of functions to The Provost Marshal General was confirmed by War Department letter, 30 March 1942, which was issued for the purpose of clarifying the entire subject matter of internal security.^{11/} These functions and personnel were consolidated with the Emergency Protection functions of The Provost Marshal General and became the Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office. The Alien Section became a part of the Personnel Security Branch of the Internal Security Division.

The Provost Marshal General, by oral instructions, on 9 March 1942, was authorized to act for the Secretary of War in granting or denying consent in the employment of aliens on classified and aeronautical War or Navy Department contracts. These instructions were confirmed by letter from the Secretary of War to The Provost Marshal General, dated 4 September 1942.^{12/}

In an exchange of correspondence between the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, on 30 April 1942 and 4 May 1942, the War Department assumed responsibility for the clearance of aliens in all commercial plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts or sub-contracts. The resulting transfer from the Navy to the Army of the clearance of aliens centralized this function in the War Department.^{13/} The Secretary of the Navy by letter, 8 May 1942, directed all naval bureaus and offices to take such action as might be necessary to effect this transfer.^{14/}

^{9/} Public Law 891 - 76th Congress, S. 4570, 16 December 1940, authorizing an Under Secretary of War's Office

^{10/} WD orders, Assignment of Duties and Responsibilities to Under Secretary of War, 21 April 1941

^{11/} WD letter, 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{12/} S/W letter, 4 Sep 1942, re: "Provost Marshal General authorized to grant consent for employment of aliens on behalf of the S/W"

^{13/} S/N letter to S/W, 30 April 1942, on the subject "Personnel Security" and letter from Asst. S/W to the S/N, 4 May 1942, on the same subject

^{14/} S/N letter, file (SC)A-8-5/QM, Serial 01152716, 8 May 1942, subject: "Personnel Security"

On 18 March 1943, upon the recommendation of The Provost Marshal General, the Acting Secretary of War delegated to the service commanders authority to act for the Secretary of War in granting consent for employment of aliens on classified and aeronautical contracts. The directive marked the first step towards decentralizing the operations of the Alien Employment Program. 15/

This action was in conformity with the instructions of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to decentralize activities from Washington to the service commands. The authority to grant consent for the Secretary of War covering alien employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts was further delegated by the Under Secretary of War, on 1 July 1943, to the Commanding General, Materiel Command, Army Air Forces, and to such district supervisors of Army Air Forces procurement districts (now Air Technical Service Commands) as he might designate. 16/ Further decentralization of authority to grant consent for the employment of aliens was not authorized as such action would result in loss of control with probable impairment of security. 17/

During August and September 1943, the operations of the Alien Employment Program were transferred from The Provost Marshal General's Office to the service commands and the procurement districts, Army Air Forces. Officer personnel from The Provost Marshal General's Office installed the decentralized program and supervised its operation until service commands and Army Air Forces' personnel were competent to continue the program independently. Later, on 18 October 1943, complete operational and policy instructions were issued in an Army Service Forces letter covering requirements for employment of aliens on classified and aeronautical contracts. The program was administered in the service commands and Army Air Forces procurement districts after that date, under the 18 October 1943 letter, as amended. 18/

Policy and Procedure

On 2 April 1937, the Army Air Forces Materiel Division, in a letter to manufacturers of aircraft and their accessories, set forth the then current policy of the War Department covering the employment of aliens on army contracts under the provision of the Air Corps Act. Aliens were not to be employed if (a) they had not received their first papers prior to date of request for employment, (b) they had

15/ Secretary of War's memorandum, dated 18 March 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

16/ OUSW letter, dated 1 July 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program"; FMG letter, dated 1 July 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

17/ WD letter, AG 014.311 (24 Sep 43)OB-S-SPDC, dated 5 October 1943, subject: "Decentralization of Alien Program"

18/ ASF letter, SPX 014.31 (9 Oct 43)OB-S-SHMG-P-M, dated 18 October 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

taken out first papers and had allowed more than 30 days to elapse after the date upon which they could have taken out final papers, and (c) they had been in the United States for a period of time and had shown no evidence of declaring their intention to become citizens of the United States, until forced to do so by reason of their employment being affected by the Air Corps Act.19/

Additional impediments were placed on the employment of aliens by Army Air Forces. On 16 August 1937 manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft accessories were informed that requests for approval for employment of aliens must show clearly why services of aliens were necessary and why no American citizen was available. On 26 October 1939, manufacturers of aircraft equipment were informed by the Air Corps that all further requests for employment or re-employment of aliens under provisions of the Air Corps Act must clearly state why an alien was recommended over a United States citizen.20/

These instructions to contractors represented War Department policy concerning the employment of aliens on aeronautical contracts prior to 1940. Accordingly, few aliens received consent for employment on aeronautical contracts, and contractors, in most instances, made no attempt to employ an alien on aeronautical contracts because of the difficulty in convincing the War Department that an alien should be employed instead of a citizen.

In addition to the restrictions imposed on alien employment on aeronautical contracts, contractors were required to determine the citizenship of all prospective employees in order to guard against unauthorized employment of aliens.21/

On 15 August 1940, the Secretary of the Navy directed naval inspectors and supervisors to maintain a check on the citizenship status of all aliens working on classified and aeronautical contracts,

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- 19/ Letter from Executive, Materiel Division, Air Corps, to Manufacturers of Aircraft, Aircraft Engines and Aircraft Accessories, 2 April 1937, subject: "Citizenship of Employees Under Section 10 (j), Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926"
- 20/ Letter from Executive, Materiel Division, Air Corps, to Manufacturers of Aircraft, Aircraft Engines, Aircraft Accessories, 16 August 1937, subject: "Citizenship of Employees under Section 10 (j), Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926;" Letter from Air Corps Materiel Division to Manufacturers of Aircraft, Aircraft Engines and Aircraft Accessories, subject: "Citizenship of Employees under Section 10 (j), Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926", 26 Oct 1939
- 21/ Secretary of the Navy letter, 5 June 1940, subject: "Citizenship of Employees of Contractors Performing Work Covered by Navy Contractors"

stating that approval for employment had been granted upon the condition that the alien obtain United States citizenship as quickly as possible.22/

On 25 November 1940, the Assistant Secretary of War, in a memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, outlined the causes for denial, by the Secretary of War, of permission for the employment of aliens on secret, confidential, or restricted contracts or contracts for aircraft or aeronautical equipment.

a. The principal causes for refusal were:

- (1) Failure of alien to apply for first papers.
- (2) If alien could be replaced by a citizen without interfering with production.

b. Probable causes for refusal were:

- (1) Citizen of country concededly inimical to the United States. (Rare exceptions might be made in the cases of employees of extremely long service who were vital to production; who were especially recommended by the company requesting permission for their continued employment; whose loyalty to the United States was vouched for by the company; and who had no relatives or other interest in nations hostile to the United States or of nations under their control.)
- (2) Aliens who had relatives or interests in a country which was admittedly a potential public enemy, wherein by threat, the alien might be persuaded to commit subversive acts.
- (3) Aliens who held membership in any organization generally conceded to be engaged in activities subversive to the interests of this nation or were associated in any way with members thereof.
- (4) Aliens known to be sympathetic to or who had shown themselves to have allegiance in any way to an unfriendly nation. (This could often be determined by questioning neighborhood acquaintances.)

c. Possible reasons for refusal were:

- (1) Failure in cooperating with government agencies or

22/ Secretary of the Navy letter, 15 August 1940, subject: "Citizenship Status of Aliens Authorized to be Employed on U. S. Navy Classified Contract Work"

employers in their conduct of the alien survey by evasion of questions asked them during this survey.

- (2) Recently hired aliens not important to production.
- (3) Remote connections in countries of known or believed enmity toward democracy.
- (4) Arrests by civilian officers of the law or generally doubtful character rating within a community.

In a letter to the Office of Production Management on 21 June 1941, the Secretary of the Navy set forth the policy of the Navy Department and procedure in relation to the employment of aliens under existing legislation. The letter stated that, when a questionnaire was received by the Navy Department, the questionnaire would be analyzed and evaluated and thereafter the employer would be notified that the Secretary had either granted or denied consent for the employment of the alien. In certain types of cases, the decision was rendered as expeditiously as possible because of the nature of the work done by the alien employee. Cases which called for an investigation were referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After an investigation report was received from that agency, action was taken on the questionnaire.^{23/}

On 24 June 1941, the Production Branch, Office of the Under Secretary of War, reported that 376 aliens had been disapproved and 3,628 aliens approved for employment on classified and aeronautical War Department contracts.^{24/} These figures represented a small percentage of the employable alien population. However, the great movement of industry to war production had not as yet taken place, and there still existed a surplus of native-born or naturalized citizens.

Between 1940 and 1942 numerous alien seamen were "jumping ship" and securing shore employment after their ships docked in United States ports. These desertions were due to the dangers attending sea duty and the high wages paid in defense industries. The result was a shortage of skilled seamen. The Maritime Commission in 1942 appealed to the War Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service for assistance in meeting this problem. In an exchange of correspondence between the Maritime Commission, the War Department, and the Navy Department in 1942 and 1943, the Maritime Commission requested the War Department to disapprove alien seamen who had sea duty after 1938 for employment on classified and aeronautical contracts. The War Department adopted this suggestion of the Maritime Commission,

^{23/} Secretary of the Navy's letter dated 21 June 1941, re: "Employment of Aliens in Private Industries Working on Navy Contracts"

^{24/} Under Secretary of War's Office memorandum, 24 June 1941, subject: "Enforcement of Statutes Concerning Alien Workers on Aeronautical and Classified Contracts"

by inserting Item 14 in the Alien Employment Questionnaire, to determine if an alien applicant had service as a seaman since 1938, and disapproved such aliens for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts.^{25/} This policy was discontinued on 9 April 1943 after a conference with members of the Maritime Commission, War Shipping Administration, the Department of State and the Department of Justice as blanket disapproval of those aliens had not been of material assistance to the War Shipping Board in securing seamen for ships leaving the United States. It was then agreed that alien seamen would be approved or disapproved in the same manner as other alien applicants for classified employment. Any information regarding illegal entry after service as a seaman would be reported, however, to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

By early 1942, alien questionnaires were being received in increasing numbers from contractors who wished to employ aliens on classified and aeronautical contracts. Between 1 January 1942 and 17 March 1942, prior to the transfer of the Alien Program to the Provost Marshal General, approximately twelve thousand aliens were approved for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department Contracts. The volume of these requests caused a considerable backlog of alien investigations, as action on the alien questionnaire could not be taken expeditiously until an investigation report had been received.

The policy of individual clearance of aliens based on evaluation of the questionnaire and an investigation met the requirements of security, as the loyalty of the alien could be determined and the alien cleared before he was permitted to work on classified and aeronautical projects. However, this procedure did not contribute to the expeditious granting of alien clearances.

On 25 March 1942, the President suggested to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Attorney General that a study be made of the possibility of granting blanket consent to resident aliens who were citizens of allied nations.^{26/}

In a memorandum to The Provost Marshal General's Office, dated 6 April 1942, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, stated that security was best effected by the existing procedure of individual clearances after submission of a questionnaire.^{27/}

^{25/} Alien Questionnaire, W.D., FMGO Form 301

^{26/} Letter from President F. D. Roosevelt to Secretary of War, dated 25 March 1942, re: "Blanket Consent for Employment of Aliens on Classified Contracts"

^{27/} Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2's memorandum dated 6 April 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens"

Various plans for expediting the clearance of aliens for employment in industry were under consideration in 1942 in order that clearance from the Secretaries of War and Navy, as required by statutes, could be obtained expeditiously. The following proposals were considered in a conference between representatives of The Provost Marshal General and the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, on 10 April 1942:^{28/}

- a. The granting of blanket consent to all friendly aliens.
- b. Revision of War Department procedure to permit individual aliens to apply for the consent required by the various alien statutes.
- c. Granting of temporary consent to all aliens pending clearance of the formal application for consent.

Within the limitation of the statutes, the War Department attempted to formulate a policy and procedure that would permit the clearance of aliens as expeditiously as possible but which would also be consistent with the demands of national security. On 9 March 1942, at the time the Alien Employment Program was transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office from the Office of the Under Secretary of War, aliens were granted consent for employment on War and Navy contracts on the basis of proof of loyalty to the United Nations. Interpretation of this policy, in general, served as a basis for denial for employment to:

- a. Citizens of Axis countries, pro-Vichy French, Spaniards and Latin Americans who were affiliated with or suspected of being affiliated with Axis intelligence and propaganda units and Falangist dominated units, such as Franquists and Sinarquists.
- b. Those who had members of their immediate families permanently residing in Axis or Axis-dominated countries.
- c. Refugees previously employed in the technical or industrial services of Germany or Italy.
- d. Members of the Communist Party and Young Communist League. Membership in the Communist Party was not considered to be a basis of denial unless, after investigation, the subject was found to be an active and dangerous member of the Party.
- e. Japanese aliens and American-born Nisei Japanese, who were processed under a separate Japanese-American Program.^{29/}

^{28/} Memorandum for Files by Mr. Jack Ohly, dated 10 April 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens"

^{29/} See Japanese-American Program

f. Those who served in any of the armed forces of the Axis countries (except members of the Italian Army and Navy during the First World War, if Italians, and were not members of the Federation of Italian World War Veterans). If an Italian alien was suspected of having been a Communist during the period covered by 1904-1920, a denial of consent was considered the best decision to make. Cases such as this were extremely rare and membership in the Communist Party hard to prove.

g. Aliens who had made frequent trips to their homeland and particularly those who had remained there for a year or more at a time.

h. Citizens of all other countries not heretofore mentioned who were known to have been associated with subversive organizations.

i. In general, all enemy aliens, i.e., aliens of countries with which there existed a state of war, who permanently resided in their fatherland since 1930 and then entered the United States.

j. Aliens who arrived in the United States since 1938 and whose fatherlands were occupied by German, Italian, or Japanese forces.

Each case was investigated either by The Provost Marshal General's Office, Investigations Division, or by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before consent was granted. If the alien sought employment as a key employee with full access to secret employment, a Federal Bureau of Investigation report was requested. In some cases, the alien might be approved pending the completion of the investigation. Generally, the investigation of the alien was conducted by The Provost Marshal General's Office.

In cases where doubt existed relative to an alien considered indispensable by his employer, only temporary, if any, consent was granted to enable the employer to procure an acceptable replacement.^{30/}

Prior to 4 May 1942, the War and Navy Departments had been operating internal security programs independently of each other. This resulted in unnecessary duplication of effort in the administration of their respective programs of which the Alien Employment Program was a part. Situations were discovered where the War Department had disapproved an alien and the Navy Department had approved the identical alien, or vice versa. On 9 February 1942, in an effort to lessen this confusion, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War stating that the Navy Department would agree to consent to employment of aliens where appropriate action had been taken by the Secretary of War. On 4 May 1942, the Secretary of War

30/ Statement - Policy Used by The Provost Marshal General's Office as Basis for Denial of Consent for Employment of Aliens on Classified and Aeronautical Contracts

assumed the responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy for the clearance of aliens for employment on classified and aeronautical Navy Department contracts.^{31/} Since this date, alien policy determination and procedure have been the responsibility of the War Department.

Immediately upon this transfer of functions from the Navy Department to the War Department, studies were undertaken of all phases of internal security, resulting in the publication on 9 August 1942 of the first comprehensive directive addressed to the service commands, concerning all phases of internal security.^{32/} One of the prime objectives of this directive as applied to the Alien Employment Program was to outline administrative and procedural details for the clearance of aliens in order that previous objections of employers concerning the time required to clear the alien might be remedied.

The policy, previously discussed, upon which consent and denial for employment of aliens on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Departments contracts was based was continued. The procedure for handling alien questionnaires was explained in great detail for the benefit of the service commands, the employer, and the alien who found it necessary to execute the alien questionnaire. Under this procedure, the employer submitted copies of the alien questionnaire properly executed to the nearest plant protection representative of the service command. An investigation was conducted in each case. Three copies of the questionnaire were transmitted to The Provost Marshal General's Office. On many alien questionnaires showing no derogatory background, it was possible to take action without waiting for the investigation report. On the other questionnaires where derogatory background was indicated, action was withheld until the investigation report was received.

Within the Alien Employee Branch of the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, a standing operating procedure (called "ground rules") had been developed to assist the officers charged with the responsibility of granting and denying consent to alien applicants for employment. The ground rules were susceptible to interpretation and served merely as a guide. Each case was adjudged on its merits. In close cases, the maximum possible degree of danger to the war effort was weighed against the need for the alien's services and his loyalty. Where there was no allegation of disloyalty, consent was granted with a minimum of delay. Immediate denial was made on evidence of disloyalty disclosed by investigation or other means. The ground rules were as follows:

^{31/} Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of War, 9 February 1942;

Assistant Secretary of War to Secretary of the Navy, 4 May 1942

^{32/} SOS letter, SPMGS 381, 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

The War Department did not:

a. Prohibit the employment of aliens on aeronautical or classified War and Navy Department contracts. It was a prerequisite to employment, however, that the consent of the secretary of the department concerned be obtained.

b. Discriminate against an alien because of race, creed, color, or national origin.

c. Deny consent for employment in any case before an investigation was conducted.

d. Deny consent for employment because of normal labor activity of the alien.

e. Recommend an alien for employment or bring pressure to bear on a facility to influence employment.

f. Disclose the information on which action in alien cases was based.

g. Grant temporary consent pending submission of an alien questionnaire.

h. Make determination of the applicability of certain phases of the operation of a facility to the statute and regulations governing alien employment; i.e., the operations of the facility were covered by statute and regulations.

i. Permit judgment in determination of appropriate action to be influenced by pressure groups or powerful interests.

The War Department did:

a. Require that the consent of the secretary of the department concerned be obtained before an alien was employed on work covered by aeronautical or classified War or Navy Department contracts or have access or participation of the type described below:

- (1) Access to work in progress under aeronautical or classified (secret, confidential, restricted) War or Navy Department contracts.
- (2) Access to plans and specifications for such contracts.
- (3) Participation in such contract trials.

b. Require that an alien questionnaire (D. HCO Form No. 301) be executed by every alien whom the facility proposed to employ on aeronautical or classified contracts or who was to have access or participation as described above.

c. Deny consent for employment if there existed reasonable doubt of the alien's loyalty.

d. Treat the case under the Suspension of Subversive Program if there was substantial evidence of subversive activity or proclivity for subversive activity.

e. Permit an alien for whom employment had been denied to request a review of his case and to be heard, if he so desired, by the Industrial Employment Review Board.

f. Require adequate investigation before denying consent for employment of aliens.

g. Withhold consent pending investigation in the case of aliens who entered the United States since 1930 from the following listed countries:

Germany	Japan	Austria
Italy	Roumania	Hungary
Bulgaria	Finland	Korea
Manchuria	Thailand	

h. Withhold consent, pending investigation, in the case of aliens who entered the United States since 1938 from the following listed countries:

France	Belgium	Denmark
Poland	Czechoslovakia	Lithuania
Latvia	Albania	Greece
Turkey	Estonia	Norway
Sweden	The Netherlands	Luxembourg
Yugoslavia	Portugal	Spain
China	Switzerland	Argentina

i. The basis for discretionary denial of consent after investigation was as follows:

- (1) Unwillingness to serve in the armed forces of the United States if such unwillingness was coupled with any other information indicating disloyalty.

- (2) German, Austrian, Hungarian or Italian aliens who had made one or more return trips to their native countries since 1930, regardless of their stated reasons for the visits.
- (3) Membership in known subversive organizations.
- (4) Purchases of Reichwandler Marks.
- (5) Refugees previously employed in technical, diplomatic, or military services of Germany or Italy.
- (6) Those who had members of their immediate family residing in enemy or enemy dominated countries, particularly where regular correspondence would indicate close family ties.
- (7) Arsonists and those who had been convicted of malicious destruction of property. Others with criminal records would be assisted in an honest effort to rehabilitate themselves.
- (8) Communist leaders with long records of causing disorder would be denied. Affiliation with the communist party as a member was insufficient grounds for immediate denial; however, the case would be earmarked for possible future speedy action.

On 23 October 1942, at the request of the War Manpower Commission, The Provost Marshal General consented to an experiment designed to expedite the clearance and employment of aliens on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts. 33/ It was agreed that the United States Employment Service in Detroit would screen alien applicants for employment, obtain and execute the alien questionnaires and recommend consent or denial. The questionnaire was then transmitted to The Provost Marshal General for final action. The experiment, begun on 2 November 1942, by-passed the service command by providing that the alien questionnaire would be routed directly to The Provost Marshal General's Office. As a loyalty determination could not be made from the information contained in the questionnaire, it was necessary to conduct investigations and, thus, any advantage derived from the direct transfer of the questionnaire was lost due to the necessity for investigation.

33/ SOS Memo, 23 October 1942, subject: "Summary of Agreement between the Internal Security Division and U. S. Employment Service respecting Employment of Aliens on Classified Contracts"

In September 1942, several alien questionnaires were submitted by companies wishing to employ citizens of the Philippines on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts. The Judge Advocate General had in 1941 issued an opinion that citizens of the Philippines were American nationals and not aliens within the meaning of the statute concerning employment of aliens.

The policy and procedure contained in instructions issued to service commands in the 9 August 1942 letter, 34/ continued in existence, with slight modifications, until the operation of the Alien Employment Program was decentralized to the service commands in September 1943.

At the time of decentralization of the Alien Employment Program, a compilation of all current directives, policy, and procedures was made. This compilation was termed the "Alien Bible" and was distributed to all service commands, and Army Air Forces procurement districts. Amendments and additions were made from time to time in order that the operation of the program in the field might be uniform and in accord with current policy and procedure as established by The Provost Marshal General.

Complete policy and administrative procedures supplementing all prior directives and summarizing the policy and procedures in existence in The Provost Marshal General's Office were issued to the service commands on 18 October 1943. 35/

Under the decentralization program, action for approval or disapproval of the alien was taken by the nine service commands, Military District of Washington, and the six Army Air Forces' procurement districts.

Approved cases were retained in the headquarters of the service commands or the procurement districts. Disapproved cases were transmitted to The Provost Marshal General. Current additions and deletions from the list of disapproved aliens were transmitted by The Provost Marshal General's Office to the service commands and Army Air Forces in order that each action agency might have a current list of disapproved aliens. No attempt has been made to outline the numerous procedural details set up in the 18 October 1943 letter.

34/ SOS letter, 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

35/ ASF letter, file SPX 014.31 (9 Oct 43) OB-S-SFMGP-M, 18 October 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

From time to time, after the decentralization, information was received from contractors and facilities that representatives of both the service commands and the Army Air Forces were claiming the responsibility for the clearance of aliens. To eliminate this conflict of jurisdiction, The Provost Marshal General on 27 June 1944 assigned to the Army Air Forces responsibility for the clearance of aliens for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts at those plants and facilities:

a. Assigned to Army Air Forces on the Master Inspection Responsibility List for inspection service,

b. For which the Army Air Forces was designated on the Master Inspection Responsibility List as the appropriate procurement agency to receive recommendations resulting from security inspections, and

c. For which the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics was designated (Na) on the Master Inspection Responsibility List as the appropriate procurement agency to receive recommendations resulting from security inspections. 36/

The decentralized procedure proved to be an immediate success. The backlog of alien investigations which had been built up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1941 and then The Provost Marshal General's Office through 1942 and 1943, was completely eliminated in a short time. Consent, in those cases which under the "ground rules" could be approved before investigation, was usually granted within twenty-four hours after receipt of the alien questionnaire by the service command or Army Air Forces' procurement districts. In those cases requiring investigation prior to approved action, a period averaging about three weeks was the usual time lag. This expedited procedure met with the complete satisfaction of all concerned. The War Manpower Commission was satisfied that there was no undue delay; employers no longer hesitated about employing aliens; the aliens felt that there was no longer any discrimination, and the labor unions were convinced that the War Department had been completely fair in carrying out the President's policy of non-discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin.

Originally, during the operation of the Alien Program in The Provost Marshal General's Office and after the decentralization to the service commands it was an approved policy to conduct investigations in every case where an alien was an applicant for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts. Due to improvement in the outlook of the war situation and the adoption of the policy of calculated risk commensurate with security needs,

36/ASF letter, SPX 014.31 (27 Jun 44)OE-S-SPMGP-M, 27 June 1944,
subject: "Alien Employment Program"

the investigation policy covering aliens was revised on 12 September 1944, by instructing the service commands to screen all alien questionnaires and to conduct investigations only where it was necessary to establish the loyalty or disloyalty of the alien. 37/

From the time The Provost Marshal General assumed supervision of the Alien Employment Program on 9 March 1942, it was the policy to grant requests for review of denials of consent in alien cases, although specific authority for such review was not mentioned in any of the early directives under which the Alien Employment Program was operated. The review was accorded as a privilege and not as a right under the statutes and army regulations. The comprehensive internal security directive of 9 August 1942 contained the first statement concerning procedure to be followed in submitting requests for review.

By an order of The Provost Marshal General, dated 23 February 1943 and effective 1 March 1943, the Industrial Employment Review Board was set up in the Office of The Provost Marshal General. One of the functions of the Board, as cited in the order, was the review of denials of consent for the employment of aliens on aeronautical and classified War and Navy Department contracts. Since the review was regarded as a privilege, no provision has ever been made for payment to the alien for any loss incurred as a result of his inability to secure suitable employment. However, in a few instances, The Provost Marshal General's Office was queried concerning payment by aliens denied consent for employment.

Discrimination Against Aliens

Both Allied and German propaganda, prior to entrance of the United States into the war, instilled a feeling of distrust against European nationals within the United States. As a natural consequence, and irrespective of any directions from the War and Navy Departments, the average American manufacturer refused to employ aliens after receiving War or Navy Department contracts. Factors which further tended to discourage the employment of aliens on work covered by Government contracts were:

a. Some employers, resolving questions of doubt in favor of the safety factor, insisted on employing only citizens.

37/ ASF letter, file SPX 014.31 (9 Sep 44) OS-S-SPMGP-M, 12 September 1944, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

b. Some employers tended to ignore the distinction between "classified" contracts (Secret, Confidential and restricted), on which a consent to employ an alien was necessary, and unclassified contracts, on which consent was not necessary, and applied the requirements of the former. A misunderstanding as to the application of the alien employment consent statutes and the policies of the government, existed on the part of some employers, some field representatives of the Government, and a portion of the public.

c. The necessity for submission of alien questionnaires, which must be filled out by alien applicants for classified contract work, and by the employer, tended to discourage the employment of persons for whom that procedure was necessary.

d. Employers tended to favor those who could fill a position immediately. Delay occurred in obtaining consent for the employment of aliens on aeronautical and classified government contracts.

In addition, both the War and Navy Departments were inserting clauses in all classified contracts, which called for consent of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy before an alien might be employed. The burden of enforcement of the contract provisions rested squarely on the manufacturing company. Before the labor shortage became acute, it was the practice of many employers to refuse to employ an alien and no attempt was made to obtain permission for such employment from the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy.

The problem of determining whether a prospective employee was a United States citizen also devolved upon the employer. Many employers refused to employ anyone who could not produce a birth certificate or naturalization papers. The Secretary of the Navy issued instructions on 6 June 1940 to various Navy bureaus, calling attention to the difficulties of the contractor in determining citizenship and stating that the employee could prove citizenship by authentic birth certificate, naturalization record, medical records, affidavits of persons with knowledge of such birth, or any other mode of proof competent to verify such fact. 38/

Congress attempted to clarify the status of many individuals claiming United States citizenship by the passage of the Nationality Act of 1940, Public Law 853, 76th Congress, approved 14 October 1940.

38/ Secretary of the Navy letter, subject: "Citizenship of Employees of Contractors Performing Work Covered by Navy Contracts", 5 June 1940

The Act conferred United States citizenship on many individuals born outside the United States of American born parents and clarified the citizenship status of other individuals mistakenly claiming United States citizenship.39/

Despite efforts of various government agencies to inform the contractors of rules and regulations governing alien employment, public opinion seemed to be against employment of aliens and, prior to the manpower shortage beginning in 1942 and the change from civilian to war production, relatively few aliens secured employment on classified or aeronautical War or Navy Department contracts.

Shortly before June 1941, the facts concerning discrimination against employment of aliens had come to the attention of the President, who requested officials of the Office of Production Management to take steps to speed up employment of aliens so that the services of loyal aliens could be used in defense industries. On 19 June 1941, a conference was held to discuss the Presidential request and to establish a uniform policy in the employment of aliens. In attendance were representatives of the War and Navy Departments, the Department of Justice, and the Office of Production Management.40/

The representatives of the Office of Production Management claimed there was no uniformity in the enforcement of statutes and regulations governing employment of aliens by the Army and Navy and that there were different standards used by various bureaus and branches of the War and Navy Departments in clearing aliens for employment. They also alleged that various War and Navy Department contractors refused to employ aliens because of the difficulty in clearing aliens for employment on classified and aeronautical contracts.

On 21 June 1941, the Navy Department in a letter to the Office of Production Management denied that any discrimination existed in the employment of aliens in so far as the Navy Department was concerned. 41/

39/ Public Law No. 853, 76th Congress, 14 October 1940, subject: "Nationality Act of 1940"

40/ Memorandum from Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, 19 June 1941, subject: "Enforcement of Statutes Concerning Alien Workers on Aeronautical and Classified Contracts"

41/ Secretary of the Navy letter, 21 June 1941, subject: "Employment of Aliens in Private Industries Working on Navy Contracts"

On 24 June 1941, the Office of the Under Secretary of War, in a memorandum concerning discrimination of aliens in war industries, prepared for the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, stated that such discrimination as existed was not due to directives of the War Department and that early in February 1941, the War Department had agreed to investigate any specific complaint of the Office of Production Management alleging discrimination. 42/

On 25 June 1941, the President issued Executive Order No. 8802, relating to discrimination of workers in defense industries. This order provided, with respect to alien employment in private industry, that government contracting agencies should include in all defense contracts a provision obligating the contractor not to discriminate against the worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The Executive Order also established the Committee on Fair Employment Practices to investigate and take appropriate steps to redress valid grievances. 43/

The Executive Order of 25 June 1941 had a beneficial effect on alien employment and to some extent clarified the position of the alien in industry. It did not stop refusal on the part of many employers to employ aliens, simply because of their foreign birth, as long as native born labor was available. On 25 March 1942, the President wrote to the Secretary of War requesting that consideration be given and a report submitted concerning the policy of granting blanket consent to aliens in various categories for employment on classified and aeronautical contracts. 44/ Letters on the same subject were also written by the President to the Secretary of the Navy, the Attorney General and to the Committee on Fair Employment Practices.

The Military Intelligence Division, G-2, in a memorandum for the Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, 6 April 1942, stated that the security of plants engaged in production for the War Department was best effectuated by the existing procedure which required that before an alien could be employed on classified or aeronautical contracts, a questionnaire must be submitted by the employer and the approval of the Secretary of War obtained for such employment. The memorandum further stated that submission of a questionnaire for check against the records of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division prior to approval for employment was essential to prevent the employment of those individuals, who by virtue of past activity were suspected of being disloyal to the United States, and whose employment would be inimical to the security of the plant where they were employed. 45/

42/ OUSW Memorandum, 24 June 1941, subject: "Enforcement of Statutes Concerning Alien Workers on Aeronautical and Classified Contracts"

43/ Executive Order No. 8802, 25 June 1941, "Discrimination of Workers Participating in the Defense Program"

44/ Letter from President F. D. Roosevelt to Secretary of War, 25 March 1942

45/ G-2 Memorandum, MID 014.31 Policy, 6 April 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens"

In an attempt to carry out the intent of the letter of 25 March 1942, from the President to the Secretary of War, representatives of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, on 10 April 1942 conferred with representatives of The Provost Marshal General's Office, concerning the continued discrimination against aliens in various war industries and the necessity of finding a method of removing this discrimination. The following propositions which had been advanced from time to time were discussed:

a. The granting of blanket consent to all friendly aliens,

b. Revision of War Department procedure to permit individual aliens to apply for consent required by various alien statutes,

c. Granting of temporary consent pending clearance of the formal application for consent,

d. Advising the leaders of organized labor to notify all their locals to bring to the War and Navy Departments' attention all cases in which employers fail to file application for consent for alien employees in their plants,

e. Increased publicity designed to discourage discrimination, and

f. Some means designed to solve the difficulties encountered in obtaining employment because of inability of millions of American born citizens to present birth certificates. 46/

The War Department, Navy Department, Department of Justice and Committee on Fair Employment Practices, after consideration of all the factors involved in the employment discrimination of aliens in industry, submitted a joint reply to the President on 19 June 1942. The following plan was recommended to eliminate discrimination and enable the alien population to contribute to the war effort:

a. Procedures in existence for processing applications for aliens for employment on classified or aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts were to continue in force. The United States Employment Service and union organizations would assist aliens in preparation of questionnaires.

46/ SOS Memorandum for Files, 10 April 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens"

b. The War and Navy Departments agreed to act promptly on receipt of the alien questionnaire and give their approval or disapproval either of which would be subject to change at a later date.

c. The War Department would give special and expedited consideration to (1) nationals of United Nations and friendly American Republics, and (2) to any other aliens, including enemy aliens, who came within certain prescribed categories or classifications - namely, (a) aliens who had served in the armed forces of the United States and had been honorably discharged; (b) aliens who had members of their immediate family in the United States military service; (c) aliens who had resided in the United States continuously since 1916 without having returned to their country of origin within the last ten years; (d) aliens who had married persons who, at the time of marriage were citizens of the United States and who had resided in the United States continuously since 1924 without having returned to the country of origin within the last ten years; and (e) aliens who had declared their intention to become citizens of the United States and who before 7 December 1941 had filed petitions for naturalization.

The Committee on Fair Employment Practices agreed to handle all individual complaints concerning discrimination.

It was recommended to the President that publicity be initiated, by publications and radio broadcasts, concerning existing laws and regulations covering government policy relating to employment of aliens in war industries.

The first result of this suggestion was a press release from the Office of the President, dated 11 July 1942, clarifying the policy of the government regarding employment of aliens. The announcement stated that an individual should not be refused employment simply because of his alien status. It also clarified the legal restrictions governing employment of aliens on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts and emphasized that there were no other federal laws or regulations restricting the employment of aliens in war industries.

In an effort to make more manpower available for industry, on 4 June 1942, the Under Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy issued a joint statement authorizing contractors to accept the signed declaration of citizenship from a prospective employee in lieu of a naturalization certificate or birth certificate. It also brought to the contractors' attention the applicable statutes governing the employment of aliens. 47/ This joint statement was revised and republished on 22 August 1942 due to the expiration on 30 June 1942 of Public Law 671, 76th Congress, approved 28 June 1940, concerning employment of aliens on classified government contracts. 48/

47/ Joint War and Navy Department Memorandum, 4 June 1942, "Requirements for Proof of Employees of American Citizenship"

48/ Joint War and Navy Department Memorandum, 22 August 1942, "Requirements for Proof of Employees of American Citizenship"

On 3 August 1942, the Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Services of Supply, issued a memorandum to all War Department contracting services, directing that an anti-discrimination clause be inserted in all existing and future contracts to conform with the anti-discrimination policy enunciated by the President in Executive Order No. 8802, dated 25 June 1941. 49/

On 8 August 1942, the Navy Department transmitted to naval authorities a copy of the President's press release of 11 June 1942 regarding discrimination to all Navy Department bureaus and directed compliance with the policy enunciated by the President, subject to existing procedures for clearance of aliens. 50/

By early 1943 the United States had entered into full war production. Manpower shortages were prevalent in many instances but by this time the practices and procedures in clearing aliens for war industries had become standardized. From figures concerning the total number of aliens in the United States, it was evident that the alien population constituted a reservoir of manpower that had not been completely exhausted. To encourage further the participation of the alien population in war industry, the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Maritime Commission issued, on 7 June 1943, a further revision of joint statement of 4 June 1942 and 22 August 1942, directed to all employers. It covered the War and Navy Department requirements for employment of aliens, the application of the anti-discrimination contract clause and Executive Order 8802 dated 25 June 1941, and the procedure for requesting consent to employ aliens for work on classified and aeronautical contracts. 51/

Complaints concerning discrimination ceased as (1) full utilization was made of all employable aliens, (2) the procedure for clearance of aliens began to be understood by both contractors and aliens, (3) the anti-discrimination clause of the Executive Order 8802 became an effective instrument as administered by the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, (4) the decentralization of the Alien Employment Program to the service commands expedited alien clearance to such an extent that approval or denial was made in many cases within 48 hours, and (5) review procedure was established to grant, on request, a hearing to a denied alien. 52/

49/ SOS Memorandum, 3 August 1942, subject: "Compliance with Executive Order 8802, Relating to Non-Discrimination"

50/ Secretary of the Navy letter, 8 August 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens in National War Industries"

51/ Joint Statement by Secretary of War, Attorney General, Secretary of the Navy, and Chairman of Maritime Commission on Employment of Aliens, 7 June 1943

52/ SEE The Industrial Employment Review Board

Investigations

War and Navy Department contracts were being awarded to private industry with increasing frequency and number through 1940 and 1941. Contractors formerly engaged in civilian production now desired to transfer their alien employees to War and Navy Department classified and aeronautical contracts. Under section 10 of the Air Corps Act of 2 July 1926 53/ and section 11 of the Act of 28 June 1940, 54/ the consent of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy was necessary before the alien could be employed on classified or aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts. Increasing numbers of requests for employment of these aliens on classified and aeronautical contracts were being received in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. These requests in turn were transferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for investigation via Military Intelligence Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. In a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War, dated 13 December 1940, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, recommended that such requests receive a record check by Military Intelligence Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be requested to make an investigation only in such cases which warranted investigation, but not disapproval, on the basis of available information. 55/

By 1942 the steadily increasing number of requests for loyalty investigations proved burdensome to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On 31 March 1942, by memorandum to The Provost Marshal General, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, proposed that routine loyalty investigation of aliens be transferred from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to The Provost Marshal General. 56/ The Investigations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, thereafter conducted loyalty investigations of aliens for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts on the basis of the 31 March memorandum. An exchange of correspondence between The Provost Marshal General and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, during April, May, September, and October 1942 resulted in the formal transfer of the responsibility for the conduct of alien investigations on 1 November 1942.

53/ Air Corps Act, Act of 2 July 1926, 44 Stat, 784 - 10 U.S.C.,
"Employment of Aliens"

54/ Act of 28 June 1940 - Section 11, Public Law 571, 76th Congress,
"Aliens"

55/ Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated 13 December 1940, subject:
"Investigation of Alien Applicants for Employment on Classified
Material"

56/ Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, memorandum dated 31 March 1942,
subject: "Routine Check of Aliens"

On 9 August 1942, in connection with instructions contained in a complete Internal Security directive, subject, "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures," the service commands were informed that an investigation would be conducted in every alien case. 57/ Routine investigations, (i.e., a check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence Division) and a check of references on alien questionnaires were conducted in case of aliens who entered the United States prior to 1919 and who had not left the United States since 1 January 1930. In all other cases, a complete or "special" investigation was conducted. In every alien investigation, a routine check of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Immigration and Naturalization Service was made by submission of a copy of the alien questionnaire. By 1943, experience had disclosed that complete or special investigations were not always necessary in the case of citizens of allied nations. On 17 June 1943, the following instructions which noticeably decreased the number of special investigations were issued to the service commands: 58/

"a. An investigation will be conducted in every alien case. All aliens will be subjects of 'special' investigations excepting those coming within the following categories who will be subjects of 'routine' investigations:

- (1) Aliens who immigrated to the United States prior to 1 January 1919 and who have not left the United States since 1 January 1930, except Orientals.
- (2) Aliens who are native born citizens of the following named countries:

United Kingdom	of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	
Australia	Costa Rica	Canada
Cuba	El Salvador	Dominican Republic
Guatemala	Honduras	Haiti
Mexico	Nicaragua	New Zealand
Norway	Newfoundland	Panama

A 'special' investigation of any alien coming within the above categories may be requested when an evaluation of the alien questionnaire or any other circumstances indicate a desirability therefor. A representative of the Personnel Security Division of the service command will examine each case and determine whether a 'special' or a 'routine' investigation will be conducted".

57/ SOS letter, file SPMCS 381, 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

58/ PMGO Memorandum, file SPMGP 381, 17 June 1943, subject: "Investigation of Alien Applicants for Employment on Aeronautical and Classified War and Navy Department Contracts"

Further modification as to the type of investigation was made when the Alien Employment Program was decentralized to the service commands on 18 October 1943 so that aliens who were native born citizens of the United Nations, except Orientals, and aliens who immigrated to the United States prior to 1 January 1920 and had not left the United States since 1930, would receive, in the absence of special circumstances or evidence of disloyalty, routine investigations. 59/ All other aliens received special investigations at the discretion of the Director of the Internal Security Division of the appropriate service command.

During the early part of 1944, further analysis of alien investigations conducted by the service commands led to the conclusion that unnecessary investigations were being made. Accordingly, on 12 September 1944, the service commands were given authority to screen all alien questionnaires and conduct only such investigations as would be necessary to establish the loyalty or disloyalty of the alien. 60/

The Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report for 30 June 1945 discloses that a total of 207,093 alien questionnaires were submitted for approval for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Departments contracts. Approval was granted in 201,673 cases and denied in 5,420 cases. 61/ The extent of the investigation activity can be seen by these figures. In every case an alien questionnaire was transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service for a central file check. In addition, many cases received a routine investigation and where derogatory information was disclosed a special investigation was conducted. 62/

Responsibility for Enforcement of the Alien Employment Program

The problem of enforcement of the provisions of the statute (Air Corps Act and Army Regulation 380-5, par. 61) covering the Alien Employment Program received careful attention. The Air Corps Act and any other statutory enactments ordinarily would have been enforced by The Attorney General. However, no action under statutory authority could be taken except in case of a violation brought to the attention of the U. S. District Attorney. Such a procedure could not in itself prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning classified and aeronautical contracts. The War

59/ Army Service Forces letter, SPX 014.31 (9 Oct 43)OB-S-SPMGP-M.

18 October 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

60/ Army Service Forces letter, SPX 014.31 (9 Sep 44)OB-S-SPMGP-M,

12 September 1944, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

61/ Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report - Section 11 -

"Alien Classified and Aeronautical Program"

62/ See "Loyalty Investigations Program"

Department, to prevent such unauthorized disclosure, placed the responsibility for enforcement of the statutes and army regulations first upon the supply services and later upon the commanding generals, service commands and Army Air Forces. The statutes and army regulations were applicable to all plants and facilities having aeronautical and classified War or Navy Department contracts. The responsibility for enforcement of the Alien Employment Program, as distinguished from the authority to grant consent for employment, was charged to the chiefs of the supply arms and services as a part of their internal security responsibility until the publication of Services of Supply Circular No. 31, dated 22 July 1942, when this responsibility was transferred to the commanding generals of the service commands. 63/ Excepted from the transfer were certain plants and facilities charged to the Chiefs of Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Engineers. Specific responsibility for the enforcement of the Alien Employment Program in all plants and facilities having aeronautical or classified contracts was charged to the commanding generals of the various service commands in the 9 August 1942 letter. Excepted from this responsibility were naval shore establishments and plants assigned on the Master Inspection Responsibility List to the Army Air Forces and technical services. In addition, the technical services were required to see that the secrecy agreement inserted in every contract was observed and enforced by each contractor.

It never was the responsibility of the service command to inspect all plants and facilities having aeronautical and classified contracts for unauthorized alien employment. The position of the service command was rather that of a War Department field agency charged with the over-all coordination and integration of the Alien Employment Program. To relieve the service command of the responsibility for the program in plants not on the Master Inspection Responsibility List would have been to remove from the program a field agency which, when informed of violations of the statutes and regulations governing alien employment, was in a position to take the necessary corrective action. This responsibility did not consume any appreciable time or labor by the service commander. The action taken by most of the service commanders in this respect was approximately as follows:

a. Notification to all plants deleted from the Master Inspection Responsibility List and installations on the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List that the Alien Employment Program was continued in effect for classified or aeronautical contracts.

63/ Services of Supply letter, File SPMGS 381, dated 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"; Services of Supply letter, dated 17 April 1943, subject: "Army Responsibility for the Alien Removal of Subversive Employee and Key Personnel Security Programs"; Army Service Forces letter, SPX 014.31 (9 Oct 43)OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 18 October 1943, subject: "Alien Employment Program".

b. Notification of all plants cleared by Military Intelligence Service for work on aeronautical and classified contracts of the necessity for clearance of aliens before employment on or access to such contracts.

c. Liaison with procurement districts to ascertain measures taken to enforce alien provisions of aeronautical and classified contracts.

d. Investigation by Security Intelligence Corps agents of reported cases of unauthorized alien employment in plants not listed on the Master Inspection Responsibility List.

Persons who furnished non-commercial and non-standard fabricated parts to the contractor and who were consequently required to do much of the work contemplated in the prime contract, were sub-contractors and not materiel men, hence, the statute was held to be applicable to such individuals. 64/

Alien Trainee Program

During the early part of 1944, representatives of The Provost Marshal General's Office charged with the clearance of aliens, discussed with representatives of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Department of State a project, sponsored by the State Department, to bring into the United States for training in United States industry a large number of South and Central American students. This training project was divorced from the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, in September 1944, and transferred to the International Training Administration, Inc., a nonprofit government-sponsored corporation formed for the purpose of coordinating and integrating training programs as part of an over-all good neighbor policy.

The problem of jurisdiction in the clearance of these aliens for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts was discussed with Military Intelligence Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. It was concluded that since these aliens were to be employed by the various contractors, they should be classed as alien employees and cleared by The Provost Marshal General's Office. Accordingly, on 21 September 1944, instructions were issued to the various service commands and Army Air Forces establishing a procedure for the clearance of alien trainees identical with the clearance received by ordinary alien

64/ Memorandum for Judge Advocate General, dated 18 July 1942, subject: "Employment of Aliens by Contractors and Sub-Contractors in the Performance of Government Contracts".

employees, except that no loyalty investigation would be required if the loyalty of the trainee had been determined by the State Department prior to his entrance into the United States. 65/

In January 1945, Military Intelligence Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, again became interested in the clearance of aliens who entered this country for training as a result of security regulations issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the release of classified information to foreign nationals. After several conferences, it was decided that the clearance of alien trainees should be placed under the over-all supervision of Military Intelligence Division.

The Provost Marshal General was instructed by War Department letter, dated 10 January 1945, that the approval of alien trainees for employment on classified and aeronautical contracts and information would be obtained from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, before consent for such employment was granted by The Provost Marshal General's Office. 66/

The Provost Marshal General received administrative instructions concerning the processing of requests to employ alien trainees from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 1 February 1945, as follows: 67/

"In situations where employment for alien trainees is requested on government projects classified no higher than 'restricted' the Office of The Provost Marshal General will forward the request to the chief of the appropriate technical service for his recommendations, and based upon such recommendations either approve or reject the application.

"In all other cases where employment by alien trainees on government contracts classified higher than restricted is desired, the requests will be referred to the Director of Intelligence, A.S.F., or to the Air Provost Marshal, depending upon which force has primary cognizance, for recommendations and remarks. Thereafter the request will be forwarded to the A.C. of Staff, G-2, Foreign Liaison Officer, for clearance or rejection for such employment, in accordance with existing directives. The Office of The Provost Marshal General will be informed of such decision so that proper notification may be given to the interested agencies."

65/ WD letter, AG 014.31 (21 Sep 44)OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 21 September 1944, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

66/ WD letter, AG 014.31 (4 Jan 45)OB-S-B, dated 10 January 1945, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

67/ G-2 letter, MID 014.31, dated 1 February 1945, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

On 15 March 1945, the service commands and the Army Air Forces were instructed to transmit to The Provost Marshal General's Office all requests received from contractors for the employment of alien trainees on classified and aeronautical contracts. 68/

Statistics

The Progress Report for the week ending 17 March 1942 issued by the Office of the Under Secretary of War, showed 20,444 aliens approved and 826 aliens disapproved for employment on classified and aeronautical War Department contracts. This was the last progress report submitted by the Under Secretary of War's Office as the transfer of the Alien Section from the Office of the Under Secretary of War to The Provost Marshal General's Office ordered on 9 March 1942 was accomplished by 17 March 1942. Subsequent statistics were compiled by The Provost Marshal General.

From 9 March 1942, when The Provost Marshal General assumed responsibility for the Alien Employment Program, to 30 June 1945 there were approximately 207,000 alien requests for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts. Approximately 5,400 denials and 201,000 approvals for employment on classified and aeronautical War and Navy Department contracts were issued.

Figures covering the number of aliens approved and disapproved each month during 1942 by The Provost Marshal General's Office are not available. By 31 December 1942, 87,988 requests for alien employment had been acted upon. Consent had been granted on 84,944 requests and denied on 3,044 requests.

68/ War Department letter, AG 014.31 (6 Mar 45)OB-S-SPUD-M, dated 15 March 1945, subject: "Alien Employment Program"

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particular
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National Defense
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Joint Committee
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Navy Department
signs, dated 15 March

REMOVAL AND SUSPENSION OF SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM

World War II was a war of production as well as of armies. It was a war of research and machines, and of methods and supplies. This fact, and the place of the American production in the ultimate victory, was recognized early.

The importance of the industrial front made its security a matter of prime consideration in the conduct of the war -- not only from the viewpoint of production but also because of the classified nature of the materials produced. The protection of war industry became the overall mission of Internal Security -- that phase of it designed to keep subversives from damaging the war effort was the objective of the Suspension of Subversives Program.

The object of the Suspension of Subversives Program was to identify and exclude from privately operated facilities, or vital portions thereof, of importance to the national defense or to the war effort, persons suspected of or susceptible to subversive activity in order to:

- a. Preclude damage or destruction by such individuals to war production, premises, installations, material, and utilities.
- b. Preclude delay in delivery of war material while in transit by action of such individuals.
- c. Prevent espionage and transmission of valuable information by such individuals to the enemies of the United States.

The Suspension of Subversives Program was an administrative procedure, based upon a joint agreement between the War Department and the Navy Department, embodied in a Joint Memorandum adopted 10 January 1942, and having the approval and support of labor, under which the War Department or Navy Department might request the removal of an employee suspected of subversive activity from a facility important to the war effort.^{1/} Subversive activity was defined in the Memorandum as "sabotage, espionage, or any other wilful activity intended to disrupt the National Defense Program." The Program was designed to prevent damage to the war effort, and not to remain passive until after an overt act has been committed. The Program was not concerned with overt acts of sabotage, espionage and subversion, which were within the province of

^{1/} Joint Memorandum, dated 10 January 1942, subject: "Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement", letter from Congress of Industrial Organizations, dated 20 January 1942

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Beginning in 4 May 1942, the War Department supervised and operated the program for facilities of importance to Navy procurement, by mutual agreement.^{2/} Staff supervision was originally a function of the Under Secretary of War but was later delegated to The Provost Marshal General. Field operations were performed by the service commands, Military District of Washington, and Army Air Forces.^{3/}

Background and Development of Policy

Sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities by their very nature have always been extremely difficult of proof, even after the act has been accomplished. Sabotage, in the form of fires, explosions, or damage to intricate machinery, most frequently is of such nature that most, if not all, of the evidence of the cause of the act is destroyed along with the material or plant affected. Exhaustive investigations and study of many of the unexplained fires, explosions, and other damage of suspicious nature during World War I have not produced satisfactory proof as to whether they were accidental, deliberate, or enemy-inspired. Determination of whether a destructive incident was enemy-inspired has been extremely difficult, as in the proceedings before the Mixed Claims Commission relative to the "Black Tom" explosion. To detect subversive activity and plans for sabotage or espionage before their accomplishment, an even more difficult problem, definitely confronted the United States as the clouds of war gathered in Europe before the outbreak of hostilities on 1 September 1939. The use of subversive propaganda, sabotage, and espionage on a scale hitherto unparalleled was a prime objective of the Axis powers as a definite instrument of warfare long before 1939. That any modern war would be won or lost by development of the most effective weapons, and by production behind the lines, was fully realized by officials of our government.

On 26 June 1939, the President took a step which marked the beginning of government activities which developed, in one phase, into the Suspension of Subversives Program. This Program originated in a Confidential Memorandum from the President to his cabinet, in which he directed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the War Department's Military Intelligence Division, and the Office of Naval Intelligence control and handle all investigations of espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters.^{4/} Following this, the President directed that

- 2/ OSW letter, dated 27 April 1942, subject: "Internal Security";
OASW letter, dated 4 May 1942, re: Suggestion that War Department assume responsibility for the handling of aliens, etc.
- 3/ OUSW letter, dated 20 November 1942, re: Discharge of Subversives;
WD letter, file AG 383.4 (5 Jan 44) OB-S, dated 8 January 1944,
subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated
Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"
- 4/ Presidential memorandum, dated 26 June 1939, re: Investigation of
Espionage, Counter-Espionage, and Sabotage Matters

the Federal Bureau of Investigation take charge of investigative work in espionage and sabotage, emphasizing that the task was to be conducted on a national basis. In a statement released to the press on 6 September 1939 those instructions were made public, and all law enforcement officers were requested to inform the Federal Bureau of Investigation field agents of any information in these categories.^{5/}

The Navy was at that time taking steps to study and deal with sabotage and espionage at industrial facilities. On 27 September 1939 inspectors at naval aircraft plants and Navy contractors were requested to take appropriate action.^{6/} On 1 November 1939, private employers manufacturing equipment or material for the Navy Department were urged to bring to the attention of their employees the provisions of the Federal Espionage Act.^{7/}

Contractual provisions for obtaining the dismissal of undesirable employees in war or national defense production plants was initiated when the Navy by directive of 9 May 1940 required the insertion in its classified contracts of a clause whereby the contractor agreed to refuse employment to, or if already employed, to discharge and exclude, any person designated by the Navy as "undesirable". Another provision inserted in contracts required the contractor to report to the Navy any espionage or sabotage existing at his plant.^{8/} Similar contract provisions were adopted for some War Department procurement contracts at this time and required that the contractor dismiss an employee who, in the opinion of the contracting officer, was incompetent, careless, insubordinate or otherwise objectionable. Similar standard provisions for all War Department contracts were adopted in 1942 but it is not known to what extent such provisions were inserted into earlier War Department contracts.

Early in 1940 a delineation of jurisdiction (the so-called "delimitation agreement") with respect to investigative duties was agreed upon by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence

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- 5/ President Roosevelt's press release, dated 6 September 1939, re: Investigation of charges of violations of Federal laws relating to neutrality, espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and kindred offenses
- 6/ Navy letter, file Aer-PR-1-EMR P8, dated 27 September 1939, subject: "Sabotage, Isolating and Minimizing Extent of Damage"
- 7/ Joint letter, Bureau of Construction and Repair No. AC-5 and Bureau of Engineering No. A806 (10-2Yr), dated 1 November 1939, subject: "Security of Information Concerning Naval Equipment in Procurement Stage - Distribution of Espionage Act"
- 8/ Navy letter, file EN/1A (400609)P, dated 9 May 1940, subject: "Insertion of National Defense Clause in Certain Navy Contracts"

Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence.^{9/} This agreement was revised on 9 February 1942. The Federal Bureau of Investigation assumed responsibility for cases of espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage involving civilians, and agreed to inform the Military Intelligence Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence of important developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts, or affecting utilities, transportation or communication systems; similar information, including names of individuals, was to be transmitted in cases of actual or presumptive espionage or sabotage. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was to be "the coordinating head of all civilian agencies furnishing information of subversive movements."^{10/}

Acting under its part of the agreement, the Navy on 12 November 1940 instructed the Naval districts to furnish information from their intelligence files to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^{11/} Then on 2 December 1940 and 12 February 1941, the Navy, for the first time, urged its contractors to maintain, on a voluntary basis, personal history cards and data concerning employees and to forward important information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^{12/} The directives indicated that the keeping of such files by contractors was already considered of importance in preventing espionage and sabotage.

Measures to control subversive activity in private plants of importance to War Department procurement were very limited at that time. On 14 December 1940, the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, informed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, that private employers were transferring undesirable workers to new plants being erected for government contract work, and that private employers did not know how to weed out undesirable employees. The Assistant Secretary of War referred the problem for comment to the Air Corps and various procurement agencies.^{13/} Their replies pointed out the need for a procedure for keeping out or removing undesirable employees from defense plants.^{14/}

^{9/} Agreement -- Delimitation of Investigative Duties of Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division, dated 5 June 1940

^{10/} WD letter, file AG 383.4 M-B-M, dated 8 July 1940, subject: "Delimitation of Investigative Duties of FBI, ONI and MID"

^{11/} Navy letter, dated 12 November 1940, subject: "Suspect Lists and Files"

^{12/} Navy letter, file Op-16-B-6 (SC)LS-1/QM LS-1/QM Serial No. 0238116, dated 2 December 1940, subject: "Security of Commercial Plants Engaged in Naval Classified Contracts"; Navy letter, file Op-16-B-6 (SC) QM/1J3 QM/WD Serial No. 092316, dated 12 February 1941, subject: "Security of Commercial Plants Engaged in Naval Classified Contracts"

^{13/} OASW Memorandum, dated 26 December 1940, subject: "Transfer of Undesirable Employees to New Plants"

^{14/} Correspondence from Chiefs, Supply Arms and Services in reply to 26 December 1940 letter, subject: "Transfer of Undesirable Employees to New Plants"

The Army, Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were all receiving information establishing that employees, of a type dangerous to the safety of production, were working in defense plants and that their presence endangered also the safe-guarding of classified information on defense matters. A memorandum to this effect was submitted to the Under Secretary of War on 20 March 1941, by the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.^{15/} It stated that employees with subversive tendencies were working in defense plants and urged the adoption of policies to accomplish the transfer or dismissal of these workers. The importance of taking action before the commission of an overt act and the necessity for the interest and support of labor were specifically pointed out. It stated that plant management would be justified in transferring or dismissing employees where there existed reasonable grounds for suspicion of intent to commit acts of sabotage or espionage as determined and measured by attitudes or previous history.

The Under Secretary of War's reply to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, agreed that it would be for the best interests of the War Department to eliminate or transfer undesirable employees in defense plants, and stated that he would consult Labor's representative on this matter.^{16/}

By 5 July 1941 the Under Secretary of War, who was then supervising the plant protection program, had received since 1 January 1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services, 550 reports of subversive individuals and suspected cases of sabotage.^{17/} On 12 May 1941 the Under Secretary of War charged the Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services with responsibility for the operation of a plant protection service.^{18/} The subject of subversives was discussed at an interdepartmental conference of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division, and it was indicated that, because of the primary interest of the War Department in defense contracts, it should initiate action for the exclusion of undesirable employees from defense plants. In a memorandum of 26 September 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, recommended to the Under Secretary of War that the War Department take such action, and that it sponsor new legislation as existing laws afforded very little basis for corrective action.^{19/}

^{15/} ACoFS, G-2, WDGS, Memorandum, file G2/10268-2041, dated 20 March 1941, subject: "Plant Protection"

^{16/} OUSW Memorandum, dated 26 March 1941, subject: "Plant Protection"

^{17/} OUSW memorandum, dated 5 July 1941, subject: "Statement in Answer to Sabotage Question in the House Military Affairs Committee Investigation, Special Committee No. 3"

^{18/} OUSW memorandum, dated 12 May 1941, subject: "Plant Protection Inspection Service"

^{19/} ACoFS, G-2, WDGS, memorandum, file MID 230.8, dated 26 September 1941, subject: "Removal from defense employment of undesirable individuals"

On 1 November 1941 an intra-office memorandum for the Under Secretary of War summarized the results of informal discussions with representatives of labor, studies made of possible legislation, the propriety of proceeding by Executive Order which would outline the removal procedures, and the methods employed in Britain.^{20/} The Under Secretary of War was also provided with a copy of an intra-office memorandum of the Department of Justice dated 4 November 1941 which concluded that the executive branch of the government had the power to take administrative action to order the discharge of persons from defense industries.^{21/} Further studies of the problem from a legal and administrative viewpoint were made in December 1941 in the Office of the Under Secretary of War.^{22/}

A reference to the alien population of the country is appropriate at this time. It had been generally expected that aliens would be the chief source of subversive activities in this country. However, investigative reports soon indicated that much of the trouble could be expected from enemy agents and sympathizers among native-born or naturalized citizens. The Chief of Naval Operations made this observation in a memorandum dated 25 November 1941 to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, recommending enlargement of plant protection activities.^{23/}

Executive Order 8972, dated 12 December 1941, prepared by The Provost Marshal General, authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to take appropriate measures to protect national defense material, premises and utilities from injury or destruction. This Executive Order became the basis of the program for the removal of subversives by administrative procedures.^{24/}

By 3 January 1942 national labor leaders had concurred informally in a War Department sponsored removal of subversives program which would create a minimum of friction.^{25/}

Several administrative procedures were considered. Mr. Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, suggested that subversive employees be removed or transferred by action of union management committees in individual plants, acting possibly with the assistance of

^{20/} Memorandum for Under Secretary of War, dated 1 November 1941, subject: "Removal of Saboteurs and Spies from Key Facilities"

^{21/} Digest of Memorandum of Law, dated 4 November 1941, re: Power to Take Administrative Action to Enforce the Laws of the United States by Requiring the Discharge of Certain Employees from Defense Industries

^{22/} Three OUSW memorandums for file, dated 19 December 1941

^{23/} Navy memorandum, file (SC) P14-2/QM Op-16-B-10/he P14-2/Q: Serial 01265816, dated 25 November 1941, subject: "Extension of duties, tasks, and functions of Personnel Security Section (Op-16-B-10) of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, Division of Naval Intelligence"

^{24/} Executive Order 8972, dated 12 December 1941

^{25/} OUSW Plan for Discharge of Suspected Subversives, dated 3 January 1942, prepared by Mr. John H. Ohly

representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, and the American Legion. This proposal was rejected because it threw the entire matter into the realm of labor relations and it was generally agreed that the problem should not be handled in such a way as to complicate the labor relations situation.

Some representatives of the Under Secretary of War advocated that the decision as to initiating removal of subversives from plants be made by a board of three civilians, one familiar with labor problems, one familiar with management problems, and one representing the public. They also suggested that representatives of Army and Navy intelligence organizations and of the Federal Bureau of Investigation be attached to the Board as advisors.

These suggested procedures were eliminated at a conference on 9 January 1942. The conference discussed a plan advanced by the Navy and approved by the Under Secretary of War. Representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, Department of Labor, American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the Railway Brotherhoods attended.^{26/}

The program adopted for removal of subversives appeared in a joint Army and Navy memorandum dated 10 January 1942.^{27/}

The joint memorandum set forth only the general foundation for the removal procedure. It was understood that the Army and Navy would provide necessary implementing machinery by appropriate directives. The memorandum stressed the following points:

a. That representatives of organized labor agreed to the program.

b. That Army or Navy representatives had authority to request the immediate removal of an individual when adequate investigation revealed good cause to suspect such person of subversive activity.

c. That, before requesting a removal, the Army or Navy representatives notify management and representatives of labor of the request. One purpose of this notification was to minimize any possible injustice and to permit the making of arrangements for other employment in non-defense or non-war work. It was expressly provided that the representatives of labor could handle the removal if they desired.

^{26/} OLSW memorandum for files, dated 20 January 1942, subject: "Plant Protection - Discharge of Subversives - Conference with Labor"

^{27/} Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement, dated 10 January 1942

d. That right of review was given to the employee with the provision that, should the review disclose that the removal was without sufficient cause, reimbursement for loss from unemployment would be made.

e. Reimbursement was to be charged against the government contract for the project.

The only paragraph in the joint memorandum which was later revised was the method of obtaining reimbursement.

The administrative procedure necessary to implement the Joint War and Navy Departments' Memorandum was the subject of considerable discussion in the Office of the Under Secretary of War.^{28/} The instructions finally drawn up by the Office of the Under Secretary of War were published on 5 February 1942.^{29/} Under those instructions, the procedure for removal was to be initiated by the plant protection inspector who would consult, so far as practicable, with representatives of Military Intelligence Division and with the local field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Notice to the labor representative was stressed in those instructions. It was provided that, if the local representative did not remove the employee, the plant protection inspector would forward the case through channels to the Office of the Under Secretary of War for action. Only in emergency cases was the plant protection inspector authorized to request immediate removal of the employee. The plant protection inspector was cautioned not to request removal of an employee on the basis of idle rumor, normal labor activity, gossip or anonymous communications; removal action was to be based upon reasonable suspicion of engagement in subversive activity. The plant protection inspector was cautioned to use the utmost care consistent with security in making a decision and was reminded that it was not necessary that there be present concrete evidence sufficient to justify an arrest for violation of the Federal Sabotage or Espionage Acts.

During the week of 17 February 1942 a meeting was held at the Office of the Under Secretary of War to discuss and work out details of the procedure outlined in the 5 February 1942 circular. The meeting was attended by plant protection officers from the offices of the Chiefs of the Supply Arms and Services.^{30/}

^{28/} OUSW memorandum for files, dated 28 January 1942, subject: "Plant Protection - Removal of Subversives - Developments"

^{29/} Unnumbered WD Circular, dated 5 February 1942, subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement"

^{30/} Report of Activities of Plant Protection Division, OUSW, re: Subversives, etc., dated 17 February 1942

Meanwhile the Navy had informed its bureaus and offices of the adoption of the joint memorandum. 31/ The Secretary of the Navy issued instructions similar to the instructions in the restricted War Department Circular (5 February 1942). The instructions differed with respect to the action to be taken if the local labor representative did not effect the removal. Under the Navy letter, the Naval inspector was directed to notify the contractor to discharge the employee immediately.

Following publication of the War Department Circular (5 February 1942), the Secretary of the Navy suggested that information concerning subversives be freely exchanged between the Army and the Navy, and that the service designated as responsible take the necessary action. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Navy suggested that final action be taken by the same service as had been designated by the Army and Navy Munitions Board as responsible for plant protection inspections. This proposal was outlined in a letter to the Secretary of War, who concurred in it on 11 February 1942. 32/

Operation of Subversives Program under The Provost Marshal General

In March, 1942, a War Department circular was issued reorganizing the War Department. 33/ This circular was implemented by an order of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, on 9 March 1942. 34/ While these directives did not refer specifically to the Plant Protection Division of the Office of the Under Secretary of War, the transfer of internal security functions to The Provost Marshal General was later confirmed by a War Department letter issued to clarify the entire subject of internal security. 35/ Further, on 29 July 1942, the Under Secretary of War orally stated that the Internal Security Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office would be responsible for the administration of all internal security functions. 36/ At the time of the transfer, no coordinated program existed for inquiring into the records of employees in plants of importance to War Department procurement. The employing facilities had the primary responsibility for

31/ Navy letter, file (SC) A8-5/QQ Op-16-B-10 A8-5/QQ Serial 0191216, dated 22 January 1942, subject: "Subversives--Discharge of From Private Plants of Importance to Naval Procurement"

32/ Navy letter, serial 0381216, dated 9 February 1942 and OWS letter, dated 11 February 1942, re: Responsibility for personnel security

33/ WD Circular No. 59, dated 2 March 1942, subject: "War Department Reorganization"

34/ WD letter, dated 9 March 1942, subject: "Initial Directive for the Organization of the Services of Supply"

35/ WD letter, file AG 381 (3-26-42), dated 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

36/ PMGO memorandum for file, dated 29 July 1942, subject: "Instructions by the Under Secretary of War"

security but were merely directed to keep adequate personnel records and to investigate new employees. 37/ Some of the plants had adopted excellent security programs. Many were doing little or nothing about this problem.

Accordingly, to establish a definite program for determining the loyalty of employees in war production, the "Key Personnel Program" was inaugurated by letters to the Supply Arms and Services dated 22 April 1942. 38/ The Navy had already inaugurated a definite program for plants important to Navy procurement. 39/ Subsequent developments of the Key Personnel Program are discussed under that title. 40/

Up to 15 April 1942, the Army had removed between 40 and 50 suspected subversives and the Navy between 60 and 65. 41/ Practically all those removals were made from Washington because the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and G-2 investigation reports were not sent to plant protection inspectors in the field. Based upon information obtained by their local intelligence offices, a few removals were made in the field by the Air Corps and by the Ordnance Department.

In April 1942, it was suggested by labor and by the Under Secretary of War's Office that a Review Board should be set up within the War and Navy Departments to hear appeals. The Joint Memorandum stated that the removal should be subject to "such review as shall be provided by the Under Secretary of War or the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, depending upon which service requested the dismissal." It was recommended that the Board be composed of one Army officer, one Navy officer, one civilian from the War Department and two outstanding citizens not in either Department. 42/ This suggestion was supported by discussions with representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations who had begun to inquire about a definite review procedure. Prior to this reviews were

37/ OUSW pamphlet, dated February 1942, subject: "Plant Protection for Manufacturers"

38/ PMGO letter, dated 22 April 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Form NNI-140 to be Executed by Key Personnel in Facilities of Importance to Army Procurement"

39/ Navy letter, file (SC)QM/ND Op-16-B-10 QM/ND Serial No. 01827916, dated 7 January 1942, subject: "Personnel Security"; Navy letter, file (SC) QM/ND Op-16-B-10 QM/ND Serial 0381016, dated 10 February 1942, subject: "Personnel Security - Private Commercial Plants to be Furnished Personnel Security Questionnaires, Form NNI-140"

40/ SEE "Key Personnel Program"

41/ WD memorandum for files, dated 15 April 1942, subject: "Plant Protection - Removal of Subversives"

42/ SOS memorandum, dated 10 April 1942, subject: "Removal of Subversives"

made by an Army officer designated by the Office of the Under Secretary of War and by a Naval officer designated by the Navy Department. The Congress of Industrial Organizations had no objection to the manner in which these reviews were being conducted, but desired that a Review Board with a definite procedure be organized. The Congress of Industrial Organizations suggested that the Board be set up outside the War and Navy Departments and that it consist of a representative of the Department of Labor and a public representative.^{43/}

While conferences were being held and the matter was being studied, a separate Review Committee was organized 4 May 1942 within The Provost Marshal General's Office to hear appeals by individuals removed under the program. This committee was composed of several Army officers and a Navy officer and a procedure for handling appeals was adopted.^{44/}

In June 1942, Mr. Lee Pressman, General Counsel, Congress of Industrial Organizations, protested vigorously concerning the procedure being followed in the removal of suspected subversives. Mr. Pressman complained about the failure to inform the individual concerning the charges against him and the failure to set up a review procedure, and stated that no attempt was made to find employment in other plants on non-war work if the individual removed was the subject of only a faint suspicion of subversive activity. This matter was brought to the attention of The Provost Marshal General by the Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Army Service Forces.^{45/} The Provost Marshal General replied, on 22 June 1942, that in general, the operation of the circular was satisfactory and that a review committee had been set up.^{46/}

By the 4th of September 1942, 304 removals had been effected by The Provost Marshal General and 50 were reported by the field. Approximately 185 of these cases were appealed, of which 117 were affirmed and 25 reversed.^{47/}

^{43/} SOS memorandum for files, dated 22 April 1942, subject: "Removal of Subversives - Ideas of the CIO"

^{44/} See "The Industrial Employment Review Board"

^{45/} SOS memorandum, file SPGC-L, dated 4 June 1942, subject: "Plant Protection - Removal of Subversives"

^{46/} PAGO memorandum, dated 22 June 1942, subject: "Removal of Suspected Subversives"

^{47/} PAGO memorandum, dated 6 September 1942, subject: "Progress Report on Subversive Cases"

On 20 November 1942, the authority previously assigned orally to The Provost Marshal General in the removal of subversives under the War Department circular, 5 February 1942, was confirmed in writing by the Under Secretary of War.^{48/} This letter specifically authorized The Provost Marshal General, or such responsible officers as he might designate, to act for the Under Secretary of War in the administration of the provisions of the circular, including authority to sign removal requests. It further authorized The Provost Marshal General to establish a Review Committee to consider appeals.

On 4 May 1942, the War and Navy Departments agreed that the War Department would assume responsibility for operation of the procedures for approval of aliens for employment on aeronautical or classified contracts, the control of subversives, fingerprinting and any other personnel security measures except at Naval Shore Establishments. This agreement is set forth in a letter from the Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy and resulted from a conference between representatives of those two departments.^{49/} Previous letters had attempted to establish a careful delineation of responsibility between the Army and Navy and are pertinent in this connection.^{50/} Following this agreement, the Secretary of the Navy issued a letter dated 8 May 1942 informing Naval agencies of the transfer to the Army of responsibility for personnel security.^{51/} This transfer of responsibility to the Army eliminated confusion and duplication resulting from overlapping interests.

The Provost Marshal General issued, on 9 August 1942, a letter to the service commands covering the general subject of "continuing protection policies and procedures."^{52/} Section V of the letter discussed the policies and procedures for the Removal of Subversives Program.

Until the 9 August 1942 letter, there was no comprehensive directive implementing the removal program with the necessary procedures particularly as affected by the agreement of the Army to handle removals

^{48/} OUSW letter, dated 20 November 1942, re: Discharge of Subversives

^{49/} OASN letter, dated 4 May 1942, re: Suggestion that War Department assume responsibility for the handling of aliens, subversives, etc.

^{50/} Navy letter, file AS-6(420330), dated 30 March 1942, re: Internal Security; OSW letter, dated 27 April 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{51/} Navy letter, file (SC)AS-5/QM Serial 01152716, dated 8 May 1942, subject: "Personnel Security--Transfer to Army of Responsibility for".

^{52/} PMGO letter, file SPHGS 381, dated 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

in private plants of importance to Navy procurement. On 6 October 1942, the Navy informed its field forces of the 9 August 1942 letter.^{53/} The Director of Naval Intelligence reviewed the subversive program from 1939 to date in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy dated 8 October 1942.^{54/}

In November 1942, The Provost Marshal General by letter to the service commands, the Army Air Forces, Chemical Warfare Service and the Chief of Ordnance, called attention to the authority provided in the 9 August 1942 letter for field representatives of appropriate services to effect removals of subversives.^{55/} The letter specifically discussed an apparent reluctance of field representatives to exercise their authority.

Every effort was made to further the Services of Supply policy to decentralize War Department activities where possible.^{56/} The Joint War and Navy Department Memorandum dated 10 January 1942 ^{57/} and the unnumbered War Department circular of 5 February 1942 ^{58/} had contemplated that removal action would be taken by War Department representatives in the field, but complete operation in the field had not been practicable because of the lack of experienced personnel, the absence of investigative reports, and uncertainty as to criteria upon which to base removals. Also, the field agencies were reluctant to effect removals as long as The Provost Marshal General directed removals from Washington. The program was decentralized in October 1943 and finally, the publication of Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on Internal Security, 3 November 1943 completely divested operation of the subversive removal program from the staff level.^{59/}

^{53/} Navy letter, dated 6 October 1942, subject: "Personnel Security in Commercial Plants of Importance to Naval Procurement"

^{54/} ONI Review of Personnel Security Measures, dated 4 October 1942

^{55/} FMGO letter, file SPMGS 004, dated 26 November 1942, subject: "Discharge of Subversives"; FMGO letter, file SPMGS 381, dated 29 November 1942, subject: "Key Personnel Security Program in Plants and Facilities Privately Owned or Government Owned and Privately Operated which are Important to the War Effort"

^{56/} SOS memorandum, dated 24 July 1942, subject: "Decentralization of Actions now Requiring Approval by the War Department in Washington, D. C."

^{57/} Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement, dated 10 January 1942

^{58/} WD unnumbered circular, dated 5 February 1942, subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement"

^{59/} Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1, 2, and 3, dated 3 November 1943

As the Subversive Removal Program progressed complaints of representatives of organized labor continued to mount; specifically, the complaints were directed at the alleged failure of some representatives of the War Department to distinguish between normal labor activity causing work stoppage and slowdowns, and subversive activity. These complaints were also inspired because of the lack of an efficient machinery for obtaining reimbursement in cases where the removal had been found upon review to have been made without sufficient cause.

Numerous conferences were held by representatives of The Provost Marshal General, the Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, and the Under Secretary of War, with various labor officials with the result that on 12 April 1943 another directive was issued calling attention to the necessity for exercising great care to disregard idle rumor, to recognize normal labor activity and to disregard gossip and anonymous orank communications concerning employees. It was pointed out that, while a strike or a slow-down was disruptive of the war program, such activity, unless accomplished with subversive intent, was not to be considered as a basis for removing an employee under the provisions of the February 1942 circular. The importance of notifying labor representatives prior to removal action was again emphasized. Examples were given of reasonable grounds for removal when accompanied by suspicion of subversive activity.^{60/}

This letter of 12 April 1943 defined, for the first time, the extent to which reimbursement was appropriate in the event of reversal upon review, and provided a form for use by the employee in making a claim. However some problems involving reimbursement arose because the Joint War and Navy Department Memorandum of 10 January 1942 provided that where reimbursement was to be made "the loss shall be charged against the government contract for the project." By the middle of May 1943 approximately 100 removals had been considered made without sufficient cause. In these cases it proved to be practically impossible to allocate the cost of reimbursement "against the government contract for the project" for the following reasons:

- a. The facility had many contracts and it was impossible to charge the reimbursement costs correctly to any one or more contractors.
- b. The facility had no contracts with the War or Navy Department, as was the case with public utilities, or the firm was building a new plant at its own expense and as yet had no war contract. OR

^{60/} ASF letter, file SPX 004,003(4-3-43)OB-S-SPAAM-M, dated 12 April 1943, subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army and Navy Procurement"

c. In a few cases of reversals, the order reversing the original removal order failed to state specifically whether the employee was to be reimbursed and the facility was uncertain as to whether payment should be made in such cases.

After further conferences between representatives of The Provost Marshal General, the Under Secretary of War, Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, the Director of Administration, Army Service Forces, and the Fiscal Director, a procedure was evolved on 31 July 1943 which solved the problem of reimbursement. The Joint Memorandum of 10 January 1942 was modified by the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy so as to delete the provision for charging reimbursement against "the government contract for the project." A fund to provide reimbursement was created out of the appropriation "Contingencies of the Army" and the Secretary of War orally designated The Judge Advocate General's Office as fiscal officer to process claims for reimbursement.^{61/} By 1 September 1943, the necessary machinery was established and on 8 September 1943 the modification of the Joint Memorandum was published.^{62/}

At one of the conferences, on 25 May 1943, the problem of reinstatement in employment of an individual previously removed as a suspected subversive was discussed. The 5 February 1942, unnumbered War Department circular contained no express provision for reinstatement. However, the Industrial Employment Review Board, Provost Marshal General's Office, established in March 1943 to review all requests for review of removal orders in numerous cases had directed "reinstatement" believing that this power was a necessary corollary of the power of removal. After a discussion of the policy involved, it was agreed that the Industrial Employment Review Board would henceforth make no recommendation in regard to reinstatement or restoration and that reinstatement would be considered essentially a labor relation matter which The Provost Marshal General could refer to the Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces.^{63/}

The Provost Marshal General, by memorandum to the Under Secretary of War dated 10 July 1943, recommended revision of Procurement Regulations by inserting a clause to the effect that the contractor would "re-instate" a removed individual where, upon review, the removal was found

^{61/} OUSW memorandum, dated 31 July 1943, subject: "Removal of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement"

^{62/} WD unnumbered circular, dated 8 September 1943, subject: "Modification of Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement"

^{63/} RMGO memorandum, dated 25 May 1943, subject: "Reinstatement of, or restoration of former employment status, of individuals removed under the provisions of Unnumbered Restricted WD Circular, subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement", dated February 5, 1942"

to have been effected without sufficient cause. It was proposed that similar provisions be included in sub-contracts.^{64/} This proposal met serious objections from the Director, Industrial Personnel Division, which were set forth in his memorandum for the Director of Administration, Army Service Forces, dated 19 July 1943, which urged that to order reinstatement was beyond the appropriate sphere of the War Department's interest in the matter and was an interference with the employer-employee relations not directly justified by security reasons.^{65/} Consequently, the proposal of The Provost Marshal General was not put into effect and subsequent decisions of the Industrial Employment Review Board did not specify that an employee was to be reinstated in his former employment.

A meeting was held 1 September 1943 to consider further inquiries made by labor concerning the removal program.^{66/} This was attended by representatives of The Provost Marshal General, Industrial Personnel Division, the United Automobile Workers, the United Railroad Workers, and the National Headquarters of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The union representatives stated that on the whole, the program was operating very satisfactorily; however, they claimed there had been difficulties in connection with the employer-employee relationship in many cases as a result of the removal action, and there was criticism of the failure to take effective steps to provide other employment. The unions suggested that the War Department suspend the employee instead of removing him, so that his employment status would not be destroyed. Failure to disclose to the employee the reasons for removal was also a subject of discussion.

This conference of 1 September 1943, led to a careful scrutiny of the entire removal program in the Office of the Under Secretary of War, Provost Marshal General's Office, and the Industrial Personnel Division. The Provost Marshal General made recommendations upon this subject by memorandum to the Under Secretary of War on 13 September 1943.^{67/} This memorandum was submitted to the Director, Industrial Personnel Division

64/ FMGO memorandum, file SPMGL 383.4, dated 10 July 1943, subject: "Restoration of Subversives"

65/ SOS memorandum, file SPGC-L 383.4, dated 19 July 1943, subject: "Restoration of Subversives"

66/ FMGO memorandum for file, dated 2 September 1943, re: Conference on 1 September 1943; Industrial Personnel Division memorandum, dated 2 September 1943, re: Removal of Subversives - Conference with Representatives of the United Automobile Workers and the United Railroad Workers

67/ FMGO memorandum, file SPMGY 383.4, dated 13 September 1943, subject: "Comments on CIO Memorandum"

for comment. His comments were set forth in a detailed memorandum for the Under Secretary of War on 20 October 1943.^{68/} These memoranda discussed the objections raised by labor and analyzed them at length. The effect of the removal procedure upon employer-employee relations was agreed to be a valid subject for action and a revised form of "removal" letter was recommended wherein the suspected subversive employee would be suspended rather than removed from employment. Thus, "suspension" of an employee from employment would not terminate the employer-employee relationship and would entitle him to resume working upon the vacating of the suspension. In a memorandum to the Under Secretary of War on 1 November 1943, The Provost Marshal General concurred and inclosed as suggested draft of a letter to be used when "suspending" an employee from employment on War and Navy Department contracts.^{69/}

Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1, 2, and 3, on Internal Security, issued on 3 November 1943 called attention to the crucial shortage of manpower and adopted a policy of "calculated risk" for Internal Security Programs generally. Manpower shortage, the policy of calculated risk, and the reduction in the number of industries appearing on the Master Inspection Responsibility List thus became subjects for consideration in revision of the suspension program. Revision of the administrative instructions in the 5 February 1942 circular and a detailed outline of policy and procedures designed to adapt the program to the current internal security situation were prepared. No change in the Joint War and Navy Departments' Memorandum of 10 January 1942 was considered necessary. On 20 December 1943, representatives of The Provost Marshal General, Industrial Personnel Division, and the Under Secretary of War reached final agreement on these two companion directives and new administrative instructions were published.^{70/} Responsibility for administration of the program was placed upon the service commands and the Army Air Forces; supervision was the responsibility of The Provost Marshal General. The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service and Chief of Ordnance were not authorized to order suspensions under this revised procedure. The directive of 8 January 1944 constituted a complete handbook for operation of the program in the field without the necessity of consulting other directives. The proper grounds for suspension were carefully enumerated and all procedures outlined.

^{68/} Memorandum, Director, Industrial Personnel Division, file SPGCAL, dated 20 October 1943, subject: "Removal of Subversives"

^{69/} PMGO memorandum, file SPMGB 381.4, dated 1 November 1943, subject: "Removal of Subversives"

^{70/} WD Circular No. 339, dated 28 December 1943, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"; WD letter, file AG 383.4 (5 Jan 44) OB-S, dated 8 January 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

Because the manpower shortage was still crucial, the service commands on 10 April 1944 were instructed to assist all suspended suspected subversives in securing other appropriate employment.^{71/}

No further change in the suspension policy was made until publication of the War Department letter of 4 November 1944.^{72/} This directive limited the suspension program to facilities in the following five categories:

1. Facilities included in the Master Inspection Responsibility List.
2. Facilities engaged on secret or top secret contracts.
3. Facilities engaged on Army Air Forces' research, experiment, engineering, and development projects.
4. Facilities approved for the reproduction of classified material under the provisions of paragraph 18, AR 380-5.
5. Such other facilities as would thereafter be specifically designated by The Provost Marshal General.

This change in policy was caused by (1) the opinion that the European War was approaching its end and (2) extension of the theory of calculated risk to the less vital facilities.

On 10 May 1945, a WAGO intra-office memorandum recommending that the suspension of subversives program be continued following the defeat of Germany, was approved.^{73/} This recommendation was based on the determination that subversive influence within the United States would not be eradicated simply by the defeat of the German Army, but that the indoctrinations causing subversive acts would continue to prevail for an unknown period of time.

On 21 August 1945, following the surrender of Japan, instructions were dispatched to all service commands, Military District of Washington and all technical services, stating that the Suspension of Subversives Program would be continued but that all proposed suspensions were to be forwarded thereafter to The Provost Marshal General's Office for prior

^{71/} ASF letter, file SPX 383.4 (5 Apr 44) OB-S-SPMG, dated 10 April 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

^{72/} WD letter, file AG 383.4 (31 Oct 44) OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 4 November 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

^{73/} WAGO memorandum, dated 10 May 1945, subject: "Action to be Taken in Suspended Subversive Cases at Termination of European Conflict"

approval.^{74/} This was done as a means of exercising closer scrutiny over all suspensions after the cessation of hostilities.

Administration of Program

The Subversive Program was administered by The Under Secretary of War from its inauguration on 10 January 1942 to 9 March 1942, when administrative supervision and operation of the program was transferred to The Provost Marshal General.

It was directly operated by The Provost Marshal General until November 1943 when it was decentralized to the service commands. Thereafter The Provost Marshal General exercised staff supervision over the program.

On 28 March 1942, an office order was issued creating the Internal Security Division in The Provost Marshal General's Office.^{75/} Four officers and ten civilians of the plant protection personnel transferred from the Under Secretary of War's Office comprised the Facility Employee Branch, the functions of which included the Subversive Program. Under the procedures then established, this branch was to receive information on suspected subversives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff. Other information that led to removal action came from various sources such as complaints sent to the President, Secretary of War and Congressmen. Since the Federal Bureau of Investigation, already overloaded with work, was requested to make the investigations, sufficient information upon which to base removal action was obtained only with great difficulty.

With the inauguration of the Key Personnel Program on 22 April 1942, information and questionnaires concerning key employees in war production came to The Provost Marshal General and provided a basis for action under the removal program.^{76/} Form NNI-140 and its successor, Personnel Security Questionnaire, FMGO Form No. 58, were reviewed in the Facility Employee Branch, Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office.^{77/} Where additional information concerning an individual was desired, a check was made of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence Division, or investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was requested, later investigation by The Provost Marshal General's investigative organization was requested.

^{74/} Teletype, file SPHGS 004, dated 21 August 1945, re: Discontinuance of Production Security Inspections at all Facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List

^{75/} FMGO Order No. 42, dated 28 March 1942

^{76/} WD letter, file AG 321.19 M.I.D. (2-26-42) MB-M, dated 7 March 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaire Forms to Accompany Requests to The Provost Marshal General for Investigations"

^{77/} WD, FMGO-ID, Personnel Security Questionnaire Form No. 58

The subversive program from the start was handicapped by insufficient information upon which action could be based. All Federal Bureau of Investigation reports of suspected subversive activity in war facilities which had not reached the point where action could be taken were to be forwarded through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to The Provost Marshal General. Military Intelligence Division and Office of Naval Intelligence reports were also to be furnished by the Military Intelligence Division. However, the Military Intelligence Division did not transmit all such Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, Military Intelligence Division reports, or other reports to The Provost Marshal General unless in the opinion of that Division there was in the investigation report sufficient indication of suspected subversive activity to warrant removal action under the unnumbered restricted War Department circular of 5 February 1942. In many cases the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigation was incomplete or pending because the Federal Bureau of Investigation apparently did not feel that further investigation would reveal sufficient evidence to justify criminal action by the Department of Justice. Difficulty was also experienced when The Provost Marshal General desired further information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Requests by The Provost Marshal General for further Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation were generally met with the comment that it would be made if The Provost Marshal General could furnish undeveloped leads in existing reports or new leads. Similar difficulty with the Federal Bureau of Investigation was encountered when The Provost Marshal General received information of a complaint nature from plants or procurement officers indicating that investigation of certain employees was necessary. Such requests were transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, and three to nine months elapsed before a Federal Bureau of Investigation report was received.

Illustrative of the problem is a memorandum to Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, from the Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, stating that "the Federal Bureau of Investigation will not conduct any investigation unless there is evidence to indicate that there has been a violation of some federal statute." In one case where a request had been made to Military Intelligence Division for an investigation of a suspected subversive, the Military Intelligence Division informed The Provost Marshal General after an interval of three months, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had received the request and determined that the activities of the individual were "not a violation of any federal statute over which this Bureau has jurisdiction," and that no investigation would be undertaken in the absence of evidence that the individual was connected with a subversive organization or movement or engaged in subversive activity. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation had jurisdiction over this type of investigation of civilians, this led to an impasse. This problem was

discussed at the conference of 29 July 1942 in the Under Secretary of War's Office.^{78/} As the discussions did not result in improvement of the situation, the Deputy Chief of Staff on 26 November 1942 authorized The Provost Marshal General to discontinue the use of the Military Intelligence Division as a source of derogatory information, and to forward requests for reports direct to, and receive responses directly from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^{79/} This directive also abolished the Plant Intelligence Branch of the Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service. Two officers and eight civilians from that branch were transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office to act as liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An office memorandum, of 9 January 1943, created a Federal Bureau of Investigation Liaison Section in the Internal Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, to handle all direct communications between The Provost Marshal General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.^{80/} This direct liaison between The Provost Marshal General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation resulted in an immediate increase in the flow of Federal Bureau of Investigation reports. Once Federal Bureau of Investigation reports became available directly from that office, the Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence Division record checks were discontinued. Very few Naval Intelligence reports had been received anyway by The Provost Marshal General. The Navy, however, had constantly advised its field officers to furnish information on suspected subversives to the War Department, and kept the Naval districts and Navy Department representatives informed of procedural changes originating in The Provost Marshal General's Office, in regard to investigation and removal of suspected subversives.^{81/}

^{78/} PMGO memorandum for files, dated 29 July 1942, subject: "Instructions by the Under Secretary of War"

^{79/} Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff, file WDOSA 230 (11-26-42), dated 26 November 1942, subject: "Change in Administrative Procedure Involving the Military Intelligence Service, the Office of The Provost Marshal General, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation"

^{80/} PMGO interoffice memorandum, dated 9 January 1943, subject: "Creation and Functions of the FBI Liaison Section"

^{81/} Memorandum from Director of Naval Intelligence, dated 8 July 1942, subject: "Subversives in Private Commercial Plants Having Navy Contracts, Dissemination of Information Concerning"; letter from Director of Naval Intelligence, serial 01651916, dated 14 July 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Questionnaires (Form NNI-140) -- War Department Procedure"; Vice Chief of Naval Operations letter, dated 6 October 1942, subject: "Personnel Security in Commercial Plants of Importance to Naval Procurement"; and Vice Chief of Naval Operations letter, serial 0122550, dated 18 December 1942, subject: "Personnel Security Affecting Internal Security of Private Plants, Government Owned-Privately Operated Plants, and Naval Shore Activities - Procedure"

However, one difficulty remained. Direct relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation was authorized only at the Washington level. The Director of Internal Security of the service commands still had to submit requests for Federal Bureau of Investigation reports to the Director of Intelligence of the service command. This obstacle to the expeditious performance of investigations and exchange of information regarding suspected subversive employees was removed upon the consolidation of the internal security divisions of the offices of the Directors of Intelligence of the service commands on 1 January 1944. On 26 March 1944, direct communication between the Security and Intelligence Division of the service commands and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field was authorized.^{82/}

The Provost Marshal General in the beginning operated the removal program from Washington even though the 5 February 1942 circular contemplated that the "plant protection inspector" in the field was to take the action after weighing his suspicion of subversive activity and consulting with G-2 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where practicable. There were two reasons for this action. First, the inspectors of the procurement agencies had no liaison with Federal Bureau of Investigation field offices, since it was contrary to the "Delimitation Agreement", and they had no adequate means to secure prompt investigations from their procurement service.^{83/} In addition, the 5 February 1942 circular did not detail the criteria for determining subversive activity and a long process of education was necessary before the field representatives could be trained properly to apply the standards for removal. Since the program was an exercise of extraordinary wartime power, every precaution was taken to prevent an abuse of the power.

On 29 July 1942 in connection with a statement of War Department labor policy in all government owned contractor operated facilities, the Chief of Ordnance issued the following instructions, regarding removal of subversives, to the War Department representatives at facilities under the supervision of the Chief of Ordnance:^{84/}

^{82/} ASF letter, file SPX 383.4 (18 Mar 44) OB-S-SPDC, dated 24 March 1944, subject: "Delimitation of Responsibility for the Investigation of Espionage, Sabotage and Subversion in the United States and Possessions"

^{83/} Agreement - Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division, dated 5 June 1940

^{84/} Letter from Chief of Ordnance, file SFOID D.A.B. #533, dated 29 July 1942, subject: "Statement of War Department Labor Policy to all Government-owned, Contractor-operated Facilities"

"Discharges directed by the War or the Navy Department for suspicion of subversive activities will be handled in accordance with the provisions of the 'Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement,' dated January 10, 1942.

"Discharges directed by the Army or Navy Officer in Charge in the interest of plant security will be handled in the following manner: (1) the officer, or his representative, will direct the contractor to suspend the employee in question immediately; (2) the employee will be advised in detail of the specific reasons for his suspension and of his right to a hearing; (3) if requested, a hearing will be held by the officer, or his representative, within a reasonable period and at such hearing the suspended employee will have an opportunity to produce witnesses and present evidence and to be assisted by counsel; (4) based on such hearing, the officer, or his representative, will direct the reinstatement (with authority to grant back pay) or the discharge of such employee; and (5) an employee so discharged will have the right, upon request, to have his case reviewed by the War or Navy Department."

These instructions did not carry out the procedures outlined in the subversive circular in several respects; however, they represent one of the first endeavors by a technical service to set up procedures whereby the field representatives could carry out the removal of suspected subversives. Despite these instructions, few removals were initiated by Ordnance Department representatives in the field.

Notwithstanding the language of the circular, most field representatives thought that removal proceedings would be initiated only by The Provost Marshal General acting for the Under Secretary of War. This opinion persisted even after the 9 August 1942 letter and the issuance of the letters of 26 November and 29 November 1942, although the authority of the service commands, the Air Forces, Chemical Warfare Service and Ordnance was specifically pointed out.

Until 1943, it was the policy of The Provost Marshal General that except in unusual cases he would not initiate removal action without a Federal Bureau of Investigation report. Service command reports at first tended to be less thorough than Federal Bureau of Investigation reports. There was also the question of investigative jurisdiction. Under the "Delimitation Agreement," investigations of subversive individuals in war plants was a Federal Bureau of Investigation function and it was not clear how far service command agents could proceed. Thus, loyalty investigations were limited to investigations of loyalty of individuals against whom there was no charge of subversive activity. Theoretically,

if the investigation indicated that an individual was engaged in subversive activity, the case was to be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The line between loyalty checks and the field of prosecution was difficult to follow or even define.^{85/} It was the belief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that it should investigate only where prosecution was a likely result. This view was also shared by G-2. However, it was apparent that some agency must make investigations where a suspicion, only, of subversive activity was the likely result, and this function was assumed by The Provost Marshal General's agents after August 1943.^{86/}

In 1943, the number of removals by the field began to increase, as a result of directives informing the service commands and the other agencies of their authority and responsibility in this regard. In 1942, the proportion of removals by field agencies, as compared with those directed by The Provost Marshal General, were originally very low but gradually increased.^{87/}

<u>Date</u>	<u>PMGO Removals</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Field Removals</u>	<u>Total</u>
25 May 1942	--	180	---	32
29 Jun 1942	87	267	2	34
1 Aug 1942	15	280	8	42
5 Sep 1942	22	304	8	50
1 Dec 1942	149	453	29	119

The relative increase in these figures in late 1943 was as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>PMGO Removals</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Field Removals</u>	<u>Total</u>
28 Aug 1943	31	684	106	568
25 Sep 1943	31	715	73	641
30 Oct 1943	74	789	156	796

By the middle of 1943 The Provost Marshal General determined that the field had gained sufficient experience and familiarity with the program and knowledge of standards for taking removal action to justify complete decentralization.

^{85/} Memorandum from Chief of Control and Inspection Branch, Office of the Chief of Administrative Services, file SPAAI, dated 1 July 1942, subject: "Activities of G-2, WDOS, and PMG re: Investigations, sabotage, subversive activities, and plant protection"

^{86/} Letter from First Service Command, dated 14 August 1942, subject: "Responsibility for Investigation of Suspected Subversives" and PMGO 1st Ind, dated 31 August 1942

^{87/} Suspension of Suspected Subversives as Recorded in The Provost Marshal General's Office

On 14 September 1943, a Standing Operating Procedure covering the operations within The Provost Marshal General's Office was prepared.^{88/} These included the following:

1. Evaluation of derogatory investigation reports to determine whether or not a removal from employment should be ordered.
2. Preparation of removal orders.
3. Preparation of memoranda to The Judge Advocate General covering reimbursement when ordered by the Industrial Employment Review Board after reversal upon appeal.
4. Preparation of all correspondence relating to removals.
5. Determination of all matters relating to policies regarding the removal of subversives program.

Also, before a removal order was issued under the authority of the Under Secretary of War the Director of the Personnel Security Division personally reviewed the file and approved the removal.^{89/} Decentralization of operations of the subversive program was then accomplished by transmittal of all files, where action had not already been taken, to the appropriate service commands for action. The last removal order issued by The Provost Marshal General was early in December 1943.

The delegation of authority to the field under War Department circular No. 359 was to the service commands and Army Air Forces only. The technical services no longer had removal authority. Because of the need of trained personnel for administration of the program, it was deemed undesirable to decentralize the authority to order suspensions of suspected subversives below the service command level.^{90/}

The former Review Committee of the Industrial Employee Branch of The Provost Marshal General's Office was organized as the Industrial Employee Review Board.^{91/} A formal procedure was adopted by the Branch for certifying cases to the Board for review where a request for review was received in The Provost Marshal General's Office. Certifications

^{88/} PMGO interoffice memorandum, dated 14 September 1943, subject: "Standing Operating Procedure of Industrial Employee Branch"

^{89/} SEE "The Alien Employment Program"

^{90/} WD letter, file AG 383.4 (28 Jan 44) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 31 January 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

^{91/} SEE "Industrial Employee Review Board"

to the Industrial Employee Review Board were also made in cases involving requests for review from Japanese Americans where action for suspension or disapproval for work in war production had been taken by the Japanese American Branch. Following the publication of Civilian Personnel Regulation No. 36, permitting temporary Civil Service employees of the Military Establishment to appeal to the Industrial Employment Review Board, the Industrial Employee Branch also certified Civil Service appeals. There were however relatively few such cases. Another type of certification performed by the Industrial Employee Branch was that of removals ordered by the War Shipping Administration when the Under Secretary of War authorized appeals to be made to the Industrial Employment Review Board.^{92/} The Branch also handled the certification of appeals in alien cases where consent for employment on classified or aeronautical War and Navy Departments contracts had been denied or revoked, as well as appeals from discharges ordered by the War Department Traffic Security Board.^{93/}

Reference to the various types of information on subversives will indicate the wide scope of the problem of gathering and weighing the amount of information necessary to support a determination that an employee should be suspended. Some of these items are of particular interest. For instance, the Department of Justice prepared a study dated 7 March 1944, explaining the implications that may be drawn from the purchase, within the United States, as of specific dates, of Reichswanderer Marks.^{94/} The Reichswanderer Mark served as medium of exchange within Germany and their purchase in the United States established foreign credits for the German Government. Further, an effort was made to distinguish between the small group of former criminals whose record indicated they might be dangerous to the war effort and the large group of former convicts who could be advantageously employed and re-assimilated into society. Letters containing statements of the Honorable Henry Stimson, Secretary of War and the Honorable Paul V. McNutt, War Manpower Commissioner, encouraging the employment of former criminals, excepting those whose records contained indications of special danger to war plants, were disseminated to all service commands. Individuals who had been convicted of arson or malicious destruction of property were among those considered dangerous to war production.

The Loyalty Section of the Industrial Employee Branch accumulated a large amount of information concerning subversive or reputedly subversive organizations, such as the Kyffhaeuser Bund.^{95/} This information

^{92/} Letter from Chief of Transportation, File SPTOI 230.8, dated 11 January 1944, subject: "Removal of Suspected Subversives from Army Transports and from War Shipping Administration Ships Allocated to the Army"

^{93/} WD memorandum No. W380-44, dated 10 March 1944, subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board"

^{94/} Department of Justice memorandum, dated 7 March 1942, re: Purchases and Sales of Reichswanderer Marks

^{95/} RIGG Kyffhaeuser Bund Report, dated 4 January 1943

was obtained from a wide variety of sources, including the Military Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, Provost Marshal General reports, police investigations, and other miscellaneous sources. The information gleaned from Federal Bureau of Investigation reports was particularly helpful. The Under Secretary of War ruled on 8 July 1942 that communistic beliefs alone were not sufficient grounds for action.96/

The general problem of reimbursement and the final adoption of an adequate procedure added a new function to the Industrial Employee Branch in August 1943. While the Under Secretary's letter to The Provost Marshal General of 31 July 1943 stated that a Fiscal Officer would be assigned to The Provost Marshal General's Office to process cases, actually no Fiscal Officer was at that time available for this duty. As a result the Under Secretary's Office gave oral direction to The Judge Advocate General to have the matter handled by qualified officers in the Claims Division of that office. In the beginning, the Industrial Employee Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, upon receipt of a reversed case from the Industrial Employment Review Board, notified the subject of his right to reimbursement and referred his claim to The Judge Advocate General for further action. Upon receipt of request from the employee, The Judge Advocate General furnished a form and instructions for making claims, at the same time furnishing a check list to the employer which was used as a check against the employee's claim. In July 1944, an expedited procedure was arranged by The Judge Advocate General's Office and Industrial Employment Review Board. Under the revised method the Industrial Employment Review Board transmitted the claim form direct to the employee along with notification of the decision in the case. At the same time, a form was transmitted by the Industrial Employment Review Board to the employer to verify the date of the employee's removal, his salary, and other information needed to corroborate the employee's claim.

There was also unnecessary delay by the field representatives in forwarding the case to the Industrial Employment Review Board for review. A letter was issued on 13 July 1944, requesting that the transmission of cases from the service commands and Army Air Forces to The Provost Marshal General be expedited after removal action had been taken.97/

On 1 July 1944, the principal activities of the Industrial Employee Branch, Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, in connection with the Suspension of Subversives Program consisted of:

96/ OUSW memorandum, dated 8 July 1942, re: Subversives

97/ WD letter, file AG 383.4 (13 Jul 44) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 13 July 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

1. Examination of case reports of individuals suspended as suspected subversives, as soon as the files were received from the field,
2. Certification of subversive files to the Industrial Employment Review Board for review on appeal,
3. Certification of reversed cases to The Judge Advocate General's Office for reimbursement,
4. Preparation of correspondence relating to suspended subversives, particularly congressional correspondence, and
5. Careful evaluation of all policy matters relating to Subversive Program.

By 4 August 1945, the Claims Division of The Judge Advocate General's Office had approved the payment of \$157,996.47 to 319 individuals whose removals or suspensions had been appealed to the Industrial Employment Review Board and found to be without sufficient cause.^{98/}

Payments made from funds allotted to the Fiscal Officer under the Suspension of Subversives Program were as follows:

Fiscal Year:	1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944	\$70,404.89
Fiscal Year:	1 July 1944 to 30 June 1945	84,580.31
Fiscal Year:	1 July 1945 to 30 June 1946	2,591.37
TOTAL		\$ 157,577.57

Neither The Provost Marshal General nor the service commands had any authorized method of checking to see that the suspended suspected subversive did not obtain improper employment in other war industries. On 28 August 1942, Military Intelligence Service did not have adequate personnel for this purpose.^{99/} The matter was taken up formally with the Attorney General by letter from the Secretary of War, dated 20 October 1942, suggesting that the follow-up was the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No satisfactory solution was offered by the Attorney General.^{100/}

^{98/} Reimbursement List

^{99/} MIS letter, file MID 000.24 8/19/42 (3/8/42), dated 28 August 1942, subject: "Removal of Subversive Employees"

^{100/} OSW letter, dated 20 October 1942, re: Follow-up on Removed Persons

In the fall of 1943 and early 1944 other efforts were made to meet this problem and the Delimitation Agreement was finally changed to permit the service commands to make a periodic check on the employment of employees removed or suspended from employment.101/

Another problem arose when the service commands, on the basis of new information, removed a person whose case had already been reviewed by the Industrial Employment Review Board and reversed as having been made without cause. A teletype to all service commands on 23 August 1943 required such new evidence to be submitted to The Provost Marshal General.

Certain legal problems were presented when court actions were instituted against The Provost Marshal General or his representatives by removed or suspended employees testing the legality of the action. Among the allegations was one that the removal or suspension had been made by the Army Representative acting under instructions of The Provost Marshal General. The attention of the service commands and the Army Air Forces was therefore directed to the instructions, already issued, requiring that the War Department be represented at the removal or suspension proceedings but prohibiting the War Department Representative from accomplishing the actual removal.102/

In 1943, William Kurt Gohr sued the United States in the Federal District Court in Missouri because of his suspension from the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Company, Fort Worth, Texas. This suspension had been affirmed, on appeal, by the Industrial Employment Review Board, Provost Marshal General's Office.

The Gohr complaint was dismissed on 25 January 1945.103/ The United States Attorney had moved to have the case dismissed on the ground that Gohr had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that the plaintiff was not injured by the action of the defendants. The basis for this statement was that the hearing before the Industrial Employment Review Board was purely administrative in character and the Industrial Employment Review Board would consider additional information at any time; The Provost Marshal General's Office had submitted a deposition to that effect for the court's consideration. Moreover, it was pointed out that the act complained of, i.e., the discharge of Gohr, was the act of the company and not of the United States Government. It was also pointed out that the court had no jurisdiction, for the following three reasons.

101/ ASF letter, file SPX 383.4 (18 Mar 44) OB-S-SPDC, dated 24 March 1944, subject: "Delimitation of Responsibility for the Investigation of Espionage, Sabotage and Subversion in the United States and Possessions"

102/ ASF letter, file SPX 004.003 (25 Sep 43) OB-S-SREGP-U, dated 29 September 1943, subject: "Removal of Subversives"

103/ Decision in Case of WILLIAM K. GOHR vs USA - Suspected Subversive, dated 25 January 1945

1. Defendants were obeying an order of their superiors valid on its face,
2. Suit was against the United States, which had not consented to be sued, and
3. There was improper service on Assistant Secretary of the Navy Bard, the Under Secretary of War Patterson, and Colonel M. S. Battle, Chairman, Industrial Employment Review Board, Provost Marshal General's Office.

On 10 May 1945, Judge Charles E. Wyzanski in the Federal District Court, Boston, Massachusetts, announced his decision in the case of HANS VON KNORR vs. SHERMAN MILES.¹⁰⁴ VON KNORR had alleged that General Miles, the Commanding General, First Service Command, had interfered with his liberty by ordering his removal from employment with Cities Service Company. He sought an injunction and damages. VON KNORR had been removed, after investigation as a suspected subversive, by the Director, Internal Security Division, First Service Command. On appeal to the Industrial Employment Review Board, the removal was affirmed.

Judge Wyzanski dismissed Von Knorr's action and stated that the War Department might exclude from war plants or contiguous areas any person or persons in whom the government lacked confidence. He further held that the government's power to exclude persons from war plants was absolute and not dependent upon the facts concerned or the merits of any particular case; that the formalities of notice, hearing, and counsel were not requisite; and that the government could rely even on its uncorroborated suspicions and need not give any explanation of its action. The plaintiff, Von Knorr, appealed this decision and a hearing was pending.

Members of Congress frequently requested information as to the reason for a particular suspension or removal. This information was treated as confidential by the War Department. The problem of disclosure of confidential information was not new to government bureaus. In a letter to the Honorable Carl Vinson, dated 30 April 1941, Honorable Robert Jackson, the Attorney General of the United States, stated that:

"It is the position of the Department of Justice, restated now with the approval and at the direction of the President, that all investigative reports are confidential documents of the executive department and that congressional or public access thereto would not be in the public interest.

¹⁰⁴ Judge Charles E. Wyzanski's Decision in Case of HANS VON KNORR vs. SHERMAN MILES, Commanding General, First Service Command, dated 9 May 1945

"This accords with the conclusions reached by a long line of predecessors in the Office of Attorney General and with the position taken by the President from time to time since Washington's administration; and this discretion in the executive branch has been upheld and respected by the judiciary."105/

The Secretary of War has consistently followed the policy enunciated by the Department of Justice. In a letter dated 12 March 1945 to Honorable R. Ewing Thomason, Chairman, Subcommittee, House Military Affairs Committee, Washington, D. C., the Secretary of War stated that the records of investigations made by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, with reference to loyalty of individual officers, are confidential and for the use of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff and cannot be disclosed.106/

The Provost Marshal General consistently refused to permit the examination of confidential files under his jurisdiction except by authorized military personnel on the basis of the policies mentioned above. No undue difficulty was experienced as a result of this policy.

Suspensions by the Japanese-American Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, of Japanese-Americans suspected of subversive activity rested upon the same basic authority as the Suspension of Subversives Program.107/

As the number of removals increased, so also did the percentage of cases reversed on appeal to the Industrial Employment Review Board. Prior to the creation of the Industrial Employment Review Board, the percentage of reversals had been relatively small; for example, by 28 December 1942 the Review Committee had received 300 cases, of which it had reversed 68. By the summer of 1943, some months after the Industrial Employment Review Board had been in operation, the percentage of reversals was steadily increasing. At the same time reports were coming in from the field that the service commands were reluctant to make removals in any case where they are not convinced that the facts were sufficiently derogatory to assure that the action would be affirmed on appeal. Dissatisfaction with the reversals by the Review Board resulted in complaints by many of the service commands that the reversals were casting a cloud upon the effectiveness of the entire program. In a number of instances removals had been made by the service command upon the basis of insufficient derogatory information or upon the failure properly to evaluate information. It was necessary to point out repeatedly to the service commands that they were taking action on information which was not adequate to justify the Industrial Employment Review

105/ Opinion of the Attorney General of the United States - Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative Reports, dated 30 April 1941

106/ CSW letter, dated 12 March 1945, re: Disclosure of Information contained in Confidential Files

107/ See "The Japanese-American Program"

Board sustaining the action after hearing the evidence presented by the subject and his own witnesses. On numerous occasions, when the subject appeared before the Board on appeal he was able to clarify information which had definite indications of subversive activities, and in such cases a reversal would properly be directed. The importance of the personal appearance is particularly worthy of mention, as the percentage of reversals where the subject did not make a personal appearance was relatively small. Efforts to correct the situation in the field were consistently made during inspection visits of Personnel Security Division officers to the service commands as well as by the various directives which outlined proper standards for taking removal action.

On 14 February 1944, the service commands and the Army Air Forces were directed to effect suspensions when it appeared appropriate in operating the program and not to permit their decisions to be influenced by any action which might be taken by the Industrial Employment Review Board.^{108/} At the direction of the Under Secretary of War, a study was made of the cases reviewed by the Industrial Employment Review Board from 1 January 1944 to 30 April 1944 to determine the necessity for continuance of the program, and was submitted to him on 16 August 1944.^{109/} The study pointed out the factors already mentioned: inadequate investigation in some cases, erroneous evaluation in some cases, and the effect of personal appearance by the subject. The study also recommended the issuance of a letter directing that consideration be given to the

- "(1) Importance of the facility to the war effort;
- "(2) Importance of the individual to the facility;
- "(3) Degree of access by the individual to classified information;
- "(4) Nature of the individual's duties and the opportunity for substantial damage to the war effort afforded thereby; and
- "(5) Possibility of the transfer of the individual from sensitive duties, involving frequent access to classified information or opportunity for substantial damage to the war effort, to other duties wherein the degree of observation or the nature of the duty would permit the employment of the individual without undue risk.

^{108/} WD letter, file AG 383.4 (10 Feb 44) OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 14 February 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives"

^{109/} PMGO memorandum, dated 16 August 1944, subject: "Reversals of Decisions to Suspend Suspected Subversives from Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

The proposed directive was approved by the Under Secretary of War and published on 4 September 1944.110/

A statistical report indicating field activities under the Suspension of Subversives Program was received monthly by The Provost Marshal General beginning in January 1944 after decentralization of the program to the service commands had been completed.111/ A monthly statistical summary of information received from the service commands was prepared for Section 11 of the Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report. This information, shown in graph form, indicated that during the first month after decentralization (January 1944), approximately 7,500 cases were evaluated by the service commands for possible action under the Suspension of Subversives Program. The statistics show that, as a result of application of the doctrine of calculated risk, activity in the service commands declined until December 1944 when less than 2,000 cases were evaluated. An increase in activity took place in 1945, before the capitulation of Germany.112/ Between V-E Day and V-J Day there have been no suspensions.

Reports of removals and suspensions received by The Provost Marshal General from the beginning of the program in March 1942, to 30 August 1945 indicate that approximately 790 suspensions or removals were made by The Provost Marshal General and 1,576 by the service commands, Army Air Forces, and the technical services.

110/ WD letter, File AG 383.4 (4 Sep 44)OS-E-SPMGP-M, dated 4 September 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"

111/ Statistical Report Form, Control Approval Symbol MGP-49, page 4, Personnel Security Activities

112/ Monthly Progress Report, Section 11, Administration

FINGERPRINTING PROGRAM

The War Department Fingerprint Program was established as a security measure to safeguard the military establishment and suppliers and manufacturers of war material by providing positive identification of personnel whose criminal records indicated that their continued employment might endanger the war effort. Persons who had been convicted of such crimes as arson, malicious destruction of property, or other similar crimes were considered to be potentially dangerous to the war effort, as were persons who had been committed to insane asylums. The identification of individuals within these categories was not the only benefit to be derived from the fingerprinting program, however, as knowledge of the program kept many persons with criminal records from attempting to obtain employment. The program also provided a psychological deterrent to criminal and subversive acts on the part of those who were fingerprinted.

Development and Procedures

War Department Civilian Employees:

The Program to fingerprint War Department civilian employees was long in development. Executive Order No. 8781 issued 12 June 1941 which required that all employees in the executive civil service be fingerprinted, extended the fingerprinting program to all War Department civilian employees. 1/

The Director of Civilian Personnel of the War Department was made responsible for fingerprinting all War Department civilian employees. Civil Service Commission fingerprinting forms and procedures for those classes of War Department employees formerly fingerprinted under the Civil Service Commission rules were retained. 2/ Fingerprinting forms supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation were used to fingerprint the additional War Department civilian employees brought within the increased scope of the fingerprinting program by the Executive Order. 3/ Supervision of the fingerprinting of this latter group of War Department employees was exercised by the Director of Civilian Personnel, Office

1/ Executive Order 8781, 12 June 1941, "Employees in the Executive Civil Service to be Fingerprinted"

2/ WD Civilian Personnel Division Memorandum No. 99, 14 Jul 41

3/ WD Civilian Personnel Division Memorandum No. 99, Supplement No. 2, 17 Oct 41

of the Secretary of War. This dual system of forms and supervision created confusion and misunderstanding on the part of officers and civilians who administered the fingerprinting program in the various field installations of the War Department.

On 2 June 1942, The Provost Marshal General, at the request of the Director of Civilian Personnel of the War Department, assumed responsibility for the fingerprinting of all employees covered by the Executive Order of 12 June 1941 but not covered by the prior Civil Service Commission rules and regulations. 4/ One of the first steps taken was the establishment of a system of code numbers for each post, camp, and station or other establishment. These code numbers showed the corps area number so that fingerprint cards and T-2 reports could be returned through corps area headquarters. Provision was also made for a definite coding to indicate in what establishment on the post an employee was working. Although this system of code numbers prevented misdirection and delay in distribution of T-2 (Criminal Record Summary Sheet) reports for the personnel fingerprinted under the supervision of The Provost Marshal General, inexperienced field personnel, both officers and civilians, were frequently unable to decide whether the Civil Service Commission Fingerprint Form (No. 2390) or the fingerprint form supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be used. As insurance against error, some civilian personnel officers in the field adopted the practice of sending in fingerprints on both forms.

On 23 June 1942, the Director of Civilian Personnel and Training of the War Department clarified instructions issued on 2 June 1942, by restating the classes of War Department employees to be fingerprinted under the supervision of The Provost Marshal General as follows:

- (1) Employees whose appointments were excepted from Civil Service Commission rules.
- (2) Employees appointed under Schedule A of the Civil Service Commission rules and regulations. 5/

On 19 January 1943, in view of the tremendous increase in the War Department's civilian component and the resultant burden placed upon the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission,

4/ SOS Memorandum, file SPMGS 344-1, dated 2 June 1942, subjects: "Fingerprinting"

5/ WD Civilian Personnel Division Memorandum No. 73, 23 Jun 42, subject: "Fingerprinting Functions to be Assumed by PMGO"

the War Department agreed to assume full responsibility to the Civil Service Commission for determining the suitability of War Department appointees as to character and loyalty. 6/ Commanding officers of field establishments (or other authority to whom appointing power had been officially delegated) and chiefs of forces and services in the departmental service were given full responsibility for this determination and instructed to fingerprint civilian employees as required by Civil Service instructions, in addition to utilizing other investigative facilities placed at their disposal. These instructions remained largely in effect until the discontinuance of the program late in 1943. 7/

Changes in the fingerprinting procedure were recommended from time to time but final action was not taken until March, 1944, when the current system of fingerprinting civilian employees was established. 8/ Under this system, each applicant was fingerprinted on a National Defense Program form supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The use of the Civil Service Commission fingerprint cards, which had caused confusion, was abolished. A code number assigned by the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, indicated the service command and installation where the employee worked. The cards were sent directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the date of forwarding being noted in the applicant's file. The Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation searched the fingerprint cards against the criminal record files and a Form T-2 (Criminal Record Summary Sheet) was sent to the Director, Security & Intelligence Division of the appropriate service command or to the Military District of Washington. T-2 reports were then sorted by means of the code for further distribution to employing installations within the service command. Action taken on receipt of a T-2 report started with a review of the record. If it appeared that it might justify dismissal, it was referred to the appropriate investigating office for investigation and complete report on the basis of which appropriate action might be taken. The application for employment submitted by the individual was also checked to determine whether a wilful withholding or misstatement of material facts had been made.

Two copies of War Department Form 65, the report of action on criminal record, were sent by the service command with each T-2 form distributed to the employing office. 9/ In each case that a T-2 form

6/ WD Administrative Memorandum No. 4, 19 January 1943; subject: "Character Investigation of Civilian Employees"

7/ WD ltr, AG 200.2 (16 Nov 43)OB-P-PMG-MB-A, 25 Nov 43, subject: "Fingerprinting"

8/ WD Civilian Personnel Circular No. 28, 14 Mar 44

9/ Form WD 65, 9 Mar 44, "Report of Action on Criminal Record"

was received, a Form 65 was executed in duplicate, the original transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the duplicate returned with the T-2 form as a part of the records of the employing office. This action was for the purpose of notifying the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the action taken as a result of the discovering of a criminal record.

Administrative instructions concerning the use of War Department Form 65, and the disposition of T-2 forms were clarified in August, 1944. 10/ Revised instructions for fingerprinting of War Department civilian employees, issued in March, 1945, changed the procedure to be followed in processing War Department Form No. 65 by providing that records of action taken by the War Department would be transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on War Department Form 65 only in the following instances: 11/

- (1) Where the subject was denied employment or removed on the basis of information developed by a fingerprint check.
- (2) Where the subject of a criminal or arrest record died while still employed by the War Department.

It is interesting to note that Civil Service Departmental Circular No. 496, 21 July 1945, extended to all federal departments and agencies some of the simplifications of methods of control over fingerprinting developed by the War Department. 12/

Uncoded cards received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation were referred to the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office for assignment of a code number. In such instances a code number was assigned the installation from which the cards were received and the installation notified of the assignment of the code number. Similarly, T-2 reports reaching the service command for further distribution occasionally could not be processed because of the deficient coding and were referred to the Provost Marshal General's Office for correction and distribution.

As civilian personnel officers of posts, camps, and stations and other War Department installations became accustomed to the correct procedure established by the various fingerprinting directives, the supervisory burden in the Provost Marshal General's Office slackened. Originally three clerks were employed to handle the necessary duties involved in assigning codes, coding uncoded fingerprint

10/ WD Civilian Personnel Circular No. 87, 1 Aug 44, "Fingerprinting Civilian Employees"

11/ WD Civilian Personnel Circular No. 34, 26 Mar 45, "Fingerprinting Civilian Employees"

12/ CSC Dept. Cir No. 496, 21 Jul 44, "Revised Fingerprint Card Procedures"

cards and transmitting T-2 forms. By October 1944 the activities had decreased until it was a part time job for a clerk and took 10% of the time of the officer in charge. Peak loads were disposed of by having two or more clerks familiar with the coding procedure.

Employees of Private Industry

The fingerprinting of employees of private plants as a security measure reflected the trend and interest in universal fingerprinting that had been prevalent in the country prior to the war, encouraged by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In a memorandum dated 19 February 1941, the Under Secretary of War requested the technical services to encourage the practice of fingerprinting employees in manufacturing facilities of importance to procurement. 13/ This War Department policy was in accord with the policy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in encouraging the voluntary submission of fingerprints.

On 10 December 1941 immediately after Pearl Harbor, this voluntary policy was changed. In a memorandum for the technical services and the Army Air Forces, the Under Secretary of War directed that all guards and watchmen employed in facilities producing material for the War Department be fingerprinted. 14/ War Department personnel were to supervise the taking of the prints but after the records were checked, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was to notify management of all adverse reports.

During January 1942 the policy of requiring fingerprints of all employees of private industry having War Department contracts was under discussion. The War Department encountered the opposition of national labor organizations to this policy. Labor leaders withdrew their objections to the proposed program to fingerprint all employees of facilities having War Department contracts only when it was agreed that neither prints nor records would be made available to plant management.

Accordingly, when the Plant Protection Division of the Under Secretary of War on 25 February 1942 issued instructions to the Army Air Forces and the technical services to fingerprint all employees engaged in the production of munitions for the armed forces, it was expressly stated that "It is imperative that all persons who are fingerprinted should be notified that the records are the property of, and will be retained by, the United States Government." 15/ A psychological touch was the recommendation that the chief executive of

13/ OUSW Memo, 19 Feb 41, subject: "Fingerprinting of Plant Employees"

14/ OUSW Memo, 10 Dec 41, subject: "Fingerprinting of Guards & Watchmen"

15/ OUSW Memo, 25 Feb 42, subject: "Fingerprinting of all Persons Engaged in Producing Munitions"

the plant be the first individual to be fingerprinted. Administration of the program was lodged with the district procurement officers of the technical services and Army Air Forces.

The Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, was transferred to the Internal Security Division, Office of The Provost Marshal General, on 9 March 1942 and detailed instructions covering all phases of the Fingerprinting Program were issued by The Provost Marshal General to the technical services and Army Air Forces on 17 March 1942. ^{16/} This directive established the present system of assignment of various codes for installations and facilities important to War Department procurement. War Department representatives and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation cooperated to instruct military and civilian personnel in various cities in the United States in the taking of fingerprints. A Fingerprint Records Section was established in the Internal Security Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office to assume staff jurisdiction of the Fingerprint Program. This section received all T-2 records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation for distribution to the technical services and Army Air Forces, assigned code numbers to facilities and installations, and became responsible for all inquiries concerning the Fingerprint Program.

Prior to May 1942, the War Department and the Navy Department had each conducted its own internal security program. As a result of a series of discussions, conferences, and an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, it was determined that the only satisfactory way to avoid duplicate internal security efforts was to combine all such programs under one department. Accordingly, on 4 May 1942, the fingerprint program, as well as other internal security programs of the Navy Department, was transferred to the War Department. ^{17/}

Shortly thereafter, in a memorandum to Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, all corps areas, defense commands and supply areas and services, The Provost Marshal General announced that the War Department had assumed jurisdiction over the fingerprinting of War Department civilian employees, the fingerprinting of personnel employed by Naval contractors and employees of public utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. ^{18/} The burden of fingerprinting the employees of private contractors rested upon the procurement districts but plans were being formed to transfer this burden, where possible, to the commanding generals of the corps areas.

^{16/} PMGO Memo, 17 Mar 42, subject: "Instructions for the Fingerprinting of all Persons Engaged in Producing Munitions"

^{17/} Asst S/W to S/N, 4 May 42, re: War Department to Assume responsibility for Personnel Security

^{18/} PMGO Memo, file SPMGS 344.1, 2 June 42, "Fingerprinting"

One month later, to put "teeth" into the program, instructions were issued that persons refusing to be fingerprinted were to be interviewed by an officer and, if they persisted in their refusal, they were to be discharged. 19/ At the same time, it was pointed out that only such crimes as arson or aggravated malicious mischief, or a record of insanity or subversive activities should disqualify workers. In this directive it was stated for the first time that persons with records of the type deemed dangerous would be removed from positions where they might cause material damage. Prior instructions had only gone so far as to state that the records would be returned to the chief of the supply arm or service responsible for plant protection for "such action as may be deemed necessary."

In August 1942, The Provost Marshal General issued the first comprehensive instructions covering Internal Security to the commanding generals of the service commands. 20/ Operation of the fingerprinting program was transferred from the technical services to the commanding generals of the various service commands. Plants and facilities vital to the war effort were assigned priority for fingerprinting. Service commanders were to request The Provost Marshal General's Office to assign a code number to each facility except those on the Inspection Responsibility List, to which code numbers had previously been assigned. Fingerprinting cards and instructions were to be furnished by representatives of the service commands to plants and facilities. Completed fingerprint cards were transferred directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation from service command headquarters.

This consolidated statement of policies and procedures covering internal security contained the first War Department authority for the suspension program on the basis of criminal record derived from fingerprints. It directed service commanders, after evaluating criminal records, to take appropriate action in accordance with the Removal of Subversives Program.

In answer to complaints in connection with construction projects that the routine procedure by which a criminal record was obtained took so long a time that the project was completed and the employee gone before the T-2 record was received, a method of expediting the fingerprinting of employees was devised whereby the construction project was identified and the fingerprint card forwarded directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 21/ The real cause of the delay, however, was the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was being over-burdened with a sudden flood of fingerprint cards and personnel was not available to check the records immediately.

19/ PMGO Memo, SPMGS 344.1, 2 Jul 42, "Fingerprinting"

20/ SOS ltr, SPMGS 381, 9 Aug 42, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies & Procedures"

21/ SOS, PMGO ltr, SPMGS 344.1, 16 Sep 42, Fingerprinting of Employees on Construction Projects; SOS, PMGO ltr, SPMGS 344.1, 30 Oct 42, Instructions for Fingerprinting Employees on Construction Projects

On 26 November 1942, there was distributed to all service commands, technical services, and procurement districts copies of correspondence between the chairman of the War Production Board and War Manpower Commission and the Secretary of War stressing the importance of permitting employment in war production of as many people with criminal records as possible, compatible with security. The Secretary of War stated that the War Department would disregard criminal records unless they disclosed indications of special danger to war plants. An inclosure to this letter stated that persons with tendencies toward arson or the malicious destruction of property should not be admitted to war production plants, and others, whose records indicated serious mental or emotional instability, and who had not made a satisfactory readjustment to normal activities, might also be excluded. Announcement of this policy was necessary, not so much as a result of the Fingerprint Program, but because of the regular investigative procedure which included local police record checks which disclosed many criminal records that would ordinarily bar an individual from employment.

One defect in the program was: 22/ Persons applying for employment in war plants were fingerprinted and the fingerprints sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When a person was discharged as a suspected subversive the Federal Bureau of Investigation was notified but the subversive discharge was not entered on a criminal record card but only on a subversive name file. Thus, a person might be discharged from a war plant as a suspected subversive and although fingerprinted again at the time of employment at another plant, might escape detection because of the fact of the discharge did not appear in the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

As a result of conferences between The Provost Marshal General's Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to correct this defect in the fingerprinting program, a procedure was evolved by which the Provost Marshal General's Office would send to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Identification Division) identification charts of all suspended subversives so that the fact of the subversive suspension could be included on the fingerprint records at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, the Provost Marshal General's Office agreed that in future suspensions of subversives an attempt would be made to secure a fingerprint card for transmission to Federal Bureau of Investigation in addition to the identification chart. Service commanders were notified that in all future suspension of subversive cases, if possible, a ten-finger fingerprint record of the suspected subversive should be secured at the time of suspension, for inclusion in subjects file to be transmitted to The Provost Marshal General's Office. 23/

22/ FMG ltr to CG, SOE, 17 Mar 43, subject: "Fingerprint Program"

23/ FMGO ltr, SPWGP 321.19, subject: "Fingerprinting Suspected Subversives, dtd 2 Jul 43"

From the inception of the Fingerprint Program in early 1942 a flood of fingerprint cards poured into the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Over two and one-half million cards arrived in one month. Over twenty million were received during the period of March 1942 - March 1943. Approximately thirty million such prints had been received by November 1943.

When the War Department Fingerprint Program of industrial employees was initiated, certain large companies (i.e., Hercules Powder Company, Wilmington, Delaware; E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington, Delaware; Shell Union Oil Co., New York, New York; Wheeling Steel Co., Wheeling, West Virginia; Ford Motor Company, Detroit, Michigan) were already operating a fingerprinting system on the recommendation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These companies pointed out that their programs were well established; the records obtained were available to security officers of the War Department; and that it would be an unnecessary waste to change to the War Department procedure.

A local union at the Ford Manufacturing Co., Detroit, Michigan, in September 1943, complained that fingerprint records were reaching the management of the Ford Company, contrary to the previous agreement between the War Department and representatives of labor. The union position was supported by the Industrial Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, which pointed out that the War Department had represented to labor representatives that no records would reach the employers' hands and suggested that the programs of the excepted companies were a violation of this pledge.

In October 1943, at the direction of the Assistant Provost Marshal General, the Director, Personnel Security Division, visited the five excepted companies. In a memorandum to The Provost Marshal General, dated 27 October 1943, the Director, Personnel Security Division, pointed out that the excepted companies were doing more with the cooperation of the local police than was being done at plants where the War Department program was in effect. Furthermore, the growth in number of duplicate prints submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the substantial coverage already obtained led to the conclusion that the continuance of the War Department Fingerprinting Program would be unwise. 24/

On 4 November 1943, The Provost Marshal General in a memorandum for the Director of Administration, Army Service Forces recommended that the War Department Fingerprint Program for private industries of importance to War and Navy Department procurement be discontinued and stated that:

24/ FMGO Interoffice Memo, dated 27 Oct 43, subject: "Fingerprinting"

a. The War Department Fingerprint Program had been practically completed in all facilities of importance to the war effort.

b. Present fingerprints taken under the program were, in general, duplicates of those of new employees, representing labor turnover; returns to the War Department were so few that the continuance of the program could not be justified.

c. The discontinuance of the Fingerprint Program would release a minimum of about 35 civilian employees throughout the service commands.

d. There would be a substantial saving of personnel within the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of the burden imposed upon that Bureau by the War Department Fingerprint Program. Concurrences were obtained from the following agencies: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy Department, Military Intelligence Service, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Director of Administration, Federal Power Commission, Chemical Warfare Service, Office of Chief of Ordnance, and the Air Provost Marshal, Army Air Forces.25/

On 25 November 1943, by order of the Secretary of War, the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, defense commands, the service commands, and Military District of Washington were notified that War Department fingerprinting of employees of private contractors was discontinued.26/ Fingerprinting of civilian employees of the War Department was not affected by this order.

Although the official program ended, continuance without War Department backing by companies on a voluntary basis was possible by arrangement with local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The War Department, moreover, informally agreed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation that prints of persons removed as subversives from employment would continue to be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for recording in their criminal files when a report of suspension was sent in. These prints had been requested from the service commands by The Provost Marshal General on 2 July 1943, and the giving of such prints was a condition of entering an appeal from the removal.27/ If prints had not previously been obtained, an appellant who appeared in person was fingerprinted by a clerk in the Industrial Employee Branch of the Personnel Security Division.

25/ PMGO letter, SPMGP 200.2, 4 Nov 43, subject: "Elimination of Unessential Activities"

26/ WD letter, AG 200.2 (18 Nov 43) OB-P-PMG-MB-A, 25 Nov 43, subject: "Fingerprinting"

27/ PMG letter, SPMGP 321.19, 2 Jul 43, subject: "Fingerprinting Suspected Subversives"

Evaluation

The importance of the information received by War Department representatives through T-2 reports is difficult to evaluate. In the field of War Department civilian personnel, the civilian personnel officer in the lowest operating echelon, i.e., posts, camps, and stations, evaluated T-2 cards and took appropriate action in accordance with instructions received from the Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War. No statistics are available in The Provost Marshal General's Office concerning separations of War Department civilian personnel due to receipt and evaluation of criminal records.

In the field of industrial employees, a relatively small number (possibly 50 individuals) have been removed or suspended under authority of War Department Circular 339 dated 28 December 1943, subject, Suspension of Subversives from Privately Owned Plants of Importance to War and Navy Procurement because of a criminal record. 28/

The weakness of the program from the War Department's viewpoint was the long delay encountered in receiving T-2 records from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This period varied from six months to six weeks. Trained personnel in the Federal Bureau of Investigation were not available nor could personnel be trained to process the fingerprint cards being received in such tremendous volume during 1942. Eventually, however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was able to eliminate this backlog of fingerprint cards.

At the time of the elimination of the War Department's Fingerprint Program in November 1943, the interval between submission of a fingerprint card and the receipt of the T-2 card had been reduced to eight weeks and further reductions were anticipated.

It may fairly be inferred that the fingerprint program did eliminate from employment individuals who reasoned that their previous criminal record would lead to discharge. The program also served as a warning to all individuals fingerprinted that upon the commission of a crime all fingerprints would be screened for all possible criminal records.

28/ SEE "Suspension of Subversives Program"

VISITOR CONTROL AND IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM

The Visitor Control Program was designed to control the admittance of individuals, other than employees, into plants and facilities important to the war effort. Operation of the program was vested in the service commands, the supply services, and Army Air Forces. Staff supervision was exercised by The Provost Marshal General.

The program had a threefold objective: (1) the safeguarding of classified information; (2) the internal security of facilities and installations important to the war effort; and (3) the continuity of maximum production of such facilities and installations by the reduction of visits to a minimum.

Development of the Visitor Control Program

Visitor control was a responsibility of the chiefs of supply arms and services, under the supervision, first, of the Assistant Secretary of War, and later of the Under Secretary of War, and also under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, so far as the subject matter of classified information was concerned. At that time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was also interested in the matter of visitor control as it was conducting plant protection surveys and recommending standard methods of operation.

On 11 April 1941, staff supervision over the chiefs of supply arms and services to effect the accomplishment of War Department regulations relative to visitors at manufacturing plants was undertaken by the Assistant Secretary of War, who announced plans then being formulated for the institution of plant protection inspections.^{1/}

A directive, issued on 12 May 1941, to the chiefs, supply arms and services, announced the method of plant protection inspection service, which was then to become effective.^{2/} This directive contained the following statement:

"Visitors should be controlled through proper credentials and positive means of identification,

^{1/} Letter from Asst S/W to Ch of Ord, dated 11 April 1941, subject: "Plant Protection Responsibility"

^{2/} Letter from OUSW to technical services, dated 12 May 1941, subject: "Plant Protection Inspection Service"

combined with regulations to prevent their circulation in plants unless escorted by an authorized company representative."

Restriction of visitors to facilities and installations engaged in war production was one of the objectives of the Office of the Under Secretary of War in its efforts to build up and maintain maximum production. In a letter to the president of the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 18 September 1941, the Under Secretary of War pointed out that "the number of visitors must be restricted or a heavy burden will be imposed upon plant management and interference with production will result. In the best interests of the national defense program, I strongly advise that you restrict the visitors to your plant to those persons who are authorized government officials or directly connected with government contracts or with your own industry." This letter was subsequently furnished to the chiefs of the supply arms and services, with the suggestion that it be adopted as a general policy of the War Department. 3/

Operation of the Program by The Provost Marshal General

It was about this time that the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General's Office was first extended to include one phase of visitor control. As a result of the consideration by the Chief of Staff of the operational functions which should be transferred to The Provost Marshal General's Office from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, a directive on 29 October 1941 transferred to The Provost Marshal General the operational function of "issuance of credentials to visitors in plants and arsenals engaged in classified work." 4/ This function had previously been conducted by the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. It should be noted that staff supervision over this function was not included in the transfer. Copies of this directive were not released to the commanding generals of the corps areas and chiefs of the supply arms and services until 17 December 1941. 5/

This operative function was assigned to the Emergency Operations Division and subsequently to the Internal Security Division within The Provost Marshal General's Office. Because

3/ OUSW memorandum, dated 19 September 1941, subject: "Letter signed by Under Secretary of War Restricting Visitors to Defense Plants"

4/ WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (9-10-41)MC-E, dated 29 October 1941, subject: "Decentralization of Operative Functions, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID"

5/ WD letter, file AG 321.19 MID (12-15-41)MSC-B-M, dated 17 December 1941, subject: "Transfer of Certain Operative Functions from the M.I.D. to The Provost Marshal General"

of the fact that the functions of The Provost Marshal General's Office as to plant protection and emergency operations were then in process of discussion and organization, no active steps were taken for the first several months to perform the operative function of visitor control thus transferred.

In the meantime, however, visitor control was being further studied in the Office of the Under Secretary of War in connection with the plant protection inspection service and the drafting of proposed regulations for the guidance of management at war plants and facilities. The manual, "Plant Protection for Manufacturers," published by the Office of the Under Secretary of War in February 1942, provided a set of working rules on the subject.^{6/} The definition of "visitor" as prescribed in AR 380-5 was quoted for the benefit of manufacturers of war materials, i. e., " * * * any person admitted to a government or commercial manufacturing establishment engaged in classified work or project for the War Department except (1) a person employed on the work or project, or (2) a person directly and officially concerned with the work or project." It will be observed that while the definition of "visitor" appears to be limited to matters of a classified nature, the rules were, in fact, not so limited by the instructions contained in the manual.

With the transfer of the plant protection functions of the Office of the Under Secretary of War in March, 1942, The Provost Marshal General acquired the authority to coordinate and supervise plant protection activities generally. Existing instructions on plant protection inspection, including those contained in the manual for manufacturers covering Visitor Control, were adopted as the instructions of The Provost Marshal General.^{7/}

With the creation of the Internal Security Division in The Provost Marshal General's Office, and the acquisition by that division of the operations and functions of visitor control previously referred to, considerable attention was given to the development of a comprehensive directive on visitor control and identification. A proposed directive was prepared and submitted to G-2 and to the Chief of Administrative Services in July 1942 but concurrence was not obtained.

On 22 July 1942, the Services of Supply was reorganized and the continuing protection responsibility of plants and facilities was transferred generally from the supply arms and services to the Commanding General, Services of Supply.^{8/}

^{6/} "Plant Protection for Manufacturers" issued by the Plant Protection Division, Office of the Under Secretary of War, February 1942

^{7/} WD letter, file AG 381 (3-28-42), 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{8/} WD letter, file AG, dated 22 July 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

This transfer of responsibility made it necessary to include information on visitor control and identification concerning visits to plants and facilities vital to the war effort in the comprehensive Internal Security directive of 9 August 1942 issued to the commanding generals of all service commands.^{9/} The visitor program covered a much wider field than the visitor control measures required by AR 380-5, although specific safeguards to classified information required by AR 380-5 were not affected. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, was given authority to prescribe policy and procedures for the clearance of all visitors outside of Washington. The Provost Marshal General, in order to be in a position to discourage and reduce non-essential visitors in the interest of continuity of production, cleared all official visitors from Washington, through the chiefs of supply services having the pre-dominant procurement contract with the facility to be visited.

The instructions issued on 9 August 1942 left many questions relating to visitor control unanswered. After considerable difficulty and delay, a comprehensive directive on visitor control was finally published on 28 November 1942.^{10/} This directive stated that the fundamental objective of the visitor control program was: "To control and reduce the number of visitors to plants, facilities, and installations important to the war effort, in order to safeguard military information * * *, to maintain maximum war production, and to provide for their internal security * * *." The directive also provided that authorization to visit plants, facilities, and installations, and to control visitors during such time, would follow uniform procedure regardless of whether the plant, facility, or installation was engaged on classified work. It was emphasized that the primary responsibility for the control of visitors rested with the commanding officer of the government operated plant, facility, or installation, and with the owner and operator of the privately operated plant, facility, or installation. Thus, all authorizations by the service commands, Army Air Forces, or supply services to visit facilities important to the war effort were made subject to the final approval or disapproval of the person primarily responsible. Special attention was given to the problem of visitors essential to the continuance of production, such as repair men, insurance company inspectors, and technical consultants, as well as persons whose services were required in an emergency. As to identification, a standard was prescribed by the letter whereby each visitor was to be prepared to identify himself and present an identification card issued by his employer, it being made clear, however, that the

9/ SOS letter, file SPMGS 381, dated 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

10/ SOS Circular No. 90, dated 28 November 1942, subject: "Visits to Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort"

identification card was not to be confused with authority to visit, and was for identification purposes only.

The commanding generals of service commands were made responsible for the issuance of all authorizations to visit plants, facilities, and installations under their continuing protection jurisdiction, except foreign visitors, public relations visitors, visitors from Washington, state and local official visitors, visitors essential to continuance of production and visitors to those plants assigned to the commanding generals, supply services, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces for continuing protection.

The chiefs of the supply services and the Commanding General, AAF Materiel Command, were made responsible for the issuance of all authorizations to visit plants, facilities, and installations under their continuing protection jurisdiction except for foreign visitors, public relations visitors, visitors from Washington, D.C., state and local agency visitors and visitors essential to continuance of production.^{11/} The Provost Marshal General was to effect the clearance of all official visits from Washington to important plants, facilities, and installations through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces Materiel Command, the chiefs of supply services or commanding generals of service commands, except for public relations visitors and military and civilian personnel of the supply services located in Washington.

The Visitor Control Program in Washington, D.C., was operated in The Provost Marshal General's Office in the following manner: Upon receipt of a request for issuance of visitor credentials to an official government visitor, a letter was addressed to the requestor stating that subject to the approval of the contractor the individual was authorized to visit the facility for a particular purpose. If the plant or facility was under the continuing protection responsibility of the commanding generals, supply services, or the Army Air Forces the visit was also cleared with those offices.

In the service commands, visitor requests were granted subject to the approval of the contractor and subject to the clearance of the supply services or Army Air Forces if classified material was to be examined. During 1942 and 1943 prospective visitors were required to fill out Personnel Security Questionnaires and

^{11/} SOS Circular No. 90, 28 November 1942, subject: "Visits to Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort". Minor changes in circular No. 90, relating to procedure for clearance of visitors by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations and the clearance of federal and state officials were contained in ASF Circular No. 61, dated 20 July 1943.

in some instances a routine investigation was conducted or records of government agencies were checked. With the publication of Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1 and 2, 5 November 1943, visitor control clearances were required only for those facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List of facilities vital to the war effort. In most cases no investigation except a name check of government agencies was made. The tendency during 1944 and 1945 was to place more and more responsibility for visitor control upon plant management.

In conformity with the provisions of the governing directive, The Provost Marshal General's Office prepared a new series of identification cards for issuance to internal security inspectors and other War Department personnel, and formulated procedures for the issuance and control of identification cards.^{12/} A supply of identification cards and appropriate instructions were distributed to the service commands and supply services.

The next step taken by The Provost Marshal General in the field of general directives, was the revision of the February 1942 manual, "Plant Protection for Manufacturers." This new revision, issued under date of 1 May 1943, by order of the Secretary of War, stated that it was prepared jointly by the Army and Navy, and, therefore, applicable to plants and facilities in which the Navy Department had an interest, as well as plants and facilities of interest only to the War Department. The material in the February 1942 manual, covering visitors, was revised and brought up to date and the matter of special visitors treated in considerable detail. Pertinent provisions of the manual are quoted below:

"a. Responsibility. - The primary responsibility for the control of visits to and visits within any plant, facility, or installation rests with the commanding officer of the Government-operated plant, facility, or installation, and with the owner and operator of the privately operated plant, facility, or installation. Thus, all authorizations to visit are subject to approval or disapproval by the person primarily responsible.

"b. Limitation of visitors. - No visitor will be admitted except for a legitimate and necessary purpose. This restriction applies to all, including Army and Navy representatives, and all other Federal or local government officials.

^{12/} ASF letter, file SPMGS 344.2, dated 10 April 1943, subject: "Identification Cards for Internal Security Inspection Personnel"

"c. Special visitors.

- (1) Reporters, photographers, and other representatives of publicity agencies may not be admitted to a manufacturing establishment engaged on war contracts unless accredited by the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department or the Office of Public Relations of the Navy Department, and unless the purpose has been made known to, and approved by, the plant management beforehand.
- (2) Foreign nationals (except Canadians) and United States or Canadian citizens representing a foreign government or organization will be admitted only on written authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, or the Director of Naval Intelligence.
- (3) State and local officials making inspections required by state laws and local ordinances may be admitted without prior authorization from representatives of the Army or Navy.
- (4) Firemen, policemen, physicians, nurses, and similar authorities may be admitted in an emergency without prior authorization. In an emergency every reasonable precaution will be taken to prevent persons from taking advantage of confusion to make unauthorized entry.
- (5) Casual visitors, such as salesmen or applicants for employment may be admitted by the plant management under established rules and restrictions approved by the plant protection inspector.
- (6) Properly identified agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may be admitted to the plant without prior authorization from representatives of Army and Navy, and should be given all possible assistance in the performance of their duties.

"d. Visitors essential to production. - Persons essential to production such as repairmen, accredited insurance company inspectors, and technical consultants may be admitted by plant management without prior authorization from representatives of the Army or Navy.

"e. Control of Visitors.

- (1) Visitors will be kept constantly under surveillance, or will be accompanied by a plant, Army, or Navy official.
- (2) Each visitor must be prepared to identify himself and, in plants engaged in classified work or projects, to show that he is a citizen of the United States. For these purposes the visitor will carry a card, issued by his employer, which adequately identifies him, and whenever necessary, indicates that his citizenship and loyalty have been verified. Although identification cards are not required to follow any specific form, any visitor to an important plant, facility, or installation who does not possess an identification card containing the following minimum information may be excluded therefrom by such commanding officer or operator:
 - (a) Personal characteristics such as name, height, weight, color of hair and eyes, race, birth date, distinguishing marks.
 - (b) Photograph; print of one or both thumbs or index fingers; signature of holder.
 - (c) A statement substantially as follows, preferably personally signed by an authorized official of the visitor's employer: This is to certify that the information hereon is correct; that the person identified hereby is our representative; and that information, verified to the satisfaction of the undersigned, has been presented; that he is a citizen of _____ and is loyal to the United States.

An identification card is for purposes of identification only. It is not a pass and does not confer authority to visit a plant or facility, no matter by whom issued.

- (3) Minimum requirements of the War and Navy Departments in the matter of records is a visitors' book showing for each visitor his signature, address, and affiliation | purpose of visit, time of entry and departure, name

of plant official granting admission, and whether or not the visitor had access to 'Secret', 'Confidential', or 'Restricted' plans or material."

On 29 May 1943, in cooperation with the Office of Civilian Defense, instructions were issued in which provision was made for the admittance of medical personnel to plants on the Master Inspection Responsibility List in the event of an emergency.^{13/} The Office of Civilian Defense utilized the investigative facilities of the Internal Security Division of the service command to investigate and establish the loyalty of medical personnel. The Office of Civilian Defense then issued Office of Civilian Defense Identification Card Form No. 166, which was countersigned by the Director of Internal Security of the appropriate service command after evaluation of the investigative report. Fortunately, the need for emergency medical services arose in only a few facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List. On 19 July 1945, after a survey of the entire visitor program, and in accordance with the policy of eliminating unnecessary security measures, this directive was rescinded, it having served its purpose.^{14/}

Under the revision of the Internal Security Program issued as War and Navy Departments Joint Circulars Nos. 1 and 2, 3 November 1943, the existing standards previously established covering Visitor Control and Identification were not changed; however, the number of facilities to receive inspection service was greatly reduced and, as a result, the number of facilities over which staff supervision could be effectively exercised was greatly diminished. So long as the plant, facility, or installation was on the old Master Responsibility List, or Installations Inspection List, visitor control and identification activities were examined at regular intervals and a check made upon the effectiveness of control procedures and compliance with existing directives. The calculated risks taken in supervision of internal security matters under the joint Army and Navy circulars was extended to the Visitor Control and Identification Program, inasmuch as no effective procedure was left for inspecting such operations in a plant not on the new Master Inspection Responsibility List or Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List.^{15/} The effect of this extension of the policy of calculated risk and the abandonment of the continuing protection theory was to transfer responsibility for visitor control to the owners and operators of those plants which

^{13/} ASF Memorandum No. 5580-6-43, dated 29 May 1943, subject: "Visitor Clearance of Emergency Medical Service Personnel"

^{14/} ASF Circular No. 276, dated 19 July 1945,

^{15/} Joint War and Navy Departments Circulars Nos. 1 and 2, dated 3 November 1943, subject: "Internal Security"

were not assigned for inspection responsibility to either the service command or technical services. The management of such plants and facilities, however, did not thereby escape responsibility under the provisions of Army Regulations 380-6.

The Army Air Forces' regulation concerning visitors to manufacturing facilities under the supervision of the Materiel Command, Army Air Forces, was issued in December 1943.^{16/} The instructions contained therein were based upon and followed closely the regulations promulgated by The Provost Marshal General covering visitor control. Provision was made for coordination between The Provost Marshal General and the Air Provost Marshal for the clearance of official visitors from Washington to facilities under the supervision of the Army Air Forces.

In order to provide greater security and uniformity in the issuance of identification cards, instructions were issued in February, 1944, providing for the issuance of new identification cards (W.D., A.G.O. For No. 65-6) to key civilian technicians within the continental limits of the United States, when recommended by the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Army Service Forces or chiefs of technical services for visits to war plants, posts, camps and stations in connection with the performance and maintenance of material.^{17/}

These instructions made obsolete the procedure established by The Provost Marshal General on 10 April 1943 for the issuance of identification cards to internal security inspection personnel. However, identification cards, previously issued under the directive, were utilized until it was rescinded in September, 1944, and all outstanding identification cards called in and replaced by the new cards.^{18/}

To prevent unnecessary interference with the production efforts of American industry, the policy was reiterated that visits by War Department military and civilian personnel to government or privately owned industrial facilities engaged in war production must, to the greatest practicable extent, be limited to those visits which were required in connection with war production.^{19/}

Staff supervision over the Visitor Control Program was limited to facilities and installations on the Master Inspection Responsibility List since only those facilities were inspected by security inspectors. With the publication of Joint War and Navy Departments

^{16/} AAF Regulation No. 46-4, dated 13 December 1943.

^{17/} WD Circular No. 82, dated 24 February 1944, subject: "Identification Cards"

^{18/} ASF Circular No. 294, dated 7 September 1944, Part Three, Sec II, "Identification Card - Internal Security Inspection Personnel"

^{19/} ASF Circular No. 307, dated 25 November 1944.

Circulars Nos. 1 and 2, 3 November 1945 and of the consequent decrease in the number of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List the Visitor Control Program was reduced to a minimum consistent with security.

As the war progressed, the Visitor Control Program gradually became less active, and the service commands and technical services finally referred practically all requests to visit facilities to plant management for determination.

Termination of the Army Service Forces Visitor Control Program

After the end of the European war, in accordance with the policy of eliminating all security functions that could not be justified, it was decided to eliminate the Visitor Control Program as administered by The Provost Marshal General. Accordingly, on 30 July 1946, the service commands were informed that:

- a. Army Service Forces Circular No. 90, dated 28 November 1942 and Army Service Forces Circular No. 51, dated 20 July 1943, were rescinded.
- b. Owners and operators of facilities, while primarily responsible for the control of visitors, should permit no interference with production.
- c. Army Service Forces security inspections of facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and installations on the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List would continue to cover visitor control measures.20/

Thereafter, to all intents and purposes, The Provost Marshal General exercised no security functions with regard to visitor control except to report on local facility visitor control systems in plants on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and installations on the Installation Security Inspection Responsibility List. Such security functions as were exercised under Army Regulations 380-5 were assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the technical services.

After the capitulation of Japan, personnel security inspections were discontinued at facilities on the Master Inspection Responsibility List and installations on the Installation Security

20/ ASF Circular No. 289, dated 30 July 1945, subject: "Visit Control at Facilities and Installations Important to the War Effort"

Inspection Responsibility List. Consequently, inspection reports of visitor control systems were no longer possible. A directive was published which eliminated the last vestige of the Army Service Forces visitor control program.21/

21/ ASF Circular No. 329, dated 31 August 1946, "Visit - Sec IV, ASF Circular 289, 1945, rescinded"

MILITARY CLEARANCE PROGRAM

In an opinion upholding the legality of the military clearance program, The Judge Advocate General stated to The Provost Marshal General:^{1/}

"It cannot be denied that there are disloyal citizens of Japanese ancestry. If routine induction procedures were applied to them, they might find their way into our Army and thus have unlimited opportunities to commit sabotage, espionage and other acts of treachery.* * * It is altogether proper that reasonable steps be taken to separate the loyal from the disloyal to the end that the men of our Army may be guarded against a traitor in their midst. The danger is real, the means adopted are appropriate to the end, and although they result in some discrimination against a group of American citizens, such discrimination is justifiable as it arises from a proper exercise of the war power."

In other words, the purpose of the military clearance program was to permit the induction into the Army of persons of Japanese ancestry who were not considered potentially dangerous by reason of any attachments to the Japanese nation or sympathy for the Japanese war aims.

Prior to 7 December 1941, the policy concerning induction into the Army was to treat all nationalities alike. Before Pearl Harbor, the Selective Service System drew into the Army all nationalities regardless of the increasing probability of war with the Axis powers. At the time the Selective Service Act was passed, war with Germany, Italy and Japan was more than a year away and, while it appeared that this country might become involved in war with Germany, war with Japan seemed even more remote and there was little concern over the Japanese segment of our population except in the three west coast states.

The large number of young Japanese-American citizens who had left this country and returned to Japan at a very early age was not realized, nor was the true significance of this Kibei class of American citizens understood until the war with Japan made it necessary to examine the possibilities of sabotage or espionage by this type of citizen.

The problem was peculiar to persons of the Japanese race. The

^{1/} JAGO opinion concerning the legality of pre-induction screening procedures as applied to Japanese-American personnel, file SPJGW 1945/3273, dated 9 April 1945

question of dual citizenship or dual loyalty to two nations at war apparently had not been anticipated at the time of the passage of the Selective Service Law. Children born in the United States of Japanese alien parents, and especially those children born before 1 December 1924, were, under many circumstances, deemed by Japan to be loyal citizens of Japan. Statistics released in 1927 by the Consul General of Japan at San Francisco indicated that over 51,000 of the approximately 63,000 American born persons of Japanese parentage then in the western part of the United States held Japanese citizenship.^{2/}

In addition, many children in this country of Japanese parentage were sent to Japanese language schools outside the regular hours of public schools. Some of these schools were sources of Japanese nationalist propaganda cultivating allegiance to Japan. The Japanese problem in this country was also unique because the relatively recent immigration to this country had resulted in only two generations residing within the continental limits. The older generation (over 45) were, with very few exceptions, Japanese aliens, yet their children, almost all under 35 years of age, were American citizens by virtue of birth in this country. Thus, all Japanese-American citizens of military age had parents who were enemy aliens prohibited by law from ever attaining American citizenship.

The association of influential Japanese residents with Japanese consulates provided a ready means of disseminating propaganda for the maintenance of the influence of the Japanese government with the Japanese population in this country.^{3/} Accordingly, the Japanese-American citizen was viewed with considerable suspicion and doubt as to his loyalty.

Under the provisions of the Selective Service Act, any screening out of Japanese-Americans would have to be performed by the various local selective service boards. To authorize the local boards to act as a screening unit was undesirable because it would require a delegation of authority to the local board to determine which Japanese-American registrants were loyal and which were not. The screening of these people for loyalty required at least a basic knowledge of Japanese ideology, history and government. Obviously the personnel on the average local selective service board were not qualified to make such decisions.

^{2/} Hiramabayashi vs US, 320 U.S. 81 (US Supreme Court)

^{3/} H. R. Rep. No. 1011, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, P. 17

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, informal request was made to the Director of Selective Service who instructed all local boards to take no action on any Japanese-American registrant who might be eligible for induction. Thereafter, on 17 June 1942, the Secretary of War wrote Major General Lewis B. Hershey, the Director of Selective Service, to this effect. 4/

This decision relieved all Japanese-American citizens and aliens of liability to induction under the Selective Service Act. Within the Selective Service System, the local boards were instructed to place arbitrarily all these registrants in class "4-C" or non-acceptable alien category. Citizens and aliens alike were thus reclassified and excused from further call to service. This policy was continued until February 1943, at which time the War Department policy changed to permit the acceptance of volunteers for specifically formed Japanese-American combat organizations.

Recruiting of Volunteers for the All-Japanese Combat Team

One of the first conferences in the War Department, concerning the use of Japanese-American volunteers, was held on 2 January 1943 in the Office of Mr. John J. McCloy, The Assistant Secretary of War. Mr. McCloy opened the meeting by saying there was a paper in the War Department relative to the use of Japanese as combat troops. He pointed out that three main points were considered, namely: (1) their fighting qualifications; (2) their propaganda value; and (3) the impact on Asia. 5/ Captain Zacharias and Commander Goggins of the Navy advocated using Japanese-Americans in the Army. These naval officers offered the assistance of the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in the form of qualified personnel and the use of Office of Naval Intelligence intelligence files. Although these Navy officials advocated that the Army use these troops, they indicated that the Navy did not intend to use them.

The Screening and Recruiting Program in the Military Intelligence Service

The screening in the War Department of all personnel of Japanese ancestry was inaugurated in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in January 1943. The program was the logical result and a part of a major decision by the War Department to accept a token number of volunteers from the Japanese-American section of our population. The War Department was influenced at least partly in this

4/ Ltr from Dir of Sel Ser, File No. 11-5.59-106, dated 1 June 1942, subj: "US Citizens of Jap Descent", and ltr from Sec. of War, dated 17 June 1942, subj: "Eligibility of Persons of Jap Descent for Service in the Army"

5/ HIS memo dated 4 January 1943, subj: "Conference re Use of Japanese in the Army"

decision by the belief that an all Japanese combat unit would assist in allaying the suspicion and hostility that prevailed throughout the United States against all American citizens of Japanese ancestry. The War Department had directed the mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast and the policy up to this time had been to exempt entirely this class of citizen from responsibilities under the National Selective Service Act. The War Department believed that, by giving loyal Japanese-Americans an opportunity to form a unit of considerable importance for service in an active theater, they could prove their loyalty and help remove some of the stigma cast upon them because of their racial origin.^{6/} It then became an intelligence problem to devise the screening procedures through which the Japanese volunteers would be processed. When this decision was made, more than 90% of the Japanese population were living in war relocation centers; therefore, the problem of forming a combat team was interrelated with the project of releasing these same men from the war relocation camps. For this reason the two problems were combined, for men sufficiently loyal to be inducted into the Army were likewise loyal enough to be released from detention in a War Relocation Camp. Pursuant to a directive from General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, a screening plan was devised in the Counter Intelligence Group of Military Intelligence Division.^{7/} It suggested that a questionnaire be drawn up in which the questions and the answers would provide a reasonable index of the loyalty of the individual volunteer. The plan included a team of officers who would visit relocation centers and supervise the execution of these questionnaires by men of military age who desired to volunteer. It was further provided that the completed questionnaires would be returned to the Counter Intelligence Group of Military Intelligence Division for evaluation and further check of other intelligence agencies in an effort to assemble all the available information which might bear on the loyalty of the individual volunteer. The decision as to the acceptability in each case would be forwarded to National Headquarters, Selective Service System. In a memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated 25 January 1945 to the Office of Naval Intelligence, a request was made for the assistance of two naval officers.^{8/}

6/ Ltr from Sec of War, file No. 9-10, dated 12 January 1943, subj: "Reasons for the Formation of a Combat Team Made up Wholly of Japanese-American Citizens"

7/ MIS memorandum, file MID 291.2 Japanese 1-8 43, dated 8 January 1945, subj: "Screening of Japanese-Americans"; and MIS memorandum, same file and date, subj: "Induction of Japanese-Americans"

8/ Memo for Acting Director, ONI, dated 25 January 1943, subj: "Organization of a Japanese-American Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

On 12 January 1943, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, informed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, that the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, had been directed to activate a combat team composed of citizens of Japanese ancestry and that The Adjutant General had been directed to take the necessary action for securing personnel for these units.^{9/} The Deputy Chief of Staff had directed that the Bureau of Public Relations coordinate all publicity with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and submit to the Deputy Chief of Staff any proposed publicity for approval prior to release. On 20 January 1943, a radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directed that a similar combat team composed of citizens of Japanese ancestry be formed in Hawaii.^{10/} This radiogram provided that a similar clearance procedure be set up in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department, in order to assure the loyalty of the volunteers from that area.

On 22 January 1943, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, published a War Department letter, to the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, Third Army, and Seventh and Eighth Service Commands, directing the organization of a combat team of volunteers from the continental United States to be activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, and assigned to the Third Army.^{11/}

Simultaneously with the issuance of directives ordering the formation of these all-Japanese combat teams, plans were being formulated in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and The Provost Marshal General's Office to accomplish the screening of volunteers and to assist the War Relocation Authority in determining the loyalty of all American citizens of Japanese ancestry under its jurisdiction. Two projects were initiated: (1) the establishment of a Japanese-American Joint Board by War Department letter dated 20 January 1943, and (2) the setting up in the Counter Intelligence Group, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of a screening unit to receive questionnaires executed by Japanese-American citizens who desired to enlist.^{12/}

^{9/} Memo from the Organization and Training Division, G-3, file WDGCT 320 (Japanese)(1-10-43), dated 12 January 1943, subj: "Organization of a Japanese-American Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

^{10/} Radio from Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated 20 January 1943, subj: "Formation of Combat Team and Clearance of Japanese-American Volunteers from Hawaii"

^{11/} WD letter, file AG 320.2 (1-20-43)OB-I-GM-M, dated 22 January 1943, subj: "Organization of a Japanese Combat Team"

^{12/} WD letter, file AG 291.2 (1-19-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943, subj: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Authority Centers"

The Japanese-American Joint Board was made up of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Office of Naval Intelligence; the War Relocation Authority; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and The Provost Marshal General. The Board was directed to

(1) "transmit the investigation reports and copies of the questionnaires to the War Relocation Authority, together with its recommendation concerning the release of such individuals from war relocation centers on indefinite leave" and

(2) "state whether the Joint Board has any objection to the employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort of any of those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are released by the War Relocation Authority pursuant to its recommendation."

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War was requested to coordinate the activities of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Provost Marshal General's Office, and the Director, Bureau of Public Relations and was also designated as the point of contact for agencies outside the War Department. ^{13/}

Under the administrative provisions of the directive, ten Army teams, each consisting of one officer, two Caucasian sergeant investigators and one sergeant of Japanese ancestry, reported to Washington, D. C., on 23 January 1943 for an intensive training program conducted by The Provost Marshal General. The program included discussions by the best authorities on the Japanese problem available from War Relocation Authority, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Secretary of War, Bureau of Public Relations, Western Defense Command, Provost Marshal General's Office, the War Department generally, and also included a history of the evacuation, Japanese psychology, the administration of relocation centers, the relocation program, the social and economic factors likely to influence Japanese, the objectives of the mission, and the mechanical administrative details. While the training program was in progress the War Relocation Authority decided to register the aliens at the same time and mechanics of the registration plan were varied to accommodate this additional work. The teams departed from Washington, D. C., to the respective relocation centers on 2 February 1943. Actual registration was commenced in the centers on 7 February 1943 under the direction the War Relocation Authority Project Director and the team captains, assisted by the administrative staffs of the respective centers. Every male citizen over the age of 17 years was required to complete Selective Service Form 304A and, before answering questions relative

13/ WD ltr, File AG 291.2 (1-19-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943,
Subj: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese
Ancestry in War Relocation Authority Centers"

to service in the armed forces and loyalty to the United States, he was given a personal interview by Army team personnel. If the registrant was willing, he was interviewed relative to volunteering for service in the United States armed forces, and, if he desired, necessary selective service forms were accomplished and sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and, if there approved, forwarded to Selective Service for physical examination and induction of the individual. If the individual was disapproved for induction by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, his file was returned to the War Relocation Authority for processing through Provost Marshal General's Office and the Japanese-American Joint Board. The Japanese-American Joint Board processed the cases of all individuals who had not volunteered or who were not eligible to volunteer and, under the authority of the directive, it recommended to War Relocation Authority whether they should be released from the center.

Although the War Department letter was published on 20 January 1943, it was some time before the complete screening unit within Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was agreed upon and set up in the Counter Intelligence Group. On 23 January 1943 a memorandum was dispatched to General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, by Colonel J. T. Bissell, Chief, Counter Intelligence Group. ¹⁴ The proposed questionnaire and the mechanics of processing were described briefly. A complete description of the proposed screening unit was not submitted for approval by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, until 10 February 1943. The memorandum for General Strong of 23 January 1943, contained certain statistics and plans concerning the number of recruits which were anticipated. It was stated that statistics

"indicate that the number of citizens of military age and Japanese ancestry who are eligible to make application for voluntary induction * * * is roughly as follows:

Outside of War Relocation Centers...	4,000
Within War Relocation Centers.....	22,600
Territory of Hawaii.....	30,400."

It was further explained that the directives activating the combat team called for 4,500 fillers. Of these, the quota set by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of fillers from the continental United States was 3,000, and the quota from Hawaii was set at 1,500. In order to secure the appropriate number of fillers, allowing for a certain percentage of deferments for physical and

¹⁴ Memo, Chief, CIG, MIS, dated 23 January 1943, Subj: "Clearance of Filler Personnel for the Combat Team Composed of Men of Japanese Ancestry"

other reasons, it was estimated that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, would mark as acceptable at least 4,286 men from the United States in order to obtain 3,000 acceptable and qualified recruits. The setting of these quotas proved unnecessary because it failed to consider the discontent and actual disaffection among residents of War Relocation Authority camps as a result of the mass evacuation and other matters. Instead of the 4,286 volunteers to be accepted, less than 1,500 were received from all the war relocation camps as well as other Japanese-American citizens throughout the United States.^{15/}

Final plans for the screening unit were submitted on 10 February 1943 to Colonel Bissell, Chief, Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, in a memorandum relating to the Japanese-American combat team.^{16/} This memorandum described briefly the original plan to call 4,500 men from Hawaii and the continental United States. It described the clearance section as a special section in the Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Division, for the processing of the special questionnaire Form DSS 304A.^{17/} The questions to be included in the form had been agreed upon at that time. Actually the form was an elaborate four-page personal history statement to be filled out by every registrant of Japanese ancestry within the jurisdiction of the Selective Service System. While this was published as a Selective Service form, it was composed after conferences by the representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Japanese experts in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Its purpose was to present to the Japanese certain kinds of questions, the answers to which would reveal their connections with the Japanese nation, relatives in Japan, foreign travel (visits to Japan) and a number of other factors peculiar to the racial background and education of the young Japanese-American citizen. A point-scoring system was devised in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as a means of evaluating the favorable or unfavorable answers supplied. Since the idea of the questionnaire originated with certain naval officers familiar with Japanese intelligence, assistance from the Office of Naval Intelligence was secured.^{18/}

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- 15/ Memo dated 23 January 1943, Subj: "Clearance of Filler Personnel for the Combat Team Composed of Men of Japanese Ancestry"
- 16/ Memo dated 10 February 1943, Subj: "Proposed Section for Processing Forms Relating to the Japanese-American Combat Team"
- 17/ Form DSS 304A--Statement of US Citizen of Japanese Ancestry
- 18/ Memo dated 25 January 1943, Subj: "Organization of Japanese-American Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"; Memo dated 10 February 1943, Subj: "Proposed Section for Processing Forms Relating to the Japanese-American Combat Team"

Along with the plans being formulated in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and other divisions of the War Department General Staff, concerning this change of policy toward the acceptance of Japanese-American citizens for army service, conferences were being held with officials of the Selective Service System in order properly to instruct the local selective service boards in the special method of handling all Japanese-American registrants. A new local board release, dated 27 January 1943, became effective 1 February 1943.^{19/} It informed the local boards that certain Japanese-American citizens would be permitted to volunteer and announced the publication of the new Selective Service Form DSS 304A and Form 165 which were to be used by all registrants of Japanese extraction who desired to volunteer.^{20/} The release established a similar procedure through a Board of Transfer in which case the registrant would execute DSS Form 154.^{21/} This additional procedure was necessary as most registrants had originally registered with local boards on the west coast but were not permitted to enter that area due to their evacuation by the Western Defense Command.

Upon receipt of a determination of acceptability from the War Department, the local board was to proceed with the registrant's induction by removing him from the 4-C classification and placing him in 1-A. Thereafter, he would be processed in the same manner as any other individual under the provisions of the draft law. If, on the other hand, the War Department deemed the registrant not acceptable for service in the army, the local board would leave him in class 4-C.

On the effective date of Local Board Release No. 179, the commanding generals of all service commands were informed by ASF letters of the plan to activate an English speaking Japanese-American combat team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.^{22/} The letter disclosed that the unit would be ready to receive fillers not earlier than 1 March 1943, and reflected the optimism of the War Department by stating that 3,000 of these men would be selected in the continental United States by voluntary induction through Selective Service. No action was required of the commanding generals except to report to the War Department the number inducted in each service command.

^{19/} Local Board Release No. 179, Selective Service System, dated 27 January 1943, Subj: "Induction of Volunteers of Japanese Ancestry"

^{20/} Selective Service Form DSS 304A--Statement of American Citizens of Jap Ancestry; Selective Service Form DSS 165--Application for Voluntary Induction

^{21/} Selective Service Form DSS 154--Request for Transfer for Delivery

^{22/} ASF ltr, File SPK 342 (1-28-43)PR-I, dated 1 February 1943, Subj: "Induction of US Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

The launching of this recruiting drive was announced with carefully planned and controlled publicity. The first general publicity concerning this venture was scheduled to be released during a press conference of the Secretary of War on 28 January 1943.^{23/} Subsequent press releases were issued by the War Department and circulated in periodicals published in the camps of the War Relocation Authority. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a letter to the Secretary of War dated 1 February 1943 gave his full approval to the proposal.^{24/} In this letter, the President gave the first hint that Selective Service procedures might later be reinstituted for this class of citizen stating:

"This is a natural and logical step toward the reinstitution of Selective Service procedures which were temporarily disrupted by the evacuation from the west coast."

The main part of the letter, however, was devoted to a statement of policy toward all loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry. The President said:

"No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country wherever his skills will make the greatest contribution--whether it be in the ranks of our armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service, or other work essential to the war effort."

The extensive publicity given this change of War Department policy on induction of Japanese-Americans, although conceived with the best of intentions, resulted indirectly in increasing the criticism of the War Department's treatment of this group of American citizens. The fact that the plan provided only one means by which a person of Japanese ancestry could get into the army, i.e., by volunteering for a specially formed all-Japanese combat unit, added fuel to the argument that the War Department was indulging in segregation by race. Many Japanese-American citizens protested that

^{23/} Memo dated 19 January 1943, Subj: "Release of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers"

^{24/} Ltr from President F. D. Roosevelt, dated 1 February 1943, Subj: "Approving the Organization of All-Japanese Combat Team"

the use of a "segregated unit" would only discourage otherwise loyal Japanese-American citizens who desired to be treated the same as persons of any other racial extraction. Mr. James M. Omura, Executive Director, Pacific Coast Evacuee Placement Bureau, Denver, Colorado, contributed an article to a Japanese language newspaper "The Rocky Nippon" in which he criticized the formation of this all-Japanese combat unit and argued that volunteer American citizens of Japanese ancestry should be accepted and assigned throughout the Army. Because there was some basis for his contention and because of the fear that the article would have an unfavorable effect on the volunteer program, the Secretary of War in a letter to Mr. Omura dated 9 February 1943 presented the official War Department reason for the formation of this combat team.^{25/} Among other things, the Secretary stated that he did not have to remind Mr. Omura of the wave of hatred and distrust of all things Japanese which swept this country after Pearl Harbor. Mr. Stimson stated that the War Department believed that, by giving loyal Japanese-Americans an opportunity to form an important unit of their own for service in an active theater, these young men would, by their own loyalty and behavior, set at rest the suspicions harbored by the uninformed elements of our population. Part of Mr. Stimson's letter is quoted here:

"By the same token the unit would constitute a symbol to which every loyal American of Japanese ancestry could point with pride. It is easy to see that if loyal Japanese-Americans were scattered throughout the ranks, their individual contributions would pass relatively unnoticed, whereas by the formation of a separate unit their collective strength will be evidenced to the world."

Mr. Stimson stated categorically that the War Department was not committed to a policy of segregation for Japanese-Americans. In addition, he outlined other purely military reasons which favored the establishment of a separate unit such as was proposed. In conclusion, Mr. Stimson stated:

"It was not a question of segregation but of what in the long run would work out best, not alone for the army, but for our Japanese-American population as a whole."

In screening out disloyal individuals under then existing conditions the major problem was the difficulty in determining whether certain alleged un-American or disloyal actions of Japanese-American

^{25/} Ltr dated 9 February 1943, Subj: "Explanation of Reasons for the Formation of a Combat Team Made up Wholly of Japanese-American Citizens"

citizens were the result of a sincere loyalty to Japan or were merely an attitude of disaffection caused by resentment due to the mass evacuation of most of them from their homes on the west coast.

This reaction was not anticipated in the plans drawn up by the War Department for the recruiting drive. The number of volunteers fell far short of the quota set for the United States. Instead of receiving the anticipated 4,286 volunteers from the United States and 1,500 volunteers from Hawaii, less than 1,500 volunteered in the continental United States and almost 10,000 volunteered in Hawaii. In a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (General White), dated 6 March 1943, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (General Strong) stated that, although there were 19,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry of military age within War Relocation Authority centers and approximately 4,000 outside, only 315 had volunteered by 23 February 1943.^{26/} On the other hand, General Strong stated that there were 25,000 Japanese-Americans of military age in Hawaii and, while plans had anticipated accepting only 1,500 of these men, there were 7,425 applications for voluntary induction on the Island. General Strong recommended that the quotas previously agreed upon be revised in order that the deficit of volunteers from the United States who were to be assigned to the 442nd Infantry Regiment be supplemented by the transfer of surplus volunteers from Hawaii. In a later memorandum, dated 8 March 1943, to General Strong from Colonel David G. Erskine, Chief, Counter Subversive Unit, Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Division, the figures were revised upward slightly as General Emmons, Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, had radioed that he had received 9,508 applications for voluntary induction.^{27/} Colonel Erskine also stated that, by March, 1943, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, had received only 825 applications for voluntary induction from persons within War Relocation Authority centers and 71 from persons outside the centers and that 100 more applications for voluntary induction were expected. The memorandum also gave some information concerning the failure of the recruiting drive. In one of the war relocation camps (Manzanar) the answer to the loyalty question (Question No. 28, DSS 304A) was negative or qualified in 40% of the questionnaires. The qualification often appeared in the form "Yes, if my constitutional rights are guaranteed in writing." These answers clearly demonstrated the resentment felt by individuals who ordinarily might have been expected to volunteer.

By 29 March 1943 the total number of volunteers from all of the war relocation camps as well as throughout the United States had risen

26/ Memo for AC of S, G-1, dated 6 March 1943, Subj: "Organization of a Combat Team Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

27/ MIS memo, dated 8 March 1943, Subj: "Organization of Combat Teams Composed of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

to only 1,253. A table, showing the number of eligible male citizens in all the camps and elsewhere and the corresponding number of volunteers, was incorporated in a memorandum prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. ^{28/}
The table is as follows:

	<u>Citizen Males</u> <u>18 - 37 incl.</u>	<u>Volunteers</u>
Central Utah	1,475	111
Colorado River	3,405	228
Gila River	2,210	114
Granada	1,580	121
Heart Mountain	1,970	45
Jerome	1,578	33
Manzanar	1,809	97
Minidoka	1,601	298
Rohwer	1,608	34
Tule Lake	2,270	57
Outside camps	4,000	119
	<u>23,606</u>	<u>1,253</u>

It became clear by the end of March that the recruiting drive had failed because the evacuees resented what they considered to be unjust treatment at the hands of the War Department and other government agencies. From a screening standpoint, it became extremely difficult to separate those individuals who were inherently loyal to the United States, but just "mad" because of the treatment received, from the other more dangerous elements who were really loyal to Japan. Contrary to the earlier opinion as to the Japanese-American resident of Hawaii, it became apparent, from the success of the recruiting drive in that territory, that either the Hawaiian Japanese-American was more loyal than the continental Japanese-American or he had been subjected to less discriminatory action. In Hawaii, the Japanese population was not a racial minority. On the contrary it was the majority racial group. There was no mass evacuation in Hawaii nor were these people the victims of other forms of discrimination comparable to that practiced in the United States.

Organization of the Japanese Section in Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service

Originally the screening or clearance unit of the Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Division, was a loosely organized group of War Department personnel supplemented by two naval officers

28/ Memo from AC of S, G-2, dated 29 March 1943, Subj: "Potential Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry Available for Military Service"

from the Office of Naval Intelligence. Its personnel was assigned to other intelligence duties concerning other racial groups and nationalities. A reorganization within the Counter Intelligence Group on 1 June 1943 resulted in the formation of sections based on ideological grounds. A Japanese section was created and was devoted to the solution of all intelligence problems concerning military personnel of Japanese ancestry within the army.

The WAAC Volunteer Program

On 2 April 1943, Mr. John J. McGloy, Assistant Secretary of War, suggested to Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, Director of Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, that Japanese-American women be permitted to enlist in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. By memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War dated 7 April 1943, Mrs. Hobby replied as follows:

"I am informed that a recent inquiry has developed that these women of Japanese descent object to being segregated into special units or organizations, but strongly desire to be enrolled and assigned just as all the other women are.

"This fits into our present system of operating and no special plan is necessary. All that this Headquarters needs is instructions and policy under which to proceed."^{29/}

Upon receipt of that memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of War informed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, by memorandum, dated 10 April 1943, that Mrs. Hobby desired instructions.^{30/} In addition, his memorandum stated:

"There does not appear to be any need for segregation. Segregation would increase racial friction and complicate administration. The percentage of Nisei females disloyal to the United States is estimated at 1-2%, certainly not over 5%. Screening for loyalty on an individual basis would perhaps be impracticable were it not for the fact that all these females completed loyalty questionnaires in February and March, 1943. G-2 could check the questionnaires of all applicants for the WAAC in the same manner they handled the male volunteers."

This memorandum was forwarded by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for remark and recommendation and, on 14 April 1943, Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, Chief, Military Intelligence Service, answered it by disposition form as

^{29/} Memo from WAAC Director, File SPNA 291.2 (4-2-43)E, dated 7 April 1943

^{30/} ASW memo, dated 10 April 1943, subject: "Admission of Female Citizens of Japanese Ancestry into the WAAC"

follows:^{31/}

"In view of the announced policy of the President with respect to accepting American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Army of the United States, the Military Intelligence Division approves the acceptance of American citizens of Japanese Ancestry in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, provided such applicants have been approved by the Military Intelligence Division prior to their acceptance."

Thereafter, on 15 June 1943, Brigadier General M. G. White, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War, stated that the Personnel Division (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1) had approved the acceptance of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps provided such applicants were approved by Military Intelligence Division prior to their acceptance and subject to a restriction of 500 women on the initial enrollment.^{32/} He further stated that there would be no segregation policy in the handling of these volunteers.

At about the same time, a conference was held by the representatives of The Provost Marshal General's Office and Military Intelligence Division in which it was decided that, instead of processing applicants for enlistment into the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for clearance, these persons could more properly be handled in The Provost Marshal General's Office because of the existence of files, prepared for the Japanese-American Joint Board, on all of the individuals residing in War Relocation Authority camps.^{33/} Another factor in this decision was that The Provost Marshal General was conducting investigations of civilians, both those of Japanese ancestry and other races. Up to this time, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was not a part of the United States Army.

On 17 July 1943, by memorandum to the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps from The Provost Marshal General, it was suggested that the usual Women's Army Auxiliary Corps application Form Number 761 be used in conjunction with War Department Personnel Security Questionnaire, Form 58, together with an auxiliary sheet, requesting certain additional information concerning evacuation and residence in the relocation centers.^{34/}

31/ Disposition form dated 14 April 1943, Subj: "Admission of Female Citizens of Japanese Ancestry into the WAC"

32/ AC of S, G-1 memo, File No. WDGP 291.2 WAC (4-10-43), dated 16 June 43, subj: "Admission of Female Citizens of Jap. Ancestry into the WAAC"

33/ ASW memo, dated 18 June 1943, Subj: "Admission of Female Citizens of Jap Ancestry into the WAC"; copy of disposition form, File No. MID 909, dated 22 June 1943

34/ PMCO ltr, dated 17 July 1943, to WAAC Recruiting Section, subj: "Auxiliary Form"

On 28 July 1943, War Department letter AG 291.1 (23 July 1943) PR-I, subject, "Enlistment in the WAC of Women Citizens of the United States of Japanese Ancestry," addressed to all service commanders, authorized the acceptance of women citizens of Japanese ancestry for enlistment into the Women's Army Corps.^{35/} This letter stated that enlistment of Japanese-American women would be governed by the same rules and regulations controlling enlistment of all other women, except that:

"Applicant will execute the 'Application for Enlistment, WAC' in duplicate. The original will be retained by the recruiting officer for use in further processing of the applicant. The duplicate will be forwarded to the commanding general of the service command for reference in connection with approval of application after receipt of The Provost Marshal General's report and recommendation.

"The Provost Marshal General, after investigation, will indicate approval or disapproval of the applicant to the commanding general of the service command.

"No enlistment of a woman citizen of Japanese ancestry will be completed until after her application has been approved, with or without qualifications as to duty assignment, by The Provost Marshal General, and subsequently by the commanding general of the service command. The usual enlistment procedures will be followed in order to complete the determination of the applicant's eligibility."

The letter limited the number of volunteers to 500 and established the quotas to be accepted in the various service commands.

The authorization of the acceptance of Japanese-American women in the Women's Army Corps and the placing of this function in The Provost Marshal General's Office, made this function the proper responsibility of the Japanese-American Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, because of the Branch's voluminous files on all persons of Japanese ancestry. The primary function of the Japanese-American Branch was the screening of civilians of Japanese ancestry for employment in vital plants and employment at army posts, camps and stations. When the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was absorbed into the Army of the United States, its name was changed to Women's Army Corps, but no action was taken to transfer the clearance function of these women from the Japanese-American Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, where all

^{35/} WD Ltr, File AG 291.1 (23 July 43)PR-I, dated 28 July 1943, Subj: "Enlistment in the WAC of Women Citizens of the US of Japanese Ancestry"

males of Japanese ancestry were cleared for military service. Subsequently on 25 July 1944, the function, including the existing personnel, equipment and files, of military clearance of Japanese-American males was transferred from the Counter Intelligence Group of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to The Provost Marshal General's Office.^{36/} A Military Clearance Section of the Japanese-American Branch was organized but the clearance of Japanese-American women for service in the Army was not made a function of the Military Clearance Section at that time but was performed in another section of the Japanese-American Branch until 1 April 1945. At that time the clearance of Japanese-American volunteers for the Women's Army Corps was transferred to the Military Clearance Branch, which had been made a Branch and had remained in the Personnel Security Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office, Washington, D. C., following the removal of the Japanese-American Branch to the Presidio of San Francisco, California, in December 1944.

It was originally believed that the Women's Army Corps recruiting program in the war relocation centers would result in a large number of recruits and a limit of 500 volunteers was set in advance of the recruiting drive. The announcement of the program came at an unfortunate time. The recruiting was started in certain of the war relocation centers during a period when resentment due to evacuation was at its highest point. The segregation of the disloyal from the loyal in the camps had not been completed by War Relocation Authority, and many other factors presented unfavorable conditions as far as the success of this recruiting drive was concerned. The drive was a complete failure with less than 50 volunteers from all of the ten relocation centers. By the end of October 1945, only 142 volunteered and, of this number, only 120 were approved for induction into the Women's Army Corps.

Reinstitution of Selective Service for All American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry

As early as 1 February 1943, when the War Department announced the acceptance of volunteers for the Japanese-American combat teams, there appeared the first indication that selective service, as applied to American citizens of Japanese ancestry, might be reinstituted. This indication came in the second paragraph of President Roosevelt's letter to Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War, on 1 February 1943, in which the President stated, in describing the proposal to accept volunteers:

36/ AG ltr, File No. AG 620 (24 July 44)OB-S-B, dated 25 July 1944,
Subj: "Transfer of Clearance of American Citizens of Japanese
Ancestry"

"This is a natural and logical step toward the reinstitution of the Selective Service procedures which were temporarily disrupted by the evacuation from the West Coast."

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at that time was reluctant to consent to the compulsory induction of Japanese-Americans.^{37/} He believed that it would draw into the Army many disloyal individuals. The problem of screening vast numbers of individuals who would be subject to the draft presented a different problem from that of the screening of a few hundred volunteers who were more likely to be loyal since the act of volunteering was itself some evidence of loyalty to the United States. Regardless of the attitude of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Secretary of War continued to advocate use of Japanese-Americans and, in spite of the failure of the recruiting program, the subject was still being discussed in War Department circles in April 1943. On 26 April 1943, Brigadier General White, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War stated that he saw no valid objection to the utilization of Selective Service procedures for American citizens of Japanese ancestry, provided arrangements could be made for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to screen them and provided also that the number to be inducted could be controlled and assignments limited to the existing combat units.^{38/} In the memorandum, General White stated:

"Controlled induction of the personnel in question is necessary particularly since assignment is to be limited to combat units which are to be made up of personnel of Japanese ancestry. Once such units are filled, no more inductees of this racial origin should be accepted. We have not yet had opportunity to determine the value of the combat team composed of citizens of Japanese ancestry or to decide whether or not we are justified in organizing similar units. Until this study is complete and the value clearly indicated, it would be difficult to attempt to develop satisfactory procedure in detail for the induction of the personnel in question."

General White closed his memorandum with the statement that the Personnel Division of his office was studying the problem to see if a satisfactory detailed procedure could be evolved. Of the two teams activated, the one made up of the Hawaiian volunteers was composed primarily of former members of the National Guard and had already received some military training and experience and shortly after activation

^{37/} G-2 memo, dated 4 January 1943, Subj: "Induction of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

^{38/} G-1 memo, dated 26 April 1943, Subj: "Induction of Citizens of Japanese Ancestry"

was brought to the continental United States for training first at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and later at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. This unit went overseas as the 100th Infantry Battalion and, by the fall of 1943, it was in combat in the North African Theater of Operations. The casualty rate rose quickly to more than forty-five per cent. It was the desire of the War Department to keep the all Japanese character of the organization. In view of the failure of the volunteer drive to provide adequate replacements, the need for additional filler personnel became acute and provided further argument for reinstitution of selective service. On 9 November 1943, the Executive to the Assistant Secretary of War, requested the opinion of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 concerning whether the necessary replacements could be provided for the 100th Battalion and the 442nd Infantry Regiment at the time they were needed and in the proper numbers, keeping in mind the time consumed in the screening process by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and other delays which had occurred during the drive for volunteers in the early part of 1943.^{39/} Upon receipt of the inquiry, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, requested that a conference be held between representatives of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 20 November 1943 so that representatives of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, could furnish recommendations concerning the screening procedures and the time necessary to screen an adequate supply of replacements through Selective Service. Prior to this conference, the Japanese Section of Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Division had formulated screening procedures under which pre-clearance of all persons of Japanese ancestry in War Relocation Authority centers might be accomplished prior to the actual reinstitution of selective service. The old screening procedure, which depended entirely upon the cooperation of local boards and the Selective Service System, had proven cumbersome and slow. Therefore, a new plan for speedier clearance was prepared.

By October 1943 the need for replacements for the 100th Infantry Battalion was urgent. It was necessary to reduce to a minimum all sources of delay. Therefore, in order to maintain the screening of all the individuals inducted under selective service, and yet avoid delaying the program, a plan was devised whereby individuals likely to be inducted would be pre-cleared in advance of the public announcement of the reinstitution of selective service.^{40/} The plan involved the utilization of existing files of the Japanese-American Branch of The Provost Marshal General's Office and the records of the Japanese-American Joint Board described above. Work on this plan was started

^{39/} Disposition Form from AG of S, G-1, 13 November 1943, inclosing memo from the Assistant Secretary of War, dated 9 November 1943, subject: "Induction of Japanese American Soldiers"

^{40/} WD letter, file AG 291.2 (1-19-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers"

in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 in October 1943. During October and November 1943, some thirty to forty civilians were employed on volunteer overtime work Sundays and two nights a week, in the preparation of pre-clearance classification of Japanese-Americans likely to be inducted.^{41/} The plan called for the preparation of an individual letter to the Director of Selective Service from the Military Intelligence Service in which it was stated that a named Japanese-American of military age was or was not acceptable for service in the army. This form letter contained four identifying factors, (1) the name of the individual; (2) date of birth; (3) war relocation center address, and (4) the number and address of the individual's local board. The letters, although prepared in October and November 1943, were all post-dated to 1 January 1944 and 15 January 1944. Information concerning the individual's name, birth and relocation center was typed in these letters in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; but the fourth item, the individual's local board had to be secured from the files of the Japanese-American Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office.

In order to secure the names of the individuals in relocation centers who were of military age, the files of the Japanese-American Joint Board were reviewed and a list of eligible men together with the information as to the board's action in each case was copied for use in the preparation of these letters. By utilizing the information available in the files of the Japanese-American Joint Board and the Japanese-American Branch of The Provost Marshal General's Office, considerable work had already been accomplished toward completing pre-clearance of most of the men who were eligible for service if selective Service were reinstituted.

Therefore, in the conference requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, for the purpose of securing the information desired in the Assistant Secretary of War's memorandum dated 9 November 1943, the representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, were able to assure the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, that the pre-clearance of all these individuals was already well under way and that no delay would be caused by the screening processes. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, was assured that, by the time selective service was publicly announced, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, would have already delivered a sufficient number of cases of pre-cleared individuals to the Selective Service System to permit the local boards to start immediately processing those pre-cleared upon the receipt of the order from National Headquarters, Selective Service System. This assurance of prompt action by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, satisfied Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and the plans for inducting these people proceeded with the understanding that all of them would be screened without any delay.

^{41/} Form ltr to Sel Ser from MID, 24-66395 ABCD-1000; Form ltr to Sel Ser from PMGC, 25-27962-1500

A memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, from Military Intelligence Service, subject, "Potential Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry Available for Military Service," revealed that only 1,253 volunteers had been received.^{42/} The memorandum stated that any estimate based on available statistics would have to be accepted with caution due to the many imponderables which were difficult to determine statistically. However, the memorandum attempted to set forth the estimated number of men available within the War Relocation Authority centers, and indicated that the maximum number to be derived through the proposed draft would be 8,348. The Hawaiian Department was not considered as a source of men under the Selective Service Act because General Emmons had estimated that the 2,500 volunteers, which were furnished by that territory for fillers in the two combat teams, was the maximum number of persons that should be taken from the Islands in view of the existing manpower shortage. This eliminated Hawaii from consideration in the discussion leading up to the reinstitution of selective service and, when final decision was made, the draft was applied to the continental United States but Hawaii was exempted.

Later, on 2 October 1943, the Assistant Secretary of War requested General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, to take up with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, the problem of reinstitution of selective service and stated that he understood that the number of Japanese-American volunteers had slowed to only a trickle and that probably only a few would continue to come in as they reached the age of eighteen.^{43/} Mr. McCloy added that there continued to be a strong feeling among people familiar with the Japanese situation that selective service should be reinstituted for all persons of Japanese ancestry. He informed General McNarney that he realized there were serious administrative difficulties inherent in applying selective service to these people, but he added:

"I do not think it is necessary to create another separate unit for these additional volunteers. In fact I think it would be undesirable. As soon as we start treating these people like everyone else, three quarters of our difficulties disappear. A few may have to be yanked from basic units but that is a small matter. And there is no real reason why we should not take loyal alien volunteers along with citizens. The studies which have been made thus far show that birthplace alone has little significance with respect to loyalty. Would you take this up with G-1."

On 12 October 1943 the Assistant Secretary of War in a memorandum for General White stated:

42/ G-2 memo, dated 29 March 1943, Subj: "Potential Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry Available for Military Service"

43/ ASW memo for General McNarney, dated 2 October 1943

"I think that the experience of the 100th Battalion in Italy should prove that Americans of Japanese descent, properly screened, are no menace to our security, and that our army can function perfectly well with them fighting side by side with us, at least in theatres where we are not opposing Japanese.

"The volunteering has now been stopped, I am told, because the combat team is full up. The combat team is only full up because they have transferred out of the rest of the Army Americans of Japanese descent to it. They have picked up specialists who were getting along perfectly well in the Army and sent them down to Shelby, to the detriment of the organization they have left as well as to the detriment of the organization they have joined. For example, I heard of a case of an Air Force technical sergeant who was getting along well in an air unit and now has been transferred to a ground organization in which he has no connections and for which he has no particular bent.

"I believe we should immediately consider whether we ought not reinstitute selective service for all Americans of Japanese descent, adopting the procedures which are necessary to safeguard our security. I am convinced that these men will make good units, and the propaganda value is tremendous."

The Personnel Division (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1) forwarded copies of these memoranda to (1) Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces (2) Provost Marshal General, Army Service Forces (3) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and (4) Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, requesting recommendations on the following points: (a) the selection of additional combat or service units to which Japanese-Americans in excess of replacement requirements might be assigned, (b) the feasibility of reinstituting selective service for Americans of Japanese descent and the necessary procedures incident thereto including a loyalty check.

To this staff study the Military Personnel Division of Army Service Forces attached a first indorsement dated 27 October 1943 in which it was recommended that the induction of American citizens of Japanese descent within the continental United States be reinstituted through Selective Service after clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as was accomplished in the case of volunteers for the 442nd combat team. General assignment within the Army was not recommended in view of the administrative effort required to insure assignment to other than the Southwest Pacific Theater and the further possibility of unfavorable reaction of units to such personnel. From Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, the staff study was transmitted to The Provost Marshal General's Office where a second indorsement was attached under date of 2 November 1943.

In this second indorsement The Provost Marshal General recommended the reinstitution of selective service including the screening of all men by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. He stated that the screening of all these men should not be too difficult in view of the vast amount of information available concerning them in the files of his office and in the records of the Japanese-American Joint Board which had already passed upon the loyalty of most of them. It was suggested that recommendations of the Joint Board be adopted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 concerning the loyalty of all those individuals who had been recommended for release from War Relocation Authority camps. In support of his recommendation that selective service be applied to these individuals, The Provost Marshal General stated:

"Thousands of Japanese-Americans of draft age answered Question 27 (Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?) 'Yes, if drafted'. In many cases that was probably a sincere answer on the part of the registrant who was torn between strong family opposition on the one hand and a desire to serve his country on the other. The Army teams conducting the registration within the war relocation centers were told many times by the Japanese-American youths that they would enter the armed forces willingly if they could be drafted so that their action would not be construed as a voluntary act by the Japanese government with possible retaliation against the parents, who were in practically all cases Japanese nationals. It must be borne in mind that Japanese aliens are prohibited by law from becoming American citizens, and many of the parents of the young Japanese-Americans still firmly believe that they will be deported after the war is over."

It is significant that The Provost Marshal General also stated that Japanese aliens, particularly the Hansai class, should be permitted to volunteer. A Hansai is a Japanese alien who came to this country when quite young, usually before school age. The Provost Marshal General recommended that all Japanese aliens who volunteered be approved for induction, provided they passed the same type of loyalty screening as Japanese-American citizens.

The Provost Marshal General also recommended against general assignment adopting the same reasoning set forth in the first indorsement concerning the difficulties which would arise in the Southwest Pacific Theater.

After the staff study was approved, formal notification of this decision by the War Department was transmitted to each service command, by War Department letter, dated 13 December 1943, subject, "Induction of Japanese-Americans."^{44/} The letter stated that, effective

^{44/} WD Ltr. dated 13 December 1943, Subj: "Induction of Japanese-Americans"

1 January 1944, the induction of United States citizens of Japanese extraction would be reinstituted under the following procedure:

"For such individuals who were not in war relocation centers on 1 February 1943, completed DSS Forms 304A with the necessary approval of War Department Military Intelligence Service will be included with the registrant's induction records when reporting to the armed forces induction stations.

"For such individuals who were in War Relocation centers on 1 February 1943 and who are subsequently ordered to report for induction, there will be included with their induction records a form letter properly authenticated by War Department Military Intelligence Service, showing that the individual named and described therein is, if otherwise qualified, acceptable for training and service in the Army of the United States.

"The primary reason for reinstituting Selective Service for Japanese-Americans is to provide replacements for certain Japanese-American combat units. Upon induction into the army, these individuals will be transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps for an indefinite period. They will be called to active service in groups and in the same routine order as inducted.

"In order to facilitate procedure and to assure paragraph 2 above being complied with, a complete and separate file of Japanese-American inductees will be maintained at each service command headquarters."

Following the earlier plan of controlled publicity concerning this subject, the Assistant Secretary of War forwarded a memorandum to the Director, Bureau of Public Relations, on 22 December 1943.^{45/} This memorandum stated:

"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel has decided to reinstitute the non-voluntary induction of loyal Japanese-Americans on or about January 1, 1944. It is believed that the success of this program of induction will depend largely upon the type of publicity which is given it and the method in which this publicity is handled. There is a probability that the reinstitution of the induction of loyal Japanese-Americans, coincident with the recent lengthy casualty lists of the 100th Battalion and the current feeling over incidents at the segregation center at Tule Lake, might lead to the interpretation that the reinstitution of selective service was designed as an 'exterminating measure' for Japanese-Americans. It is understood also

^{45/} Memo, dated 22 December 1943, Subj: "Publicity Releases on Re-institution of Non-Voluntary Induction of Loyal Japanese-Americans"

that G-1 has notified the Selective Service System of our intention to reinstitute induction.

"It is, therefore, recommended as a matter of urgency that a conference be held at which will be represented the Bureau of Public Relations, G-1, G-2, the War Relocation Authority, the Selective Service System, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, to discuss this matter."

The conference requested in the memorandum resulted in a publicity release which carried the approval of Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-2 and G-3.^{46/}

In order to insure proper administration within the Selective Service System of the procedures devised by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, concerning the handling of the pre-clearance letters described above, informal conferences were held at frequent intervals between representatives of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Selective Service System. Following the conferences a new local board memorandum was published by Selective Service for the guidance of all local boards in the handling and processing of Japanese-American registrants. The problem was not difficult since the administrative framework and the forms used for processing the volunteers were adequate and needed only slight modification in order to handle inductees under the proposed draft. An examination of the problem revealed that the same Selective Service forms could be used and the same channels within Selective Service could be followed.^{47/} Since the function of Selective Service was only that of forwarding these personal history statements, the only change concerning Selective Service was an increase in the number of cases processed and much of this increased workload was eliminated by the advance preparation of the pre-clearance letters described above. The preparation of the local board memorandum covering this new subject, resolved itself into a simple operation of amending the existing local board Memorandum 179 and the new memorandum was published carrying the same number but designated as Local Board Memorandum No. 179, as amended 14 January 1944.

Problems Arising in the Screening of Draftees

The original point scoring system which had been adopted by the Japanese Section of Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service, and which was the result of the combined opinions of the War Department and Navy Department was based on a mathematical arrangement

^{46/} ASW memo, dated 18 January 1944, Subj: "Approved Press Release Re Reinstitution of Selective Service for Japanese-Americans"

^{47/} Selective Service Form DSS 304A

in which every question in the DSS 304A Form had a definite point value. This plan contemplated an easy system of "grading the papers" by merely giving so many plus points for a favorable answer to a question or so many negative points for an unfavorable answer. While this system had its advantages from an administrative standpoint, it proved to be unsatisfactory because it attempted to apply fixed limitations or yard sticks to cover every type of case.

The drafting of all individuals not only increased the workload but likewise increased the problems involved from a counterintelligence standpoint. With the volunteers, the act of volunteering was some evidence of loyalty, considering the break a volunteer must make with his family background and training. During the registration by the army teams in the centers, many of these Japanese-Americans, when approached, explained the difficulty under which they were laboring by stating that offering to volunteer was difficult in view of their parents' alien status whereas, if a registrant was required by law to enter the service, he could explain that this citizenship required that he register. As The Provost Marshal General pointed out, the draft enabled these men to "save face" in this matter.

However, there were other problems inherent in the draft. The suspension of selective service and the subsequent evacuation of these people to the centers served to create an idea among many that they would be relieved of their responsibilities as American citizens as a sort of compensation for the hardship experienced. Many of them took the attitude that the evacuation constituted a loss of certain civil rights and prerogatives of citizenship. The theory adopted was that, since they were all being treated as aliens, none of them should be expected to perform the duties required of American citizens. The announcement in January 1944 of reinstitution of selective service came without advance notice and apparently as a complete surprise to the residents of War Relocation Authority centers. Almost immediately thereafter there was an increase in the number of requests for repatriation or expatriation to Japan mainly by men of military age who claimed dual citizenship as a convenient method of evading compulsory military service. Many thousands of these young men possessed legal citizenship in both the United States and Japan and it appeared that this dual status could not be affected or changed in any way by the United States government. Many of these young men apparently had used the system of dual citizenship to evade military service in both countries. Many of the Kibei class left Japan upon reaching the age at which they would be required to enter compulsory military service in the Japanese army only to return to this country to be faced with the Selective Service Draft Act. To avoid military service in the United States, they would claim exemption on the ground that they were citizens of Japan.^{48/} Not only were these young men

^{48/} State Department memo to Spanish Embassy, File No. SWP 611.2222
(1940)/10-2344, dated 28 December 1944

attempting to use their dual citizenship to evade service in the United States army, but they were actually informed by the Spanish Consulate in San Francisco that they could resort to this technique.^{49/} In addition, the alien parents who desired to save their young sons from service in the army submitted the names of their sons to the State Department as applicants for expatriation to Japan. These alien parents took the position that all of their children under the age of 21, being minors, were under their control and therefore under the protecting power of the Spanish government during the war with Japan. This device was used not only by those who were outright disloyal but also by others who were simply draft dodgers and who had no real loyalty to Japan. For example, in Minidoka Relocation Center, where 62 American citizens of military age requested repatriation, 53 of the requests were made within a few days after the announcement of the reinstitution of selective service. All 53 of the individuals had been residing inside the relocation center since evacuation, with more than a year within which to file requests for repatriation. In order to put an end to this fiction, a new policy rule was promulgated in Counter Intelligence Group, Military Intelligence Service. The rule was stated in a memorandum, dated 30 March 1944, and stated that a request for repatriation or expatriation to Japan by a Japanese-American citizen of military age made subsequent to 21 January 1944, and when his induction was imminent, would be considered an effort to evade military service if there appeared to be no other reason to consider him disloyal, and that such a request would not in itself affect his pre-clearance status of acceptability for service in the army.^{50/}

At the time of the preparation of this policy rule it was anticipated that there might be some repercussion through diplomatic channels in view of the implications involved in the contention that these men were under the protecting power of the Spanish government. It was therefore deemed appropriate that the State Department be informed of this War Department policy. A letter was signed by Mr. McCloy on 11 May 1944 and dispatched to the Secretary of State.^{51/} The letter stated the problem as follows:

"It has been the policy of the War Department to classify as not acceptable for military service Japanese-American citizens who have requested expatriation to Japan. Prior to January 21, 1944 this rule was followed without exception and it is still followed as to all such persons who requested expatriation prior to the re-institution of selective service on that date. Since January 21, 1944, there has been a marked increase in requests for expatriation,

^{49/} Summary of Information Concerning Activities of Spanish Consulate at San Francisco, dated 17 March 1944

^{50/} Memo, dated 30 March 1944, Subj: "Japanese-American Citizens Requesting Expatriation When Induction Appears Imminent"

^{51/} WD ltr, dated 11 May 1944

many of them made under circumstances which do not indicate any real desire to return to Japan but which, rather, indicate a desire to obtain a disloyal classification for the purpose of evading the draft. Many of the requests for expatriation by Japanese-American citizens of military age made after January 21, 1944, have been made by people who have heretofore been considered loyal. In many of these cases, expatriation has been requested by individuals unable to speak Japanese and who have no relatives, property, or other apparent interests in that country. The seriousness of the problem is indicated by the figures at the Minidoka Relocation Center, where 62 American citizens of military age have requested expatriation, only 9 of them prior to the announcement of the reinstitution of Selective Service.

"As a result of this problem, the War Department is considering revising its policy so as to consider individual Japanese-American citizens acceptable for military service despite a request for expatriation, where it appears that the request was made when induction was imminent and there is no other evidence of disloyalty. It should be pointed out, however, that a number of these Japanese-American citizens have dual citizenship as a result of the Nationality Law of Japan. It also appears likely that many of the requests for expatriation to Japan may be forwarded to the State Department through the Spanish Embassy, and that the policy which the War Department is contemplating adopting might result in protests from the Japanese Government being filed with the Department of State through the Spanish Embassy. For these reasons this letter is forwarded for your information and for any remarks and recommendations you may wish to make."

Although the policy stated had already been adopted and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was applying the rule without waiting for comments from the State Department, a conference with the State Department was held on 10 August 1944 and representatives attended from all interested agencies, including the Department of Interior, Department of Justice, Selective Service System, and the War Department. The agenda covered almost every possible angle and had been furnished in advance to all interested agencies. The leading advocate of the War Department revised policy was Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of War Relocation Authority. Mr. Myer took the position that the revised policy was correct and should not be changed in any respect. He argued that it was being applied only to American citizens who were being drafted into the army under an Act of Congress. He contended that the Spanish government, in its capacity as protecting power for Japanese interests in the United States, had no authority whatever over American citizens or the application of a law of Congress such as the Selective Service Act. The War Department representatives silently concurred with his contentions.

Later, on 28 December 1944, the State Department completed a memorandum to the Spanish government for transmittal to the Japanese government in which the United States Government's position was outlined and the War Department's policy was upheld. ^{52/} Paragraph 3 of this reply stated:

"Under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, every male citizen of the United States and every other male person residing in the United States who is within the designated ages is obligated to register for training and service and is subject to induction if he is acceptable to the armed forces of the United States. Japanese aliens are not inducted unless they file an application for voluntary induction, and in addition are found acceptable individually by the armed forces. Thus, no Japanese alien will be inducted against his will. The Selective Service System is, however, required to call for induction all United States citizens, including Nisei, and there is no method whereby any United States citizen may be exempted from service unless he is personally unacceptable to the armed forces or is listed in Section 5 of the Selective Service Law. In the event that any United States citizen acceptable to the armed forces refused to serve in those forces, he must undergo the penalties imposed under the appropriate regulations. Ordinarily, a United States citizen who requested permission to travel to Japan and whose application was on file prior to January 21, 1944 is considered unacceptable for service in the armed forces."

The reinstitution of selective service, together with the pre-induction screening process, created a problem with respect to the system of segregating the disloyal from the loyal within war relocation centers. As described above, during November and December 1943 most of the residents of these centers were classified as acceptable or not acceptable and letters indicating their status were forwarded to Selective Service in January 1944. Not until several months later were these men called for induction into the Army. During the time between clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and actual induction, the War Relocation Authority was processing them through its own screening system in an effort to segregate the disloyal ones for transfer to the Tule Lake Relocation Center. The clearance of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was based on information gathered early in 1943, prior to the time War Relocation Authority started separating the loyal from the disloyal. As a result, a number of men who had been cleared for induction in the army subsequently were transferred to Tule Lake by War Relocation Authority

52/ Ltr from State Department, dated 28 December 1944, Inclosing
State Department's Memo to Spanish Embassy

as disloyal segregess. In order to meet this problem and to prevent the induction of segregated men another policy rule was adopted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, which provided that any person, even although previously deemed acceptable for service in the army, if segregated to Tule Lake as disloyal would, for that reason alone, be changed from an acceptable to a not acceptable status. National Headquarters, Selective Service System, was notified of this decision in a letter dated 16 May 1944.^{53/}

The rule was conceived with good intentions and, if it had been applied in all respects, would have saved some later embarrassment to the Department of Justice, the War Department, and the Selective Service System itself. Unfortunately, however, the letter never accomplished its purpose as it was inadvertently misfiled in Headquarters, Selective Service System. Accordingly, local boards proceeded to order up for induction a number of the registrants who had been segregated to Tule Lake. Without exception, these men refused to report for induction and 26 of them were indicted for failure to report under the appropriate provisions of the Selective Service Law and were subsequently brought to trial in a Federal District Court located in Eureka, California. No advance information of the pending prosecution of these individuals was ever transmitted to the War Department by either the Selective Service System or the Department of Justice. At the trial of these men the defense counsel introduced the usual preliminary motions in their defense and the federal judge dismissed all the cases ruling that these individuals were not free agents in view of their internment in Tule Lake nor would any plea they might make in a court proceeding be considered voluntary as long as they were interned. Hence, the proceedings could not be termed due process of law. In his opinion, in the Kuwabara case, which, by stipulation, was to be dispositive of all of the cases, Federal Judge Goodman stated as follows:^{54/}

"The government urges that the question of 'due process' is not reachable at this time, but only by writ of habeas corpus after compliance with the order of the local board. However, it is clear to me that defendant is under the circumstances not a free agent, nor is any plea that he may make, free or voluntary, and hence he is not accorded 'due process' in this proceeding."

The trial could have been avoided entirely had the contents of the letter of 16 May 1944 been transmitted to the appropriate local boards. A complete statement of the War Department's position in this matter and the action which had been taken to meet this situation

^{53/} Ltr, dated 16 May 1944, Changing Classification From Acceptable to Not Acceptable Residents of Tule Lake

^{54/} US vs Kuwabara, 56 Federal Supplement page 716; and PMGO memo, dated 1 August 1944, Subj: "Federal Prosecution of 26 Japanese-American Residents of Tule Lake for Violation of Selective Service Regulations"

was set forth in a letter to The Attorney General.^{55/}

A typical case of a draft evader who attempted to use his dual citizenship in an effort to evade service in the army was that of a Japanese-American citizen by the name of Gene H. Akutsu. Mr. Akutsu stated in his DSS Form 304A, which he executed in February 1943, and at a time when he had no idea he ever would be required to serve in the army, that he had never registered with any Japanese agency for the purpose of establishing dual citizenship and that he had never applied for repatriation. He was then in a relocation center and war with Japan had been declared more than a year previously. Under such circumstances he could not establish diplomatic contact for the purpose of attaining dual citizenship. He was screened by War Relocation Authority as well as by the Japanese-American Joint Board and found to be loyal. Following the announcement of reinstitution of selective service and at a time when his induction was imminent, he requested repatriation to Japan. Thereafter he refused to report for induction. The Provost Marshal General's Office was informed of his attitude but an examination of his file indicated that he was using his status as a Japanese-American evacuee in an effort to evade service.^{56/} His failure to report for induction in the army resulted in his indictment by a Federal District Court in Idaho.^{57/} Because of the publicity attached to the case and the fact that Akutsu wrote to the Fort Douglas Induction Center requesting that he be reclassified in a 4-C class, the Commanding General of the Ninth Service Command informed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the facts in the case and suggested that Akutsu be deemed not acceptable in view of his alleged disloyal attitude. The recommendation of the Ninth Service Command was disapproved by Counter Intelligence Group, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 15 May 1944.^{58/}

Removal of All Restrictions to Assignment of Japanese-American Enlisted Men Except in the Pacific Theater

In a staff study prepared on 3 April 1944 by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, and Operations Division for concurrence, it was recommended that certain priorities be established in the assignment of Japanese-American enlisted men.^{59/} The Assistant Chief

^{55/} PMGO ltr, dated 5 August 1944, Subj: "War Department's Rule Re Tule Lake Residents"

^{56/} MIS memo re Gene Akutsu, File No. MID 201, dated 13 May 1944, Subj: "Japanese-American Draft Evader"

^{57/} MIS memo re Gene Akutsu, File No. MID 201, dated 16 May 1944, Subj: "Japanese-American Draft Evader"

^{58/} G-2 2nd Ind, dated 15 May 1944, Subj: "Gene Akutsu's Request to be Classified in 4-C Classification"

^{59/} Staff study for C/S, dated 3 April 1944, containing recommendations governing assignment of Japanese-American Enlisted Men

of Staff, G-1, indicated that a re-study of the general assignment of these men had been requested by the Assistant Secretary of War. As a result of this study, the restrictions on assignment which heretofore had applied to all persons of Japanese ancestry in the army were modified to permit their assignment as individual replacements in the European and North African theaters without regard to specific units. However, the first priority was given to the meeting of Japanese language requirements. This decision gave the Commandant, Military Intelligence Service Language School, the right to have first call on any person of Japanese ancestry who was linguistically qualified in the Japanese language.

The second priority was given to the restoration of existing Japanese-American combat units to organization strength and to provide an adequate supply of replacements. Following these two priorities, assignment was to be made as replacements to European Theater of Operations and North African Theater of Operations and with fulfillment of the above needs, assignment could be made to the Zone of the Interior excepting the Western Defense Command. In addition, it was stated that no citizen of Japanese ancestry, except Japanese language personnel and the personnel of the 1389th Engineering Construction Battalion, would be assigned to the Pacific area.

These changes in policy governing assignment removed many of the restrictions applicable to Japanese-Americans but retained restriction on assignment to Western Defense Command and Pacific Theater. A further liberalization was effected on 5 June 1944 by the publication of a War Department letter to the commanding generals of the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth Service Commands and the Western Defense Command.^{60/} This letter stated that women of Japanese-American extraction who were accepted as recruits for the Women's Army Corps could be assigned to posts and stations within the Western Defense Command. This was the first relaxation of War Department policy which had prohibited Japanese-Americans from being stationed in the Western Defense Command. Thereupon, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, directed that an earlier letter of 23 January 1942 be rescinded and that a new letter stating the policy of assignment of all Japanese-American military personnel be published. The following priorities were set forth:^{61/}

"a. Enlisted men of Japanese ancestry will be assigned from Reception Centers in continental United States in accordance with the following order of priority:

60/ WD Ltr, dated 5 June 1944, Subj: "Recruitment and Assignment of Japanese-American WAC's"

61/ Disposition form, dated 17 July 1944, Subj: "Amending WD Policy on Assignment of Japanese-American Enlisted Men to Include Western Defense Command"

(1) The Infantry Replacement Training Centers at Camp Blanding, Florida, and Fort McClellan, Alabama, within the quotas established for such personnel.

(2) Other training establishments of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces in accordance with existing instructions for all personnel.

"b. Upon completion of the full prescribed training course, or prior thereto as authorized by the War Department, they will be re-assigned in the following order of priority:

(1) Japanese language training conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff.

(2) Replacement for the 100th Infantry Battalion, the 442nd Combat Team and the 1395th Engineer Construction Battalion.

(3) Replacement requirements of the European and North African Theaters of Operations, including continental United States units earmarked for those theaters, without regard to specific units.

(4) Zone of Interior installations.

"c. No personnel of Japanese ancestry will be assigned from the continental United States to the Pacific and Asiatic Areas except specially trained language and intelligence personnel, and limited assignment personnel who originated in the territory of Hawaii and who are being returned thereto for further assignment therein or discharge."

The above change of policy removed all restrictions on the assignment of Japanese-American military personnel in the Western Defense Command.

Transfer of Clearance Functions From the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 to The Provost Marshal General

As a result of a survey of all the activities of the Military Intelligence Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Deputy Chief of Staff ordered removed from Military Intelligence Division a number of activities which were deemed operational in character rather than pure staff functions. The clearance of personnel of Japanese ancestry for military service in the army was among the functions removed. These functions, together with all of the operating personnel (one officer and eight civilians), copies of past correspondence and pertinent records, and the physical equipment were transferred to The Provost Marshal General on 25 July 1944. The transfer of this clearance function was accomplished by a War Department letter

of 25 July 1944 to The Provost Marshal General, which delegated to The Provost Marshal General the clearance of personnel of Japanese extraction, subject to policies established by the War Department.^{62/}

The War Department letter transferring the functions from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to The Provost Marshal General was distributed only to interested War Department divisions. The various directives relating to the individual procedures, such as the induction of Japanese-American citizens and the enlistment of the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program, were amended by publication of new letters inserting the words "Provost Marshal General" following the words "Military Intelligence Service."^{63/} The changing of these directives by amendment, rather than by rescission, was considered necessary as provisions had to be made so that either the Military Intelligence Service or The Provost Marshal General could grant approval since the induction records of registrants would show clearance of one or the other of the two agencies.^{64/}

The transfer was effected with a minimum of interruption to the work, and the section became the Military Clearance Section, Japanese-American Branch, Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office.

Only one major problem arose as a result of this transfer. The section had previously secured loyalty checks on military personnel of Japanese extraction for clearance purposes prior to their assignment to the Military Intelligence Service Language School then located at Camp Savage, Minnesota. While the Military Clearance Section was a part of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, it secured four-way loyalty checks from intelligence agencies and, on the basis of the information received from these loyalty checks, enlisted men of Japanese ancestry were either approved or disapproved prior to assignment at that school. With the transfer to The Provost Marshal General under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, the section could no longer perform this clearance function. To meet this problem, Military Personnel Division of Military Intelligence Division requested the Military Clearance Section, Provost Marshal General's Office to continue securing loyalty checks from intelligence agencies on enlisted men to be assigned to the Military Intelligence Service Language School and to forward the results to the personnel officer, Military Intelligence Service, who in turn would transmit to the Commandant of Military Intelligence Service Language

^{62/} WD ltr, File No. AG 020 (24 July 44) OB-S-B, dated 25 July 1944, Subj: "Transfer of Clearance of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry From the AC of S, G-2, WDGS to The Provost Marshal General"

^{63/} Disposition form, dated 24 July 1944, Subj: "Induction of Japanese-Americans"

^{64/} WD ltr, File No. AGPR-I-B 327.31 (24 July 44), dated 25 July 1944, Subj: "Eligibility for Enlistment of Men of Japanese Extraction" and WD ltr, File No. AGPR-I-B 327.02 (24 July 44), Subj: "Induction of Japanese-Americans"

School the names of the individuals on whom no derogatory information existed. On the other cases in which derogatory information was discovered, the information would be referred to an officer in the Security Branch of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for evaluation and approval or disapproval. This arrangement proved to be unsatisfactory and was discontinued on 22 November 1944 by letter from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Commandant of the Military Intelligence Service Language School.^{65/} In that letter the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, authorized the Commandant to certify, for positions of trust, all personnel of Japanese ancestry who had been or who would be assigned to the school. The Commandant was authorized to communicate directly with the Director of the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, who would secure the loyalty checks and transmit them to the Commandant, Military Intelligence Service Language School. In the discussion leading up to the writing of this letter it was stated that more expeditious processing could be accomplished by this plan. Prior to the plan, the results of the loyalty checks secured by the Military Clearance Branch (formerly Military Clearance Section) were transmitted to Military Intelligence Division by a form letter.

After 22 November 1944, the results of the checks were transmitted under the new plan direct to the Commandant, Military Intelligence Service Language School, Fort Snelling, Minnesota, by a similar form letter which had been revised only as to form.

In the performance of this operation from the date it was started by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and under the Provost Marshal General through 16 November 1945, the Military Clearance Branch completed loyalty checks on more than 4,571 Japanese-Americans in military service who were considered for assignment to the Military Intelligence Service Language School.

Japanese Alien Volunteers

War Department policy governing the acceptability for army service of alien Japanese changed in September 1944 from exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry, which had been the policy after Pearl Harbor, to acceptance of Japanese aliens who volunteered, subject to a clearance similar to that required of Japanese-American citizens described in detail above. The Secretary of War's letter of 17 June 1942 to the Director of the Selective Service

^{65/} G-2 ltr, dated 22 November 1944, Subj: "Clearance of Americans of Japanese Ancestry for Positions of Trust," together with discussion sheet

System had stated that persons of Japanese extraction, regardless of citizenship status or other factors, would not be accepted by the War Department.^{66/} This policy of exclusion was again reiterated in the staff study and recommendations leading up to the reinstitution of selective service. That staff study prepared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, recommended to the Chief of Staff "that alien Japanese be not inducted voluntarily or otherwise."^{67/}

War Department letter to all service commands, dated 2 August 1944, restated the policy in paragraph 5 as follows:^{68/} "Japanese nationals, except nationals of Korea, Manchuria and Thailand, and interned aliens who are not in actual physical custody, are not acceptable under any conditions."

Similarly, army regulations provided that citizens of Japanese occupied countries could be accepted if cleared by the commanding general of the service command in which the alien volunteered.^{69/} The War Department letter dated 2 August 1944, together with provisions of army regulations cited above, informed all service commands that Japanese aliens were ineligible for service in the army. The prohibition against the use of Japanese aliens did not amount to a serious loss of available manpower in view of the age requirement for military service, since the vast majority of them had immigrated to this country prior to the Exclusion Act of 1924. In other words, 98% of the Japanese aliens were too old for service in the army.

Legislation which prohibited Japanese aliens from being naturalized, together with the custom of the Japanese families of visiting Japan for extended periods, often resulted in a family having children some of whom were American citizens and some aliens, as a result of children being born in Japan during a visit of the mother. Under the laws of both the United States and Japan, the child's birth in Japan of Japanese parents made him ineligible for American citizenship. Although the child may have remained with his mother in Japan for only a very few days or weeks prior to his return to this country and even though he might have younger or older brothers who were American citizens, he could not change his alien status.

^{66/} Ltr, dated 17 June 1942 from the Secretary of War to Director, Selective Service System, re: "Eligibility of persons of Jap Descent for service in Army"

^{67/} Memorandum of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, dated 27 November 1943 incl staff study prepared by MPD, PMGO, G-2, and G-3, together with inds, subj: "Induction of Citizens of Jap Ancestry & Alien Jap and Recommending the Reinstitution of Selective Service for Am Citizens of Jap Descent"

^{68/} WD ltr, file AG PR-I-B 014.311, dated 2 Aug 1944, subj: "Acceptability of Aliens for Service in the Armed Forces"; WD ltr, file AG PR-I-A 014.31 (27 Mar 43), dated 7 April 1945, subj: "Acceptability of Aliens for Service in the Armed Forces"

^{69/} Par 13 D (2) (b) 1, AR 615-500, dated 10 August 1944

This type of case was quite frequently called to the attention of the War Department and, in view of the "hardship" aspect, waivers of alienage were often obtained and, in the absence of counter-intelligence objections, the alien was almost always permitted to join the Army. To accomplish this induction, the existing regulations had to be waived. After a number of these exceptional cases had been processed through the offices of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and G-2, decision was made in General Staff to change the regulations to permit a Japanese alien to volunteer providing he offered his services in writing and executed certain Selective Service forms which were to be included in the local Selective Service Board's records and in his service record in the office of The Adjutant General.

Because Japanese aliens are subjects of the Japanese Empire, the State Department suggested that their induction be handled in such a way as to avoid any appearance of pressure on the alien volunteer. International law forbids the compulsory induction of enemy aliens and therefore the State Department requested that the records of the War Department show that the act of the alien was voluntary. As a result of this suggestion, both the War Department letter which authorized volunteering by Japanese nationals and the Selective Service Regulations provided an extra procedure requiring that DSS Forms 165, 304 and 221 be executed by the alien and included in the appropriate War Department files. 70/ Paragraphs 2 and 3 of a War Department letter of 11 September 1944, subject, "Induction of Alien Japanese," read as follows: 71/

"2. Conclusive evidence that application for service was voluntary on the part of the individual is required and will be made a matter of record. A signed copy of DSS Form 165, Application for Voluntary Induction, which each registrant signs when he volunteers for induction at his local board, will be used for this purpose. The Director of Selective Service has agreed that, after the procedures contemplated in paragraph 5 below have been established, local boards will be instructed to obtain an extra signed copy of DSS Form 165 wherever a registrant of Japanese nationality volunteers for induction, and to forward it to the armed forces induction station with other papers of the individual. Individuals of Japanese nationality will be not accepted for induction without this form, properly executed. The form will be attached to the DSS Form 221 for the registrant and, upon his induction, will be attached to the original DSS Form 221 and forwarded with it through machine records processing to The Adjutant General's Office for filing. The above is in addition to the procedure prescribed in paragraph 13d (2)(b) 2, AR 615-500, 10 August 1944.

70/ Selective Service Form DSS 165-Application for Voluntary Induction; Selective Service Form 304-Alien's Personal History and Statement; Selective Service Form DSS 221-Report of Physical Examination and Induction

71/ WD ltr, File No. AG PR-I-A 327.31 (1 Jul 44), dated 11 September 1944, Subj: "Induction of Alien Japanese"

"3. For each Japanese alien who is deemed acceptable by The Provost Marshal General or by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area, and who is subsequently ordered by his local board to report for induction, there will be included with his papers forwarded to the armed forces induction station a letter properly authenticated by The Provost Marshal General, or by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area, showing that the individual named and described therein is, if otherwise qualified, acceptable for service in the Army of the United States. This letter will be inserted in the enlisted man's service record."

In addition, Local Board Memorandum No. 179, as amended on 18 November 1944, reads as follows:^{72/}

"5. A Japanese alien who has been found 'acceptable' for service and classified in Class I-A will be forwarded to the induction station as a volunteer in the same manner as this memorandum prescribes for Japanese-Americans, except that the local board (a) will attach to Form 221 one completed copy of Form 165, and (b) will enclose for forwarding with the registrant's other papers both the letter from the War Department and the Form 304 returned by the War Department showing that the registrant is 'acceptable'."

Because the pre-induction clearance of Japanese-American citizens was being performed in the Office of The Provost Marshal General, it was decided to place the clearance of Japanese alien volunteers in that office, also, thus utilizing the existing administrative machinery there and in the headquarters of the Selective Service System as well. The only operation necessary to enforce such a policy was a War Department letter to The Provost Marshal General, with copies to Director of Selective Service and other interested agencies at War Department levels.^{73/} The existing Selective Service memorandum, which outlined the procedures to be followed in the induction of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, was amended on 18 November 1944 to provide the same procedures and channels within Selective Service for the induction of Japanese aliens. Under the procedures outlined above, only 31 aliens had volunteered for induction into the army and only 22 had been accepted as of 1 November 1945.

Commissioning of Army Nurses of Japanese Ancestry

Following the attack of Pearl Harbor, the blanket exclusion of

^{72/} Local Board Memorandum No. 179, as amended, Subj: "Induction of Persons of Japanese Ancestry or Nationality"

^{73/} WD ltr, File No. AGPR-I-A 327.31 (1 July 44), dated 11 September 1944, Subj: "Induction of Alien Japanese"

persons of Japanese ancestry from military service remained in effect except insofar as it was modified in the specific instances described above. Although special provisions had been made by the War Department to accept American citizens of Japanese ancestry in certain branches of the Army, no policy had been established by the War Department concerning the use of Japanese-American women as nurses. On 2 August 1944, the Assistant Secretary of War directed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 that necessary action be taken in order to establish War Department policy concerning the use of Japanese-American qualified registered nurses in the Army Medical Corps. Thereafter, on 11 August 1944, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, by disposition form to The Adjutant General directed that certain individuals of Japanese ancestry be processed for appointment as nurses in the Army of the United States, provided they were cleared by The Provost Marshal General as to loyalty and were professionally and physically qualified.^{74/}

Physical qualification standards were the same as prescribed for the enlistment in the Women's Army Corps of women citizens of the United States of Japanese ancestry.^{75/}

Although the disposition form directed The Adjutant General to forward the names of these persons to The Provost Marshal General for clearance, their names were never received in The Provost Marshal General's Office until a copy of the disposition form, dated 27 March 1945, was transmitted thru The Provost Marshal General's Office in a memorandum for The Adjutant General from The Surgeon General.^{76/} In that memorandum The Surgeon General inclosed a copy of a proposed War Department letter which stated that American citizens of Japanese ancestry who were graduate registered nurses and who possessed certain physical and professional qualifications would be eligible for commission in the Army of the United States with assignment in the Army Nurse Corps. It further provided that, prior to commission, applicants would execute War Department PMGO-ID Form No. 58 (Personnel Security Questionnaire) in quadruplicate with certain additional information appended. The Provost Marshal General, after investigation, would indicate approval or disapproval of the applicant by transmitting notification of this decision to the commanding general of the service command in which the applicant resided. Favorable report was required as a prerequisite to the granting of a commission. The Provost Marshal General concurred on 2 April 1945

^{74/} See Inclosure to Transmittal Sheet to TAG, dated 2 April 1945

^{75/} W3 ltr, dated 28 July 1943, Subj: "Enlistment in the WAC of Women Citizens of the US of Japanese Ancestry"

^{76/} Transmittal Sheet, dated 2 April 1945, Subj: "Letter to Service Commands Authorizing Commission of Nurses of Japanese Ancestry"

and the directive was published on 10 April 1945 as an Army Service Forces letter.^{77/}

Since the basis of clearance in The Provost Marshal General's Office was on loyalty only, the handling of these nurse applicant cases within the Military Clearance Branch, Provost Marshal General's Office, and the service commands followed exactly the same channels as were provided for the processing of Japanese-American women who volunteered for enlistment in the Women's Army Corps. During the entire period in which these women were eligible for service in the Army Medical Corps, only 21 applications were received, all of which were approved, from a counterintelligence standpoint, for commissioning and assignment in the Army Nurse Corps. On 14 September 1945, the authority to commission qualified Japanese-American women, as nurses in the Army Nurse Corps, was terminated by Army Service Forces Circular #347, dated 14 September 1945.

Clearance of Officer Personnel for Civil Affairs Duties in the Occupation of Japan

One of the clearance functions transferred to The Provost Marshal General under the War Department letter of 25 July 1944 was the clearance of personnel in the service who were assigned, or to be assigned, to civil affairs duties during the occupation of Japanese territory.^{78/} The original discussion of the problem was contained in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated 27 August 1943, subject, "Training of Loyal Japanese-Americans for Civil Affairs Duties," in which Major General Hildring, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, stated that loyal Japanese-Americans in Hawaii and in the continental United States could be placed, after proper training, in minor key positions in Japan.^{79/}

The memorandum further stated that such assignment would assist materially in the "westernization" of the Japanese and afford a highly useful outlet for the educated Japanese-Americans. The memorandum recommended that American born Japanese, in the army and in civilian life, be selected, be cleared individually by Military Intelligence Service, and be trained by The Provost Marshal General in the appropriate military government program for use as civil affairs officers in the occupation of Japan.

^{77/} ASF ltr, dated 10 April 1945, Subj: "Commission of Nurses of Japanese Ancestry Who Are Citizens of the United States"

^{78/} WD ltr, dated 25 July 1944, Subj: "Transferring Screening Functions to PMG"

^{79/} Memo to C/S, dated 27 August 1943, Subj: "Training of Loyal Japanese-Americans for Civil Affairs Duties"

These recommendations were approved and, on 24 September 1943, The Adjutant General forwarded to Chief, Civil Affairs Division, a memorandum which stated that the action recommended in the 27 August memorandum was approved and, under the new procedure, Japanese-Americans in the Army who were selected would be cleared by Military Intelligence Service and trained by The Provost Marshal General. ^{80/}

Only five names were submitted under this program by the Military Government Division, Provost Marshal General's Office on 28 June 1944. All five were approved. No names were submitted later. The procedure for clearing these individuals was set forth in a memorandum dated 1 August 1944. It required the checking of all the usual intelligence files, including those of the Civil Affairs Division of Western Defense Command, an examination of the subject's 201 file in The Adjutant General's Office and conduct of a special investigation should any derogatory information of an inconclusive nature be developed. ^{81/}

Statistics

The total number of "inductee" cases processed by the Military Clearance Branch up to 16 November 1945 was 25,687. Of this number 17,506 were deemed acceptable for service in the Army and 8,181 were deemed not acceptable. These figures include the 17-year old boys who anticipated the draft and enlisted in the Enlisted Reserve Corps, in order to receive special training in the Army Specialized Training Reserve Program. In addition to the above figures, 21 Japanese-American nurses were approved for commissioning and assignment in the Army Nurse Corps. In the Women's Army Corps Program, 142 Japanese-American women volunteered and 120 were approved. Of the 31 Japanese aliens who volunteered, 22 were approved for service in the Army. Under the Civil Affairs Division program, only 5 officers of Japanese ancestry were submitted for approval and all of them were cleared for assignment to American Military Government duties in the occupation of Japan. In addition to the above "clearance" cases, 4-way loyalty checks were completed on 4,571 enlisted men who were assigned or to be assigned to the Military Intelligence Service Language School. In recapitulation, counting all the above categories, some 30,457 individuals were processed by the Military Clearance Branch in its conduct of the screening program up to 16 November 1945.

80/ Memo, dated 24 September 1943, Subj: "Training of Loyal Japanese-Americans for Civil Affairs Duties"

81/ Memo, dated 1 August 1944, Subj: "Clearance Procedure for Japanese-American AMG Officers"

Considering the many thousands of Japanese-American men who had been inducted in the Army and that almost all of them had suffered more or less hardship as a result of the evacuation, it is significant that only 12 requested renunciation of their citizenship and even more significant that 11 of these 12 were inducted into the Army prior to the adoption of the screening program. Only one of these disloyal individuals, Choyo Sugita, ASN 38667009, bore the approval of the Military Clearance Branch and was inducted on 24 April 1944. On the other hand, outside the army more than 6,700 Japanese-American citizens renounced their United States citizenship under the provisions of this law.

Of the more than 22,000 Japanese-American enlisted men in the Army as of 16 November 1945, only 120 were deemed too disloyal to be trusted with normal military duties. Of these 120 disloyal men, 115 were inducted prior to the adoption of the screening of Japanese-Americans under the Military Clearance Branch.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN PROGRAM

The War Department security program relative to persons of Japanese ancestry residing in the United States was not initiated until after Pearl Harbor. The steps taken by the War Department toward national security in the two years immediately preceding the war made no direct provision for the Japanese except as they may have been affected by the general provisions of the alien and subversive programs. No particular attention or study had ever been given by the War Department to the Japanese situation existing on the Pacific Coast. In the middle 1930's the Office of Naval Intelligence had developed some interest in the Japanese fishing industries operating out of Los Angeles, the Columbia River, and Puget Sound, and the West Coast naval districts planned a general intelligence check on all Japanese aliens, their organizations, and their foreign contacts and activities, but such a program was not completed prior to the outbreak of war. The progress made, however, provided the basis for the intensive intelligence activity inaugurated immediately after Pearl Harbor. Army Military Intelligence activities prior to the war had been limited to activities of military personnel. The Federal Bureau of Investigation entered the picture in 1940, primarily to investigate alleged unlawful money transactions and violations of the Securities Exchange Act. In 1941 the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation increased their activities as a result of the Tashibana incident. 1/

Immediately following Pearl Harbor, the Department of Justice, with information furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, began the apprehension of, hearings on, and internment of Japanese aliens. The evidence justifying these internments was largely predicated upon Office of Naval Intelligence reports on individuals or organizations, of which the individuals were members, which had been labeled by the Office of Naval Intelligence as strongly pro-Japanese. Also apprehended were those persons employed in high positions in certain firms which were known to be subsidized by the Japanese government. During the seven or eight years immediately preceding the war the Navy had accumulated a substantial volume of information, particularly on aliens, for general intelligence purposes.

1/ Lt. Com. Tashibana (Tatibana), IJN, exchange student was apprehended in 1941 attempting to purchase information as to Pacific fleet maneuvers. The Japanese Consul furnished a \$50,000 cash bond. Tashibana was released at the request of the State Department and returned to Japan.

In this respect Navy operations and information differed from those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which investigated only upon suspicion or complaint. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports were fewer in number, they were very thorough.

The handling of aliens presented few legal problems. The internment of these aliens, however, did not solve the Japanese security problem, since the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation knew, through records already accumulated, that many American-born Japanese, while technically entitled to protection and constitutional guarantees as citizens, were nevertheless loyal to Japan. The number of persons affected and the degree of their loyalty were not known. When efforts were made to ascertain loyalties by interviewing the supposedly loyal persons, intelligence agencies discovered that the Japanese ties of society and blood were so strong that the necessary information was rarely obtained. As the agencies worked feverishly through the early weeks of the war, the matter became more complex and baffling, and led to a general mistrust of the Japanese population as a whole, causing a series of official restraints, such as curfews, tending to curb their activities. These acts in turn served to make the Japanese draw closer together, to become less communicative and further to hamper the investigative program. In addition, many of the Japanese believed that invasion might come shortly and they wished to be on the right side. Japanese fanatics, both alien and citizen, fostered this notion which in turn increased the distrust by authorities and led to further restrictions. In February of 1942 all United States Civil Service employees including those at Army posts and establishments who were of Japanese descent were suspended from employment. 2/ The Selective Service System ceased the induction of American-born Japanese in February 1942, and directed the reclassification of all Japanese to 4-C. 3/ All Americans of Japanese descent serving in the United States Army and attached to units stationed in the Ninth Service Command were either transferred to other service commands or put on inactive duty by transfer to the Enlisted Reserve Corps. These actions had a demoralizing effect on loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry. However, there was insufficient information upon which to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal, and the peril to the west coast of the United States was so great that no risk could be taken. Military necessity required immediate handling of the group as a whole, and all Japanese American citizens were obliged to undergo temporarily a limitation of their normal rights and activities.

The Western Defense Command (which was co-extensive with the Ninth Service Command) took further steps. Military control of the Western Defense Command area was established in March 1942 by Executive Order 9065, followed by a determined policy to clear western United States

2/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(2-7-43)MSC-M, dated 9 February 1942, subject: "Civilian Employees of Japanese Ancestry."

3/ See "Military Clearance Program."

military areas of Japanese. Voluntary evacuation of Japanese Americans was attempted but failed because of the economic inability of the Japanese families to make the change, and non-acceptance of Japanese residents by other states. Of the 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry residing in the "sensitive" Pacific Coast area, only approximately 5,000 voluntarily evacuated. As this plan proved unsuccessful, Western Defense Command created, by appropriate order, the Wartime Civil Control Administration (whose duties and files later were assigned to Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command), issued a series of exclusion orders and evacuated the Japanese to assembly centers. The President by Executive Order No. 9102, 12 March 1942, created the War Relocation Authority for the purpose of handling relocated persons. As voluntary relocation was ineffective, ten relocation centers were constructed in the western United States to house the population on a semi-permanent basis pending relocation or termination of the emergency period. When the Japanese reached the relocation center, Army jurisdiction ceased and was supplanted by the War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency. Relocation of Japanese occurred between March and September 1942 and by September the War Department had no control of the Japanese civilians or of any program for the control of Japanese Americans except exclusion from residence within the specified "sensitive" areas of the West Coast, which may be roughly described as the western half of Oregon and Washington, all of California and the southern third of Arizona. The aliens who had been interned were under jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. Army Military Police Escort Guard Companies, however, provided necessary security at relocation centers and internment camps, but remained outside the compound, ordinarily taking no part in the internal affairs.

The evacuation of Japanese from the west coast areas was accomplished despite some objection by the Japanese themselves. Many individuals and organizations believed it unnecessary as a military matter and therefore a violation of the constitutional rights of American citizens. Many official, semi-official and un-official hearings were held on the West coast, and the necessity, methods, and conditions of evacuation were widely discussed. Evacuation was urged by War Department officials as well as by many white residents of the Pacific Coast area. Some of this group were prompted as much by economic considerations as by security. Various protective groups representing minority races in this country produced testimony and argument against a mass exclusion. Some erstwhile loyal Japanese American citizens were so embittered by the forced relocation that they became disloyal. The War Department clearly recognized the tremendous and long lasting social and economic problem which had been created, and that the longer the exclusion order continued the greater the time that would be required to remedy the matter. Details concerning the necessity for and methods of carrying out the evacuation were amply reported by Western Defense Command. 4/

4/ Final Report, "Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. (U.S. Government Printing Office)"

By October 1942, the majority of the Japanese population of the United States was residing in ten relocation centers in the western part of the United States. The War Relocation Authority assumed the responsibility of relocating these people at least for the duration, if not permanently. On 1 November 1942 the War Relocation Authority announced and put into effect its initial leave clearance and relocation program. The War Relocation Authority was charged with the responsibility of providing the economically disrupted evacuees with food, shelter and medical attention, protecting the Japanese from irate citizens and restraining them from leaving for a community until they could make adequate financial adjustments and thereby not become a public charge. The War Relocation Authority contended, however, that in order successfully to relocate these evacuees its program must be accompanied by some kind of an orderly leave clearance procedure whereby the individual would be released upon proper showing that he could meet the above conditions. Pursuant to such leave program the War Relocation Authority in November and December 1942 released several hundred Japanese who diffused generally throughout the country, except the southern states. Various intelligence agencies and security organizations became alarmed. The Eastern Defense Command and the Southern Defense Command refused admission to such persons without special clearance. The Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army Military Intelligence Service and The Provost Marshal General were concerned about the release of such persons without a loyalty investigation.

The War Department appreciated that loyal Japanese should be permitted to serve in the armed forces and in war industries. The War Relocation Authority saw the need for cooperation with the intelligence and security agencies in order to break down the barrier to employment and relocation. The intelligence and security agencies recognized the need for and value of a regulated method of dividing the loyal from the disloyal. Accordingly, a series of conferences were held in December 1942 and January 1943 attended by representatives of the War Department, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, The Provost Marshal General, and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff; representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence; and representatives from civilian agencies, including the War Relocation Authority, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and War Manpower Commission. By joint agreement between all parties represented and concerned, the War Department letter of 20 January 1943, subject, "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers", was published. 5/ This directive outlined the general War Department policy, which continued for the duration and also provided for initial administrative procedures.

Functions Under Authority of War Department Directives.

The objective of the original War Department program relative to Japanese is stated in the opening paragraph of the directive of

5/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(1-19-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers."

20 January 1943:

"A plan has been formulated whereby the War Department will, upon request of the War Relocation Authority, assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry under its jurisdiction. The purpose of the plan is to determine (a) loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry to permit of their release by War Relocation Authority from war relocation centers, and (b) whether those so released may be inducted into the military service or may be available for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort." 6/

Behind this opening statement lay some additional considerations. It was the intention of the framers of the policy and the directive that by giving the American-born Japanese an opportunity to prove their loyalty by serving in the armed forces, working in war plants or contributing indirectly, such persons might have an opportunity to display their patriotism and soften the hatred and distrust which had arisen in this country against them as a class. In addition it was hoped that this plan would break down the barrier and induce the American public to accept the loyal Japanese in communities, in industries and in all occupations. In other words it was to provide an opportunity for the loyal Japanese to display loyalty and thus protect their social and economic future. The directive made no provisions for aliens. It was assumed by some authorities that the most logical division in sentiment and loyalty would be between alien and citizen, and accordingly a direct invitation was issued to the citizens to demonstrate their loyalty by participating in the war effort. Subsequent events proved, however, that there was no positive correlation between citizenship and loyalty.

Under the administrative provisions of the directive ten Army teams, each consisting of one officer, two Caucasian sergeant investigators, and one sergeant of Japanese ancestry, were specially selected by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, and The Provost Marshal General, and reported to Washington, D. C., 23 January 1943, for an intensive training program conducted under the direction of The Provost Marshal General. A ten day training program was organized and presented by Colonel Alton C. Miller who later became Director of the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, and as such supervised the Japanese American program. Speakers included selected authorities on Japanese from the War Relocation Authority, Office of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Office of Assistant Secretary of War, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, Western Defense Command and the War Department generally.

The program included a history of the evacuation, Japanese psychology,

6/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(1-19-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers."

the administration of relocation centers, the relocation program, the social and economic factors likely to influence Japanese, the objectives of the mission, and the mechanical administrative details. While the training program was in progress the War Relocation Authority determined to register the aliens at the same time and the mechanics of the registration plan were varied to accommodate this additional work.

The teams departed from Washington, D. C., to the respective relocation centers on 2 February 1943. Actual registration was started in the centers on 7 February 1943 under the direction of each War Relocation Authority Project Director and the team captains, assisted by the administrative staffs of the respective centers. Every male citizen over the age of seventeen years completed Selective Service Form 304A, 7/ and was interviewed by Army team personnel before answering questions in the form concerning his willingness to serve in the armed forces and his loyalty to the United States. If the registrant indicated willingness to serve, he was interviewed relative to volunteering for service in the United States armed forces, and if he was willing to volunteer necessary Selective Service forms were accomplished and transmitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and, if there approved, forwarded to Selective Service for physical examination and induction of the individual. If the individual was disapproved by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for induction, the file was returned to War Relocation Authority for processing through The Provost Marshal General and the Japanese American Joint Board.

Women and aliens over seventeen years of age executed War Relocation Form 126R 8/ and a personal history statement similar to DSS Form 304A, but were not interviewed by Army representatives. All files except those of volunteers for induction were then forwarded to The Provost Marshal General and later to War Relocation Authority headquarters in Washington, D. C., for inclusion of Federal Bureau of Investigation reports. Members of the Army teams gave careful consideration to individual interviews and at the same time sounded out the sentiment of the Relocation Center's population as a whole. An official message of the War Department was delivered at a series of meetings in the centers and all questions raised by registrants were answered. The teams at the centers maintained direct contact with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War which acted as coordinator and kept team captains daily informed as to changes in policy and procedure.

Opinions differed as to the success of the program. A higher percentage of disloyalty and a lower percentage of volunteers than the

7/ DSS Form 304A, "Statement of United States Citizen of Japanese Ancestry."

8/ WRA Form 126, Rev., "War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance."

Authority had prophesied were disclosed. On the other hand, this was important to security agencies. Detailed reports from the ten centers were made by the team captains to the Assistant Secretary of War, and a compilation of statistics thereon is included in the reports of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 7 May 1943. 9/ At some centers there was organized resistance to the Army program and the number of volunteers was much less than anticipated.

At the close of registration in March, 1943, the Japanese American Joint Board was organized pursuant to paragraph 2 h of the 20 January 1943 letter. 10/ The Board comprised representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Relocation Authority and The Provost Marshal General, and its activities were coordinated by a representative of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War who acted as executive secretary of the Board.

In order to comply with the provisions of the directive, a Japanese American Section was established in the Industrial Employee Security Branch, Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, Washington, D. C., on 28 March 1943. The section was re-organized as a branch in July, 1943, and established as a Class IV installation of The Provost Marshal General's Office at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, on 15 December 1944. 11/ Operating procedures were prescribed whereby the War Relocation Authority transmitted to The Provost Marshal General the questionnaire accomplished at the center, together with a Federal Bureau of Investigation report, if any, (which had been previously obtained by War Relocation Authority) and the Form 26 (Individual Data Form). 12/ The Provost Marshal General thereupon record-checked each subject at Office of Naval Intelligence, summarizing the favorable and derogatory factors appearing in the file and transmitted the case to the Japanese American Joint Board. If deemed necessary by The Provost Marshal General, a record check was obtained from the Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command, either prior or subsequent to submission of the case to the Japanese American Joint Board. The Joint Board thereupon made its recommendation on the form to War Relocation Authority in favor of indefinite leave or stated that it could not recommend in favor of indefinite leave at that time. 13/ The lack of finality of the recommendation was a concession to the War Relocation Authority to permit resubmission of any case. The recommendation of the Joint Board was advisory only; paragraph 5 of the 20 January 1943 directive provided

9/ Senate Report, Mil. Affairs Com., "Jap. War Relocation Centers," 7 May 1943.

10/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(1-13-43)OE-S-F-M, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers."

11/ ASF letter, file SPX 020(24Nov44)OE-I-SPMOC, dated 27 November 1944, subject: "Transfer of Japanese American Branch, Personnel Security Division, Office of The Provost Marshal General."

12/ WRA Form 26, Rev., subject: "Individual Record."

13/ PMGO: J-A 2 Rev., subject: "Summary and Report."

as follows:

"The procedure prescribed herein is intended to supplement the leave regulations and Administrative Instructions No. 22, Revised, issued by the War Relocation Authority, and not to supersede those regulations or instructions except as may be ordered by the War Relocation Authority." 14/

After completion of action by the Joint Board, the War Relocation Authority was notified in writing and an information copy sent to Office of Naval Intelligence at the latter's request. The original file, with a copy of the action, was returned to The Provost Marshal General for permanent record. The Provost Marshal General processed 40,041 cases through the Board, 24,896 receiving favorable recommendations, 12,606 unfavorable, and 2,539 no recommendation, as a further check was pending at the time of dissolution of the Board.

The 20 January 1943 directive provided that the Japanese American Joint Board should also determine the eligibility of the individual for employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort. The Provost Marshal General recommended, and the Japanese American Joint Board concurred, that no war plant clearance be given without a field investigation. This, of necessity, retarded the volume of actions and, by agreement, cases were submitted as rapidly as possible for action as to leave clearance and were resubmitted for war plant clearance decision as rapidly as the special field investigations could be accomplished. 15/ The Joint Board screened the cases, however, endeavoring to investigate especially only those whose records appeared clear after the several agency checks. Prior to transfer of this function to The Provost Marshal General on 14 October 1943, the Japanese American Joint Board processed 698 employment cases, approving 486 and disapproving 112. 16/ All administrative and clerical work originally intended for the Japanese American Joint Board was actually accomplished by The Provost Marshal General's personnel. The Japanese American Joint Board acted only as a policy making body meeting twice weekly. These policy meetings were attended by observers for The Provost Marshal General in addition to his representative.

The procedures established by the directive were not as successful as the War Department had expected. The Japanese did not respond as anticipated. The large percentage of them admitted disloyalty and a low percentage volunteered. However, both civilian and military departments of the government, as well as private industry, were seeking additional manpower, and such agencies saw an opportunity to use several

14/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(19Jan43)OB-S-F-M, dated 20 January 1943, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers."

15/ See "Investigations Program, PMGO."

16/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(12Oct43)OB-S-3PMGP-M, dated 14 October 1943, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort."

thousand Japanese. No use had previously been made of these persons because of the lack of machinery or information for screening out those who might possibly be disloyal or dangerous. With the establishment of the Japanese American Joint Board, these government agencies and private industry saw an opportunity to make use of selected personnel of Japanese ancestry and gradually opened more fields of opportunity as hereinafter outlined.

Following Pearl Harbor, all pilot certificates issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration to persons of Japanese ancestry were cancelled by the Secretary of Commerce at the request of the Secretary of War. 17/ On 6 April 1943 the Secretary of War relaxed his original position and by letter to the Secretary of Commerce withdrew his objections to issuance of Airman Identification Cards to persons of Japanese ancestry who were American citizens and had never been to Japan, and provided that the applicants would execute Personnel Security Questionnaires, transmit them to The Provost Marshal General for analysis by him in the light of the applicants' records already on file and such other investigation as he might deem necessary. 18/ The analysis and report were then transmitted to the Japanese American Joint Board, which in turn transmitted the report to the Civil Aeronautics Administration with a statement as to whether the Japanese American Joint Board had any objection to the issuance of an Airman Identification Card and whether the applicant's approval might be unrestricted or limited. This policy and procedure remained in force until 8 April 1944 when it was changed to transfer this Japanese American Joint Board function to The Provost Marshal General. 19/ During the existence of the program 27 applications were processed, 23 being approved.

Shortly after the declaration of war an order was issued suspending all civilian employees of Japanese ancestry from employment at Army posts or establishments. 20/ On 3 May 1943 a directive was issued providing that such persons might be employed providing they were citizens and that an application be processed by The Provost Marshal General, including the usual record check and analysis, and then transmitted to the Japanese American Joint Board. 21/ The Japanese American Joint Board considered the case and transmitted a copy of the

17/ Letter 18 April 1942 from Act'g Sec'y of Commerce to Secretary of War re Airman Identification Cards.

18/ Letter 6 April 1943 from Secretary of War to Secretary of Commerce, subject: "Airman Identification Cards."

19/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(3Apr44)OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 8 April 1944, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Army Posts and Establishments, and the Issuance of Airman Identification Cards to American-born Japanese, and Naturalized Citizens of Enemy Alien Descent."

20/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(2-7-43)MSC-M, dated 9 February 1942, subject: "Civilian Employees of Japanese Ancestry."

21/ WD letter, file AG 291.2 (5-3-43)OB-S-F-M, dated 3 May 1943, subject: "Employment of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in Army Posts and Establishments."

report and analysis to the commanding officer of the post or establishment, and stated whether the Japanese American Joint Board had any objection to the employment of the individual, and whether such employment might be unrestricted or limited. On 7 October 1943 this policy was amended to permit the employment of aliens and was again changed on 8 April 1944 to provide that The Provost Marshal General should make the decision without transmitting the case through the Japanese American Joint Board. 22/

The Japanese American Joint Board was intended as a temporary organization and the trend was to release gradually its functions to The Provost Marshal General. Employment at Army posts or establishments was not a major program until October 1944 when Storage Division, Army Service Forces, sought to procure the services of large numbers of Japanese for work in Ordnance depots as munitions handlers. So great was the need that a special conference of representatives of the Storage Division, Army Service Forces, Army Ordnance Department, War Relocation Authority, and The Provost Marshal General was held to establish special procedures for the rapid clearance for employment of Japanese at Tooele Ordnance Depot, Tooele, Utah, and Sioux Ordnance Depot, Sidney, Nebraska. Housing projects had been constructed as a special inducement to employees and relocation of entire families was contemplated. For several months during the latter part of 1944 and the first half of 1945, applications were processed in large numbers, the information often being transmitted by telephone or TWX in an effort to provide ordnance depots with manpower and assist the War Relocation Authority in its relocation program. Under this part of the program 1,198 applications for employment in Army posts and establishments were processed and 881 were approved.

At the time of the general registration program in February 1943 when volunteers for induction into the Army were being accepted, there was considerable agitation among the women in relocation centers over the fact that they were not given the opportunity to serve in uniform. Hundreds of women indicated their willingness to serve in the Women's Army Corps, WAVES, SPARS and the like, with the result that the question was later considered by the War Department and on 28 July 1943 a directive was issued providing physical standards, a quota of 500, and the extent of investigation necessary for the induction of American citizens of Japanese ancestry into the Women's Army Corps. 23/ In addition to the regular Women's Army Corps form, applicants executed

22/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(30Oct43)OB-S-SFMG-M, dated 7 October 1943, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Army Posts and Establishments;" WD letter, file AG 291.2(3Apr44)OB-S-SFMG-M, dated 8 April 1944, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Army Posts and Establishments, and the Issuance of Airman Identification Cards to American-born Japanese, and Naturalized Citizens of Enemy Alien Descent."

23/ WD letter, file AG 291.1(23July43)PR-L, dated 28 July 1943, subject: "Enlistment in the WAC of Women Citizens of the United States of Japanese Ancestry."

a Personnel Security Questionnaire and forwarded it to The Provost Marshal General for record check and approval or disapproval. Approval by The Provost Marshal General and the appropriate service commander was a prerequisite to induction. The program was not very fruitful in that only 139 applications were received, many of which were turned down because of disloyalty. The Women's Army Corps induction followed the general trend of the Army volunteer program for males, in that a large number of volunteers was anticipated but only a relatively small number actually volunteered.

As stated previously, the Japanese American Joint Board recommended many Japanese for leave from the centers without determining their eligibility for war plant employment. The War Relocation Authority, however, released many additional Japanese from the centers without waiting for clearance from the Japanese American Joint Board. As a result, in May and June 1943 some 10,000 Japanese were released and diffused throughout the midwestern and eastern part of the United States. Hundreds of them sought and obtained employment in vital war plants, in many instances having access to secret or confidential War or Navy Department work. The War Relocation Authority, having no security responsibility, and, acting through its field agents, aided the Japanese in obtaining any employment possible, regardless of the nature of the work. Service commands and procurement districts of Army Air Forces became alarmed at this unrestricted employment. The War Department took the position that all Japanese should be cleared for employment in vital war plants. The War Relocation Authority objected to the removal of Japanese who had not been cleared. The Provost Marshal General being responsible for the internal security, began the drafting of an overall plan for the handling of Japanese employment problems. At the same time Japanese were complaining of refusal to permit their attendance at certain educational institutions on the Army and Navy prescribed list which included those schools and colleges where classified work or experimentation was being carried on. The Japanese American Joint Board procedure of pre-clearances was not working well in this connection. The Japanese American Joint Board was utilizing all facilities at its command to investigate persons of its own selection, many of whom had no desire to leave the centers. On the other hand, many persons whom the War Relocation Authority had released were seeking or had obtained employment in plants or facilities important to the war effort without any determination as to their loyalty. The program established by the 20 January 1943 order proved ineffective as to policy and procedure relative to facilitating employment.

The 14 October 1943 directive contained a clear statement of policy relative to employment of Japanese in plants or facilities important to the war effort or attendance of such persons at educational institutions. 24/ The directive prescribed a procedure for pre-clearance

24/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(12Oct43)OB-3-SFMGP-M, dated 14 October 1943, subjects: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort."

of such persons. It provided, however, that a person employed prior to 14 October 1943 should be permitted to continue such employment pending investigation. At approximately the same time The Provost Marshal General had decentralized the alien and subversive programs to the service commands but as far as Japanese were concerned The Provost Marshal General retained his status as an operating agency. 25/ This was because the program was not sufficiently crystallized, nor service command personnel sufficiently trained on Japanese matters, to permit decentralization. Briefly, the directive provided that persons seeking employment in a plant or facility important to the war effort or attendance at the prescribed educational institutions should file a Personnel Security Questionnaire with the service command which would initiate a field investigation locally and forward all information to The Provost Marshal General for examination of the basic file and decision. 26/ This decision might take one of the six forms provided in instructions attached to the directive. The service command was left no discretion as to loyalty, but might vary the action after determining the importance of the facility or the sensitivity of the particular job. If the action taken by The Provost Marshal General amounted to a suspension, denial, or removal, either by him or the appropriate service command, the action was enforced under War Department Unnumbered Restricted Circular, 5 February 1942, subject, "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement." 27/

After 14 October 1943 the Japanese American Joint Board ceased to pass upon the matter of war plant employment, although the action taken in 598 cases previously processed by the Board was considered authoritative.

The Provost Marshal General processed 3,361 applications for facility employment, resulting in 1,921 approvals, 310 disapprovals, and no action in 650 cases, due to cessation of employment, or to a determination that the facility was not of sufficient importance.

The letter of 14 October 1943 marked one rather important change in investigative procedure. The investigations instituted by the Japanese American Joint Board followed the usual practice of making local record checks and interviewing neighbors and references in the area. This procedure normally produced the best available information, but in cases of Japanese a few months operation demonstrated that the information secured in a neighborhood check was not reliable and when in conflict with information secured by a check of the intelligence

25/ See "Suspension of Subversives Program" and "Alien Employment Program."

26/ WD PMGC ID Form 58, "Personnel Security Questionnaire."

27/ ID Cir, subj, "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement," 5 February 1942.

agencies, the latter was usually given the most credence. With the departure during 1943 of many thousands of Japanese for resettlement in the Fifth and Sixth Service Commands, the framers of the directive shifted the emphasis from investigations in the area of former residence to investigations in the area of present residence. While very little neighborhood information was obtained on a new resident, personal interviews with the subject were permitted. This represented another departure from the former policy of not requesting interviews of the subject. The Provost Marshal General proceeded cautiously, however, in advising personal interviews, but early in 1944, after examination of the initial results, encouraged personal interviews whenever possible. This required indoctrination of agents in the service commands with a background of Japanese ideology and loyalty factors, together with full instructions as to a psychological approach. Since the need for indoctrination was immediate and it was difficult to reach all agents at once, two methods were used.

a. A course was instituted at the Security Intelligence School, Chicago, Illinois, (Class IV Installation of The Provost Marshal General's Office) consisting of an eight hour lecture course delivered to each class by an officer of the Japanese American Branch who travelled to the school for that purpose.

b. Officers were sent twice from the Branch to the First and Third Districts of the Sixth Service Command and to the Second Service Command to instruct agents in those areas.

This procedure was highly beneficial and marked an immediate improvement in field investigations and an increase in information obtained from the subjects on interview. When the subject of the investigation became aware that his questioner was reasonably well informed, the subject became more communicative and less evasive, frequently admitting or volunteering substantial information not otherwise obtainable. Where adequate records appeared on a person or group of persons, a record check plus a personal interview was more beneficial and more reliable than the usual neighborhood check and required less time and personnel. This was particularly true when dealing with a cohesive group of which even the closest neighbors know very little. The files of the Japanese American Branch included approximately 1500 neighborhood investigations as against more than 2500 investigations which included the personal interview. A comparison of the two leaves little doubt as to the overwhelming preference for the latter.

The directive of 14 October 1943 provided for appeal from denials of consent or from restriction on employment, but was obscure on the matter of appeals from denials for attendance at educational institutions. This matter was clarified on 16 May 1944 by a directive providing that no appeals should be taken from actions in educational

cases. 28/

On 31 August 1944 a directive was issued exempting attendance or employment at educational institutions from the restrictions of the letter of 14 October 1943. 29/ This was accomplished at the recommendation of The Provost Marshal General after a staff study demonstrated that the access of students or employees to secret and confidential research being conducted at educational institutions was so remote that it did not justify the time and effort spent in screening the several thousand prospective employees and students. This action drew a prompt commendation from the War Relocation Authority. 30/ However, laboratories and experimentations being conducted in educational institutions, some of which were on the Master Inspection Responsibility List, were treated as facilities important to the war effort, requiring a clearance only if the individual would have access to a particular laboratory or experimental facility.

In the summer and fall of 1944, in anticipation of an early end of the European war, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, directed drastic reductions in personnel and security operations. Revision of the 14 October 1943 letter was seriously considered, in that the definition of a plant and facility important to the war effort was believed to be unnecessarily broad in view of the changing security situation. The procedures under the directive were so well established, however, that it was deemed inadvisable to undertake a complete revision and unnecessarily disturb field operations. Instead, a modifying directive was published on 4 November 1944, limiting the application of the 14 October 1943 directive to

- a. Facilities included in the Master Inspection Responsibility List.
- b. Facilities engaged on secret or top secret contracts.
- c. Facilities engaged on Army Air Forces research, experiments, engineering and development projects.
- d. Facilities approved for the reproduction of classified material under paragraph 18, AR 380-5, and

28/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(12May44)OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 16 May 1944, subject: "Appeals from Denials of Consent for the Attendance of Persons of Japanese Ancestry at Educational Institutions of Importance to the War Effort."

29/ WD letter, file AG 291.2 Japanese (29Aug44)OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 31 August 1944, subject: "Attendance or Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry at Educational Institutions Important to the War Effort."

30/ Letter from War Relocation Authority to Provost Marshal General's Office dated 11 August 1944.

e. Such other facilities as may be hereafter specifically designated by The Provost Marshal General. 31/

Very little use of the last provision was necessary. This reduction in coverage of the Japanese security program reduced the facility cases sharply and made the program second in importance to the clearances effected under the letter of 8 April 1944, since ordnance depots were making increased demands for Japanese to be employed as munitions handlers.

As previously stated, the Japanese American Joint Board was intended as a temporary agency only, and from time to time by directive its functions were one by one transferred to The Provost Marshal General. By 1 May 1944, the Japanese American Joint Board had completed recommendations as to indefinite leave for approximately 40,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry over the age of 17 years. On 25 May 1944, a directive abolished the Japanese American Joint Board and transferred its operational functions to The Provost Marshal General. 32/ Representatives, observers and persons directly connected with the Board, including several officers in The Provost Marshal General's Office, received personal commendations from the Assistant Secretary of War. 33/ With this directive, all operations provided for in the directive of 20 January 1943, and those added to the activities of the Japanese American Joint Board by later directives, had either been completed or transferred to The Provost Marshal General. The 20 January 1942 directive was not rescinded, however, and accordingly, its statement of policy remained in full force and effect.

A complete history of the Military Clearance Program concerning Japanese American personnel entering the armed forces is covered in a separate chapter, and the subject is mentioned here only to show how its policy affected or was affected by the general Japanese program. 34/ The number of volunteers secured under the original program was negligible. Selective service for Japanese Americans was reinstituted 21 January 1944, and approximately 25,000 decisions as to acceptability were made subsequent to that date, most of which were based upon the records and files of the Japanese American Branch.

31/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(31Oct44)OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 4 November 1944, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort."

32/ WD letter, file AG 291.2(25May44)OB-S-F, dated 25 May 1944, subject: "Loyalty Investigations of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in War Relocation Centers."

33/ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of War dated 16 May 1944, subject: "Commendation."

34/ See "Military Clearance Program."

Military clearance of personnel of Japanese extraction originated as a function of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, in February, 1943, but on 25 July 1944 was delegated to The Provost Marshal General and its operations were performed by a Military Clearance Section of the Japanese American Branch, subject to policy control by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS.

When the Japanese American Branch moved to San Francisco in December, 1944, the Military Clearance Section remained in Washington and was designated a separate branch of the Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office. This was deemed advisable in view of the necessary liaison with Military Intelligence Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of Justice, and Selective Service Headquarters. The separation of these branches, however, did not decrease the work of the Japanese American Branch but served rather to increase it. Prior thereto, decisions as to acceptability for military service could be made by Military Clearance Section by direct examination of the individual files of the Japanese American Branch. When these files were moved to San Francisco, it was then necessary that written summaries be prepared in the Japanese American Branch, when requested by the Military Clearance Branch, and be forwarded to the latter in The Provost Marshal General's Office, Washington, D. C. Numerous rechecks were necessary in certain cases and extensive exchange of correspondence was necessary. Between 15 December 1944 and 1 September 1945, 2,427 summaries were furnished by this Branch to the Military Clearance Branch.

In addition to the preparation of summaries of information for clearance of Japanese American born citizens prior to induction, summaries of information were also furnished in greater detail concerning persons already in the armed forces who were being considered for attendance at the Military Intelligence Language School at Camp Savage (later Fort Snelling) Minnesota. All Japanese American applications for commissions in the Army Nurse Corps and Japanese alien applicants for induction received by the Military Clearance Branch were checked against the files of the Japanese American Branch. Since the Military Clearance Branch had responsibility for approval of all other types of military service, the function of approval for induction into the Women's Army Corps was transferred to the Military Clearance Branch in April, 1945.

In connection with military clearance, another function devolved upon the Japanese American Branch in March, 1945. The mission of the Military Clearance Branch was to determine the acceptability or non-acceptability of individuals for military service, and the mission of the Western Defense Command was to determine the status of individuals in regard to exclusion. The standards used to determine

these different objectives varied, thus creating apparent inconsistencies between the findings of these two War Department agencies. In order to hold such inconsistencies to a minimum, it was determined by Western Defense Command and The Provost Marshal General that all cases wherein an individual had been deemed acceptable for military service and at the same time had been excluded by Western Defense Command, should be reviewed jointly by Western Defense Command and The Provost Marshal General to determine whether one of the agencies might alter its previous decision. Since the Military Clearance Branch did not have immediate access to the necessary basic files, this review function fell to the Japanese American Branch. All cases involving inconsistencies were considered in detail both by the Civil Affairs Division Screening Board, Western Defense Command, and by an officer of the Japanese American Branch. As a result exclusion orders were revoked in one hundred and seventy-five cases, and the Japanese American Branch prepared summaries of information and recommended to the Military Clearance Branch that the status of the subject be changed from that of acceptable to not acceptable in two hundred and six cases. This served not only to harmonize the activities of two separate War Department offices but also enabled the Japanese American Branch to effect a review, in the light of more recently acquired information, of many border-line cases. The review function involved the study of many additional cases, including aliens, persons under the jurisdiction of Hawaiian Draft Boards, and persons concerning whom no action in regard to acceptability for military service had been taken. This program occupied the time of one officer of the Japanese American Branch from 9 March 1945 to 1 July 1945.

Following the end of the war in Europe, the War Department determined to admit a substantial number of Japanese Americans to the Counter Intelligence Corps and train them for possible overseas service in the Pacific Theater. Selection and training came under the jurisdiction of the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces. Since most of the applicants were formerly residents of the West Coast area, the Ninth Service Command conducted the investigations, including a record check of the files of the Japanese American Branch. Requests for check began to arrive in July 1945 and increased heavily. By 1 September, 222 requests had been received. The Japanese American Branch prepared a summary of all derogatory information included in the files of the Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command, and the records of the Branch in each case, and forwarded it to Headquarters, Ninth Service Command, where the record check was consolidated with the field report and transmitted to the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, for decision. This function continued after the cessation of hostilities with Japan until the requirements of the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, were satisfied.

Functions Performed Other Than Under War Department Directives

As the operations of The Provost Marshal General and the Japanese American Joint Board grew, and as more and more information was collected, the files of the Japanese American Branch became more and more important as a central records agency on persons of Japanese ancestry. As a result, various government agencies, both civilian and military, increasingly sought information from The Provost Marshal General relative to Japanese. By May 1944 the Japanese American Branch had accumulated an individual file on all adult citizen evacuees, including agency checks on their parents, and Western Defense Command record checks on 50 percent of the families involved. Special field investigations totaling 3,000 were also included. Many agencies established informal liaison by exchange of correspondence with the Japanese American Branch for the purpose of securing information. The Branch furnished information only and took no action or made no recommendation in such instances.

A number of American citizens of Japanese ancestry who were residents of the Hawaiian Islands were in the continental United States at the outbreak of war, in most instances on visits or business trips or for education. Many of these persons desired to return. The situation in the Central Pacific Area was very sensitive and the Commanding General could not permit unrestricted travel of Japanese to and from the area. Names of persons wishing to return to Hawaii were checked against The Provost Marshal General's records and results of the check sent to the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, for decision. The only authority for this operation by The Provost Marshal General was an oral direction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. In December 1944, the security situation in the Pacific Ocean Area had eased and, as the manpower shortage in the Hawaiian Island was very acute, the Commanding General authorized the making of applications for return to Hawaii by almost any former resident, including excludées and internees. Favorable action on such requests was dependent upon a loyalty check and transportation facilities. This enlargement of the group of persons eligible to apply materially increased the number of applications and the Japanese American Branch made 440 record checks.

In 1943 the Civil Service Commission received several hundred applications for employment from persons of Japanese ancestry. The Commission, in processing these applications, asked permission to use the records of the Japanese American Joint Board and agreed to an exchange of information to prevent duplication of investigations. As the Japanese American Joint Board had no records except those in The Provost Marshal General's Office the authority was delegated to the Japanese American Branch, and thereafter Civil Service Commission files were opened to The Provost Marshal General and Civil Service Investigators were given access to all files on Japanese in The Provost Marshal General's Office. This mutual cooperation was of great advantage

both agencies. It was limited to an exchange of record information, however, and neither agency made recommendations to the other. The Provost Marshal General, however, at the request of the Civil Service Commission, furnished investigators with information as to evaluation of the individual records of Japanese. The Civil Service Commission checked approximately 875 files.

Under the Army and Navy security agreement, the War Department, through The Provost Marshal General, was responsible for security in all plants or facilities except Naval shore establishments and waterfront facilities. Some conflicts of jurisdiction under this plan arose over employment of individuals on vessels and waterfront facilities. Both the Navy and Army Transport Service were involved as well as some facilities which were not Naval shore establishments, but nevertheless fell within the purview of harbor operations. A conference between representatives of the War and Navy Departments, including the Army Transport Service, The Provost Marshal General, Office of Assistant Secretary of War, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the United States Coast Guard, resulted in the issuance of a directive by the Coast Guard, 31 March 1944, providing that the United States Coast Guard should have charge of clearance of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry for employment on vessels on waterfront facilities effective 1 April 1944.^{35/} As the directive provided for the United States Coast Guard instituting a search of the records of The Provost Marshal General, the files were thereupon opened to representatives of the United States Coast Guard who checked all applicants. In addition, The Provost Marshal General furnished aid and assistance to United States Coast Guard representatives as to evaluation of information derived from the files. There was no War Department authority for this operation other than concurrence in the United States Coast Guard directive. Files were consulted by United States Coast Guard in 275 cases.

The Investigations Division, United States Department of Agriculture, requested The Provost Marshal General for record checks of individuals of Japanese ancestry who sought employment in certain divisions of the United States Department of Agriculture. These inquiries were answered by letter report after a check of the files of The Provost Marshal General including War Relocation Authority, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Office of Naval Intelligence reports. The Provost Marshal General made no recommendations. There was no specific authority for this operation.

The United States Secret Service, Office of Strategic Services, and Office of Scientific Research and Development made written requests to The Provost Marshal General for information concerning persons of

^{35/} USCG letter, file CG 6614, dated 31 March 1944, subject: "Procedure for processing cases of United States citizens of Japanese Descent for Employment in Vessels and Waterfront Facilities"

Japanese ancestry seeking employment with those agencies, or in the case of United States Secret Service those Japanese residing in the vicinity of Washington, D. C. A check similar to that made in the case of United States Department of Agriculture inquiries was accomplished with the exception that, by request of the United States Secret Service, The Provost Marshal General rendered an opinion as to the loyalty of subject as indicated by the record. The Provost Marshal General also assisted the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of Scientific Research and Development to find individuals with suitable educational qualifications for work with those agencies. Summaries of information were furnished to United States Secret Service in 219 cases; to Office of Strategic Services and Office of Scientific Research and Development in 153 cases, and to United States Department of Agriculture in 92 cases.

Following the mass exclusion of Japanese from certain areas on the West Coast by Western Defense Command, certain individuals sought to return to that area. These persons were termed by Western Defense Command as exemptee applicants. Before permitting a person of Japanese ancestry to return to the evacuated area, the Civil Affairs Division of Western Defense Command required an application in writing setting forth substantially the same information as that contained in the basic questionnaire used by The Provost Marshal General and War Relocation Authority. The Western Defense Command checked the records of its own Civil Affairs Division, and forwarded a copy of these records to The Provost Marshal General who in turn checked his files and reported back to Western Defense Command any additional information on the applicant or applicant's family not already contained in the Western Defense Command's Civil Affairs Division's record check. As a minimum in each case, The Provost Marshal General's record check included a file from War Relocation Authority and file checks of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Service if the applicant had any immediate relatives in the military service. No recommendations were made; 852 summaries were furnished. The authority for this operation was the general agreement for exchange of information between The Provost Marshal General and the Civil Affairs Division. This procedure continued until November 1944, at which time it was suspended pending policy changes in the Western Defense Command.

In October 1944, the Western Defense Command determined to alter its policy by revoking the mass exclusion and issuing individual exclusion orders in lieu thereof, but only relating to approximately 12,000 persons. The Western Defense Command issued an emergency call to The Provost Marshal General to furnish lists of persons upon whom certain major derogatory factors appeared including particularly negative answers to the loyalty question (28 on SS DSS Form 304A), 36/

36/ DSS Form 304A, subject: "Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry."

adverse Joint Board recommendations, and all information available from the Department of Justice as to internees, and from the State Department as to requests for repatriation. Other miscellaneous items were included in the request. For two weeks the entire facilities of the Japanese American Branch were devoted to compiling the information, and at the conclusion thereof, two officers of the Japanese American Branch went to San Francisco to deliver and explain the use of the information, and for general conferences with the Western Defense Command relative to operating procedures. The Western Defense Command at the same time renewed its previous oral request that the Japanese American Branch be moved to San Francisco to facilitate the exchange of information between the two agencies with particular benefit at that time to the Western Defense Command. 37/ On 15 December 1944 the Branch was established at the Presidio of San Francisco as a Class IV Installation of The Provost Marshal General's Office, and on 17 December 1944 the Western Defense Command made public by Proclamation 21 its decision to revoke the mass exclusion order effective 2 January 1945, and during the interim issued approximately 11,000 individual exclusion orders. 38/ As these individual orders were based upon rather hastily assembled information, they were subject to review and during the ensuing period until V-J Day the Civil Affairs Division of the Western Defense Command checked approximately 10,000 files in the Japanese American Branch for information relative to excluded individuals. During this process many new exclusion orders were issued. The proximity of the two offices, located in the same building at the Presidio of San Francisco, enabled the respective agencies to review actual records rather than request summaries of information by mail. Thus, the Western Defense Command activities affecting The Provost Marshal General's Office varied from the old procedure of requesting summaries of information to the new process of examining the files directly. During the same period the Japanese American Branch benefited by its proximity to the Western Defense Command records. The move of the Branch to San Francisco proved beneficial beyond all possible doubt, as the files of the two agencies contained all material information on Japanese in the United States which had been accumulated from all sources during the previous two years.

In May 1945 the Foreign Funds Control Unit, Office of the Governor of Hawaii, sought information from The Provost Marshal General as to the present addresses and status of Japanese internees and citizen excludées from the Territory of Hawaii whose funds had been frozen in commercial banks in the Territory. In the two

37/ Western Defense Command letter, file 291.2 (SC), dated 12 October 1944, subject: "Determination of Potentially Dangerous Persons of Japanese Ancestry."

38/ ASF letter, file SPX 020(24Nov44)OB-I-SPMOC, dated 27 November 1944, subject: "Transfer of Japanese American Branch, Personnel Security Division, Provost Marshal General's Office."

succeeding months the Japanese American Branch provided the Foreign Funds Control Unit with the correct addresses of all such persons, approximately 1,000 in number, and thereafter currently notified if of the name and identifying data of any Hawaiian evacuee who renounced his American citizenship. This information was furnished to aid the Governor of Hawaii for use in his determination as to the unblocking of accounts and in establishing necessary communication with persons whose accounts were to be unblocked.

One Test of the Effectiveness of the Program

In 1946 many American-born Japanese began to take advantage of the law permitting renunciation of citizenship. As notices of these acts of renunciation reached the files of the Japanese American Branch they were checked against the 1943 adverse recommendations made by the Japanese American Joint Board with the results showing an astonishingly positive correlation. The comparison has not yet been completed (1 September 1946) but, of 3,000 renunciates, 94 per cent had previously been subjected to adverse recommendation by the Japanese American Joint Board. The remaining 6 per cent were principally females who were not subjected to such rigorous standards by the Joint Board and who, in many instances, had no derogatory records but were merely following husbands or families in the renunciation processes.

INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT REVIEW BOARD

The Industrial Employment Review Board was formally created, effective 1 March 1943. Its functions, at that time, were limited to hearing and disposition of:

a. Alien Appeals. Appeals from denials of consent for employment of aliens in connection with aeronautical and classified War Department and Navy Department contracts; 1/ and

b. War Facility Subversive Appeals. Appeals by individuals removed from employment in privately operated facilities of importance to the war effort, because of suspicion of subversive activity. 2/

Review was not obligatory in alien appeals but was required in war facility subversive appeals:

a. Alien Appeals. By virtue of provisions of statute, regulation, and contract, consent of the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy, as the case might be, was a prerequisite to employment of an alien in connection with aeronautical and classified War Department and Navy Department contracts. 3/ No one of those provisions made mandatory, or even suggested, a right of review of an action granting or denying such consent.

b. War Facility Subversive Appeals. The Army and Navy "Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army and Navy Procurement", dated 10 January 1942, contained the following specific requirements:

"In cases where such an individual wishes to contest the removal, within thirty (30) days after the removal such individual or a Project Representative of Management or of Employees with the individual's written consent must serve a written request for review upon the Army or Navy Representatives who requested the removal. Unless such written request for review is

1/ Air Corps Act of 1926, c. 721, 44 Stat. 784; 10 U.S.C. 310 (j) and (p); Procurement Regulations, par 337.1, Reprint date 29 Jun 44; par 61, AR 380-5, Reprint date 29 Jun 44.

2/ WD unnumbered restricted circular, dated 5 February 1942, subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement"; Procurement Regulations, par 338, Reprint date 29 Jun 44.

3/ SEE "Alien Employment Program"

served as provided, the removal shall not be subject to such review as shall be provided by the Under Secretary of War or the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, depending upon which service requested the dismissal."

Early Development. Administration of the programs for employment of aliens and for removal of suspected subversives was originally lodged in the Alien Section, Plant Protection Division, Procurement Branch, Office of the Under Secretary of War. Following the reorganization of the Army in 1942, both programs were administered by the Facility Employee Branch, Internal Security Division, Office of The Provost Marshal General.^{4/} In its early development, review procedure under both programs was informal and administrative in character.

Prior to the aforementioned transfer of the security programs from the Office of the Under Secretary of War to the Office of The Provost Marshal General, alien appeals were resolved after informal administrative review. Complete organizational separation of the review function was accomplished on 1 March 1943.

Appeals resulting from removals under the circular of 5 February 1942 were very few in number prior to May 1942. Those few appeals received were accorded an informal administrative review. On 4 May 1942, the Chief, Facility Employee Branch, Internal Security Division, created by Branch memorandum the "Review Committee" as a unit within that Branch for the purpose of considering requests for review under the provisions of Part II, paragraph 2 (d) of the circular of 5 February 1942. To avoid an unwise admixture of duties in a specific case, the memorandum provided:

"6. In the event that any member of the Committee shall have been active in the original consideration of a case to be reviewed, he shall be precluded from participating in the review of that case and the case shall be considered by the remaining members of the Committee."

Desirability of Separate Review Agency. A considerable segment of the population of the United States is alien.^{5/} A large portion of that alien population was skilled in, and engaged upon, types of work which would be of material value to production needed for war. In the rapid conversion from peacetime production to war production, it was inevitable that the dictates of security requirements produced many instances in which consent was denied for employment of aliens in connection with aeronautical and classified contracts. Likewise, although the alien status of an individual was not necessarily an

^{4/} Part III, par 5, restricted WD letter, file AG 381 (3-28-42), dated 30 March 1942, subject: "Internal Security"

^{5/} More than 4,900,000 receipt cards were received under the Alien Registration Act of 1940

index of his loyalty, the conclusion was inescapable that there always would be some cases in which consent would be denied either because of apparent affirmative indications of disloyalty, or because of the impracticability of procuring sufficient information by customary investigation to satisfy requirements as to security. Appeals from such denials by the aliens concerned were natural and inevitable. Since the reasons for denial were not disclosed, present and prospective employers naturally sought reconsideration of denials in many cases. Representatives of employees had interests which also caused them to seek reconsideration. As has been indicated, denials of consent in alien cases were often reconsidered upon request before the Board was created. Such reconsiderations were administrative in character. Two things were obviously desirable; one, that a privilege of review be established in all cases where consent was denied; and two, that a separate review agency be created. Specific provision was made in the circular of 5 February 1942, for appeals from persons removed under the provisions thereof. No requirement was stipulated as to the method of review, except that it be such as "--shall be provided by the Under Secretary of War or the Assistant Secretary of the Navy --". Until 4 May 1942, that review consisted of an examination or re-examination by an individual officer or series of officers. On 4 May 1942, participation in the review by an individual who had "-- been active in the original consideration --" of that case was precluded. The divorcement of functions thus effected as to specific cases was a natural evolutionary step in the right direction. No argument was necessary to establish the desirability of separation of the review functions, which should be quasi-judicial in nature, from the original action, which was administrative or executive in nature. With improvements in the personnel situation, this functional separation was accomplished shortly. Consonant with the dictates of legal and historical precedents, it was determined that the review function above should be separated sharply along organizational lines from the functions connected directly or indirectly with actions from which appeals were taken. The creation of the Board accomplished functional and organizational segregation. Officers assigned to the Board when it was established on 1 March 1943 were engaged exclusively in disposing of appeals. No duties or responsibilities were imposed upon them which had any other than an appellate relation to original actions from which appeals were taken.

Mission and Functions. The mission of the Industrial Employment Review Board was to serve as a representative of the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in deciding appeals from certain actions restricting or precluding the employment in connection with the war effort, of aliens and of persons suspected of subversive activity.

The functions performed by the Industrial Employment Review Board embraced the following:

a. Alien Appeals. Acted for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in reviewing denials of consent for the employment of aliens in connection with aeronautical and classified War Department and Navy Department contracts when such consent was required under statute, regulations, or contract provision.

b. War Facility Subversive Appeals. Acted for the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in reviewing suspensions of individuals suspected of subversive activity, from privately operated plants of importance to the war effort.

c. Civil Service Appeals. By order of the Secretary of War, reviewed appeals by War Department Civil Service employees, serving a trial or probationary period, from removal because of suspected subversive activity.

d. Japanese-American Appeals. By order of the Secretary of War, decided appeals by persons of Japanese ancestry from denials of consent by The Provost Marshal General for employment in plants or facilities important to the war effort, and from suspensions of such persons suspected of subversive activity.

e. War Shipping Administration Appeals. By order of the Under Secretary of War, reviewed decisions of Port Reviewing Officers in cases involving the removal of suspected subversives by the War Department from War Shipping Administration ships allocated to the Army.

f. War Department Traffic Security Board Appeals. Acted for the Secretary of War in determining finally whether orders of the Secretary of War disapproving certain persons for employment by, and prohibiting their access to the operating premises of, commercial wire and cable communications companies, were issued with or without cause.

g. Port of Embarkation Appeals. By order of the Under Secretary of War, reviewed decisions of the commanding generals of ports of embarkation in cases involving the rejections of applications for, or the revocation of, port of embarkation identification cards when rejection or revocation was expressly based on the fact that the individual was a suspected subversive.

Navy Functions. On 30 April 1942, the Secretary of the Navy suggested that the Army assume for the Navy Department, among other things, the "handling of aliens" and the "control of subversives" in all commercial plants engaged on contracts for the Navy. On 4 May 1942, the Assistant Secretary of War concurred in that suggestion. Consequently, after 4 May 1942, the War Department provided for review of alien cases and war facility subversive cases in which the original action had been initiated because of the interest of the Navy Department, or by its representatives. This combined activity provided an excellent demonstration of avoidance of duplication of departmental effort through a comprehensive consolidation. Before the transfer there occurred many inconsistencies and complications resulting from differing independent actions by the Navy Department and by the War Department

in the same case., Representation of both departmental interests in membership on the Review Committee and on the Board precluded any possibility that joint discharge of the appellate functions would be accomplished without the benefit of specialized knowledge necessary to adequate protection of interests peculiar to one of the departments concerned. The coordinated plan worked effectively and was constantly implemented by interchange of basic data. More complete integration would have been possible only with a consolidation of the departments themselves.

Alien Cases. The Air Corps Act of 1926 was the earliest statutory requirement that consent of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as appropriate, be obtained before a contractor might permit an alien to have employment in connection with specified government contracts. The relevant portions of that statute are concerned with only contracts "- -to furnish or construct aircraft, aircraft parts or aeronautical accessories - -." A subsequent statute, effective 28 June 1940, invoked a similar requirement (Sec. 11) as to the employment of aliens in connection with secret, confidential, or restricted government contracts. 6/ The latter statutory requirement was destined to termination by its own terms (Sec. 12), on 30 June 1942. Section 11 of the Act of 28 June 1940 was extended until 30 June 1944 by Section I of the HR 6355, passed by the House of Representatives on 28 January 1942 and by the Senate on 11 June 1942, with amendments which were agreed to by the House of Representatives on 22 June 1942. On 6 July 1942, HR 6355 was vetoed by the President because of objections to the extension of provisions of the Act of 28 June 1940 other than Section 11. Subsequent efforts to secure adoption of similar legislation were ineffective, principally due to opposition by the War Manpower Commission. Thereafter requirements were found in contract provisions and army regulations which were similar in substance to the requirement of the Act of 28 June 1940 and which probably were drafted to implement the provisions of that statute. Several conferences conducted with regard to the termination of Section 11 of the Act of 28 June 1940, resulted in a consensus that the validity of the requirements of both Army regulations and contract provisions was not affected by the termination of the statutory provision.

Prior to the establishment of the Industrial Employment Review Board, appeals from denials of consent for the employment of aliens, under the provisions described above, were usually resolved by one of the following methods:

- (1) Review of the record which consisted usually of an alien questionnaire, correspondence, and, in a portion of the cases, an investigation report, or

6/ Act of 28 Jun 40, Pub. No. 671 -- 76th Cong.

- (2) Review of such record in conjunction with an interview with, or "hearing" of, the individual or individuals seeking reconsideration.

No figures are available indicating the volume of appeals from denials of consent prior to 1 March 1943. During the calendar year preceding that date, approximately 2,450 denials of consent had been issued. It was found that the minimum activity ensuing upon the majority of denials of consent required action upon one or more letters in the nature of requests for reconsideration. Frequently, delegations or committees representing employees and employers appeared in person for interviews and sought reconsideration. Even before the Board was established, there was an effort to regularize reviews. 7/ There was, however, no provision for notification to interested parties of the privilege of appeal.

The provisions of statute, contract, and Army regulation, imposed upon the contractor the obligation of obtaining consent in alien cases. The contractor frequently appealed from a denial of consent. More often, however, the alien initiated the appeal. Requests for reviews were accepted from the employer, the alien, or authorized representatives of either.

The problem posed in an alien case was not identical with that presented by a subversive appeal. Succinctly stated, the question was whether the employment of the particular alien by a specific contractor in connection with aeronautical or classified War Department or Navy Department contracts might be inimical to the interests of the security. Either affirmative indications of disloyalty or the absence of sufficient information upon which to found a conclusion that such employment would entail no undue risk, was considered sufficient to furnish a basis for the Board to affirm a denial of consent.

As regards aeronautical contracts, legal authority for the alien program rested, in part, upon the Air Corps Act of 1926. As regards classified and aeronautical contracts, departmental authority for the regulatory provisions of the regulation and contract may be said to be the self-sufficient exercise of departmental contractual power. Authority of the Secretary of War was delegated orally, and later in writing on 4 September 1942, to The Provost Marshal General. The Board's power was derived from the order which created it. Although, as has been indicated, the Secretary of the Navy transferred to the Army the responsibility for the "handling of aliens", the Judge Advocate General of the Navy subsequently advised the Secretary of the Navy that he was without authority to delegate to a representative in the War Department the power to act in his stead in granting or denying consent. Consequently, each letter predicated upon the finding of the

7/ Par 5, Sec IV (Alien Employee Program), WD SOS letter, SPMGS 381, 9 August 1942 (as amended 16 January 1943), subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures".

Board in an alien case required the signatures of both The Provost Marshal General and of a naval officer authorized to act for the Secretary of the Navy.

War Facility Subversive Cases. The "Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects", appeared as Part II of the circular of 5 February 1942. That memorandum, dated 10 January 1942, was promulgated by the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Among other things, the memorandum made express provision in paragraph 2 (d) for review of removals effected thereunder. The affording of a right to review appears to have been presumed in proposals and discussions preliminary to formulation of the memorandum; the method of review, however, does not seem to have been given exhaustive attention. Even just prior to the issuance of the memorandum, there was no agreement as to whether review would be effected through "local" boards or through a "national" board. This point was not clarified for a time after the joint memorandum had been published, and an impression was disseminated by at least one labor organization that the procedure would encompass an appeal to a local board and a further appeal to a board in Washington. Several months elapsed before a generally satisfactory system for reviews was devised. Separations of the functions connected with the original actions from the appellate functions was accomplished in specific cases through the establishment of the Review Committee. In June 1942, certain criticisms were made, by a War Department representative concerned with labor relations and by one representative of a labor organization, of the review procedure. The Internal Security Division, which was then supervising operations under the circular of 5 February 1942, did not consider those criticisms well-founded.

The suspected subversive eventually learned that the War Department had contributed in some manner to termination of his employment. In only a few of the very early cases was he expressly informed personally of his right to appeal. Union representatives had been fully informed, but apparently failed to transmit the necessary information to their membership. In the event that the suspected subversive, or someone in his behalf, addressed an appeal to some agency of the government, it normally found its way to the Facility Employee Branch, Internal Security Division. Whereupon, the Review Committee obtained the record from either the files of the Facility Employee Branch or from the "local War Department representative." Originally, it was the practice of the Review Committee only to examine the record and any supplemental data. Its conclusion was then communicated to the interested parties through the agency which effected the removal. Only in that small minority of instances in which the appellant specifically requested the privilege of appearing in person, were arrangements made therefor. In event of a request for a personal appearance, the Review Committee informed the appellant of a date upon which he might appear in Washington. Distance, expense and lack of knowledge that submission of oral information was permitted, all contributed to the fact that there were very few personal appearances in connection with

earlier reviews. Most of the requests for removal emanated at that time from the Facility Employee Branch in Washington.

On 9 August 1942, it was expressly required for the first time that written individual notification of the right to contest the removal be given and a written receipt therefor obtained.^{8/} Shortly thereafter, letters from the Review Committee responding to appeals incorporated a statement that the appellant might appear personally before the Committee in Washington if he wished. In some earlier cases, appeals were prosecuted frequently without a personal appearance by appellant but with appearance on his behalf by labor representatives provided by the Washington office of the union concerned.

In or near November 1942, the review procedure was implemented by an arrangement for local hearings in selected cases. A request was made of the commanding general of the appropriate service command to appoint an officer from his staff to serve as a representative of the Review Committee in conducting a hearing in or near the locality in which the individual resided. If the case were an extremely weak one, or if the appellant protested the fact that Washington was far removed from his place of residence, use of this new device would then be invoked.

Need for development of uniform systems and procedures was apparent. In the course of a general internal reorganization within the Office of The Provost Marshal General, creation of the Industrial Employment Review Board on 1 March 1943 was a definite step in that direction. An orderly system for processing of cases was designed which is discussed later.

The Circular of 5 February 1942 contained no express provision for reinstatement of an employee, or restoration of his former employment status when it was found on review that he had been removed without sufficient cause. However, from the beginning of operations under the circular of 5 February 1942 until July 1942, reinstatement was directed by the Review Committee in each case in which it was found that the removal had been effected without sufficient cause. It was the opinion of the Review Committee that the remedy would otherwise be incomplete and inadequate. Reimbursement without reinstatement was only a partial cure of the damage to an individual wrought by an unwarranted removal. This fact appears to have been recognized emphatically in the formulation of the circular of 5 February 1942. In July of 1942 the Review Committee received an appeal in a case in which the War Department had requested that a removal be accomplished at a time when appellant had been "suspended" by independent action of his employer. On appeal, it was directed that appellant be "reinstated." That direction obviously appeared to override the action of the employer in "suspend-

^{8/} Par 11 e, Part V (Removal of Subversive Employee Program)

WD SOS letter, file SPMS 351, dated 9 August 1942, subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"

ing" appellant, which action was then subject of a serious labor controversy. As a result of the ensuing difficulties, from that time forward the language of the Review Committee's direction was altered, using, instead of "reinstatement", language indicating that appellant was to be "restored" to the status occupied by him on the date of his removal. On 25 May 1943, representatives of the Industrial Employment Review Board met with others in the Office of The Executive for the Under Secretary of War to consider whether the Board should direct either "reinstatement" or "restoration". War Department representatives concerned principally with labor relations objected vigorously to the continuation of the use of the direction either to "restore" or to "reinstate." Their objections were predicated principally upon policy considerations and fear that the War Department might be injected into a triangular dispute with employer and employee. The fact that an obligation might be considered to rest with the War Department to restore the status quo in each such case was considered but rejected as not sufficiently persuasive. It was then determined that thenceforward the Board would discontinue use of any such directive as an implementation of its findings that a removal had been effected without sufficient cause. It was not long before many protests were received by the War Department. One such protest elicited a response dated 7 July 1943 indicating that the War Department was still considering the problem. On 10 July 1943, a recommendation was made by the Office of The Provost Marshal General for solution of the problem by means of enabling contractual provisions. The Director of the Industrial Personnel Division entered a strong protest against the recommendation. A memorandum was transmitted from the Office of The Provost Marshal General to the Director of Administration on 26 July 1943 reiterating the position of The Provost Marshal General and attaching a copy of the form of letter then used by the Board in the types of cases in question. The Deputy Director of Administration approved the form letter on 28 July 1943, but did not approve the proposal of the Office of The Provost Marshal General for use of the enabling contractual provision. Cases of this sort naturally continued to harass the War Department, and no satisfactory solution was reached. The failure to require reinstatement, together with other less important matters, was the subject of a further repetitive protest by the CIO. The objections were discussed in a prolonged conference in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War on 7 September 1943. Although no solution of the problem was achieved, the matter was clearly beyond jurisdiction of the Office of The Provost Marshal General. It is interesting to note in passing that reinstatement may be required in cases involving discharge (for reasons other than subversive activity of an employee from a government-owned, contractor-operated facility.

Two items were generally incorporated as findings of the Review Committee in cases arising under the circular of 5 February 1942: first, that the removal was effected with, or without, sufficient cause, and second, that the appellant was or was not entitled to "be reimbursed for actual loss from employment." In or near August 1942, a case arose which presented a unique problem. An employee had been removed under the circular of 5 February 1942, and his removal was affirmed on

appeal. After several months, the appellant sought to have his case reopened. It was developed on rehearing that there had occurred certain changes in conditions and circumstances, which changes transpired after the Review Committee had affirmed the appellant's removal on first appeal. Those changes indicated that employment of the appellant in connection with war production would not, at the time of the second appeal, be inimical to the security interests of the United States. The problem was naturally posed as to how the barrier to appellant's employment could be removed. The Review Committee could not reverse its earlier decision since the facts would not support a finding that there was no basis at the time of removal for the required reasonable suspicion. A device was formulated whereby the Review Committee affirmed its earlier decision and found further that consideration of conditions at the time of the second review indicated that employment of appellant in connection with war production would not be inimical to the interests of the United States. It further directed the withdrawal of any objections made necessary by the removal of appellant and the finding that such removal had been effected with sufficient cause. The circular of 5 February 1942 made no express provision for such a finding or direction on review. The use of that device in similar cases was continued by the Review Committee and later by its successor, the Industrial Employment Review Board. It will be observed that the net result of such a finding, so far as employment opportunity was concerned, was to place an appellant in the same status as when it was found that he was removed without sufficient cause, except for the fact that reimbursement was denied him. This type of finding of necessity, had a very limited application.

Neither the Review Committee nor the Industrial Employment Review Board participated in computation of amounts due in the form of reimbursement. In the process of interrogation, when an appellant appeared personally, an effort was made to elicit from him information which would aid in making such a computation. Those data were communicated to the Claims Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General, which determined the amount and validity of claims. The mechanics of the reimbursement feature is a separate subject treated in detail elsewhere.

For a while, there was a difference of opinion as to the extent of the asserted authority to act in the basic Joint Memorandum. 9/ Paragraph 2 (a) states that "- - Army or Navy Representatives have authority to request the immediate removal of the individual from the Project." The authority to enforce such a request was apparently presumed. The word "Project" is not defined except by reference to the title of the document in which occurs the following phrase: "- - National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy

9/ Part II, WD Unnumbered Restricted Circular, dated 5 February 1942, subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement."

Procurement - -." Paragraph 2 e of the Joint Memorandum provided that any reimbursement " - - shall be charged against the Government contract or the Project - -." Examination of the Joint Memorandum by itself might lead one to a conclusion that its application was intended to embrace only facilities which were government owned and privately operated under contract. That presumption is promptly rebutted by reference to the caption of the circular of 5 February 1942 which incorporated the Joint Memorandum as Part II. The circular of 5 February 1942 is entitled "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement." Similarly, in the circular of 5 February 1942, the terms "request for removal", "removal", "dismissal", and "discharge" all appear to have been used without intended differences in substantive meaning. Consequently, it was decided that requests for action should be directed toward removal of the employee "from employment on, and access to, War Department or Navy Department contracts and anything relating to such work." Adoption of that language, the theory of which has not been substantially altered, was designed to place the War Department in a more readily defensible position should the employer institute litigation to upset the War Department's objective. Likewise, the request would be more readily susceptible of enforcement, if the employer refused to comply. This was partially due to the fact that many contracts contained enabling contractual provisions. The definition of "subversive activity" as enunciated in the Joint Memorandum embrace "sabotage, espionage, or any other wilful activity intended to disrupt the national defense program." Both "sabotage" and "espionage", as well as "wilful activity", are susceptible of reasonably accurate definition. Adequate investigation must reveal good cause to suspect an employee of "subversive activity" before a removal may be accomplished. A cautious technical construction of those requirements would have operated against the basic intention of the Joint Memorandum, namely, to close the barn door before the horse was stolen. Inferentially, it would have been necessary under such a technical construction for removal action to be postponed until after the act of "sabotage, espionage, or wilful activity" had been completed. Such was not the purpose in the minds of the formulators of the Joint Memorandum. It was not surprising, therefore, to discover that most removals were directed toward persons likely to cause harm, rather than employees suspected of having caused harm. There was considerable confusion as to what was embraced by "subversive activity", notwithstanding the definition in the Joint Memorandum. The Review Committee and the Board adopted a realistic view in passing upon appeals and declined to reverse any on the sole ground that no act of "sabotage, espionage or wilful activity" had been committed. Very, very few removals would otherwise have been sustained on appeal. It is possible that the Review Committee and the Board may have done technical violence to the language of the Joint Memorandum from the standpoint of pure legal construction. On the other hand, it was common knowledge that remedial revision of the Joint Memorandum was not feasible. Realism was demanded if the program was to operate, and such realism colored the views of the Review Committee and of the Board.

There were very few modifications in the basic regulations. To correct a deficiency in the mechanics for reimbursement, the sole modification in the Joint Memorandum was effected on 31 July 1943.^{10/} Other changes desired by the Office of The Provost Marshal General, some of which are discussed in the preceding paragraph were considered, but rejected. On 28 December 1943, WD Restricted Circular No. 339 was issued.^{11/} That circular replaced the circular of 5 February 1942, as well as the aforementioned WD circular of 8 September 1943. The principal changes accomplished were administrative in character. Because of objections by organized labor, the word "remove" in the language of the administrative instructions (Part I, WD Circular No. 339) was replaced by the word "suspend" in an effort to avoid possible interference by the War Department with seniority rights of the employee concerned. It is noteworthy that Part II (the Joint Memorandum) was again untouched except for incorporation of the single change as to the source of funds for reimbursement. A peculiar anomaly resulted in that the Part I of WD Circular No. 339 used "suspend", whereas Part II used "remove."

Since it appeared to be practically impossible to effect policy changes through the device of alteration of the Joint Memorandum, there were several instances in which changes of a substantive nature were accomplished through other means. The first illustration to be encountered appeared in a policy statement with regard to the War Department fingerprinting program.^{12/} The Joint Memorandum thereby came to be used as a means for excluding employees whose criminal records or histories of mental instability indicated potential hazards to security. Similarly, on 12 April 1943, a War Department letter gave implied retrospective approval to earlier interpretations of the circular which extended its scope to include removal of an employee who it was suspected was likely to cause damage.^{13/} A specific ground for removal was there spelled out where there was good cause to suspect an employee of "proclivity for subversive activity." That substantive change in policy was reiterated in a later War Department

^{10/} WD Unnumbered Restricted Circular, 8 September 1943, Subject:

"Modification of Joint Memorandum on Removal of Subversives from National Defense Projects of Importance to Army or Navy Procurement."

^{11/} WD Restricted Circular No. 339, 28 December 1943, Subject:

"Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort."

^{12/} Part VII, para 14 d and 15 d, Restricted SOS Letter, SPMGS 381, dated 9 August 1942, Subject: "Continuing Protection Policies and Procedures"; see also par 13 b, Restricted WD Letter, AG 383.4 (5 Jan 44) OB-S, dated 8 January 1944, Subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort."

^{13/} Para 2 c and 6 e, Restricted WD Letter, SPX 004.003 (4-3-43) OB-S-SPAAM-W, dated 12 April 1943, Subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army and Navy Procurement."

letter on 8 January 1944.^{14/} That letter also made minor changes in the processing of appeals.^{15/} A precipitous increase in the number of appeals certified to the Board during the latter part of 1943 and a marked increase in the percentage of suspensions reversed by the Board led to a further change in basic policy. The doctrine of calculation of risk, involved in permitting an employee to continue in a specific type of employment, was superimposed upon the unchanged requirements of the Joint Memorandum.^{16/} Although the responsibility for judging finally the risk involved was vested in the Board, very few appeals included information upon which might be based an intelligent evaluation of the importance of the facility, of the individual, or the degree of access by the individual to vital production, material or information. Further minor procedural changes in the handling of appeal records were made on 13 July 1944.^{17/} Some service commands had evolved a policy of arranging transfer of a suspected employee to work where any possible danger arising from his presence would be minimized. That practice, a fundamental change in policy not expressly provided for by the Joint Memorandum, became official with issuance of a War Department letter of 4 September 1944.^{18/}

Neither the Joint Memorandum nor the implementing circulars and letters made express reference to any stated authority; constitutional, statutory, or in Executive Order. It has been established that various agencies and departments gave consideration to recommendations for enactment of enabling legislation. Since, however, there was no known departmental effort to obtain legislation, it may be logically inferred that a conclusion was reached that such legislation was not necessary. It is probable, however, that some of the formulators of the Joint Memorandum relied upon the authority of the Secretary of War received through the delegations set forth in Executive Order No. 8972, dated 12 December 1941.^{19/} That view is enhanced by statements contained in a War Department circular enumerating the measures undertaken pursuant

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- ^{14/} Pars 12 c and 13, Restricted WD Letter, AG 383.4 (5 Jan 44) OB-S, dated 8 January 1944, Subject: "Suspension of Subversives from privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort"
- ^{15/} Pars 29, 30, and 31, Restricted WD Letter, AG 383.4 (5 Jan 44) OB-S, dated 8 January 1944, Subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort."
- ^{16/} Pars 5, 6, 7, and 8, Restricted WD Letter, AG 383.4 (10 Feb 44) OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 14 February 1944, Subject: "Suspension of Subversives."
- ^{17/} Restricted WD Letter, AG 383.4 (13 Jul 44) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 13 July 1944, Subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort."
- ^{18/} Restricted WD Letter, AG 383.4 (4 Sept 44) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 4 September 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Privately Operated Facilities of Importance to the War Effort."
- ^{19/} Reprinted in par 5, Part III, WD Circular No. 57, 20 February 1943.

to authority of Executive Order No. 8972, which included " -- the dismissal of subversives from private plants engaged in war production --."20/ The authority for review on appeal stands or falls, naturally, with the authority for the original actions from which the appeals were taken. The immediate power of the Board stemmed from the order creating it. The power thus transmitted to the Board was received by The Provost Marshal General from the Under Secretary of War.

With the cessation of hostilities, limitations imposed on employment opportunities of individuals who had been removed or suspended were withdrawn except as to employment in connection with secret and top secret contracts. The Board, with the concurrence of the Office of the Under Secretary of War, conducted a general re-examination of all appeals from removals and suspensions where it had sustained the removal or suspension. The Provost Division simultaneously undertook similar action withdrawing limitations in all cases in which no appeal had been submitted. The exception as to employment in connection with secret and top secret contracts was founded on a proposal submitted for revision of Army regulations and enactment of legislation whereby consent of the Secretary of War would become a prerequisite to access by all civilians to secret and top secret information. At the time of this writing those proposals are presently under study within the War Department.

Civil Service Cases. By order of the Secretary of War, the Industrial Employment Review Board was given jurisdiction on 3 July 1943 over appeals by War Department Civil Service employees serving a trial or probationary period, from removal because of suspected subversive activity.21/ Provision had theretofore been made for appeal by a War Department employee having a permanent Civil Service status.22/ Review of such appeals was accomplished through procedure existing under Civil Service regulations. Until 3 July 1943, there was apparently no appeal procedure for Civil Service employees serving a trial or probationary period. A specific inquiry was addressed to the Industrial Employment Review Board on 17 May 1943 as to whether there would be objection to enlargement of its jurisdiction to include appeals in that category, and the Board suggested that certain data be obtained before a decision was made. Following enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Board, the first Civil Service appeal certified, on 16 July 1943, indicated a need for clarification.

The enabling regulation was so phrased as to require virtual proof of subversive activity to allow a removal to be sustained on appeal. This and other deficiencies were corrected on suggestion of the Board in a modification of the pertinent civilian personnel regulation on 18 December 1943.23/ A closer correlation was thereby effected between the War Department policy in War Facility cases and

20/ Par 3, Part III, WD Circular No. 57, 20 February 1943.

21/ Par 3-3, Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36, 3 July 1943

22/ Par 4, Confidential WD Letter, AG 230 (3-12-43) OB-S-B-M, dated 29 March 1943, Subject: "Discharge of Subversive Civil Service Personnel."

23/ Par 3-4, Civilian Personnel Regulation No. 36, Revised, 18 December 1943

in cases involving its own employees.

The sole function of the Board in deciding appeals within this category was to determine whether the employee's removal was effected with or without cause. No provision was made for reinstatement or for reimbursement of any wages lost in the event that a removal was found to have been effected without sufficient cause.

A rather unique problem was presented in cases of this type as a result of a requirement inserted in certain military appropriation acts.^{24/} That requirement provided that no part of any appropriation contained in the act in question should be used to pay salary to any person who advocated, "or who is a member of an organization that advocates, the overthrow of the government of the United States by force - -." As a result of the ruling of The Attorney General, a person who is a member of the Communist Party of the United States was ineligible for employment by the War Department. It was a well entrenched principle governing the Board's decisions that membership in the Communist Party was alone insufficient to support a removal action in War Facility cases under the Joint Memorandum. The Board logically extended that doctrine to cases of other types where the facts were analogous. Consequently, if a War Department probationary Civil Service employee was removed, on suspicion of subversive activity, under the provisions of Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36, the Board necessarily found, if membership in the Communist Party were the sole point, that the removal was made without sufficient cause. A contradiction appeared in the fact that such an appellant was ineligible for employment in the first place. The error arose when the removing officer predicated his action upon the authority of Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36, when apparently he should have relied upon authority provided by the Civilian Personnel Regulation 60.^{25/} This situation was later adjusted by a communication from the Under Secretary of War which supplied a basis for affirming such a removal and avoiding a War Department action in apparent violation of congressional mandate.

A detailed discussion of the authority for both removal and review in cases of the sort discussed in this paragraph will be found in civilian personnel regulations.^{26/}

^{24/} e.g., Sec 11, Military Appropriation Act, 1944.

^{25/} Sec 3, Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 60, 15 January 1944.

^{26/} Par 1-2 and par 3-4 b, Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 36, Revised, 18 December 1943; par 1-2, Civilian Personnel Regulations No. 60, 15 January 1944.

Japanese-American Cases. By order of the Secretary of War, the Industrial Employment Review Board had jurisdiction over appeals by persons of Japanese ancestry from denials of consent by The Provost Marshal General for employment in a plant or facility important to the war effort and from removals of such persons under the provisions of the circular of 5 February 1942.27/ The reasons for the promulgation, on 14 October 1943, of the restrictions upon employment, peculiar to persons of Japanese ancestry, in plants and facilities important to the war effort are outlined in detail elsewhere.

It was required, among other things, that no person of Japanese ancestry be employed in an important facility until approval for the specific employment had been obtained from either the Japanese-American Joint Board or The Provost Marshal General. Very few of the appeals of this type which were certified to the Board contained any indication of action of the Japanese-American Joint Board on the question of employment. All appeals certified to the Board originated with a removal action or denial of consent initiated either by The Provost Marshal General, or by an appropriate representative of a service command or the Army Air Forces, under supervision of The Provost Marshal General.

At the time of the issuance of the original War Department letter, many persons of Japanese ancestry, theretofore evacuated from the West Coast to relocation centers, had been released by representatives of the War Relocation Authority, and had moved into industrial areas in the Middle West and East. On 14 October 1943, a number of them had already obtained employment in plants or facilities important to the war effort. Among those so employed were many whose records indicated a necessity for action under the provisions of the circular of 5 February 1942. All appeals from such removals were processed and reviewed in the usual manner.

The second group of appeals in Japanese-American cases came from individuals who had sought and been denied consent, or on whose behalf consent had been sought and denied, in accordance with the requirements of the War Department letter of 14 October 1943. As required by paragraph 16 of the "Instructions" appended to that letter, their appeals were presented and reviewed in the same manner as in appeals from denials of consent in alien cases.

Many persons of Japanese ancestry sought and obtained employment in plants and facilities important to the war effort after 14 October 1943 and without theretofore having obtained approval of such employment by either The Provost Marshal General or the Japanese-American Joint Board. Most of the appeals by Japanese-Americans certified to

27/ Para 2 c and 4, Restricted WD Letter, AG 291.2 (12 Oct 43) OB-S-SPMGP-M, dated 14 October 1943, Subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort" (Also pars 16 and 17 of appended "Instructions")

the Board were of this type. The employment of the individual concerned was terminated by action of the War Department, either indirectly or directly. Terminations were effected in such a manner that there was no substantial difference between them and those effected under the provisions of WD Circular No. 339. Among other problems, there arose a question as to whether a Japanese-American should be allowed reimbursement in a case where, without "pre-clearance", he obtained employment from which he was suspended, and the suspension was reversed on appeal. Reimbursement in such cases might encourage violation of the "pre-clearance" requirement of the 14 October 1943 letter. The Board reasoned that Japanese-Americans could not be charged with knowledge, either as a practical matter or as a matter of law, of the "pre-clearance" requirement contained in the restricted War Department letter of 14 October 1943. The Joint Memorandum and WD Circular No. 339 were the only established vehicles by which the War Department could effect this sort of employment termination on suspicion of subversive activity, and it was the view of the Board that the appeals must appropriately be entertained under the provisions of those documents. The Provost Marshal General decided that the Board:

- (1) Would consider such terminations as having been effected under the provisions of WD Circular No. 339;
- (2) Would attempt to ascertain whether the appellant had accepted the employment in question, notwithstanding his knowledge, in fact, of the existence of the War Department "pre-clearance" requirement; and
- (3) If the Board found the termination had been effected without sufficient cause and further concluded that appellant had not evidenced good faith in accepting employment without "pre-clearance", the Board would remove the barrier to his employment but would not direct reimbursement of actual monetary loss resulting from the suspension.

Very few cases were reviewed by the Board in which it appeared that the appellant had knowledge of the "pre-clearance" requirement as a condition precedent to acceptance of the employment from which he had been suspended.

Another provision of the War Department letter of 14 October 1943 required approval by The Provost Marshal General before a person of Japanese ancestry would be permitted to attend, or be employed by, an educational institution important to the war effort.^{28/} An appeal was certified to the Board from one such person who had been denied permission to attend a university. Paragraphs 2 d and 16 of the "Instruc-

^{28/} Par 2 d, Restricted WD Letter, AG 291.2 (12 Oct 43) OB-S-SPLGP-M, dated 14 October 1943, Subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort."

tions" appended to the War Department letter of 14 October 1943 laid a possible basis for appeal jurisdiction, but one of the officers contributing to the formulation of the letter and "Instructions" definitely stated that no right of appeal was intended. The Board found that it was without jurisdiction to review the action from which the appeal was taken.

In "clearing" a Japanese-American on appeal, the Board's action was always restricted to removal of the barrier as to the single facility from which he had been suspended, or where he had been denied consent. This was done to avoid inconsistencies in the simultaneous application of the provisions of WD Circular No. 339 and of the War Department letter of 14 October 1943, which documents were discussed in the second paragraph above.

Cases involving persons of Japanese ancestry were troublesome to the Board for several reasons. The inherent nature of the factors to be considered were basically different from those involving persons of different ancestry. The problems were special in nature and required considerably more research than those involved in cases of other types. Procedurally, the effecting of suspensions and terminations was often found to have been loose and informal. The individuals were frequently not informed regarding the nature of the War Department's participation in the restriction imposed upon their employment opportunities. Likewise, even in cases where circumstances led them to presume participation by the War Department, those individuals were not informed in some cases regarding their rights to appeal. Consequently, transmission of records was delayed and appeals were postponed sometimes beyond the maximum limit. Failure to conform to the maximum time within which an appeal might be submitted was waived by the Board where it was demonstrated that the individual was not given a reasonable opportunity to learn of the time limitation.

General re-examination of all appeals by Japanese-Americans was undertaken after the cessation of hostilities. Actions taken were substantially similar to those described in the discussion of War Facilities Subversive appeals. On 25 September 1945, the enabling directives covering the Japanese-American program were rescinded.^{29/} After that date, there was no difference between basic requirements affecting persons of Japanese ancestry and those affecting others. Persons of Japanese ancestry, like others employed in facilities important to procurement, remained subject to the provisions of the Joint Memorandum.

War Shipping Administration Cases. By order of the Under Secretary of War, the Industrial Employment Review Board had jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of port reviewing officers in cases involving

^{29/} Restricted WD Letter, AG 291.2 (7 Sep 45) OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 25 September 1945, subject: "Employment of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Plants and Facilities Important to the War Effort."

removal of suspected subversives by the War Department from War Shipping Administration ships allocated to the Army.

Prior to the formal creation of the Industrial Employment Review Board, a premature proposal was originated by a representative of the Industrial Personnel Division to have the Board's predecessor, the Review Committee, undertake to review several hundred accumulated cases in this category. At that time, October 1942, discharge of a number of seamen from vessels allocated to the War Department by the War Shipping Administration, had been required, apparently for security reasons, by representatives of the Army Transportation Corps. As outlined to the Review Committee, it appeared that the action of the War Department in these cases had been peremptory and not within the purview of any existing War Department directives or regulations. Among other omissions, no provision had been made for appeals. It was proposed to the Review Committee that it assume jurisdiction over cases of this type and construe the War Department discharge actions as having been consummated under the authority of the circular of 5 February 1942.^{30/} Since the proposed construction would have been of doubtful validity, particularly as to questions of reimbursement, the Review Committee declined to assume jurisdiction in the manner proposed.

Security responsibility for most vessels and water front facilities generally rested with the United States Coast Guard. An exception existed as to vessels operated by the Army Transportation Corps. Some confusion inevitably resulted. On 13 October 1942, representatives of the Review Committee attended a conference in the Office of the Executive for the Under Secretary of War, together with representatives of the Military Intelligence Service, the Industrial Personnel Division, the Navy Department and the United States Coast Guard. Consideration was again given to the general problem of security responsibility, including appeal jurisdiction over the removal of suspected subversives from Army Transports and War Shipping Administration ships allocated to the Army. At that time, the Military Intelligence Service took the position that the entire countersubversive system on board vessels of the Army Transport Service and those chartered by the Army should be placed under the control of the United States Coast Guard.

From the Fall of 1942, when most of the foregoing discussions transpired, until the fall of 1943, it does not appear that the Review Committee or the Board was injected into any phase of consideration of cases involving the Army Transportation Corps. On 13 October 1943, a proposal for enlarging the jurisdiction of the Board to include cases within this category was transmitted from the Office of the Under Secretary of War to The Provost Marshal General for consideration. It is understood that the proposal was the result of a joint study by

^{30/} WD Unnumbered Restricted Circular, dated 5 February 1942, Subject: "Discharge of Subversives from Private Plants and War Department Plants Privately Operated of Importance to Army Procurement."

representatives of the Army Transportation Corps and of the Industrial Personnel Division. In response to a request that the Board consider the proposal for enlarging its jurisdiction, the acting chairman stated, on 1 November 1943, that he agreed with the substance of the proposal and suggested that details as to phraseology and a proposed intermediate review be jointly considered by representatives of The Provost Marshal General, the Industrial Personnel Division, and the Chief of Transportation. The acting chairman further indicated his doubt as to the necessity for such intermediate review.

Following a qualified concurrence from the Assistant The Provost Marshal General, the Under Secretary of War issued instructions on 24 November 1943 which resulted in enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Board substantially in the manner proposed, but which did not eliminate the intermediate review by the port reviewing Officer. By express direction of the Under Secretary of War, the Board applied the same standards and objectives which governed decisions in War Facility Subversive cases.

As has been indicated, security responsibility as to most vessels and water front facilities rested with the United States Coast Guard, and only a small fragment of that responsibility was reserved to the War Department, namely, that relating to vessels allocated to and operated by the Army. It was only natural, therefore, that certain seamen were removed under procedures operated by the Coast Guard, and were also removed at a different time under the procedures operated by the Army Transportation Corps. In some of the cases of that sort, disposition of the appeal under the Coast Guard procedure was not in agreement with that effected under the War Department appeal procedure. Such differences in disposition were not generally reconcilable. The Office of The Provost Marshal General instigated steps to eliminate the possibility of such anomalies in a proposal whereby the War Department would agree to abide by decisions of the reviewing authority of the Coast Guard in cases within the sphere of authority of the Coast Guard, and, reciprocally, the Coast Guard would agree to abide by decisions of the reviewing authority of the War Department in cases within its sphere of authority. At a conference on 13 June 1944 attended by representatives of The Provost Marshal General, the Army Transportation Corps, the Navy Department, and the Coast Guard, this proposal and others were discussed in detail. Representatives of the Coast Guard took the position that the Coast Guard was without legal authority to acquiesce in the proposal of The Provost Marshal General under the requirements of existing executive orders affecting its jurisdiction, duties and responsibilities. A suggestion that any necessary modification of those executive orders be initiated did not meet with favor by representatives of the Coast Guard.

It was then proposed that the use of reviewing authority under either the Coast Guard procedure or under the War Department procedure be adopted for all cases of both types. Neither representatives of the Coast Guard nor representatives of the Army Transportation Corps would agree to relinquish to the other. No substantive changes resulted from the conference. It was, however, agreed that an effort would be made to avoid inconsistencies through a prompt interchange, between the War Department and the Coast Guard, of information concerning final disposition of appeal cases. Further conferences and a lengthy interchange of correspondence produced no substantial alteration in the position of either the United States Coast Guard or of the Army Transportation Corps but did succeed in accomplishing an agreement for more expeditious and efficient interchange of information.

Authority of the Board for the performance of review functions in cases of this type was derived immediately from the instructions of the Under Secretary of War, which were discussed in the second paragraph above. Authority for the review function would stand or fall with the authority for the original action which was the subject of the appeal. In most of the cases, the War Department was in the position of an employer and there could be slight doubt as to its power, in matters of this sort, over its own employees. In other cases, the War Department was in the position of a contractor in its relation to the employer of the affected seamen. In such cases, the authority of the War Department was analogous to, and perhaps stronger than, its authority in War Facility Cases.

War Department Traffic Security Board Cases. The Board acted for the Secretary of War in determining finally whether orders of the Secretary of War -- disapproving certain persons for employment by, and prohibiting their access to the operating premises (whether or not employed therein) of, commercial wire and cable communications companies --, were issued with or without cause. 31/

The Defense Communications Board, by its Order No. 3, dated 25 March 1942, authorized the Secretary of War -- to take such steps, institute such measures, and issue such regulations and orders -- as shall be necessary to safe-guard all military and naval messages handled by means of radio communications and wire communications in the United States. 32/ The Secretary of War appointed the War Department Traffic Security Board to administer the authority thus delegated. 33/

31/ Ltr, ULio (AG), AGOB-C-F 334 Industrial Employ. Review Bd. (10 Mar 44) dated 10 March 1944, Subject: "Removals from Commercial Wire and Cable Communications Companies"; par 6 d, amendment WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 10 March 1944, Subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board."

32/ Exhibit B, WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 21 January 1944, Subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board."

33/ Par 2, WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 21 January 1944, Subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board."

Among other things, it was the function of the War Department Traffic Security Board to recommend to the Secretary of War whether a specific employee should be removed on evidence of " - - subversive activities or of reasonable probability of inclinations to direct subversive activities against the United States, or for other reasons, which the Secretary of War might consider would render such employment - - detrimental to the national war effort and national safety. If such employee was thereafter removed he was accorded a right to appeal and be heard by the appropriate service command Traffic Security Board. The report of the hearing by that Board was then submitted " - - through the Commanding General of the service command in which the hearing takes place, to the Secretary of War through the War Department Traffic Security Board for final determination - -." ^{34/} Obviously, the War Department Traffic Security Board participated directly in the formulation of the original decision to remove, and thereafter, participated directly in the decision as to whether such removal was proper. Repeated efforts had been made in other fields to effect a complete separation of interests of the type which were mingled here.

On 12 February 1944, representatives of the Industrial Employment Review Board were requested to attend a conference in the Office of the Under Secretary of War together with representatives of the War Department Traffic Security Board. At that conference, it was developed that the Secretary of War had signed a letter referring to a particularly controversial case decided on appeal by the War Department Traffic Security Board, which said that nothing further could be done; whereas, another letter, also signed by the Secretary of War, stated that the case was open to consideration and might be heard by the Industrial Employment Review Board. Representatives of the Board were not informed as to the reasons for the statement in the latter letter. The Industrial Employment Review Board at that time had nothing to do with cases in this category. After considerable discussion, the Executive for the Under Secretary of War decided that the Industrial Employment Review Board would review the specific case about which the contradictory letters had been written, and further that the Industrial Employment Review Board's jurisdiction would be enlarged to permit it to consider finally for the Secretary of War all future appeals in this category. Apparently, consideration had theretofore been given to means by which the Board's jurisdiction might be thus enlarged. Jurisdiction was finally conferred upon the Industrial Employment Review Board on 10 March 1944 by The Adjutant General by order of the Secretary of War and also by the Chief of Staff by order of the Secretary of War, on 10 March 1944. ^{35/}

^{34/} Pars 4 and 5, Exhibit C, WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 21 January 1944, Subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board."

^{35/} Ltr, Ulio (AG), AGOB-C-F 334 Industrial Employ. Review Board, dated 10 March 1944, Subject: "Removals from Commercial Wire and Cable Communications Companies"; Amendment, WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 10 March 1944, Subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board."

There was one distinct difference in criteria governing the Board's determinations in cases within this category. The grounds for removal included not only subversive activity and " - - reasonable probability of inclinations to direct - -" such activity, but also " - - any other reason which the Secretary of War might consider would render such employment or access detrimental to the safety of military and naval messages handled by means of radio communication or wire communications under the jurisdiction of the United States." 36/

As previously indicated, the immediate authority of the Board was derived from express orders of the Secretary of War. His authority, the Secretary of War received by authorization of the Defense Communications Board. 37/ The delineation of the legal authority of the Defense Communications Board may be traced through a study of Executive Order No. 8964, dated 10 December 1941; and Executive Order No. 9089, dated 6 March 1942. 38/

Shortly after cessation of hostilities, restrictive rules and regulations imposed upon commercial telephone and telegraph companies were rescinded. 39/

Port of Embarkation Appeals. By direction of the Under Secretary of War, the Board had jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the commanding generals of the ports of embarkation in cases involving the rejection of application for, or the revocation of, port of embarkation identification cards when rejection or revocation was expressly based on the fact that the individual was a suspected subversive.

The commanding general of a port of embarkation had authority, apparently unrestricted, to admit or exclude any person from such installation. In order to facilitate control of entrance of persons who had been "cleared", the commanding general issued or refused port of embarkation identification cards. For example, certain civilians who were engaged as servicemen for utility companies, or as employees of contractors engaged in performing a contract within the limits of the installation, required admission to the installation in order to discharge their civilian employment obligations. On 13 June 1945, the Director, Industrial Personnel Division, with the concurrence of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, recommended

36/ Par 1, Exhibit C, WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 21 January 1944, subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board"; Ltr, Ulio (AG), AGOB-C-F 334 Industrial Employ. Review Board, dated 10 March 1944, subject: "Suspension of Subversives from Wire and Cable Communications Companies."

37/ Exhibit B, WD Memo No. W380-44, dated 21 January 1944, subject: "Administration of War Department Traffic Security Board."

38/ Exec Ord No. 8964, dated 10 December 1941; Exec Ord No. 9089, dated 6 March 1942

39/ Section VII, WD Circular No. 292, dated 25 September 1945

that the jurisdiction of the Board be enlarged to include review of decisions of commanding generals of ports of embarkation identification cards. The Provost Marshal General concurred in enlargement to include only cases in which rejection or revocation was based on the fact that the individual was a suspected subversive. The Under Secretary of War approved the recommendation as qualified.

No detailed study has been made of the authority of the commanding general of a port of embarkation to refuse admission to civilians in the manner indicated. Apparently, in the absence of restrictions imposed upon him by his superiors, his authority was complete. The authority of the Board to review applications apparently was to be coextensive with that of the commanding general to take the original action.

Organization and Operation of the Industrial Employment Review Board.

Location. The Industrial Employment Review Board was organized as a separate entity coordinate with the several divisions in the Office of The Provost Marshal General. Administratively, it reported to The Provost Marshal General through an Assistant The Provost Marshal General. By reason of the fact that it acted, in most of its functions, for or on order of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of War, or the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, or some combination of them, its organizational location was the source of a number of questions. Since the majority of the functions performed by the Board emanated immediately from the Under Secretary of War, the activities of the Board were considered to be under the general supervision of the Under Secretary of War. In actual practice, however, the appellate dispositions of the Board were of a conclusive nature and were not subjected to review by individuals or units located in a superior echelon.

Representation of Various Interests. At the time of the establishment of the Review Committee, on 4 May 1942, the personnel of the Committee was composed entirely of officers assigned to the Office of The Provost Marshal General. It was at this time that the War Department undertook for the Navy Department the "handling of aliens" and the "control of subversives" in all commercial plants engaged on contracts for the Navy. Consequently, a Navy officer was designated to serve as an auxiliary member of the Review Committee in May 1942, shortly after the Review Committee had been created. Navy representatives served after that time without necessary reference to the departmental interest involved in the specific cases reviewed. On the voluntary initiative of the Review Committee and later of the Board, it was customarily required, however, that a Navy representative serve on panels in cases in which the Navy Department had a procurement or other interest. Special procurement and other interests of the Army Air Forces were also involved in a proportion of the cases reviewed. The Army Air Forces accepted an invitation to designate one of its officers as its first auxiliary member of the Board on 1 June 1943.

As in the case of the Navy representatives, the officers from the Army Air Forces served on review panels without distinction as to the procurement interest or security responsibility involved. Consistent with the wishes of the Air Provost Marshal, a representative of the Army Air Forces was designated to sit on all cases involving procurement or other interests of the Army Air Forces. Assignment of additional representatives from the Navy Department and from the Army Air Forces, commensurate with the increase in the volume of work of the Board will be hereinafter discussed.

Personnel. Not unlike most organizations in the War Department the Review Committee was constantly plagued by shortage of personnel. For some time, similar problems complicated the work of the Board. The Review Committee originally consisted of a Chairman, Secretary, and two members. Two of those four were so involved with other duties that they were unable materially to assist the Review Committee in the discharge of its responsibilities. The first Navy position was created on 16 May 1942. Two additional positions were allotted by The Provost Marshal General; one on 1 October 1942, and another on 21 October 1942. The Industrial Employment Review Board, when created on 1 March 1943, consisted of a Chairman, an Executive, four members and one auxiliary Navy member with a designated alternate. Broadening of the jurisdiction of the Board and increases in its work load required additions in personnel until May 1944. At that time, the total membership of the Board included nine members furnished by The Provost Marshal General, three furnished by the Army Air Forces, and three furnished by the Navy Department. Included in the nine furnished by The Provost Marshal General, were the Chairman, the Executive, and the Administrative Officer for the Chicago Panel which will be discussed later. Sufficient personnel was thus available to arrange for three Review Panels, each consisting of one representative from the Office of The Provost Marshal General, one from the Army Air Forces, and one from the Navy Department. After May 1944, the membership of the Board was consistently reduced commensurately with the decrease in the volume of cases certified to the Board. The Chairman and the Executive were not regularly available for assignment to Review Panels. Representation was normally possible on each Review Panel for the Army Service Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Navy Department. After the cessation of hostilities, the volume of the work of the Board was substantially reduced. Commensurate reductions in personnel were effected to a point where membership of the Board consisted primarily of personnel made available on a part time basis from the Army Service Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Navy Department.

Qualifications Desirable for Member of Board. Legal or judicial experience was generally considered the principal qualification desirable in selection of personnel for the Board. In general practice, however, it was not always feasible for the Chairman of the Board to consider the background and qualifications of personnel prior to their

selection and assignment to the Board. Since that was not practicable, the Chairman made available to appropriate representatives of each service furnishing personnel to the Board, a written statement setting forth what the Board considered desirable in the way of qualifications.

Review Panels. The entire Review Committee, except one member who served as administrative officer, or "Recorder", jointly considered each appeal. As previously indicated, membership of the Review Committee varied from a total of four to a total of six. In practice, a total of three was considered necessary to form a quorum. Because of the increasing volume of work, because of limited personnel, and in the interest of efficiency of operation, a panel system was designed simultaneously with the creation of the Industrial Employment Review Board. A review panel consisted normally of three officers, the senior of whom served as president of the review panel. Assignments to review panels did not follow a regular rotation. Panels were so arranged that a representative of the Navy Department and one from the Army Air Forces were included on review panels considering each appeal in which the agency concerned had a procurement or other interest. Under the panel system, there were other factors which, at times, operated contrary to regular efforts to equalize the work load of each member of the Board. Assignments were arranged, so far as practicable, to select the best qualified among those available at the time to serve as president of the review panel; to avoid personality conflicts; to assure review panels that were "balanced"; and to have present on each review panel one of the better interrogators.

"Master" Cases. As has been previously indicated, the Board arranged in certain selected cases for "local" hearings before an officer designated to serve as a representative of the Board. In the absence of a personal appearance by an appellant, the review panel designated to act on the appeal, considered whether the appellant should be afforded the opportunity to appear before a representative of the Board in the locality of appellant's residence or place of employment. If the decision were negative, the appeal was then decided after examination of the record. If the decision were affirmative, appropriate instructions were communicated to the commanding general of the proper service command. After the local hearing, the transcript and statement of the representative were returned to the Board. A review panel (to the extent practicable, of the same composition as that which decided that the appellant might be heard locally) was designated to review finally the appeal. The procedure described in this paragraph was modified with the establishment of the Chicago and New York panels.

Branch Panels. In order to expedite the work of the Board, to facilitate personal appearances, and consequently to reduce to a minimum the effect of removals upon the manpower situation, The Provost Marshal General recommended on 20 January 1944 that branch panels of the Board be authorized. Similar organizational proposals had been

explored previously, and the change, which was a natural development, was approved on 28 January 1944. The plan contemplated not to exceed three branch panels located in industrial areas and unrestricted by service command boundaries.

The first branch panel was created and began functioning in Chicago, Illinois on 1 March 1944. 40/ The Chicago Branch Panel was designated a Class IV Installation. That arrangement left operational control with The Provost Marshal General but required the Commanding General of the Sixth Service Command to furnish "housekeeping services." At that time, the entire personnel of the Board was stationed in Washington, D. C. Assignments to the Chicago Panel were rotated among the membership, each member customarily serving a tour of one month. Initial assignments were staggered so as to institute a rotation whereby one member of the Chicago Panel departed simultaneously with the arrival of his relief at the conclusion of each of the last three of every four consecutive calendar weeks. The Provost Marshal General initiated that rotation system in an effort to insure more uniform consideration by all panels and to facilitate a constant interchange of views and opinions among all members of the Board. That system remained in effect until 19 June 1944, at which time the organization of the Board was again substantially changed.

Establishment of the second branch panel in New York City, New York, was first considered in April 1944. The Provost Marshal General announced his determination of the necessity for such installation and recommended publication of the necessary circular on 5 May 1944. Apparently as a result of objections emanating from the Office of The Air Provost Marshal, a conference was arranged on 5 May 1944 by the Executive for the Under Secretary of War. It was decided to operate the installation for a period of six weeks "on a trial basis." Difficulty and delay were experienced in the processing of the necessary circular which was finally issued on 22 May 1944. 41/ On 7 August 1944, a report was submitted to the Under Secretary of War covering the operations of the New York Branch Panel for the period from 19 June 1944 to 29 July 1944. It was recommended that the New York Branch Panel be continued so long as the geographic distribution of appeals remained substantially unaltered. That recommendation was approved.

Initiation of Proceedings. Requests for review in cases of all types were transmitted through the Personnel Security Division (later the Provost Division), Office of The Provost Marshal General. It was the function of that Division to procure all relevant parts of the record and obtain all pertinent information. The record was examined in the Office of the Chairman of the Board to assure that the appeal was ready for initiation of proceedings. A letter was then dispatched

40/ Part One, Sec. 1, ASF Circular No. 41, dated 7 February 1944.

41/ Part Two, Sec. 1, ASF Circular No. 151, dated 22 May 1944.

from the office of the Chairman to the appellant informing him of the methods by which his appeal might be perfected. The entire record was thereafter transmitted to Chicago or New York if appropriate. Appeals emanating from within the geographical limits of the First and Second Service Commands were assigned to the New York Panel. Appeals from within the geographical limits of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Service Commands were assigned to the Chicago Panel. To the Washington Panel were assigned appeals from locations within the geographical limits of the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Service Commands.

In each case in the last group the appellant was regularly afforded, among other methods, the privilege of appearing before a representative of the Board in the location where he was employed.

In all cases, one of the methods provided was the privilege of appearing before a Panel in Washington. The decision to afford that opportunity grew out of several factors. First, it was desired to counteract any false presumption that a decision after review of a case by a Panel in New York or Chicago was appealable to a "superior" Board in Washington. Second, many appellants were represented by unions and attorneys for unions having their principal offices in Washington. Third, employers often initiated appeals or appeared in behalf of appellants, and their presence in Washington was frequently required by other matters unrelated to the Board.

The initial letters addressed to the appellant and others interested in the appeal specified that an election of methods must be made within fifteen days from the dispatch date of the letter, or otherwise the Board would proceed to decide the appeal on the record alone.

Following discontinuance of the New York and Chicago Branch Panels, initial letters addressed to appellants offered a choice of three methods of appeal. The appellant could appear personally in Washington, or before a Representative of the Board in the vicinity of the appellant's residence. Without appearing personally, the appellant could supplement the record with written information and have his appeal decided on the record as supplemented.

Assignment of Cases. The President of the Review Panel assigned each case to a Member who served as interrogating officer, and whose function it was to prepare the opinion and to supervise the preparation of the minutes and letter announcing the decision of the Board. It was the responsibility of that officer to assure that each of his colleagues on the Review Panel had an opportunity, in advance of the date set for consideration of the appeal, to examine completely all files in the case. It was his responsibility, if the case was decided on the record alone, to summarize for the Review Panel the salient factors of the case and to state the issue as he saw it.

Review of Record Alone. If appellant indicated a wish to have his appeal decided without his personal appearance and indicated that he would submit additional written information, the acknowledgement of

his letter specified the time when his appeal would be considered.

Likewise, if no further action was taken by appellant after his initial request for review, his appeal was decided on the stipulated date after examination of the record alone.

Review after Personal Appearance. If the appellant elected to appear personally, his case was docketed, and a letter addressed to him specifying the time for his hearing. In setting the hearing date, a reasonable time was allowed for appellant to obtain counsel and arrange for transportation.

If the appellant appeared personally, the President of the Review Panel read a prepared opening statement indicating the conditions under which the hearing would proceed. Each appellant was afforded an opportunity, but was not required, to submit his testimony under oath. A similar privilege was accorded all persons submitting information on behalf of the appellant.

Normally, the case was then developed through interrogation conducted by the member of the Review Panel to whom the case was assigned. Interrogation often proved to be extremely difficult for the reason that all information which furnished the basis for appellant's removal usually bore a confidential classification. It was an inflexible requirement that the appellant be provided with no information indicating the nature or source of the data which furnished the basis for the original action. It was obviously mandatory, therefore, that interrogation be skillfully designed. In the majority of cases that came before the Board, the record included one or more reports of investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is particularly noteworthy, therefore, that, throughout the history of the Board's activity, only one complaint reached the Board to the effect that the identity of informants was revealed. Even in that case, the complaint appeared not to have been well-founded and the situation was explained to the satisfaction of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In the preparation of reports of investigations conducted by the service commands, it was required that the identity of the informants be concealed. The report provided no factual information upon which the reader could base his own conclusion as to an unidentified informant's credibility. Some of those reports did contain the investigating agent's conclusion as to such informant's reliability or credibility. Under the circumstances, it was often difficult, if not impossible to determine, for example, whether an agent was actuated by bias or prejudice. Superimposed upon those obstacles was the fact that, with few exceptions, actions appealed to the Board were based upon suspicions directed toward an individual's loyalty, from which suspicions were drawn a conclusion that such an individual constituted a poor security risk. Naturally, interrogation into such circumstances could not be conducted in the ruthless manner of many prosecutors.

Discovery of the truth, not conviction on a stated charge, was necessarily the object of the interrogation. Generally, members of the Board sought to obtain a variety of information which would enable the Board to evaluate the man. Reactions, both mental and physical, emotions, and other tenuous indices of the individual's propensities as they affected his loyalty, were observed and weighed. The appellant was questioned in considerable detail, though seldom directly, with regard to all the various allegations and suspicions which were the source of his difficulty. Fortunately, most of the members of the Board had had considerable experience in examination of witnesses. They were cognizant of the problem confronting the appellant on appeal and were equally aware of the security requirements and the dangers of the risk to be calculated.

In a progressively increasing percentage of cases considered by the Board, appellants were represented by counsel and accompanied by witnesses, representatives of employers, representatives of employees, and counsel for either or both. With regard to the circumscribing restrictions upon the information which precipitated the War Department action, interrogation of the appellant by a member of the Board usually followed immediately after the reading of the opening statement by the President of the Review Panel. If the appellant or his representative indicated a preference to proceed by submitting a statement or by subjecting himself to interrogation by his own representative prior to interrogation by a member of the Board, that privilege was usually accorded him. Generally, however, statements and interrogation by attorneys for appellant followed interrogation by a member of the Board. Conformance with the usual rules of evidence was not normally required. The Board was extremely lenient with respect to the nature and extent of information submitted by appellant to support his case. Such liberality grew out of the recognition of the fact that the appellant was combating unspecified and unstated suspicions and allegations.

In all cases, it was the practice of the Board to notify the War Department agency, which initiated the original action from which the appeal was taken, with respect to the time and place set for the review. That practice was designed to enable such agency to arrange for a representative to attend and present any data or information not fully expressed in the record as submitted to the Board. The representatives were accorded the privilege of submitting any additional written or oral information pertaining to the case.

After all information had been submitted, the panel engaged in an executive session in which the entire case was summarized by the member responsible for its development. After a full discussion, the Review Panel's proposed disposition of the appeal was then determined. Customarily, except when pressure of an inordinate work load prevented, a written statement of the Review Panel's reasoning was prepared in memorandum form by the officer responsible for the development of the

case. In the event of a divided vote, the member to whom the case was assigned prepared the majority opinion if he voted with the majority. A dissenting member was privileged to incorporate a written statement of his dissent, but was not required to do so unless the circumstances made it necessary in the opinion of the President of the Review Panel. If the member responsible for development of the case dissented, the President of the Review Panel designated himself or the third member to write the majority opinion.

Realizing the importance of viewing personally an individual as an aid to a proper evaluation of risk as to loyalties, the Board recommended that the specific officer who made the decision whether to suspend, be required to interview the suspect personally before reaching his decision. None of several recommendations of this sort was adopted.

Minutes of Board's Actions and Letters Communicating the Board's Decisions. Minutes were prepared in each Board action and signed by the members of the Review Panel. The minutes detailed the Board's findings and were articulated with the letters announcing the findings and stating directions when required.

In order to comply with requirements of the controlling statute, as well as requirements of regulations and contracts, letters in alien cases bore the signatures of both The Provost Marshal General for the Secretary of War and of a designated representative of the Secretary of the Navy. Such letters were necessarily addressed to the contractors who originally sought consent, and copies were provided for the alien and for other interested persons and agencies.

In War Facility Subversive cases, decisions of the Board fell generally into three categories; first, when the suspension was found to have been effected with sufficient cause; second, when without sufficient cause; and third, when with sufficient cause but where objections were withdrawn to employment of appellant in connection with War Department and Navy Department contracts. Cases in the last category included some in which removal of the barrier was qualified to permit appellant's employment in only certain type(s) of work, or in a certain facility, or under certain stipulated condition(s), or some combination of those restrictions. Except in cases under WD Circular 339 where reimbursement was involved, subversive letters were addressed to the agency which initiated the action from which the appeal was taken. In cases within that excepted group, the letter was dispatched directly to the appellant and copies were transmitted to other interested persons and agencies. The reasons for adoption of this practice in August 1944 were to reduce to a minimum the cost of reimbursement and to expedite removal of the barrier to the appellant's resumption of employment in connection with war production. It was, however, decided not to extend further that modification of procedure since the persuasive reasons therefor were not present in cases of other types.

In other types of cases coming within the jurisdiction of the Board, minutes and letters announcing decisions of the Board generally followed the forms described in the preceding subparagraphs. Modifications appeared principally where it was necessary to stipulate expressly a difference in the source of the Board's authority or jurisdiction.

Reconsideration. There was nothing which expressly delimited or which expressly activated the authority of the Board to reconsider its own action in any case which it had previously decided. The status of the authority of the Board's predecessor, the Review Committee, was identical in this respect. Logic, unwritten expressions of views, and inferences from basic written data, all supported the conclusion adopted in the early days by the Review Committee, to re-examine its own decision when such action appeared appropriate under the circumstances. It should again be noted that the character of the information which precipitated suspensions and like actions, as well as the nature of the proceedings connected therewith, were such as to militate strongly against any contrary conclusion. In individual letters signed by the Under Secretary of War, the view was repeatedly expressed that none of these cases was ever "closed."

After 1 July 1943, determination as to whether an application for reconsideration should be granted, became the primary function of a panel, "-- no member of which shall have sat as a member of the panel which originally heard the case." That change necessitated considerable additional work in disposing of requests for reconsideration. Under the altered procedure, it was required that an entirely new panel examine the complete record and then weigh the data submitted in support of the request that the case be reopened. The underlying reason for the change was the desire to assure a thorough examination of new data with no possibility of a biased conclusion. Normally, the Board would entertain a request for reconsideration of an appeal when submitted by the affected employee, an interested employer, an interested labor official, an interested government agency, or a representative of any of them. The recommendation of the panel, acting upon a request for reconsideration, became final when approved by the Chairman of the Board. If disapproved, it was required that the case be submitted to The Provost Marshal General for decision. It is interesting to note that this was the sole instance in which proceedings by the Board might be required to be submitted outside the Board for decision. In practice, no such case ever arose. Later, with the creation of branch panels, it became increasingly difficult to adhere to the instructions described in this subparagraph regarding the formulation of panels in disposing of requests for reconsideration. So far as was practicable, however, such panels continued to be composed of members who had not participated in the original decision.

Effect of Review Panel's Proposed Disposition. If the disposition of an appeal proposed by a Review Panel was approved by the Chairman of the Board, it thereupon became the decision of the Board, and was final and conclusive. Operating through the medium of several such

panels, there existed a possibility that treatment of appeals might not necessarily be uniform. Great weight was attached to the value of such a panel's personal examination of an appellant, which occurred in the vast majority of cases. That opportunity for personal examination was naturally not available to the Executive Officer or the Chairman in their review of the completed records. A serious procedural problem was posed when there resulted a disagreement with the conclusions proposed by a Review Panel. In such cases, it was the established practice of the Board from the beginning of its operations, for the Chairman to remand the record to the Review Panel and communicate to that panel the reasons for his different view. Illustrative were cases in which the decision proposed represented an apparent departure from a well defined trend in Board actions or in which the disposition proposed was contrary to other Board actions in cases where the facts were apparently similar. The Review Panel then was obliged only to re-examine the entire record and give full consideration to the factors pointed out by the Chairman. The panel modified its proposed disposition to agree with the view of the Chairman, or adhered to its original position. In either case, the disposition thereafter proposed became the decision of the Board. This phase of the Board's procedure caused concern for some of the officers who served as Chairman of the Board. In each instance, however, after exploration of the entire situation, a conclusion was reached to continue the policy as outlined.

Fingerprinting. Shortly after the creation of the Board, a paragraph was incorporated in letters outlining methods by which appeals might be perfected, which required that the appellant be fingerprinted before his appeal might be given further consideration. That requirement was included at the request of the Director, Personnel Security Division (later the Provost Division), in order that the prints might be recorded with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Since the language of the Personnel Security Division requirement was so designed as apparently to make fingerprinting a condition precedent, some difficulties ensued. When an appellant did not appear personally, the fingerprinting requirement was not in fact construed an actual bar to further consideration of his appeal. Eventually, statement of the requirement in letters to appellants was eliminated entirely. At the request of the Director, Personnel Security Division (later the Provost Division) the Board continued to obtain prints from appellants when they appeared personally, in order to comply with the wishes of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"Reversals." Of the 2,952 cases which had been decided by the Board on 26 October 1945, 722 or 25%, fell within the "reversed" category. 2378 of the total cases were subversive; in that group there were 458 cases "reversed" or 19%. The remaining 574 cases were alien cases of which 261 or 46% were in the "reversed" category. The disparity in the percentage differences between the two types arose principally from the fact that a "reversal" in a subversive case was effectually a clearance for work on all War Department and Navy Department contracts, whereas a "reversal" in an alien case was a limited clearance for one facility.

Each case "reversed" upset a decision, usually well considered, by one or more representatives of the War Department or Navy Department. It was not surprising, therefore, that criticism was occasioned by some "reversal" actions of the Board. Cognizance was taken in an official War Department letter of such criticism.^{42/} Similar influence of that factor had theretofore come to the attention of The Provost Marshal General, and remedial action had been initiated.

The value of the opportunity for personal examination of an appellant was emphasized throughout the history of the Board. The entire subject of "reversals" and the importance of personal appearances were made the subject of an exhaustive study, dated 25 August 1944. In that study it was concluded, among other things, that the experience of the Board, as a quasi-judicial body, was in line with that of courts of law. It was pointed out that when cases were submitted to the United States Supreme Court merely on written brief, without oral argument, there were fewer reversals than when cases were argued. The Review Board was denied one advantage afforded to regular courts in that the latter had the additional benefit of hearing oral arguments from both parties to the case.

Attacks upon Validity of Proceedings before the Board. Inasmuch as decisions of the Board had the resultant effect of limiting, in varying degrees, the employment opportunities of appellants whose appeals were not sustained, the infrequency of legal attacks upon Board proceedings is somewhat surprising. Particularly is that true as to War Facility Subversive cases. The majority of appellants in such cases were highly skilled mechanics or supervisors who, upon being barred from employment in connection with War Department and Navy Department contracts, necessarily experienced difficulty in following their vocations since the greatest part of their type of work was devoted to production under the contracts in question. Many appellants were highly paid executives, technical experts, or key employees of important industrial facilities. Normally, all these appellants found their incomes substantially reduced as an indirect result of decisions of the Board. Some significance of the effectiveness and accuracy of the work of the Board may be indicated by the fact that, at this writing, out of 2952 actions by this Board, only four attacks against the validity of the Board's action have arisen. No one of the four has yet met with success.

In Marie Schadt vs Arthur Boyer, et al, plaintiff alleged that she had been arbitrarily removed from her employment in a facility which was engaged on war contracts, and ordered to leave the premises.^{43/} Plaintiff alleged that the Board, on appeal, denied her application for a specification of reasons for her removal. The complaint stated that plaintiff's removal was arbitrary, illegal, under cover of right

^{42/} Pars 1 and 2, WD Letter, AG 383.4 (10 Feb 44) OB-S-SPMG-M, dated 14 February 1944, Subject: "Suspension of Subversives."

^{43/} Schadt vs Boyer, et al, Civil No. 3446, E. D. Pa (1943)

granted by the Espionage Act and the Joint Memorandum, and had deprived her of her "liberty and property without due process of law, which are guaranteed her under the Fifth Amendment - -." Claiming no adequate remedy at law, plaintiff sought relief by injunction against defendant's continuing in effect the removal order and requiring withdrawal of same. The complaint further sought affirmative relief through notification to interested persons and agencies that plaintiff was lawfully entitled to be employed wherever she desired. Monetary damages also were sought. Attorneys for Schadt likewise represented the plaintiff in Albert Andrew Flinspach vs Arthur J. Boyer, et al.^{44/} The complaint in the Flinspach case proceeded upon premises legally identical with those in the Schadt case. Defendant, Major Boyer, in both suits was the officer on whose immediate request the removal had been effected. In both suits, Major General Allen W. Gullion, The Provost Marshal General at that time, 30 September 1943, was also joined as a defendant, and a copy of the summons and complaint were received by him in the District of Columbia through the mail. Motions to quash the purported service of process as to General Gullion were filed, indicating that the attempted services were null and void since they were made by mail and outside the jurisdiction of the court. At the same time, defendant Boyer filed motions to dismiss on the ground that defendant Gullion was an indispensable party to the suits and could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and on the further ground, in the Schadt case, that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Both cases were heard before Judge Kirkpatrick on 3 December 1943. The motions were sustained on the obvious grounds that purported service of General Gullion was not sufficient and that he was an indispensable party. Although the memorandum opinion does not so indicate, it is understood that Judge Kirkpatrick, during the discussion of the motion in chambers, expressed his view that the discharge of the defendants was effected by their employers, even if induced by representatives of the Army, and that plaintiffs were consequently in the wrong court. The remedy, if any, would be for malicious interference with contracts.

The plaintiff, in William K. Gohr vs United States of America, et al joined as defendants, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Board, the Board, the local Army Air Forces representatives, the employer corporation, and the copartnership which was successor to the employer corporation.^{45/} Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment. The complaint alleged that plaintiff was employed under war contracts, was removed, and appealed to the Board. It was further alleged that, on appeal, plaintiff's removal was found to have been effected without cause, but that upon request of representatives of the Army Air Corps the Board reconsidered its action before notifying plaintiff and without permitting plaintiff's counsel to

^{44/} Flinspach vs Boyer, Civil No. 3350, E. D. Pa. (1943)

^{45/} Gohr vs United States, et al, Civil No. 2477, E. D. No. (1944)

appear at the "rehearing" despite his request to do so. Plaintiff alleged that on "rehearing" the Board affirmed the removal. It was further averred that the actions, procedures and orders of the Board were unconstitutional and discriminatory in that: the Fifth Amendment was violated since his liberty and property were taken without due process, the Sixth Amendment was violated in failure to apprise plaintiff of charges against him, the Board entered a "special order of a quasi-criminal nature" without giving him his constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses, the Board acted upon hearsay, the Board denied plaintiff a public trial, and the lack of appeal from the decision of the Board was an attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction. The complaint was patently subject to the same attack as in the Schadl and Flinspach cases, since many of the defendants were served outside the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, since the United States is suable only with its consent, and since the United States had not consented to be sued in cases of this character, plaintiff's attempt was obviously doomed to failure. Several motions to dismiss were filed simultaneously. In one motion, the United States contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that the court had no jurisdiction, and that the United States as a sovereign had not consented to be sued. A second motion attacked the inadequacy of service as to the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the Industrial Employment Review Board. The third motion stated that, as to certain of the defendants, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies and since plaintiff had not been injured by action of the defendants. The jurisdiction of the court was also attacked for apparent reasons. On 29 May 1944, Judge George H. Moore sustained all three of the defense motions and overruled plaintiff's motion to inspect and copy records. Unfortunately, no memorandum opinion was filed and the orders were entered without comment by the Court. Subsequently, on 5 July 1944, plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, only the United States appeared as defendant. Plaintiff, in his amended complaint, claimed to have been subrogated to the rights of a bankrupt corporation which was a defendant in the original complaint. Plaintiff sought to obtain judgment of the Court construing a contract between the bankrupt corporation and the United States. The theory advanced appears devious and was probably capable of no better support than was the original complaint.

In Hans von Knorr vs Sherman Miles plaintiff alleged that the defendant had "ordered" his employer the Cities Service Oil Company to remove the plaintiff from employment on and access to work under War Department or Navy Department contracts and anything pertaining to such work, and that pursuant to such order, plaintiff was forcibly removed.^{46/} The complaint claimed deprivation of liberty without due process of law and sought injunctive relief. Examination of the answer filed in this case indicated that the authority for the War

^{46/} von Knorr vs Sherman Miles, Civil No. 2513, D. C. Mass (1944)

Department's entire security program was subjected to test as a result of the manner in which the issues were joined. The facts of this particular case do not indicate that it was a particularly desirable one, from the standpoint of the government, upon which to base such a test. The position of the government was upheld in the District Court. The theory of a part of the opinion of the Court is at considerable variance with that advanced by the government. At the time of this writing, an appeal by the plaintiff is pending.

PART II

PROVOST ACTIVITIES

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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

The mission of The Provost Marshal General with respect to criminal investigation included preparation of general policies, plans, and procedures and staff supervision and control over criminal investigations within the military establishment. 1/

Prior to December 1943, the following policy, published in a War Department letter dated 28 June 1942, was strictly observed: "Criminal investigation is not a function of the Office of The Provost Marshal General. It is a function of command, normally conducted by military police personnel in the command." 2/ This policy resulted from a study in June 1942 by the Investigations Division, RIGC, recommending that the pending criminal cases be closed promptly and that, since criminal investigation is a function of command, all future criminal investigation cases received by The Provost Marshal General be referred to the appropriate commander for action. 3/

Upon assignment of the mission of staff supervision over criminal investigation within the military establishment to The Provost Marshal General in December 1943, it was necessary to rescind the War Department letter of 28 June 1942. 4/

The immediate cause for change of War Department policy regarding supervision over criminal investigation was the necessity for control of expenditures of confidential funds needed by service commanders in the conduct of criminal investigations. In addition, there had developed a need for coordination of criminal investigation activities between the War Department and other Federal agencies, between service commands and overseas commands, and between the War Department and civilian agencies. The Provost Marshal General established in his office a Provost Division, on 8 January

1/ Transmittal Sheet from Control Div, ASF, to Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, w/1st Ind and Incls, dated 8 December 1943

2/ WD letter, file AG 029 (6-24-42) MS-SPMGI-M, dated 28 June 1942, subject: "Investigational Functions of Office of The Provost Marshal General"

3/ Memorandum for The Provost Marshal General, dated 16 June 1942, subject: "Criminal Investigations"

4/ WD letter, file AG 020 (29 Mar 44) OB-3-SPMGI-M, dated 8 April 1944, subject: "Additional Investigative Functions of the Security Intelligence Corps"

1944, which was charged with the execution of his mission pertaining to criminal investigation.^{5/} The Provost Division was divided into three branches of which one was the Criminal Investigation Branch, charged with responsibility for the preparation of plans, policies and procedures and the exercise of staff supervision and control over criminal investigation within the military establishment.^{6/}

Criminal Investigation Within the Army Service Forces

To enable The Provost Marshal General to exercise supervision over the conduct of criminal investigation within the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces, it was necessary that he be provided, among other things, with monthly statistics on criminal investigation activities in the Zone of the Interior. Accordingly, an Army Service Forces letter was issued on 17 February 1944 to the commanding generals of all numbered service commands and the Military District of Washington, requiring submission to The Provost Marshal General of a monthly report containing detailed information on the number and types of criminal investigations pending at the first of each month, cases opened during the month, cases closed during the month, cases pending at the end of the month, and cases pending over sixty days.^{7/} Reports for February 1944, as submitted by the service commands, were incomplete because statistics of this kind had not been maintained by the service commands and could not be reconstructed. Subsequent reports for March and April 1944 showed improvement, but there was still considerable confusion regarding the classification of crimes. "Miscellaneous or other offenses" showed an increasing volume and included many offenses that were of a purely military nature. These were not pertinent because they were, for the most part, breaches of discipline and not crimes. In order to clarify this situation, supplemental instructions were published on 27 May 1944.^{8/}

During the first three months of 1944, several service commands were experiencing difficulty, due to a lack of trained personnel, in conducting criminal investigations. Service commanders desired to use Security Intelligence Corps personnel in criminal investigative activities since many of these agents

^{5/} PMGO Orders No. 3, dated 10 January 1944, subject: "Provost Division"

^{6/} Functional Organization Chart, Provost Division, PMGO

^{7/} ASF letter, file SPX 250.1 (12 Feb 44) OB-S-SPMGR, dated 17 February 1944, subject: "Criminal Investigation Activities"

^{8/} ASF letter, file SPX 250.1 (19 May 44) OB-S-SPMGR-M, dated 27 May 1944, subject: "Criminal Investigation Activities"

were well qualified for this work. The use of Security Intelligence Corps personnel was barred by the provisions of the War Department letter dated 28 June 1942, which was not rescinded until 8 April 1944. To alleviate this situation in the service commands, a teletype was dispatched on 18 February 1944 to the commanding generals of all numbered service commands and the Military District of Washington, which authorized them to direct Security Intelligence Corps investigators to conduct criminal investigations which were the responsibility of the Security and Intelligence Division of the Service Command.

The monthly statistics concerning criminal investigations obtained from the service commands were published in Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Reports. During the fiscal year 1 July 1944 to 30 June 1945, a reported total of 52,378 criminal investigation cases were handled in the continental United States, of which 50,376, or 96% were completed. Crimes against the person comprised 19% of the cases, and crimes against property 81%, as computed in accordance with established procedures of "Uniform Crime Reporting," which is followed by all recognized law enforcement agencies. A dual crime (one involving two or more criminal acts) is classified under the more serious of the two offenses; for example, a concurrent murder and theft of property would be classified under "homicide" - crime against the person. Stolen government property valued at \$2,149,216. was recovered as a result of criminal investigation in the army within the continental United States alone during the fiscal year 1944-45.

In February 1944, a report was received from the Bureau of Narcotics, U. S. Treasury Department, that the use or sale of narcotics by military personnel presented serious difficulties to the Bureau. A restricted Army Service Forces letter was published to the commanding generals of all numbered service commands and the Military District of Washington, directing that they comply with requests from appropriate agencies of the Bureau of Narcotics for the assistance of military personnel in obtaining evidence of narcotics transactions involving members of the military establishment. 9/ This letter resulted in close cooperation and coordination of activities between investigative units of the service commands and local offices of the Bureau of Narcotics. Resultant reports have indicated outstanding success in solving crimes involving violations of the narcotic laws by military personnel or by military personnel and

9/ ASF letter, file SPX 250.1 (24 Feb 44) OS-S-SPMGR-M, dated 4 March 1944, subject: "Cooperation with the Bureau of Narcotics, United States Treasury Department"

civilians jointly.

In April and May 1944, several service commands, particularly the Fourth Service Command, were encountering problems of jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations conducted at Class III (Army Air Forces) and Class IV (Technical Service) installations. At Class I installations, under the direct command of the service commander, there was, of course, no question of jurisdiction. Similarly, at Class II (Army Ground Forces) installations, there was no difficulty because responsibility for criminal investigation was a service command responsibility. The problem at Class III installations was discussed with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Air Provost Marshal), and a decision reached that, although commanding generals of service commands were responsible for the supervision of criminal investigations at all installations within the geographical limits of the service command, they were not responsible for the actual conduct of the investigation. Investigation of crime occurring on a post is primarily a function of local command, and the responsibility therefor rests upon the commanding officer of the installation. Accordingly, it was agreed that the service commander would not assume the responsibility of the installation commander in the actual conduct of criminal investigations but that, upon request of the installation commander, the service commander would provide trained criminal investigators or such other assistance as he might deem necessary. This policy was transmitted to all service commands on 2 June 1944. 10/

The application of this policy of cooperation and assistance by the service commanders and commanding officers of Class III and Class IV installations proved beneficial but, in some instances, commanding officers of Class III installations did not submit monthly statistics on criminal investigation activities to service commanders, thus greatly hampering service commanders in exercising their assigned responsibility of supervision of criminal investigations in all installations within the geographical limits of their service commands. This matter was discussed with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Air Provost Marshal), who initiated publication of an Army Air Forces letter to all Army Air Forces commands and installations in the continental United States. 11/ The letter directed that the commanding officer of every Class III (Army Air Forces) installation submit to the commanding general of the service command in which his installation was located, monthly

10/ 1st Ind, file SPMGR 000.5, from The Provost Marshal General to the CG, 4th Svc, dated 2 June 1944

11/ AAF letter 45-13, dated 20 September 1944, subject: "Criminal Investigation Activities"

statistics on criminal investigations conducted under his supervision. The letter also provided that requests from service commanders for copies of reports of individual criminal investigations conducted at Class III installations be granted and that copies of such reports be furnished to the requesting service commander. This Army Air Forces letter was also published in an Army Service Forces circular for the information and guidance of all service commands. 12/ Publication of this letter resulted in greatly improved relations between service commands and Class III installations and particularly in obtaining complete statistics by service commands on criminal investigation activities at all military installations within the Zone of the Interior.

During the latter part of 1944, there arose a need for further clarification of the service commanders' responsibility over criminal investigations at Class III (Army Air Forces) installations, particularly with respect to the administration of confidential funds. Consequently, a confidential Army Service Forces letter, prepared by The Provost Marshal General, was distributed on 10 February 1945 to commanding generals of all numbered service commands and the Military District of Washington. 13/ This letter gave specific instructions regarding conditions under which service commanders would assume direct control and charge of criminal investigations at Class III installations, and also instructions regarding the administration of confidential funds for the conduct of criminal investigations at Class III installations. The letter resulted in complete clarification of the responsibility of the service commander for supervision over criminal investigation at Class III installations, and provided him with adequate control through the administration of confidential investigative funds at Class III installations.

Paragraph 6a(4)(a)11, Army Regulations 170-10, 24 December 1942, provided that service commanders were responsible for provost marshal investigative functions at Class IV (Technical Service) installations. Upon request of the Chief of Transportation, this function was revised on 22 January 1945, to read, "Provost marshal investigative functions, except at ports of embarkation." 14/ Thereafter, all criminal investigations conducted at ports of embarkation were under the direct supervision of the Chief of Transportation and close liaison was maintained between The Provost Marshal General and the Chief of Transportation. This delineation of responsibility did not create any

12/ ASF Circular No. 329, 30 September 1944

13/ ASF letter, file SPX 000.3 (11 Jan 45) OB-S-SPICY-M, dated 10 February 1945, subject: "Criminal Investigation - Army Air Forces Installations"

14/ WD Circular No. 25, dated 22 January 1945

confusion or result in a relaxation of the criminal investigation program or other change, except that monthly criminal investigation statistics covering ports of embarkation were submitted to The Provost Marshal General by the Chief of Transportation instead of by the service commanders.

Several questions were raised during the summer of 1944 by service commanders concerning their jurisdiction over investigation of discharge from the army allegedly secured through misrepresentation, concealment, or fraud. These questions were answered by a confidential War Department letter, dated 10 September 1944, to commanding generals, major commands, theaters of operations, service commands, and independent base commands. ^{15/} This letter placed the responsibility for investigation directly upon the commanding general of the service command within which the soldier was stationed at the time of his discharge, and also directed that the commanding general of the service command take final action in each case in accordance with the circumstances as revealed by the investigation. It soon became necessary to clarify the legal question, "When may a discharge allegedly secured through fraud be rescinded?" An opinion was obtained from The Judge Advocate General in a memorandum, dated 1 June 1945, which stated that the War Department may elect to rescind an honorable discharge for fraud, upon decision by the War Department or its representative that the physical disability resulting in honorable discharge had been intentionally self-inflicted. ^{16/} If the discharge is rescinded for fraud, (a) the soldier may be tried by court-martial for his fraud, as well as for intentionally incurring a disability, or (b), if trial by court-martial is not desired or does not result in his dishonorable discharge, the War Department may discharge him under conditions other than honorable.

Criminal investigations conducted at posts, camps, and stations were generally accomplished by enlisted personnel under the command of the post provost marshal. Such personnel carried the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) classification of 301 and as such were not entitled to the use of confidential funds in the execution of their duties. Reports from the service commands indicated that approximately 90% of the criminal investigations during the first half of 1945 were conducted by criminal investigators (MOS 301) and 10% by agents of the Security Intelligence Corps. Pursuant to the request of several service commanders, confidential funds were made available for use by criminal investigators in the investigation of crime and pertinent instructions were published in a confidential letter dated 19 June 1945 to the commanding generals of

^{15/} WD letter, file AG 220.8 (31 Aug 44) OB-S-A-SPGAM-M, dated 10 September 1944, subject: "Policy Covering Disposition of Reports Concerning Discharges from the Army Allegedly Secured through Misrepresentation, Concealment or Fraud"

^{16/} JAG memorandum, file SPJGA 1945/4726, dated 1 June 1945, subject: "Rescission or Modification of Honorable Discharges Based Upon Physical Disability Intentionally Self-Inflicted"

the numbered service commands and the Military District of Washington. 17/ These instructions provided that confidential funds might be made available by the service commander for use by qualified criminal investigators. The question immediately arose, "What qualifications should an individual possess in order to be permitted to conduct criminal investigations and, therefore, be eligible to use confidential funds?" Accordingly, a set of guides were published on 16 July 1945 to the Commanding General, Seventh Service Command, and information copies were sent to the commanding generals of all other service commands. 18/ The policy was adopted that the determination of whether an individual possesses necessary qualifications must be made by the service commanders. The question was also raised regarding what constitutes suitable identification for criminal investigators and who was responsible for the issuance of such identifications. It was decided that The Provost Marshal General would provide service commanders with suitable identification folders in blank and the service commander would be responsible for the issuance of the identifications. This decision was transmitted to the commanding general of each service command at the time that identification folders were provided. 19/ Badges were not authorized or provided.

Criminal Investigation Within The Military Establishment

In 1944, The Provost Marshal General's responsibility for the preparation of general policies, plans, and procedures and the exercise of staff supervision and control over criminal investigation within the military establishment was limited to "within the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces." This limitation resulted in a serious operating handicap and required close cooperation and liaison with the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground Forces. It became apparent that a single War Department agency should be responsible for staff supervision over the investigation of crime within the whole army. Therefore, in order to provide efficient and effective service for overseas commanders requesting investigations in the Zone of the Interior, The Provost Marshal General assumed responsibility for coordination of criminal investigation cases between the Zone of the Interior and overseas commands. Numerous cases being investigated overseas were referred to the War Department for investigation of undeveloped leads in the United States. Similarly, many investigations initiated in the service commands required the investigation of undeveloped leads in overseas organizations, particularly since subjects of investigation, during the course of investigation, had transferred

17/ ASF letter, file SPMGH, dated 19 June 1945, subject: "Criminal Investigations at Posts, Camps, and Stations"

18/ FMGO letter, file SPMGR, dated 16 July 1945, subject: "Qualifications of Criminal Investigators"

19/ FMGO letter, file SPMGR, dated 10 October 1945, subject: "Criminal Investigators Identification"

from the Zone of the Interior to theaters of operation.

In the Zone of the Interior, criminal investigations were conducted, in large part, by personnel under the commanding generals of the service commands. In overseas theaters, criminal investigations were conducted entirely by personnel of the various criminal investigation sections, under the provost marshals of the theaters of operations. Since The Provost Marshal General exercised no command function outside of the Army Service Forces, it was necessary that all criminal investigation cases referred to overseas commands and requiring a report of investigation be transmitted as a War Department communication by The Adjutant General. This procedure resulted in successful operation and prompt handling of criminal investigation cases referred to overseas commands.

Criminal investigation statistics, as described above, were received each month from the service commands and the Chief of Transportation and analyzed by The Provost Marshal General. Statistics on the extent of crime in theaters of operations were not available in the War Department, and it was deemed advisable by The Provost Marshal General that such statistics be submitted to him in order that comparisons could be made as to the extent and type of crime in the various components of the army. This was discussed in June 1945 with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2, War Department General Staff, all of whom indicated informal concurrence in the plan. Thereupon, on 11 August 1945, a War Department letter was published to the commanders of all overseas commands, stating that "The Provost Marshal General is charged with responsibility for staff supervision over the conduct of criminal investigation within the military establishment." The letter also provided for submission to The Provost Marshal General of monthly reports of criminal investigation activities within each command. 20/

United States Army Property Mailed into the United States by Military Personnel Overseas

In July 1944, three reports were received from the Sixth Service Command that the Collector of Customs at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, had intercepted parcels, believed to contain stolen government property, mailed by military personnel overseas to addressees in this country. These constituted the first reports of this kind brought to the attention of The Provost Marshal General. These cases were referred to the proper overseas commanders for investigation and report to The Provost Marshal General, such report to include instructions covering disposition of the intercepted property.

20/ WD letter, file AGMP-M 250.1 (15 Jul 45) OB-C-SPMGO, dated 11 August 1945, subject: "Criminal Investigation Activities within the Military Establishment"

Similar reports were subsequently received at irregular intervals from the Milwaukee Customs office thru the Sixth Service Command, totaling two or three such reports each month, and one report was received in August 1944 from the Atlanta Customs office thru the Fourth Service Command. No reports were received from any other source in 1944.

The procedure for handling the few reports which were received was to inform the service command that the report had been referred to the appropriate theater commander for investigation, and that the property should be retained either by the service command or by the customs examiner pending receipt of instructions covering disposition from the overseas commander. In approximately 99% of these cases, the overseas commander took the necessary disciplinary action without requiring that the property be forwarded to the theater as evidence. Since the Sixth Service Command was the only one reporting cases of this kind, instructions were issued to the commanding general of that command on 30 January 1945 21/ as follows:

"It is the desire of this office that when Customs officials intercept shipments containing items which are government property from overseas theaters, full report of the details be submitted to this office for referral to the appropriate theater commander and that the property be held until its disposition is directed."

This procedure was satisfactory, although delays of from six weeks to several months were experienced in receiving reports from theaters of operations. This condition was to be expected, however, because military personnel overseas were constantly changing station, and the correspondence had to be forwarded to several different organizations, through channels. In some instances, of course, the overseas investigation revealed that the intercepted item was actually the personal property of the sender and, therefore, should be released to the addressee. In the majority of cases, however, overseas investigations revealed that the property had been either stolen or otherwise misappropriated, and should be turned in to the supply officer at the nearest post, camp, or station.

Since intercepted government property was being reported during the latter part of 1944 by only one of the smaller customs offices, viz. Milwaukee, it was believed that large quantities of government property were probably entering the country via mail parcels from military personnel overseas through other and larger customs offices. Accordingly, a conference was held with the Chief, Enforcement Branch, Bureau of Customs, on 1 January 1945, to determine what instructions had been issued to customs examiners throughout the country, on the

21/ PAGO letter, file SPAGR 333.5 - White, Sheila (65-70), dated 30 January 1945, subject: "Bureau of Customs Interceptions"

subject, and to work out an arrangement whereby The Provost Marshal General might receive complete information on articles of United States government property sent to or brought back to the United States from overseas by military personnel, in order that proper disciplinary action could be taken against the bearers or senders when such action was indicated. It was determined at this conference that all customs warehouses were then on a current basis, that detained government property was being delivered to the nearest military installation if Army property, or to the nearest Naval installation, if Navy property. This procedure was in accordance with a Bureau of Customs circular letter, dated 22 October 1943 22/ which was later amended by Bureau of Customs circular letter dated 3 December 1943. 23/

These letters provided that property delivered to the nearest military or Naval installation should be accompanied by a report of the circumstances in each case and that a list, identifying the articles removed and stating the reasons therefor, should be placed in the package from which the articles have been removed before release of the package to the post office for delivery to the addressee. Insofar as could be determined, the articles received by the military installations were returned to military supply channels, and the reports were filed without further action in accordance with War Department Memorandum No. W850-31-43, dated 29 June 1943. 24/ Under this procedure, no disciplinary action against offenders was possible and measures could not be taken to prevent or discourage other personnel from making similar shipments of stolen government property.

In addition to parcels containing government property being received through the mails, it was discovered that government property was being brought into the United States in baggage and other personal effects of military personnel returning from overseas. A War Department memorandum dated 7 January 1944, directed that all government owned property and other unauthorized articles be withdrawn by inspecting officers at overseas commands, and that government owned property and other prohibited items, discovered in baggage by customs officials or inspecting officers at ports of embarkation in this country, be withdrawn from the baggage. 25/ Procedures similar to interceptions of mail parcels, as described in the preceding paragraph, were followed.

22/ Bureau of Customs Circular Letter, file 741.5, dated 22 October 1943, re: Disposition of Government property and captured enemy equipment brought into or sent to the United States from theaters of war

23/ Bureau of Customs Circular Letter, file 741.5, dated 3 December 1943, re: Disposition of Government property and captured enemy equipment brought into or sent to the United States from theaters of war

24/ WD Memorandum No. W850-31-43, dated 29 June 1943, subject: "Disposition of United States Army Property Confiscated by the Bureau of Customs"

25/ WD Memorandum No. W55-45-43, dated 19 October 1943, subject: "Return of Baggage and Personal Effects of Military Personnel from Overseas"; WD Memorandum No. W55-45-43, Changes No. 1, dated 7 January 1944

In order to insure that reports of interceptions of government property by customs officials would be forwarded through military channels so that disciplinary action could be taken when the need therefor was indicated, an Army Service Forces letter to the commanding generals of the numbered service commands and the Military District of Washington was published on 24 March 1945. 26/ This letter directed that service commanders establish liaison with local collectors of customs and request from them complete reports of all interceptions of government property. The service commanders were then required to transmit such reports to The Provost Marshal General, who in turn initiated necessary action for an overseas investigation and report covering instructions regarding disposition of the property. This letter resulted in close liaison being established between representatives of the service commanders and local customs officials. Approximately thirty to fifty reports, per week, of intercepted government property were received by The Provost Marshal General during July and August 1945.

In order to prevent, or at least greatly curtail, the mailing of government property at the source, The Provost Marshal General recommended, on 3 March 1945, 27/ that a War Department letter be dispatched to all overseas commands, presenting the problem involved in the inspection of the large number of parcels being mailed into this country, and directing the establishment of local systems for inspection and examination of all packages prior to mailing. The proposed letter, as revised by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, was published on 20 March 1945. 28/ This letter requested comments from each overseas major command in certain proposed control measures and indicated that further orders would be issued by the War Department when the comments had been received.

Following receipt of the comments from the overseas commands, a War Department letter was published on 12 June 1945, directing that all overseas commands establish and maintain a system for the effective inspection of parcels prior to mailing, to insure that government property was not being sent home illegally. 29/ The letter also required that a report of action taken, with copies of any directives issued, be mailed to the War Department, Attention: Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Reports from all theaters were received and transmitted to The Provost Marshal General for analysis. These reports revealed that positive action was being taken, in accordance with the provisions of the War Department letter of 12 June 1945, to prevent the mailing of government property and other unauthorized articles.

26/ ASF letter, file SPXMP-M 012.41 (16 Mar 45) SPDC, dated 14 March 1945, subject: "United States Army Property Mailed into the United States by Members of the Armed Forces Abroad"

27/ Summary Sheet, dated 3 March 1945, subject: "United States Army Property"

28/ WD letter, file AG 400.73 (13 Mar 45) OB-S-E-M, dated 20 March 1945, subject: "US Government Property Mailed to the United States by Members of the Armed Forces Overseas"

29/ WD letter, file AG 400.73 (7 Jun 45) OB-S-E-M, dated 12 June 1945, subject: "United States Army Property Mailed to the United States by Members of the Armed Forces Abroad"

On 14 April 1945, The Provost Marshal General received from the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, a memorandum outlining the acute problem confronting the collectors of customs at coastal ports, and directing that necessary steps be taken by The Provost Marshal General to assure the adequate inspection of ships and personnel passing through the ports for the prevention of smuggling of United States government property. 30/ The memorandum emphasized that, because of limited customs personnel for inspection activities, only about 20% of the equipment illegally passing through the San Francisco port, as an example, was being recovered. The seriousness of this situation was shown in a letter dated 1 December 1944 from the Collector of Customs at San Francisco to the Officer in Charge of the Distribution Division, Field Branch, Ninth Service Command, San Francisco. 31/

The Commissioner of Customs was requested to determine the total number of military personnel required at the various customs ports to supplement the activities of the customs examiners, and a reply was received on 18 May 1945 that 415 such personnel would be required. Consultation with the Chief of Transportation resulted in a recommendation to the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, that military personnel should not be used to assist customs examiners in the search of vessels at coastal ports, but, instead, that such assistance be provided by personnel of the Coast Guard. This was considered preferable because the Coast Guard, in its role as the Maritime Police Force, had, since its inception, assisted customs agents in boarding and inspecting vessels. This recommendation was accepted by the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, and a letter to the Acting Commissioner of Customs on 23 July 1945 32/ outlined the study made by the War Department and suggested that the necessary assistance be obtained from personnel of the United States Coast Guard.

Another survey conducted by the Commissioner of Customs at the request of The Provost Marshal General revealed that, at some customs ports of mail entry, as little as 1% of the parcels received were being inspected, and that the other 99% were being passed with no examination whatsoever. Other customs ports reflected a better record of examinations, but the over-all average of the number of parcels inspected in April 1945 was approximately 4 or 5 percent of the total number received from overseas. The Bureau of Customs did not have sufficient personnel to make a more complete inspection, and additional personnel was not available because of manpower shortages throughout the country. Consideration was given to a request from the Commissioner of Customs for 160 military personnel to assist in the examination of packages, but this request was disapproved because the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, was unable to provide enlisted men for this purpose.

30/ ASF Memorandum, file SPDDL 475, dated 14 April 1945, subject: "Illegal Return of United States and Captured Enemy Equipment from Overseas Theaters"

31/ Bureau of Customs letter, dated 1 December 1944, re: Firearms entering this country

32/ PMGO letter, dated 23 July 1945, re: Supplement to inspection force in search of vessels and civilian crew members arriving from overseas theaters

To provide assistance to customs examiners at the larger customs ports of mail entry, a study was made in March 1945, to determine the practicability of the use of a machine known as the Inspectoscope. This machine operates on the X-Ray or fluorescent principle, and enables an operator to view the contents of a package without opening it. It has been used with considerable success at industrial installations to prevent the stealing of small tools by employees, as described in the circular, "Inspectoscope," published by the Sicular Company of San Francisco, California. 33/ A test installation was made in the customs section of the San Francisco Post Office in April 1945. It was so successful in revealing government property and illegal war trophies in parcels mailed by military personnel overseas that additional installations were made during the summer of 1945 in customs offices at New York, Los Angeles, St. Paul, and Seattle. The use of the Inspectoscope greatly increased the number of parcels which could be processed by a crew of inspectors. The Inspectoscopes were operated by military personnel provided by service commanders under their bulk allotments. A crew of approximately eight men was required for the operation of each machine. The cost of the type of Inspectoscope used was \$4,250.00, f.o.b., San Francisco, California.

War Trophies Mailed into the United States by Military Personnel Overseas

Promulgation of policies regarding the possession of items of captured enemy equipment by individual members of the Army was the responsibility of the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces. In the inspection of mail parcels, many unmailable items were discovered, such as explosives and weapons capable of being concealed on the person. To prevent the mailing of unauthorized items of captured enemy equipment, the Director of Intelligence, Army Service Forces, with the concurrence of The Provost Marshal General and other interested agencies, prepared and published a War Department Circular concerning the retention of certain items of captured enemy equipment. 34/

Reports of war trophies intercepted at customs ports of mail entry, because they were either unauthorized or mailed in violation of War Department directives, were received by The Provost Marshal General in large quantities in May and June 1945. Initially, many of the reports were forwarded overseas for the information of the theater commander and for such action as he might deem appropriate. Because of the minor disciplinary nature of the infractions involved, it was decided that confiscation of the war trophies was sufficient punishment, and further reports to overseas commanders were not necessary. Therefore, in July 1945, The Provost Marshal General informed the service commands that reports involving war trophies need no longer be submitted to The Provost Marshal General.

33/ "Inspectoscope" Circular

34/ WD Circular No. 155, dated 28 May 1945

Criminal Investigation Manual

A field manual on criminal investigation, written in The Provost Marshal General's Office, was published and distributed to all components of the Army in July 1945. ^{35/} The manual, consisting of 26 chapters, 2 appendices, and 123 illustrations, was designed to be of particular assistance to criminal investigators and provost marshals in the field, and to serve as a handbook or textbook for instructional purposes.

Crime Laboratory

On 1 May 1945, there was established at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, a Class IV installation of The Provost Marshal General's Office, known as the Scientific Investigations Branch. ^{36/} This Branch was charged with responsibility for the processing of evidence submitted to it for scientific analysis in order to assist Army investigators in solving crimes. The Branch was located at Fort Sam Houston because The Provost Marshal General's School was at the same installation, and crime laboratory methods could more easily be taught to students with the laboratory located close to the school than if it were some distance away.

^{35/} Criminal Investigation Manual, FM 19-20

^{36/} ASF Circular No. 157, dated 2 May 1945

APPREHENSION OF ABSENTEES

Among other functions, The Provost Marshal General was charged with the mission of preparing general policies and procedures and exercising staff supervision and control over all matters relating to the apprehension of absentees, deserters, and escaped military prisoners (other than prisoners of war), and the guarding of military prisoners within the continental limits of the United States.

The mission pertaining to the apprehension of absentees was assigned to The Provost Marshal General by the Chief of Administrative Services, A.S.F., on 30 January 1943 as a result of informal conferences held between Brigadier General Archer L. Lerch, Assistant The Provost Marshal General, and Brigadier General Madison Pearson, Deputy Chief of Administrative Services, A.S.F.^{1/} The specific assignment of this mission was appropriate at that time since the strategic situation and the manpower shortage made it necessary that uniform policies be prepared immediately, to provide for the maximum utilization of all personnel in the Army. Moreover, personnel absent without leave, whose services were lost by reason of their absence, constituted a large source of trained manpower.

Staff supervision over the guarding of military prisoners (other than prisoners of war) was assigned to The Provost Marshal General on 3 December 1943 by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.^{2/} The continuing manpower shortage made it imperative that uniform policies for all service commands be prepared and that they outline methods of obtaining the maximum use of personnel in the guarding of prisoners, so that the confinement and movement of prisoners could be conducted with a minimum of supervisory personnel and a maximum of security.

Until 6 January 1944, these functions were performed by the Military Police Division. On that date, The Provost Marshal General created the Provost Division and charged these functions to this new division.^{3/}

The Provost Marshal General's mission in connection with the apprehension of absentees required consideration of such other factors

1/ 1st Ind from Chief of Administrative Services, SOS, SPAAM 251, dated 30 January 1943, re: "Apprehension of Deserters"

2/ Memo from Commanding General, ASF, SPICX, dated 3 December 1943, subject: "Establishment of Army Service Forces Internal Security Policies"

3/ FMGO Office Orders No. 3, 10 January 1944;
Functional Organization Chart, 15 March 1944, Provost Division

as morale, indoctrination of commanders and troops in the seriousness of being AWOL, the utilization of the press and radio for the education of the public, and the maximum use of civilian law enforcement agencies and other appropriate civilian and military agencies. However, before any aggressive action could be taken it was necessary to determine the number of absentees and to inform all interested and responsible military agencies thereof. No statistical breakdown of absence or returns was extant. Accordingly, The Adjutant General agreed on 1 February 1944 to furnish The Provost Marshal General monthly statistical reports of absentees from and returnees to military control by branch, grade, age, race, command, and major subordinate command assignment. The first report was received during March 1944 for January 1944, and permitted compilation of statistics showing the ratio of absentees and returnees.^{4/}

In order to impress service commanders with the seriousness of the problem and the necessity for aggressive action and to make it known that The Provost Marshal General was responsible for staff supervision over apprehension of absentees, a confidential Army Service Forces letter was published on 21 March 1944 informing service commanders of the necessity to review immediately their procedures and to implement or revise them, if necessary.^{5/} This letter was followed by an ASF Circular published on 7 April 1944 directing that all personnel engaged in apprehension activities be instructed to increase their efforts.^{6/} As additional aggressive action was necessary, the following programs were established.

1. Utilization of Federal Bureau of Investigation Fingerprint Records
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistance Program
 - a. AWOL Military Personnel Other Than Escaped General Prisoners
 - b. Apprehension of Escaped General Prisoners
3. Return of United States Army Absentees from Canada
4. Return of United States Army Deserters in Mexico
5. Cooperation of Immigration and Naturalization Service
6. Return to Military Control of Canadian Absentees
7. Liaison with War Department and Outside Agencies
8. Control of Preparation of Forms No. 45 and 46

Utilization of Federal Bureau of Investigation Fingerprint Records

The "Monthly Statistical Analysis of AWOL" revealed that approximately 90% of all personnel absent without leave were returned to military control within the first 15 days of absence. It was concluded,

^{4/} ASF Monthly Statistical Analysis of AWOL

^{5/} ASF ltr, file SPX 220.8 (17 May 44)OB-S-SPMGR, 21 March 1944, subject: "AWOL - Continental United States"

^{6/} Section I, Army Service Forces Circular No. 96, 7 April 1944

therefore, that primary efforts should be directed towards returning to military control all old time absentees, that is, absentees dropped from the rolls after 30 days absence and not returned to military control.

Following the procedures initiated by the Navy Department, an informal agreement was reached in May 1944 between The Provost Marshal General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation whereby the FBI agreed to compare the fingerprints of all absent military personnel reported to them by the War Department against other fingerprints on file or subsequently received by them, usually as a result of the commission of a civil or criminal offense or for the purpose of qualifying for employment in essential industry, and to transmit the information so obtained to The Provost Marshal General for apprehension purposes.

To utilize these facilities effectively, it was necessary to obtain the names of all personnel absent without leave and not returned to military control and to set up a method whereby such information could be kept current. Information concerning the status of AWOL's not returned to military control was obtainable only from the separate AG machine records units in the United States. However, information concerning returns to military control was available in War Department files.

The Adjutant General agreed to furnish the necessary information and a procedure, concurred in by G-1, WDGS; Control Division, ASF; The Adjutant General; and Military Personnel Division, ASF, was adopted on 22 July 1944 by the publication of a War Department circular which provided that a one-time report containing the name, grade, and serial number of each absentee dropped from the rolls and not returned to military control during the period 1 September 1943 to 30 June 1944 be submitted by The Adjutant General to The Provost Marshal General for transmittal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of reporting as many of the long time absentees as The Adjutant General's records could provide. ^{7/} Further, The Adjutant General agreed to submit to The Provost Marshal General monthly reports beginning with a report for July 1944 reporting the same category of absentees. To keep the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation current as to the status of individuals so reported, the circular further provided for the submission of weekly reports, beginning with a report for the 1st week of July 1944, containing the names of all personnel previously reported as AWOL who had returned to military control during the period covered by that report. Upon receipt of the foregoing reports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation marked the fingerprint files of the individuals reported as "Wanted by The Provost Marshal General," and, upon return of the person to military control, removed the "Wanted" marker.

^{7/} Section I, War Department Circular 312, 22 July 1944

During September 1944 the program went into full operation. By 30 November 1945, 40,943 absentees had been reported to The Provost Marshal General; 25,677 of these had been returned to military control or action taken to effect their eventual return, if the absentee was confined in a civil penal institution.

On 3 January 1945, another War Department circular extended the procedures of the previous circular to include all absentees from the Army except members of the Womens Army Corps.^{8/} The WAC was excepted because the Director of the WAC indicated that AWOL was not serious enough in the WAC to warrant the adoption of stern measures for effecting the return of female absentees.

Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistance Program

On 16 September 1944, the Federal Bureau of Investigation offered further assistance to The Provost Marshal General in the apprehension of absentees and deserters. Pursuant to paragraph 12e, AR 615-300, which prescribed that the aid of civil authorities would be solicited to apprehend absentees, it was agreed that the FBI would render active investigative assistance in those cases in which the service commands had been unsuccessful.

On 20 September 1944, the Federal Bureau of Investigation offered the assistance of its field agents and facilities in effecting the return to military control of United States Army absentees, provided that the War Department would declare the absentees so reported to be deserters. This statement was necessary in order to endow FBI agents with authority to arrest these men. The question as to power of arrest was raised by the Department of Justice, which had ruled that, under existing statutes, FBI agents were not authorized to apprehend absentees from the Army who were not guilty of any other offense and who had not been convicted of the crime of desertion. In order to correct this situation, it was agreed, after approval by the Secretary of War on 18 January 1945, that all requests for FBI assistance would state:^{9/} "Sufficient information has been presented to the War Department constituting reasonable grounds to believe the following individual guilty of desertion."

Thereupon, on 23 January 1945, an Army Service Forces circular, prepared by The Provost Marshal General, established a procedure whereby field commanders could utilize this means of assistance in returning old time absentees to military control.^{10/} It directed that all requests be submitted to The Provost Marshal General who would forward them to the FBI. This was necessary to assure that

8/ Section I, War Department Circular 5, 3 January 1945

9/ PMG Summary Sheet, file SPMGR 251.2, 15 January 1945, subject: "AWOL-FBI Assistance in the Apprehension of Absentees"

10/ Section I, ASF Circular 27, 23 January 1945

no cases would be forwarded involving individuals already returned to military control and to guard against duplication of requests. The circular emphasized that commanders requesting assistance were not relieved of their responsibility of continuing their efforts to effect the return of absentees.

The program began to show results immediately and, by 30 November 1945, 7,373 AWOLs had been reported to the FBI for active investigation, and 3,903 of these had been returned to military control or coordination had been established to effect their return upon completion of confinement by civil authorities. By 30 November 1945, 1,511 were returned as a result of the efforts of the FBI.

On 27 February 1944, the Federal Bureau of Investigation asked whether World War I deserters should be apprehended if their whereabouts became known. On 17 March 1945, reply was made to the Director, FBI, based upon a decision of The Judge Advocate General, that World War I deserters should not be sought.^{11/}

On 11 January 1945, The Provost Marshal General requested The Adjutant General to submit the names and serial numbers of all escaped general prisoners at large on 31 January 1945, and to submit weekly the names and serial numbers of all subsequent escapees and returnees. On 13 February 1945, The Adjutant General furnished the names of 1,214 escaped general prisoners not returned to military control. Some of these had been at large for 30 years. In view of the War Department policy not to seek World War I deserters, request was made of The Judge Advocate General as to whether a similar limitation was applicable in the case of escaped general prisoners. The Judge Advocate General ruled on 26 February 1945 that the policy established with regard to World War I deserters did not apply to the apprehension of escaped prisoners who had been convicted and sentenced, and that no known limitation prevented the apprehension of such personnel. The Judge Advocate General concluded that the establishment of a policy in this connection was of primary interest to the Director, Correction Division, AGO, and recommended that the question be referred to The Adjutant General for decision.^{12/} On 15 March 1945, The Adjutant General determined that no active effort would be made to return to military control escaped general prisoners who had been at large 20 years or more.^{13/} Thereupon, all names on the list reflecting absence of 20 years or more were deleted and the modified list, containing 784 names, was forwarded to the FBI on 1 April 1945 for active investigation leading to return. By 30 November 1945, 1,146 cases had been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 572 of these persons had been returned to military control. Of this total, 266 were returned as a result of the efforts of the FBI.

^{11/} PMG ltr, file SPMGR 251.2, 17 March 1945

JAG Opinion to PMGO, file SPJUG 1945/2807, 9 March 1945

^{12/} TAG 3d T/S Ind, file AGKA 253.6 (13 Feb 45), 15 March 1945

^{13/} Opinion of JAG to PMG, file SPJUG 1945/2351, 26 February 1945

Return of United States Army Absentees from Canada

Many investigations conducted by service commands revealed that the absentee was residing in Canada. No procedure, formal or informal, was in effect whereby such absentees could be returned to United States military control. Some of the cases involved absentees of Canadian citizenship. Thereupon, with the concurrence of the State Department, G-1 and G-2, WDGS, and the senior United States Army member of the Inter-Allied Personnel Board, procedures were established for requesting the return of United States absentees in Canada. ^{14/} These procedures provided that AWOLs, of American citizenship, discovered in Canada would be returned to United States military control thru military channels if the Canadian authorities asserted no claim for custody of the absentees in order that they might be required to serve in the Canadian armed forces or answer for a crime under Canadian law. In the event the AWOLs were citizens or nationals of Canada and the Canadian Government did not desire to return them to United States control, the United States Military Attache' would request the Canadian Government to call them for induction under the provisions of the Canadian Selective Service Act. Discovery of United States AWOLs in Canada usually resulted from investigations conducted by service commands. Upon receipt of such information The Provost Marshal General would prepare a summary of information of the case which would be forwarded thru G-2, WDGS, to the United States Military Attache' in Canada for action in compliance with the above outlined procedures. As the procedures established required that the United States Military Attache' in Canada take action necessary to apprehend and return such absentees, The Provost Marshal General kept no statistical records of this activity.

Return of United States Army Deserters in Mexico

Frequent requests were received by The Provost Marshal General from service commands for assistance in the apprehension of United States absentees, believed to be in Mexico, who were evading return to United States military control. Representatives of the State Department and interested military agencies stated that the Mexican Government had proposed to the United States government the adoption of a procedure for the reciprocal return of absentees and conscription evaders. This proposal was refused by our Government on 18 January 1944 and further proposals were not made by the Mexican government. ^{15/} An informal procedure, not through State Department channels, was necessary. On 22 June 1944 a procedure, suggested by The Provost Marshal General, and later concurred in by G-1 and G-2, WDGS, was published whereby the return of absentees in Mexico would be accomplished through

^{14/} PMG ltr, File SPMR: 251.2, 12 January 1945, subject: "Return of U.S. Army Absentees from Canada"

^{15/} State Department Dispatch No. 5135, 16 January 1944

military channels. ^{16/} Immediately after the publication of this policy, it was determined that the policy regarding payment of expenses to Mexican civil authorities for effecting return to United States military control of absentees in Mexico was subject to misunderstanding. ^{17/} The policy stated that "reasonable" expenses might be paid to apprehenders for effecting the return of absentees. The term was considered too broad in scope since pertinent statutes on the subject limited the payment incident to expenses and reward for return of absentees to \$25.00 maximum. On 27 November 1944 The Provost Marshal General suggested to the Fiscal Director that payments of rewards and expenses should be limited to the authorized maximum. ^{18/} This was accomplished 2 December 1944 by dispatch of letters to the commanding generals, Western Defense Command, and the Eighth and Ninth Service Commands and to the United States Military Attache in Mexico. ^{19/}

After the establishment of the foregoing policy, the United States Military Attache in Mexico was reluctant to request Mexican officials for the custody of wanted United States Army personnel. ^{20/} To resolve the issue, The Provost Marshal General, on 4 May 1945, requested the Director of Personnel, ASF, to obtain from G-1, WDGS, a statement of policy. ^{21/} This question was referred by the Director, Military Personnel Division, ASF, to G-1, WDGS, on 12 May 1945 for decision. ^{22/} On 28 May 1945, the Director, Military Personnel Division, ASF, based upon a decision of G-1, WDGS, stated that, in view of the lack of an agreement between the two countries for the return of deserters, no formal steps could be taken by the United States to obtain the return of United States Army absentees in Mexico. ^{23/} However, informal arrangements for such return between United States commanders and Mexican officials at the border was approved. This re-statement of policy also directed that the United States Military Attache and all other interested agencies be informed of the War Department's position in this matter. All interested agencies and the United States Military Attache in Mexico were informed on 19 June 1945. ^{24/}

16/ ASF 9th Ind, file SPMG/SPDC, to AC/S G-1 and G-2, WDGS, 22 June 1944

17/ ASF 9th Ind, file SPMG/SPDC, to AC/S G-1 and G-2, WDGS, 22 June 1944

18/ PMG 3d Ind, file SPMGR 251.2, 27 November 1944

19/ Ltr from Fiscal Director, file SPFE 251.2 General, 2 December 1944, subject: "Reward for Apprehension"

MIS ltr, file MID 906, 7 November 1944, subject: "Apprehension of Deserters by Mexican Authorities"

20/ Ltr, Military Attache, Mexico, file 4478, 29 August 1944, subject: "Apprehension of Deserters in Mexico"

21/ PMG T/S, file SPMGR 251.2, 4 May 1945, subject: "Apprehension of Deserters in Mexico"

22/ AC/S Memo, file SPMGR/220.712 (29 Aug 44), 12 May 1945, subject: "Policy of the United States War Department with regard to deserters and soldiers absent without leave in Mexico"

23/ T/S, Military Personnel Division, ASF, file SPMGR/220.712, 28 May 45

24/ PMG ltr, file SPMGR 251.2, 19 June 1945
PMG ltr, file SPMGR 251.2, 19 June 1945

In the foregoing re-statement of policy concerning return of United States absentees in Mexico, the Director, Military Personnel Division, ASF, directed that the United States Military Attache' in Mexico be informed of all cases where the absentee had been determined to be residing in Mexico.^{25/} Accordingly, an ASF Circular on 29 June 1945 directed that all such cases be forwarded to The Provost Marshal General.^{26/} The Provost Marshal General, in turn, transmitted these reports to the United States Military Attache' in Mexico, for his information.

Cooperation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

Efforts to obtain the return of United States Army absentees in Mexico and Canada were partially stalemated by the refusal of the foreign governments to return absentees who were citizens of their respective countries. To assure the apprehension of such personnel in the event they attempted re-entry into this country at some future date, procedures were established, after approval by all interested War Department agencies and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, whereby, The Adjutant General would notify the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization of the names of personnel sought and all border patrols would be alerted to apprehend and return to military control any such absentees who attempted to re-enter the United States.^{27/}

Return to Military Control of Canadian Absentees

At the inception of the apprehension program, frequent requests were received from the Canadian Embassy for aid in effecting the return to Canada of Canadian soldiers absent without leave who were apprehended in the United States. A procedure was established on 24 June 1944 with the concurrence of The Judge Advocate General and G-1 and G-2, WDGS, whereby United States commanders, upon the apprehension of a Canadian absentee, would detain such an absentee pending receipt of disposition instructions from The Provost Marshal General.^{28/} This procedure operated through military channels as no agreement then existed between the two governments for return of absentees. However, on 30 June 1944, this procedure was given the force of law, by the signing of Public Law 384, "An Act to implement the jurisdiction of civil courts of friendly foreign forces within the United States."^{29/}

25/ T/S, File SFGAM/220.712, Military Personnel Div, ASF, 28 May 1945

26/ Section IV, ASF Circular No. 245, 29 June 1945

27/ Ltrs, Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization to TAG, 11 September 1944 and 30 April 1945

28/ Section I, War Department Circular No. 258, 24 June 1944

29/ Public Law 384, 78th Congress

On 11 October 1944, the President of the United States proclaimed that the powers and privileges provided in the act were necessary to the maintenance of discipline in the armed forces of Canada stationed in the United States.^{30/} This program proved highly successful in that, of 563 apprehended Canadian absentees reported to The Provost Marshal General by 30 November 1945, 560 were either returned or, because of United States citizenship, were discharged by the Canadian government and steps taken by the United States apprehending agency to effect the induction of such personnel into the United States armed forces. Three cases were pending investigation as of 30 November 1945.

Liaison with War Department and Outside Agencies

Through liaison established by The Provost Marshal General with the Director, Office of Dependency Benefits, and The Adjutant General, information was received leading to the apprehension and return to military control of thousands of absentees who might otherwise have evaded return. This information consisted of letters written by public spirited citizens to the War Department revealing the possible whereabouts of known or alleged AWOLs.

Liaison was established for the same purpose with the Director, Selective Service System, who on 21 July 1945, issued two directives to the approximately 6,000 local Selective Service boards directing that information concerning the probable whereabouts of absentees or suspected absentees from the Army be submitted, thru Selective Service System channels, to The Provost Marshal General.^{31/} As of 30 November 1945, this program had not resulted in the receipt of many leads, although the leads received have proved valuable in effecting the return of the absentees so reported.

Control of Preparation of Forms No. 45 and 46

As the apprehension program became more firmly established, certain problems unrelated to actual apprehension but part of the administrative procedures involved in apprehension were brought to the attention of The Provost Marshal General. One of these was the inability of service commands to maintain correct information concerning the status of individuals who had been reported as absent without leave on Descriptive List of Absentee Wanted by the United States Army (WD, AGO Form No. 45). This was usually because of failure to receive the report of return (WD, AGO Form No. 46). Some service commands had files of over 14,000 open Forms 45, some of such long duration as to make the information therein useless.

^{30/} Proclamation 2626, 11 October 1944

^{31/} Local Board Memo 173-A, 21 July 1945

The non-receipt of Forms 46 continued such cases in an "open" category. On 1 February 1945, The Adjutant General was informed of this problem by The Provost Marshal General and was requested to set up a procedure whereby AG machine records units within the United States could be utilized as a control medium in the execution and distribution of reports of absence and return. On 7 August 1945, a War Department letter effectuating the recommendation was published and disseminated to all AG machine records units in the United States.^{32/} The letter established source data for use by service command headquarters in closing out open absentee files which were being maintained for personnel who had returned to duty from an absent without leave status and for whom a Form 46 had not been received. This procedure closed thousands of open files with a resulting reduction in administrative detail and a considerable savings in man-hours.

^{32/} WD Ltr, file AGCM-F 230.565 (7 Aug 45), 7 August 1945, subject: "AWOL Listings for Control of WD, AGO Forms No. 45 and 46"

PART III

PRISONERS OF WAR

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PRISONER OF WAR OPERATIONS^{1/}

The United States had very few prisoners of war in its custody until the middle of 1943. For example, as of 31 December 1942, there were only 1881 enemy prisoners of war in the United States and these had largely been received from the British who captured them. Allied military successes in North Africa in May of 1943 led to the capture of thousands of the German Afrika Korps whose immediate evacuation to the continental United States was begun. By 31 December 1943, the number of enemy prisoners of war in the continental United States had increased to 172,879. The number of prisoners rose from approximately 8,000 to approximately 167,000 between the months of April and October, 1943. From October, 1943, to July, 1944, the increase of prisoners being evacuated to the continental United States from the North African, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns was gradual. After the invasion of France on D-Day, 6 June 1944, prisoners were received in the second great influx. From July, 1944, to November, 1944, the number increased from approximately 224,000 to 360,000. The number remained fairly constant until April, 1945, but jumped, between April, 1945, and June, 1945, to a total of over 425,000. A table follows showing the numbers of enemy prisoners of war received for internment in the continental United States:

Monthly Census of Prisoners of War
Interned in Continental United States

Month and Year	Prisoners, Beginning of Month			
	Total	German	Italian	Jap
1942				
May	32	31	-	1
Jun	33	33	-	1
Jul	49	39	-	10
Aug	65	55	-	10
Sep	177	130	-	47
Oct	183	130	-	53
Nov	431	380	-	51
Dec	1,881	512	1,317	52

1/ Complete source material on the operation of the prisoner of war program is found in the Prisoner of War Circulars, series 1943, 1944, and 1945, and TM 19-500, "Enemy Prisoners of War." As of 31 August 1945, all regulations, directives, and procedures were covered by TM 19-500.

1943

Jan	23 65	990	1,313	62
Feb	2,444	1,026	1,356	62
Mar	2,755	1,334	1,359	62
Apr	5,007	2,145	2,799	62
May	36,083	22,110	13,911	62
Jun	53,435	34,161	19,212	62
Jul	80,558	54,502	25,969	87
Aug	130,299	94,220	35,986	93
Sep	163,706	115,358	48,253	95
Oct	167,748	119,401	48,252	95
Nov	171,484	122,350	49,039	95
Dec	172,879	123,440	49,323	116

1944

Jan	174,822	124,880	49,826	116
Feb	177,387	127,252	49,993	142
Mar	183,618	133,135	50,136	347
Apr	184,502	133,967	50,168	367
May	186,368	135,796	50,164	408
Jun	196,948	146,101	50,278	569
Jul	224,863	173,980	50,276	607
Aug	243,870	192,868	50,272	730
Sep	300,382	248,205	51,034	1,143
Oct	338,055	284,781	51,032	2,242
Nov	360,455	306,855	51,156	2,443
Dec	360,281	306,581	51,071	2,629

1945

Jan	359,687	306,306	50,561	2,820
Feb	360,996	307,404	50,571	3,021
Mar	365,954	312,144	50,550	3,260
Apr	399,518	345,920	50,304	3,294
May	425,871	371,683	50,273	3,915
Jun	425,806	371,503	50,062	4,249
Jul	422,130	367,513	49,789	4,828
Aug	415,919	361,322	49,184	5,413
Sep	403,311	355,453	42,915	4,938
Oct	391,144	351,150	35,065	4,929
Nov	358,419	324,623	29,539	4,257
Dec	341,015	313,234	25,696	2,085

The Provost Marshal General's staff supervision extended to the internment, care, treatment, and work of these thousands of prisoners of war.

The problems encountered were novel, interesting, and pressing. There was no body of experience upon which to draw for their solution.

Prisoner of war problems encountered in the war of 1917-1918 were the concern of the theater of operations and were not particularly helpful or guiding in the problems encountered domestically in the present war. Never before had the United States had prisoners of war in its own custody in such numbers. Never before in the history of modern warfare had prisoners been evacuated in such numbers and such distances by ocean and in some cases air transport to the homeland of a country which was waging war on foreign soil. The Geneva Conventions, which will be discussed later, had been prepared in 1929 and did not contemplate many of the trends and developments which took place in the global war which broke out in 1939 and into which the United States threw its forces in 1941. Both Geneva Conventions were untried documents, whose application had to be tested at every step.

The War Department, acting through the Provost Marshal General, followed two fundamental principles in functioning under the Geneva Conventions and the regulations which were issued supplemental thereto. These principles were, first, that the Geneva Conventions were humanitarian documents intended to prevent indignities being heaped upon soldiers of an enemy nation simply because they suffered the misfortune of being taken prisoners of war; and second, that the enemy nations held their own share of American soldiers who were to be protected by the United States Government through decent treatment of enemy prisoners.

The Provost Marshal General's Office was within the organization of the Army Service Forces, formerly the Services of Supply. The Provost Marshal General functioned as the staff agency of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and carried out the responsibility of the commanding general in matters pertaining to prisoners of war. Until 25 June 1945, a particular category of Italian prisoners of war (members of Italian Service Units) were administered by a separate headquarters, the Commanding General, Italian Service Units, Fort Wadsworth, New York, operating under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands. Army Service Forces Circular No. 279, 1944, set forth the basic regulations concerning Italian Service Unit members, including the responsibilities of the Provost Marshal General with regard to members of Italian Service Units.^{2/} Paragraph 4 thereof delineated the responsibilities of the Provost Marshal General with respect to Italian Service Units as follows:

- "4. Responsibility of Provost Marshal General.--Responsibility of the Provost Marshal General with respect to members of the Italian service units is limited to the following:
- A. Maintains the official central Prisoner of War Information Bureau in which are kept detailed records of Italian

^{2/} ASF Circular No. 279, 28 August 1944.

prisoners of war who are members of Italian service units by name and serial number, including picture, fingerprints, vital information, and records of personal property.

- b. Interprets the applicable parts of the Geneva and Red Cross Conventions.
- c. Maintains liaison with the State, Justice, Navy, and Post Office Departments, the Office of Censorship, the American Red Cross, the International Red Cross Committee, and the Legation of Switzerland.
- d. Acts as custodian of money and other property which members of Italian service units are not permitted to retain.
- e. Forwards official complaint letters to the Legation of Switzerland in accordance with the Geneva Convention.
- f. Forwards notification of proposed trial by courts-martial to the Legation of Switzerland.
- g. Discharges the War Department responsibility relating to repatriation.
- h. Transmits such funds of members of Italian service units as are authorized to the Allied occupied parts of Italy."

Of these responsibilities, subparagraphs b., c., e., f., and g. were carried out by the Prisoner of War Operations Division; the responsibility described in subparagraph a. was carried out by the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau; and those in subparagraphs d. and h. by the Finance Branch, Administrative and Personnel Division, Office of The Provost Marshal General.

On 25 June 1945, the supervision of Headquarters, Italian Service Units, was transferred from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands to The Provost Marshal General. After that date, the Commanding General, Italian Service Units, reported to The Provost Marshal General. 3/

WAR DEPARTMENT AUTHORITY FOR THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS
OF WAR

Enemy prisoners of war held by the United States come from two principal sources: those captured by Army Forces and those captured by Navy Forces, including Marine Corps and Coast Guard. It is a fundamental principle that the War Department has supervision over the internment of the prisoners of war captured by Army Forces.

So far as the custody of enemy prisoners of war captured by Naval Forces is concerned, a different situation exists. The Navy undoubtedly could have established its own prisoner of war camp for the internment of enemy personnel captured by it. However, the precedent of World War I was to the contrary; for the War and Navy Departments agreed that enemy personnel captured by the Navy would be turned over to the War Department for custody. Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, the Acting Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War referring to and inclosing a copy of the 1916 agreement in regard to the handling of war prisoners captured by Naval Forces and requested the Secretary of War to approve the continuation of the 1916 agreement. After an exchange of correspondence, it was agreed that the War Department would assume custody of all enemy prisoners captured by Naval Forces.

ORGANIZATION OF PRISONER OF WAR ACTIVITIES IN
THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S OFFICE

Organization of prisoner of war activities within the Provost Marshal General's Office progressed in relation to the increase of importance of those activities.

Prior to the receipt in considerable numbers of prisoners of war, the War Department, under an agreement with the Department of Justice, assumed custody of civilian internees who had been interned in the continental United States under procedures established by the Department of Justice. The enemy aliens were apprehended, detained, given hearings by Alien Enemy Hearing Boards and, upon the recommendation of the boards, interned by order of the Attorney General of the United States. Upon issuance of their internment orders, the internees were delivered by the Department of Justice from its detention camps to the War Department's internment camps. In addition to Department of Justice internees, civilian internees who were interned by order of military authorities were received from the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska and a few from the Canal Zone and were held in the War Department internment camps. The primary internment function of the Provost Marshal General's Office in the early stages of the war was to exercise staff supervision over the internment of more than 4200 civilian internees. The division charged with the operation of this program was known as the "Aliens Division."

With the shipment to the United States in the Spring of 1943 of the first great influx of prisoners of war from the North African Theater of Operations, the attention of the Provost Marshal General's Office turned with increasing rapidity from civilian internee matters to prisoner of war matters and, on 4 June 1943, the name of the division was changed to the Prisoner of War Division. An agreement was entered into with the Department of Justice under which the custody of all civilian internees, including those from the Territories, was turned over to the Department of Justice. The civilian internees were moved from the War Department internment camps, such as the Lordsburg Internment Camp, Lordsburg, New Mexico, the McAlester Internment Camp, McAlester, Oklahoma, and the Livingston Internment Camp, Camp Livingston, Louisiana, to Department of Justice internment camps such as the Santa Fe Internment Camp, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and the Fort Lincoln Internment Camp, Bismarck, North Dakota.

The Prisoner of War Division continued from 4 June 1943 to 11 December 1944, when a general reorganization of the Provost Marshal General's Office with regard to prisoner of war matters occurred.

Several units which had, previous to 11 December 1944, been branches of the Prisoner of War Division, became separate divisions or bureaus, and the balance of the functions previously performed by the Prisoner of War Division were continued in the present Prisoner of War Operations Division. Specifically, in addition to the Prisoner of War Operations Division, on and after 11 December 1944, there were the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau, the Army Prisoner of War Information Bureau, and the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division.

BASIC WRITTEN GOVERNING DOCTRINE

The governing principles of this nation's treatment of enemy prisoners of war are set forth in two treaties which are known as the Geneva Conventions. One is known as the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field, the other as the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The first is commonly referred to in short title as the Geneva Red Cross Convention and the second the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. These two treaties were the result of an international conference of the major powers of the world during the peaceful days of the summer of 1929. The Conventions were signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929, and were ratified by the United States in January, 1932. The ratification of the United States was deposited with the Government of Switzerland on 4 February 1932 and the treaties were proclaimed by the President on 4 August 1932. The original language of the Conventions was French and the publication thereof commonly used in the Provost Marshal General's Office was the Government Printing Office pamphlet of 1932 containing the original French and English translation. The prisoners of war treaty set up standards for the treatment of prisoners upon capture, general internment conditions, food and clothing, discipline, labor, finance, protection, and repatriation of prisoners of war. The Red Cross Convention dealt primarily with the status of wounded and sick and so-called protected personnel after capture.

In the course of prisoner of war administration, the Provost Marshal General's Office obtained translations of the Geneva Prisoners of War and Red Cross Conventions into the German and Italian languages, and caused them to be distributed for the benefit of enemy prisoners of war in War Department custody. A Japanese language translation of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention which had been prepared by the Spanish Embassy during the time it was serving as protecting power for Japanese interests in continental United States, was obtained and distributed to service commands and camps containing Japanese prisoners of war in this country and to the theaters in the Pacific area.

In the days shortly after Pearl Harbor, when it was apparent that the War Department would have custody of a substantial number of internees and ultimately prisoners of war, it became obvious that written

regulations should be prepared to supplement the Geneva Conventions and to give adequate instructions to military personnel in charge of internment camps concerning all phases of internment. Accordingly, instructions were issued to prepare a set of regulations and, on 22 April 1942, the first regulations were issued. They were entitled "Civilian Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War." It may be noted that these early regulations were undated and did not show authentication. However, their issuance date was 22 April 1942, and they were issued by order of the Secretary of War over the signature of the Chief of Staff. These early regulations were reasonably complete. They contained an introduction and chapters on the following topics: internment facilities, basic personnel record, and treatment of internees and care of their moneys and personal effects, organization of internees, clothing, food, bedding, and fuel, medical attention and sanitation, pay and finance, canteens, employment and compensation, moral and intellectual needs, discipline of internees, complaints and requests, correspondence, censorship, reports, and information bureaus. These regulations were amended from time to time by the issuance of "memoranda to accompany tentative internee regulations." The amendments were, for the most part, on the subject of mail, for many changes in the early days were made as to the number of letters allowed, censorship procedures, proper routing of mail, parcels, postage, and other subjects of that nature. In addition, War Department Circular No. 10, 5 January 1943, entitled "Accounts of Civilian Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War Trust Fund System Procedure," amended Section C, Chapter IV and Chapter VIII of those first regulations, pending their revision, by establishing a new system of handling internees' accounts.

In order to bring the written doctrine supplemental to the Geneva Convention up to date, regulations applicable to prisoners of war were republished on 24 September 1943 in War Department Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943. This circular consolidated applicable existing doctrine formerly set forth in the Internee and Prisoner of War Regulations described in the above paragraph and changes in policy since the publication of the Internee and Prisoner of War Regulations. Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943, was directed primarily to prisoners of war, whereas the former regulations covered primarily civilian internees. As the prisoner of war program progressed, it was necessary to publish amendments and additions to Prisoner of War Circular No. 1. Ten additional prisoner of war circulars were published in 1943, 54 prisoner of war circulars were published in 1944, and 15 were published in 1945. As a result, the volume of regulations became great and included amendments, amendments to amendments, rescissions, and additions to previous prisoner of war circulars. In addition, there were amendatory TWX's and telegrams in existence. It became increasingly difficult for interested persons to locate applicable regulations in the prisoner of war circular series and confusion often resulted concerning the regulations.

Because of the difficulties mentioned above, the entire series of regulations was revised, consolidated, and republished in loose-leaf form in Technical Manual 19-500. The first chapter of this manual was

published in September, 1944. Succeeding chapters were published as soon as they could be prepared and cleared with interested offices. The provisions of prisoner of war circulars included in the chapters of the manual were rescinded as the manual was published. Although this manual was designated a technical manual, in reality it was a loose-leaf compilation of policy and regulations pertaining to prisoners of war, which was intended as a primary directive for use by individuals concerned with prisoners of war. Its principal value lay in the fact that changes could be effected either by the publication of change sheets or by the substitution of new pages. Therefore, there was no necessity for cross-referencing.

In order to supplement the prisoner of war circular series and, later, TM 19-500, War Department letters, Army Service Forces letters, Army Service Forces circulars, TWX's, and telegrams were used frequently when immediate changes in the prisoner of war regulations were necessary and those changes could not be processed for publication in the circular series or the technical manual with sufficient speed. Normally, the policies or regulations announced in this temporary media were later incorporated in the more permanent prisoner of war circulars or the technical manual.

Another important manner in which information was disseminated regarding the prisoner of war program was by letters and memoranda prepared by the service commands in order to keep the various prisoner of war camps informed of regulations appearing in War Department publications and in correspondence interpreting those regulations. Copies of these service command publications were forwarded to The Provost Marshal General's Office where they were reviewed in order to assure a uniformity of interpretation of War Department regulations throughout the service commands.

EVACUATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR TO CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

In order to relieve our own fighting forces of the problems of guarding, feeding, and housing prisoners of war in the active theaters of operations, and to alleviate the critical manpower shortage which existed in continental United States arising in the latter part of 1942 and which increased as the war progressed, the War Department early adopted the policy of transferring from the active theaters of operations to the continental United States for internment those prisoners of war who were captured by our forces, and those, to the extent of 175,000, who were captured by British forces.

In the evacuation of prisoners of war from the active theaters of operations to continental United States, the following policies governed:

(1) Vital shipping space was not used in transporting prisoners of war. Only empty bottoms that otherwise would have been filled with ballast were used.

(2) Because of operational reasons, a small number of high-ranking officer prisoners of war and civilians and their staff personnel along with certain other prisoners of war and civilians were evacuated to the continental United States by air transportation.

(3) The total number of prisoners of war transported to the continental United States was consistent with the desire of the commanding generals of the active theaters of operations and the demand for additional manpower in this country, as finally approved by the War Department in coordination with other Federal agencies. This explains the "rise" and "fall" in the number of prisoners of war evacuated to this country from late 1942 to V-E Day. However, the flow of prisoners from the active theaters of operations to the continental United States for intelligence purposes was never interrupted until V-E Day. At that time, or shortly thereafter, the evacuation of prisoners of war from the European Theater of Operations and the Mediterranean Theater of Operations was stopped. Prior to V-E Day, instructions had been issued that, as of V-E Day, the only prisoners of war to be evacuated and interned in the continental United States were those who were on board ships that had cleared Gibraltar if from the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and had joined convoy if from the European Theater of Operations.

From the latter part of 1942 to V-E Day, a total of 336 movements of prisoners of war from the active theaters of operations to the continental United States by water and air transportation took place. The

transfer of prisoners of war within the continental United States represented one of the most difficult problems of the entire prisoner of war program. After the prisoners of war had arrived at the various ports of embarkation in this country, their transfer to the prisoner of war camps or hospitals had to be effected. As there was no established policy or precedent to follow, the problem of transferring prisoners within the country was one that required the utmost coordination between the Office of the Chief of Transportation and the Provost Marshal General's Office.

The adopted policy with regard to the transportation of prisoners of war was to furnish the lowest class of accommodations of the facility used. This meant that in all cases prisoners were transferred in coaches except where it was not economical or feasible to do so. For example, when small groups of prisoners or prisoner of war patients were transferred and the number involved was not sufficient to transport them economically in a special coach, pullman accommodations, such as drawing rooms, bedrooms, compartments, or roomettes were used. Pullman accommodations of that type were furnished prisoners when the prisoners being transferred were affected with a contagious disease or were of such a character as to be dangerous to the general public. Further, when transportation was by railroad cars and the journey involved the spending of two or more nights on the train, sleeping car accommodations, tourist class, when available, were furnished.^{4/} This policy was amended and expanded by a War Department circular in December, 1944, wherein it was provided that transportation for enlisted prisoners was to be of the lowest class of the facility furnished and that the transportation and routing of prisoners of war was to be handled in the same manner as military prisoners. However, officer prisoners of war in the grades of general were furnished parlor car or sleeping car accommodations when requested by the Provost Marshal General's Office or by the commanding general of the service command effecting the transfer. This circular authorized the furnishing of rooms or other compartments in regular sleeping cars when overnight travel was involved and stipulated that one berth would be furnished each prisoner of war, a lower if practicable, otherwise an upper. It further provided that physically or mentally disabled prisoners of war were to be furnished roomettes or accommodations of like kind in order that they might not endanger the health and security of the traveling public. When there was a sufficient number of such persons, the use of a special car was authorized if such accommodations were more economical than the furnishing of individual rooms or roomettes. In January, 1945, this policy was again amended. This amendment provided that no special preparation of hospital cars owned by the United States Army was to be made when the equipment or railroad

^{4/} AR 55-125, 9 January 1943. See WD Circular No. 420, 26 October 1944, and WD Circular No. 471, 15 December 1944.

stock was used in the transfer of prisoners of war. However, it was provided that the commanding general of the service command effecting the transfer could take special measures as he deemed necessary for the proper securing of such prisoners. In July, 1945, the policy regarding the transportation of prisoners of war was again amended. At that time, American soldiers were being deployed from Europe to Japan across the United States. These amendments provided that special coaches would not be used for the transfer of prisoners of war unless a group of not less than thirty passengers was transported. The transfer of less than thirty prisoners of war on rail carriers was prohibited and in movements of prisoners for distances up to five hundred miles, transfers were to be effected by the use of Government-owned motor vehicles. It was further specifically stated that, before physically or mentally disabled prisoners of war could be moved by rail transportation in pullman or sleeping cars because of the danger to the public, a certification in writing would be issued by the responsible United States Army medical officer setting forth the reason for furnishing such transportation to prisoners of war and stating that in his opinion as a physician such accommodations were imperatively necessary. It was further stated that, where rooms were furnished to prisoner of war patients, the door of the compartment would be plainly marked with a Red Cross placard showing that it was a hospital unit, and that, where an entire pullman car was used to transport mentally and physically disabled prisoners, the car would be plainly marked with a Red Cross placard on both sides and both doors of such cars.

Transfers from ports of embarkation to camps and hospitals were some of the most difficult encountered because they required a large amount of railroad equipment and guard personnel to be ready for movement to ports of embarkation at the proper time. In order to facilitate these movements, each one was designated by a code number. However, there was hardly a movement of prisoners of war arriving at a port of embarkation that did not demand a last minute change because of weather conditions, conditions at the designated port, lack of proper advance information, or changes in the allotment of prisoners to camps caused by critical labor shortages.

After the prisoners had arrived in this country and had been placed in prisoner of war camps for permanent internment, it became necessary to transfer them from one service command to another in order to alleviate critical manpower shortages in certain parts of the country. These labor shortages were brought about as the result of peak agricultural planting or harvest seasons and the increased tempo of certain industries for which priority for prisoner of war labor had been given. These transfers were directed by the Provost Marshal General.

At the beginning of the prisoner of war program, the Provost Marshal General's Office directed the transfer of all prisoner of war patients from camps to hospitals and return. However, as the program developed, this function was seen to be a problem of local concern primarily, and authority was delegated to the service commands to effect these transfers.

Authority was delegated to the individual service commands to transfer prisoner of war personnel within the service commands as necessitated by the prisoner of war program. These transfers were made in accordance with various directives issued from time to time by the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

After the surrender of Italy, the Allied Military Control Commission, the Italian Military Commission, and other Allied agencies requested the transfer of certain prisoners of war to Europe. These prisoners were requested by name for the accomplishment of certain work which required a special skill or talent. For example, requests were received for the return of prisoners of war skilled in the science of clearing harbors, rivers, docks, etc., and those whose experience had made them authorities in the civil administration of municipalities or other subdivisions of the nation. These requests also covered those persons who, upon their return, would be able to get the industrial life of Italy under way and who could reorganize the agricultural economy of that country. There were other transfers to the European Theater made upon specific request. Requested prisoners also possessed special skills or had volunteered to cooperate with the Allies in areas where their information, technical knowledge, skill, and experience would benefit the Allied operations in the particular zones for which they were requested. Sometimes these prisoners were requested as individuals and sometimes in groups classified as to trade, skill, or political affiliations. All such transfers of prisoners were effected by the Provost Marshal General and, although the number of prisoners of war of this category returned was not great, their value to the Allied occupation authorities was very great.

MILITARY POLICE ESCORT GUARD COMPANIES

At the outbreak of the war, the Aliens Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, prepared plans for the erection of permanent inclosures, each of which would contain 3,000 prisoners of war, divided into 12 companies of 250 prisoners each. These plans contemplated a camp overhead to administer each inclosure, and required that units be furnished by the Corps of Military Police to escort and guard the prisoners of war. The prisoner of war escort guard companies activated under Table of Organization 7-217 each consisted of two officers and 88 enlisted men and each was designed to perform the functions of administering, escorting, and guarding 450 prisoners of war. These companies discharged their duties at civilian internment camps operated by the Army until the internees were delivered to the custody of the Department of Justice in June, 1943, as well as at prisoner of war camps.

Since the size of prisoner of war labor companies was reduced from 450 as originally contemplated to 250, the Aliens Division proposed a revision of Table of Organization 7-217 to establish military police escort guard companies consisting of three officers and 132 enlisted men, which would guard four companies of 250 prisoners each. The revision was approved and published in Table of Organization 19-47, dated 1 April 1942.

The military police escort guard company consisted of a headquarters detachment and four escort guard sections. Each section was commanded by a sergeant and consisted of three squads: rifle, shot gun, and machine gun squad. The rifle squad was commanded by a corporal armed with a pistol and consisted of nine riflemen armed with rifles and bayonets. The shot gun squad was commanded by a corporal armed with a pistol and consisted of nine riflemen armed with shot guns. The machine gun squad was commanded by a corporal armed with a pistol and consisted of five enlisted men. This squad was equipped with several types of weapons, the use of which depended upon the squad's mission at the time. While escorting, this squad was armed with two Thompson submachine guns and three carbines. While guarding, it was assigned to duty in a guard tower in which a light or heavy machine gun was installed. The variety of weapons furnished this company provided a sufficient, diversified fire power to handle effectively any escorting or guarding mission to which it was assigned.

On 29 April 1942, the Chief of Staff authorized the Commanding General, Services of Supply (Army Service Forces) to activate additional units of this type to maintain approximately the ratio of one

such company for every 1,000 aliens and prisoners of war actually in or en route to internment camps under United States jurisdiction. Pursuant to this authority, 343 military police escort guard companies were activated. These companies were trained under Mobilization Training Programs 19-1, dated 6 May 1942, as revised, and 19-3, dated 15 June 1943.

The primary mission of military police escort guard companies was the movement and guarding of prisoners of war. In addition to the performance of its primary mission, escort guard companies were subject to be called upon to perform other military police functions and, therefore, tactical exercises were given these units in preparation for such eventualities. It was considered essential that these units have a practical knowledge of combat tactics, attack and defense, and this practical work was included in the tactical exercises, although unrelated to their primary mission. Under these programs, special consideration was given to work in alerts, prisoner of war breaks, escapes, and movement of prisoners of war by foot, motor vehicle, rail, and boat.

Military police escort guard companies were trained for a period of nine weeks, during which time the usual basic, technical, and tactical subjects were covered to the extent that time permitted.

Because of the increasing numbers of enemy prisoners of war captured by our armed forces or received from Great Britain for internment, it became necessary to furnish military police escort guard companies to the Chief of Transportation to act as voyage guards from ports of the European and North African Theaters of Operations to ports in the United States. In addition, prisoner of war escort guard companies were assigned to the First, Second, and Third Service Commands to act as train guards for the movement of prisoners of war from ports of embarkation on the Atlantic seaboard to prisoner of war camps within the continental United States.

In addition to guarding prisoners of war, military police escort guard companies were assigned to duty at war relocation centers of the War Relocation Authority. These companies performed only guard functions at these centers; all administrative and housekeeping functions were performed by War Relocation Authority personnel or by the evacuees. While the primary mission of these units was to prevent unauthorized persons, including evacuees, from entering or leaving the project areas, the commanding officers of these companies were to assume the sole command of the project in the event of emergencies.

In the interest of economy of manpower, the military police escort guard companies on duty at these installations were disbanded on 15 April 1944, and bulk authorizations of personnel were made to the service commanders as a substitute.

PROCESSING OF PRISONERS OF WAR

After capture of a prisoner, the basic personnel record, W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 19-2 (or W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 19-3 when time did not permit the completion of W.D., A.G.O. Form No. 19-2), containing the name of the prisoner, his serial number, fingerprints, inventory of personal effects, and other personal data, was prepared by the first unit which was able to effect at least partial processing. This record was prepared in the theater of operations when time permitted. However, at the close of the North African campaign prisoners were captured in such large groups and were transferred to continental United States so hurriedly that, frequently, processing could not be accomplished until the prisoners either arrived at the ports of embarkation in this country or at a prisoner of war camp.

In the event prisoners arrived in the United States without having been processed, the port of embarkation commander fingerprinted the prisoners and filled in essential identification data on basic personnel records provided that the processing did not encumber the facilities at the port. In the event that processing did encumber port facilities, prisoners were transferred to the prisoner of war camp without processing. In any event, port of embarkation commanders were charged with disinfecting all prisoners and their property prior to loading them into trains and with conducting a search of the prisoners in order to confiscate any dangerous weapons or equipment and implements of war which had not been previously taken from them. Items of military intelligence value were turned over to the Military Intelligence Service for examination. In addition, all money was taken from the prisoners, marked for identification, and sent to the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau for storage until their repatriation. In April, 1945, however, this procedure was modified somewhat when it was expected that large additional shipments of prisoners would be received at the ports from the European Theater. In order to prepare for quick clearance at the ports, it was directed that only dangerous weapons would be confiscated at the ports. When the prisoners arrived at their prisoner of war camps, any money found on them was to be forwarded to the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, for safekeeping. Any papers, letters, documents, etc., were to be turned over to the Military Intelligence Service by the camps for review. This procedure, however, was never adopted to any great extent since all shipments of prisoners were stopped after V-E Day.

Serial numbers for prisoners captured by the Army of the United States normally were assigned at the first prisoner of war inclosure

or prisoner of war camp to which the prisoners were sent. As in the case of the preparation of the basic personnel record, when large groups of prisoners were captured toward the close of the North African campaign, many prisoners were transferred to this country before serial numbers could be assigned to them in which case numbers were assigned later.

Serial numbers consisted of two components separated from each other by a dash. The first component consisted of two symbols which indicated the command in which the prisoner was captured and the name of the enemy country in whose armed forces the prisoner was serving. For example, prisoners captured in the North African Theater were assigned the number 81 followed by the letter G or I to indicate whether they were German or Italian. The second component consisted of an individual number assigned consecutively to each prisoner processed in the appropriate command irrespective of which country he served. Thus, the first prisoner processed in the North African Theater, if a German, was assigned the number 81G-1.

Similarly, prisoners transferred to continental United States without having been processed by the capturing command were processed by the service command at the prisoner of war camp to which they were first delivered. Serial numbers for prisoners in this class consisted of two components. The first contained three symbols. The first symbol was a number representing the proper service command, from one to nine. The second symbol was W to represent War Department. The third symbol was the first letter of the name of the country the prisoner served, that is, G for Germany, I for Italy, and J for Japan. The second component consisted of an individual number assigned consecutively to each prisoner processed irrespective of the country he served or where captured. For example, the first prisoner processed in the Second Service Command, if a German, was 2WG-1.

In the event the prisoners were captured by the United States Navy, serial numbers were assigned by the Navy Department as soon as practicable after the landing at a Naval shore station. In this case, the first component of the serial number designated the Naval District in which the shore station was located and the letter indicated the nationality of the prisoner. The second component consisted of a number assigned to the individual prisoner and the symbol NA showed that the prisoner was captured by the Navy. For example, the fourth prisoner received and processed at a Naval shore station in the 14th Naval District, if a Japanese, would receive the serial number 14J-4NA.

Serial numbers assigned protected personnel who were certified by the Office of the Provost Marshal General included the letters PP in parenthesis following the last digit of the serial number. For example, 4WG-89(PP).

PRISONER OF WAR FACILITIES

On 18 July 1941, a joint agreement was signed by the Secretary of War and the Attorney General regarding the internment of alien enemies which provided that the permanent detention of the aliens would be the function of the War Department. The agreement provided further for the establishment of three internment camps: two in the Southwest and one in the Southeast. On 8 December 1941, the Secretary of War directed the Quartermaster General to make available to the corps area commanders (service commanders) funds for the construction of additional internment camps in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Corps Areas. Because of the internment of large numbers of German, Italian, and Japanese enemy aliens by the Department of Justice, and the evacuation to the continental United States of internees from the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska and the Canal Zone, the Provost Marshal General was authorized to construct nine permanent enemy alien internment camps. One officer prisoner of war camp was also authorized. In addition, 14 permanent internment camps in the planning stage were authorized.

Because of considerations of cost of construction and the discomfort to military personnel as well as internees, the Provost Marshal General established the 40° north latitude as the northernmost boundary within which the construction of internment camps would be authorized. The type of construction of camps was to be of theater of operations or hutment type, complete with necessary hospital facilities of a standard design. The feasibility of using available CCC camps was explored but, because of the fact that the distribution of internees in small increments at CCC camps would result in an increase in necessary administrative and overhead personnel, the use of CCC camps was not favorably considered.

The program for construction of permanent internment camps contemplated stockades for the confinement of 3,000 internees and facilities for approximately 600 military personnel. The stockades were divided into three compounds having a capacity of 1,000 internees each, and contained the following facilities: barracks, lavatory, mess, company administration building, storehouses, administration building, recreational building, post exchange, and infirmary. In addition to the indoor recreation space provided, an adequate outdoor recreation area was included within the inclosure. Adjacent to the stockade, housing for the American officers and enlisted men, administration building, infirmaries, post exchange, warehouses, recreation building, and utility area were provided and, of course, pertained to the administration and operation of the internment camp.

Hospital facilities for the internees were constructed within the inclosure to accommodate the internees and the military personnel.

In the location of prisoner of war camps primary consideration was given to the problem of internal security. No prisoner of war camps were established within a radius of 40 miles of installations vital to the war effort. Prior to the establishment of camps in the Eastern Defense Command, approval was obtained from the respective commanding generals. Originally, restrictions were placed by these commanding generals upon the establishment of camps within the following states: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and within certain areas of Washington, Oregon, and California.

Before the United States captured prisoners of war in any number, the first of an ultimate total of 175,000 captured by the armed forces of the United Kingdom were received for internment in continental United States. The Commanding General, Services of Supply (Army Service Forces), directed that prisoner of war companies be formed and distributed throughout the various cantonments for the purpose of relieving service troops and providing supplementary labor for work being left undone. Plans were made immediately for the construction of internment camps at various posts, camps, and stations. These plans included facilities for prisoners of war which it was anticipated the United States Forces would capture. A program for the construction of facilities having a capacity of 210,000 prisoners of war was initiated. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that prisoners of war be utilized to the extent practicable in agricultural pursuits. Therefore, in the program of advanced planning for an additional 100,000 prisoners of war, primary consideration was given to the agricultural areas where labor shortages existed or might exist. The Department of Agriculture and the War Manpower Commission were consulted in the selection of those areas.

In addition to segregation by nationality required by the Geneva Convention, certain segregation policies were established in compliance with which separate camps were established for the internment of prisoners of war falling within the following categories:

- (1) Anti-Nazi German Navy prisoners of war.
- (2) All other German Navy prisoners of war.
- (3) Anti-Nazi German Army prisoners of war.
- (4) All other German Army prisoners of war.

By an agreement with the Department of Justice, the War Department released all civilian internees to the Department of Justice on the condition that the release or parole of enemy aliens interned by military commanders outside the continental United States and held in

custody in the continental United States would be effected only by order of the Secretary of War. The transfer of these internees made certain internment camps available for prisoners of war after June, 1943.

In order that more extensive use of prisoner of war labor to alleviate current labor shortages might be made, the commanding generals of the service commands were authorized on 22 July 1943 to establish temporary prisoner of war camps as branches of permanent prisoner of war camps. Former CCC buildings, other existing facilities, or tents were used in the establishment of these camps.

On 17 September 1942, the responsibilities for the use and utilization of prisoners of war, including the location of prisoner of war camps and all security matters connected therewith, were placed upon the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.^{6/} The memorandum imposing these responsibilities provided further that prisoners of war would be used to the utmost possible extent in any and all areas of the continental United States where they were needed to perform essential labor except when conditions were such that it was considered impossible to provide reasonable security. This memorandum removed the restrictions theretofore in effect with respect to the location of prisoner of war camps in areas under the jurisdiction of the defense commanders. On 2 October 1943, the responsibilities referred to above were delegated to the commanding generals of the various service commands.

Despite efforts by the Army Air Forces and the Navy Department to prevent the location of prisoner of war camps in the vicinity of sensitive Army Air Forces and Naval installations, the responsibility for the location of prisoner of war camps remained that of the service commanders. However, where prisoners of war were located or used within a ten-mile radius of sensitive Army Air Forces or Naval installations, special precautions were taken in the establishment and operation of those camps. As of 31 August 1945, the only restriction on the location of prisoner of war camps was in the Military District of Washington. In this area, no prisoners of war were housed or employed in any capacity within a ten-mile radius of the White House, except at Andrews Field, Maryland.^{7/}

^{6/} WD Memorandum No. W 580-10-43, 17 September 1942.

^{7/} Memorandum, Headquarters, Military District of Washington, dated 15 July 1944, subject: "Policy Re Employment of Prisoners of War Within the Military District of Washington;" rescinded by similar memorandum, 3 May 1945, same subject. The latter memo imposed the ten-mile limit.

As the need for prisoner of war labor in critical labor shortage areas in the United States increased, the construction of prisoner of war camps under existing construction directives often restricted the possibility of immediate action to alleviate emergency manpower shortages. By memorandum, dated 27 July 1944, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, authorized the service commanders to approve construction of temporary prisoner of war camps costing less than \$4,000 to meet emergency requests for labor in harvesting crops. However, under this authority, only small camps could be constructed. Inasmuch as the average cost of converting existing facilities or providing minimum new facilities for prisoner of war use was \$38.00 per man, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, on 13 February 1945, authorized the commanding generals of the service commands to direct the division engineers to provide housing for prisoners of war when the necessary construction of alterations did not exceed a cash outlay of \$38.00 per man and the commanding generals personally certified that such construction was in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, Chapter 2, TM 19-500.

The type of construction of prisoner of war camps established in the United States was, under the Geneva Convention, equivalent to that provided United States troops at base camps. Base camps were established on a permanent basis for the complete administration of prisoners and were located primarily to assure maximum employment of prisoners of war. Branch camps were established on a permanent or temporary basis to satisfy definite work needs. The facilities at prisoner of war base camps were designed to meet the following requirements:

- (1) Buildings or tents were lighted and heated sufficiently.
- (2) Officers' quarters were established on the basis of 120 square feet per man.
- (3) Enlisted quarters were established on the basis of 40 square feet per man.
- (4) Sanitary facilities conformed to paragraph 10, AR 40-205.
- (5) Latrines conformed to paragraph 19, AR 40-205.
- (6) One laundry tub was provided for each 25 men.
- (7) Indoor recreation space was provided on the basis of two square feet per man at permanent camps.
- (8) Buildings for prisoner of war canteens were provided on the basis of two square feet per man at permanent camps.

(9) Infirmary and hospital facilities were provided in each compound or were made available in the immediate vicinity.

(10) If feasible, a separate building was provided for religious services.

(11) Single or double barbed-wire fences were constructed.

(12) Warehouse space was provided either on or off the camp areas.

(13) Outdoor recreational area was provided on the basis of 200 square feet per man.

(14) Sentry boxes or guard towers were provided.

(15) Adequate drainage was provided.

(16) Water supply was approved by appropriate authorities and sufficient supply was assured.

(17) Hot water was provided.

(18) Guard house or detention facilities were provided either on or off the camp.

(19) Adequate lighting of fences and the ground immediately adjacent thereto was provided.

(20) Adequate fire protection facilities in the stockade or immediately adjacent thereto were provided.

In the establishment of branch camps, housing or tentage utilized for this purpose and the subsistence and sanitary facilities for prisoners in these camps were in accordance with the Geneva Convention and comparable to those furnished United States troops under similar conditions. Military installations were utilized wherever possible in order to use existing housing, supplies, services, and utilities. No prisoner of war camps were established at the expense of the War Department unless the estimated net income to the government for the first six months or less of the work contract was in excess of the cost of construction or conversion of the camp. In addition to military installations, prisoner of war branch camps were established by converting housing owned by other Federal agencies. In addition, state, local, and privately owned housing was utilized.

Prisoner of war labor was utilized to the maximum in the establishment, conversion, maintenance, and dismantlement of security and housing facilities for themselves and their guard personnel. Advanced detachments of prisoners, living under field conditions, were utilized to prepare sites, including roads and fences, and to perform other common and semi-skilled labor incident to the establishment of branch camps.

As of 31 August 1945, there were approximately 155 base camps and 511 branch camps in operation in the United States. Camps were established in all but three states: North Dakota, Nevada, and Vermont.

ORGANIZATION OF PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS

In general, prisoner of war camps were operated in the same manner as other military establishments and according to the basic principles of the organization and decentralization indicated in Section 103.2, ASF Organization Manual, M 301, dated 15 August 1944. In order that prisoners of war might be segregated, separate prisoner of war camps were established for German, Japanese, and Italian prisoners of war.

In the construction of prisoner of war camps each stockade was divided into compounds having a capacity of from 1,000 to 1,600 prisoners of war. Within the compound the prisoners of war were assigned to companies of 250 prisoners each. However, since the air space requirements were reduced from 60 square feet to 40 square feet per prisoner by order of the Secretary of War, the size of prisoner of war companies was increased from 250 to 400. Each company was commanded by a commissioned officer of the United States Army, and, in addition, one duty sergeant, one mess sergeant, and one supply sergeant, one corporal company clerk, one private first class, and one cook were assigned to each company. The service commanders were authorized to reduce the American personnel wherever possible, as the prisoner personnel became competent to take over the duties of the American military personnel assigned to the prisoner of war camps. However, an absolute minimum of one American supply sergeant was maintained in each company. Prisoners were employed in so far as possible on work necessary to the administration, management, and maintenance of prisoner of war camps, and qualified prisoners were used as first sergeants, cooks, cooks' helpers, hospital orderlies, interpreters, tailors, shoemakers, barbers, carpenters, mechanics, plumbers, platoon sergeants, stockade leaders, and assistant stockade leaders.

When prisoners of war were first transferred to prisoner of war camps, the leaders of their respective squads, platoons, companies, battalions, and camps were designated according to the relative rank of the prisoners. These leaders were responsible for maintenance and cleanliness of the quarters of their units. They were also used to relay orders or for such other duties as were assigned to them by the camp or company commanders. However, the designation of leaders according to relative rank was discontinued and at each prisoner of war base and branch camp prisoners were permitted to select from their number a spokesman to represent them as agent or intermediary before the military authorities, protecting power, and relief or aid organizations. The selection of the spokesman for enlisted prisoners and his tenure of office in that capacity was subject to the approval of the camp commander. In camps for officer prisoners, the senior officer

was the prisoner of the highest grade and, unless incompetent or incapacitated, he was recognized as the spokesman. Where camps were occupied by both officer and enlisted prisoners, each of these groups was represented by its respective spokesman. 8/

For the servicing and maintenance of the compound to which officer prisoners and officer protected personnel were assigned, orderlies from enlisted prisoners of war of the same nationality were assigned as necessary, not exceeding one orderly for each general officer and one orderly for each group of 12 other officers. In addition, cooks as necessary for officers were assigned from enlisted prisoners of the same nationality. However, in order that all available prisoners of war might be utilized in military or private contract work, prisoners of war capable of performing a full day of productive labor were not assigned as orderlies.

One military police escort guard company consisting of three officers and 132 enlisted men was utilized for the guarding and securing of 1,000 prisoners of war. In addition, overhead administrative personnel was assigned to the camps by the commanding generals of the service commands. The allotments of overhead administrative personnel varied according to the size of the camp, the problems of a local nature, and whether such a camp was on an existing military post or was an independent installation. Typical allotments subject to change for particular reasons were set up by the Provost Marshal General's Office which established standards for a typical 3,000-man prisoner of war camp. This allotment permitted the use of 22 officers and 73 enlisted men. In addition to this personnel, specialists such as chaplains, medical officers, and necessary housekeeping troops were provided. These varied with the needs of each camp.

If the camp was an independent 3,000-man prisoner of war installation, a station complement was established and the assignment of 35 enlisted men was permitted. If the camp interned 6,000 prisoners of war, the allotment of enlisted men as station complement was raised to 46. The enlisted personnel used as station complement housekeeping troops was allotted in the following categories: 15 from Quartermaster Corps, 6 from Detached Men's List, 15 from Engineer Corps, and 10 from Quartermaster Corps Motor Pool.

In this type of camp, the number of officers assigned was not standardized since the need of different types of officers and officers of different services varied greatly. However, it was usually in the neighborhood of 37 to 40 officers.

Military police escort guard companies on duty at prisoner of war camps were disbanded on 15 April 1944 and bulk authorizations of their personnel were made to the service commanders to perform essential military police duties and to perform the functions of

8/ ASF letter, SPX 383.6 (23 Mar 44) OB-S-SPMG-H, dated 24 March 1944, subject: "German Prisoner of War Spokesmen and Supervisors."

guarding prisoners of war. While the ratio varied according to service commands, officers, enlisted men, and civilians were assigned to camps at an approximate rate of 17 per 1,000 prisoners of war. The War Department Manpower Board dispatched personnel teams to prisoner of war camps in the various service commands and, upon the recommendations of these teams, the overall ratio of American military personnel was reduced to 16.5 per cent and subsequently to 13.5 per cent.

In order that prisoners of war might be afforded medical, surgical, and dental treatment identical with that provided United States troops, hospitals were established in all base camps not located on a military installation. In addition, infirmaries inside each compound were provided. Where prisoner of war camps were located on military installations, a portion of the post hospital normally was fenced off for the care and treatment of prisoner patients. At branch camps an infirmary was provided either within the compound or in the vicinity of the stockade. Prisoner patients requiring hospitalization were transferred to the nearest station hospital, and where patients required general hospital care they were transferred to designated general hospitals. To provide dental treatment at branch camps, The Provost Marshal General's Office arranged with the dental division of The Surgeon General's Office for the assignment of mobile dental clinics to the service commands. These clinics were completely equipped and traveled to all branch camps in isolated areas. Protected personnel who had appropriate training were used as far as possible in sanitary and medical work necessary for the well-being of the prisoners of war.

SUPPLIES AND RATIONS

Taking Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention as the guide in the furnishing of food, clothing, and equipment to prisoners of war, tables of clothing and equipage allowances were established and subsistence was authorized to be issued on the basis of Type A field rations. Also a table of allowances of general supplies was established in order to furnish mess equipment and necessary janitorial and cleaning supplies. Approved items of clothing and equipment, general supplies, subsistence, and fuel were supplied prisoner of war camps upon requisition. Requisitions for additional allowances by the camp commanders were screened by the service commanders to assure that minimum quantities consistent with need were approved. The requisitions were then filled by the Quartermaster regional supply depot.

From the inception of the prisoner of war program, except as circumstances or climate required, no clothing was issued in the first instance or as a replacement to a prisoner, who was not an officer prisoner, until the uniform in which he was captured became unfit for use. The national uniforms of prisoners were renovated and used whenever possible. Except for the clothing of officer prisoners and the national uniforms of prisoner enlisted men, all outer garments worn by prisoners were marked with the letters "PW" six inches high across the backs of the coats, shirts, blouses, and jackets and with letters four inches high on the front of each sleeve between the elbow and the shoulder. Trousers were marked with letters four inches high across the back immediately below the belt and on the front of each leg immediately above the knee. Articles of the United States Army uniform were not issued unless altered in a manner which would prevent them from being mistaken for parts of the Army uniform. All issued outer garments were dyed dark blue by the Quartermaster. Officer prisoners were permitted to wear uniforms purchased by themselves of the same general pattern, design, and color of their own national uniforms.

One of the first difficulties encountered in the issuance of clothing to prisoners was the fact that the garment shrank because of the use of the dye. Therefore, the directive requiring this dyeing was rescinded.

Another change in policy which was adopted with regard to clothing occurred as soon as the emphasis was placed upon employing prisoners of war to alleviate manpower shortages. It soon became apparent

that the uniforms worn by the prisoners at the time they were captured were not always adequate or suitable for work purposes. Therefore, regulations were amended to provide that there would be no issue or replacement of clothing issued to a prisoner until his own clothing became unfit for use, except when he required work clothing.

Also with regard to the marking of clothes, since officer prisoners were authorized to purchase articles of United States issue from the Quartermaster, the regulation that the clothing of officer prisoners would not be marked had to be modified in order that officer prisoners wearing United States uniforms could be identified. However, uniforms purchased by officer prisoners of the same general pattern and color as their national uniform continued to be immune from marking.

After prisoners of war claiming protected status had been certified by the Provost Marshal General's Office to be protected personnel, the marking of their clothing was changed from "PW" to "PP" in order to identify them as protected personnel.

In connection with clothing issued for work purposes, in addition to the ordinary items issued such as denim articles, prisoners working on special work such as logging projects were authorized to be issued boots, loggers, shoe pacs, and warmer types of clothing. Prisoners employed in outdoor projects, other than logging projects, in cold zones were issued ice creepers in addition to the warmer clothing. All prisoners were authorized a second pair of shoes when deemed necessary by the camp commander to safeguard their health against inclement weather.

In order to furnish prisoners with toilet articles and barbers' and tailors' supplies, a gratuitous issue was authorized not to exceed one dollar per man per month. The items authorized included razor blades, shaving brushes, shoe brushes, tooth brushes, combs, shoe laces, needles, shoe polish, tooth paste, razors, soap, thread, and towels. This gratuitous issue was soon modified to provide for a gratuitous initial issue only, the purpose being to require prisoners to purchase personal items in the prisoner of war canteens. In the fall of 1944, as a result of the change in policy forbidding the sale of critical items to prisoners of war in prisoner of war canteens except certain essential critical items, articles such as handkerchiefs, towels, and shoe laces were removed from the prisoner of war canteen stock. In order to provide for a replacement issue of handkerchiefs, towels, and shoe laces, an additional gratuitous issue was authorized whenever a prisoner could show that he possessed no more than one pair of shoe laces for each pair of shoes, three handkerchiefs, and one towel.

In order to furnish prisoners of war a food ration equal in quantity and quality to that of troops at base camps in accordance with Article 11 of the Geneva Convention, Type A field ration was authorized. This ration was altered to suit the needs of the various national groups but in no instance was the money value of the ration to exceed that prescribed for enlisted men of the Army, nor was food authorized to be requisitioned beyond what was actually needed.

Although the rations were altered to suit the needs or tastes of the various national groups, it soon became apparent that there was much food waste in the prisoner of war camps because of the food likes and dislikes of the prisoners or their inability to prepare the foods furnished to them in the Type A field ration. With a view to reducing this waste, a field study was conducted by the Office of the Quartermaster General. As a result of this study, a prisoner of war menu and messing guide was published in July, 1944.^{9/} In addition to defining the duties of the mess officer at a prisoner of war camp and the sales officer at the post, a menu board was established in each prisoner of war camp, the members of which were to familiarize themselves with the different varieties and quantities of food required and to prepare prisoner of war menus, using the post menu as a guide. Also in this prisoner of war circular was included information concerning the national eating habits of German prisoners, their likes and dislikes, and suggestions concerning the proper preparation of the food to be furnished them. The results obtained under this directive, however, were not satisfactory, principally because the personnel assigned to the duties as mess officers, members of menu boards, and other mess duties lacked experience in this work, or were overburdened with other duties to the detriment of the messing program. This situation resulted in prisoners of war being furnished food identical with that furnished our own troops.

This situation, together with the decrease in the supply of food for civilian consumption, made it apparent that a corresponding decrease in rations for prisoners of war would have to be made. On 2 February 1945,^{10/} instructions were published requiring that food substitutes be utilized to replace critical items and items which the general public was unable to procure. On 27 February 1945,^{11/} revised instructions were published requiring more stringent food conservation in prisoner of war messes and placing a new interpretation on the wording of Article 11 of the Geneva Convention. That Article provides that the food ration of prisoners of war would be equal in quantity and quality to that of troops at base camps. The interpretation in ASF Circular No. 72 was that the food furnished prisoners of war need not be

^{9/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 35, July, 1944.

^{10/} ASF Circular No. 39, 2 February 1945, Part II.

^{11/} ASF Circular No. 72, 27 February 1945.

identical in quantity and quality of nutrients. In order to control the prisoner of war feeding problem further, a directive was initiated by the Quartermaster General and published after coordination with the Surgeon General and the Provost Marshal General to provide 14 suggested daily menus utilizing food substitutes and establishing a caloric level of 2500 calories for sedentary prisoners and a maximum of 3400 calories for prisoners engaged in moderate activity.^{12/} Under the 14 suggested menus, no choice cuts of meat were to be issued and full use was to be made of the less desirable cuts. In order to assist camp commanders to feed those prisoners whose duties required their absence from the compound mess at regular meal periods, the Quartermaster General issued a sandwich guide for the preparation of meals to be eaten away from camp.

Pursuant to studies made in the field by the Quartermaster General and the Surgeon General, an additional reduction in caloric content of the prisoner of war diet was authorized on 29 May 1945.^{13/} This circular established the minimum caloric requirements, as set by the Surgeon General, of 2500 calories for sedentary prisoners and 3000 calories for prisoners engaged in moderate activity. However, provision was made whereby the nutrition officer or proper medical authority could direct an increase in issue above the 3000 calories based on the increased activity of the prisoners. Also when an increase of a ration was deemed to be required in excess of 3700 calories, the commanding general of the service command, upon recommendation of the service command surgeon, was authorized to increase the ration. Later, it was directed that prisoner of war menus be prepared by the service command food service supervisor, using the menus provided by the Office of the Quartermaster General as a guide. The menu board at the prisoner of war camp was eliminated.

The Quartermaster General ran a field test on prisoner of war menus at Fort Meade, Maryland, where a prisoner of war camp was located convenient to Washington. Thereafter, a new menu guide was issued by the Quartermaster General on 4 August 1945.^{14/} During June and July, 1945, many complaints were voiced that prisoners of war were not receiving enough food to allow them to perform their labor. With the adoption and distribution of ASF Circular No. 191 and the new Quartermaster General menu guide, complaints of this nature dwindled, and, by the end of August, had completely disappeared.

^{12/} ASF Circular No. 150, 27 April 1945, Section II; ASF Circular No. 153, 30 April 1945, Section I, contained provisions regarding holiday rations.

^{13/} ASF Circular No. 191, 29 May 1945, Section IV. The provisions of this circular were made applicable to protected personnel by ASF Circular 216, 12 June 1945, Section III.

^{14/} Letter Office of the Quartermaster General, 4 August 1945. Subject: "Menu Guide for Use in Preparing Service Command Monthly Prisoner of War Menus."

RECEPTION, HOSPITALIZATION, TREATMENT, AND DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SICK AND WOUNDED

The medical and surgical care rendered enemy prisoners of war held in military installations in the United States gave rise to new tasks and difficult problems and imposed added responsibilities upon the Surgeon General and the Medical Department at large, as well as upon the Provost Marshal General. Close liaison was necessary between the Surgeon General and the Provost Marshal General in this regard. A Medical Liaison Branch was established in July, 1943, by the assignment by the Surgeon General to the Prisoner of War Division of a medical officer. Later the branch grew by the assignment of additional officers.

Article 1 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention gives in general terms the basic concept underlying the policy of the War Department in the care and treatment of sick and wounded prisoners of war. It states:

"Officers, soldiers, and other persons officially attached to the armies, who are wounded or sick, shall be respected and protected under all circumstances. They shall be humanely treated and cared for without distinction of nationality by the belligerent in whose power they are."

The policy established by the War Department that enemy prisoner of war patients were to receive the same treatment and care as is accorded our own troops, meant that the Army doctor had to become indoctrinated with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. He had to be made to understand the governing humane policies and, at the same time, learn the security measures established by the Provost Marshal General.

The commanding officers of medical installations were made to realize that there were two distinct classes of sick and wounded personnel admitted to their hospitals, namely: United States personnel in need of hospital care and enemy sick and wounded. It became necessary, in the course of time, to bring to the attention of all service command surgeons and commanders of general and regional hospitals that, in addition to observing the Geneva Convention, the prisoner of war regulations promulgated by the Provost Marshal General also had to be followed. Prisoner of war patients entailed many complex problems. It was necessary to segregate and isolate prisoner of war patients from United States patients; the letters "PW" had to be superimposed upon all their hospital garments, if ambulatory; separate latrine facilities

were needed; special processing as directed by the Provost Marshal General had to be instituted; administrative, professional, and security staffs had to be coordinated; separate messes were to be made available; separate pay schedules followed; restricted recreational facilities and PX or canteen services had to be set into operation; provisions had to be made for writing correspondence on special forms prepared by the Provost Marshal General with special handling, censorship, and routing; religious services in the prisoners' faith and language had to be arranged; and inclosures and needed security personnel had to be furnished.

Most of this groundwork was accomplished by personal visits to the various camps and medical installations by medical liaison officers. Necessary publications were supplied, lectures on the Geneva Convention were given, and interest in other pertinent circulars was stimulated. The Provost Marshal General's Office arranged that the executive officer of the Medical Liaison Branch, a Medical Administrative Corps officer, provide a course of instructions concerning medical problems at the prisoner of war administrative officers' course at the Provost Marshal General's School, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

The flow of prisoners of war to the zone of the interior began in May, 1942. Prisoner of war patients were transported to the shores of the United States in Army transports or in hospital ships, depending on the degree of their injuries or illnesses. In the first few movements, the number of sick and wounded arriving from overseas was comparatively small and they were sent along with able-bodied prisoners to designated prisoner of war camps. As more and more sick and wounded prisoners arrived, it became apparent that a definite policy had to be formulated for their reception, processing, care, and treatment. A careful and exacting analysis of all difficulties and obstacles encountered gradually produced policies which eliminated most of the snags, without offending existing security regulations or affecting the manner in which prisoners of war were handled.

In close cooperation with the Hospital Division of the Surgeon General's Office and after conferences with officers of the Provost Marshal General's Office, the Medical Liaison Branch of the Prisoner of War Division initiated the publication of appropriate instructions.^{15/} Under the provisions of these instructions, the facilities of certain receiving hospitals in the vicinity of ports of embarkation were made available for the reception, processing, and initial treatment of prisoner of war patients. In addition, general hospitals in certain service commands were made available for prisoner of war patients. As time went by and the influx of prisoner of war patients became greater, hospital facilities for prisoner patients had to be extended.

^{15/} WD Circular No. 214, September, 1943, Section VI.

After coordination between the Office of the Surgeon General and the Provost Marshal General's Office, the instructions above referred to were rescinded and new regulations governing the reception and hospitalization of prisoner of war patients were published. Under the provisions of these regulations, as prisoner of war patients arrived at a port they were transferred to a general hospital designated for that port. At the receiving port hospital the patients were processed and those who were transportable were sent to other general hospitals or station hospitals at camps or to appropriate prisoner of war camps for further treatment. Rather than to have prisoner of war patients scattered throughout the United States in general hospitals, which would burden these hospitals with problems peculiar to prisoners of war, such as providing separate ward facilities with appropriate security measures, segregation of different nationalities, problems of administration, etc., it was decided to concentrate, as far as practicable, prisoner of war patients at one general hospital in each service command. For example, in the First Service Command, facilities at Lovell General Hospital were designated for prisoner of war patients; in the Second Service Command, Malloran General Hospital; in the Third Service Command, Valley Forge General Hospital; in the Seventh Service Command, Winter General Hospital; etc. In addition to these general hospitals, certain hospitals were designated for the reception and treatment of special types of cases among prisoners. For example, prisoners suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis were sent to Fitzsimons General Hospital, Denver, Colorado; the blind to Valley Forge General Hospital, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania; the deaf to Malloran General Hospital, Staten Island, New York; and prisoners suffering from neurological disorders and psychosis were sent to Mason General Hospital, Long Island, New York.

This circular also reaffirmed the War Department policy on the treatment of prisoners of war by providing that they were to be furnished the same medical and surgical treatment accorded United States military personnel. This circular further provided that commitment proceedings under AR 600-500 and AR 600-505 for mental cases were not required since the transfers were effected for further observation and treatment.

With the increasing scale of the campaigns in Italy and France, efforts were made to have German prisoner patients in combat zones retained in overseas theaters and not sent to the zone of the interior. This was found necessary because of the fact that the influx of United States casualties to the zone of the interior was increasing rapidly and hospital beds at general hospitals had to be kept open for United States military personnel. However, overseas theater commanders informed the War Department that they did not have facilities or personnel adequately to care for sick and wounded prisoners, and that they had no alternative but to send German prisoner patients to the zone of the interior. Because of this sudden unforeseen influx, Glennan General Hospital, Okmulgee, Oklahoma, was designated exclusively for German prisoner patients arriving from overseas. As German prisoner patients

arrived from overseas, they were sent to the receiving port hospital where they were processed with the least practicable delay, not exceeding a period of 72 hours. If found transportable, they were transferred to the custody of the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, at Glennan General Hospital, after clearance with the Medical Regulating Officer of the Surgeon General's Office. Those found to be nontransportable were retained at the receiving port hospital until their physical condition permitted their transfer. Upon admission to Glennan General Hospital, patients were given a thorough examination, classified, and processed with the least practicable delay for transfer if not in need of general hospital care. To keep beds at Glennan General Hospital available, the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, made beds available at station hospitals surrounding Glennan, such as those at Prisoner of War Camps Bowie, Howze, Livingston, Gruber, etc., to which patients not in need of general hospital care were transferred. Convalescent cases were sent to Prisoner of War Camp, McAlester, Oklahoma.

Because of the continuing large influx of German prisoner patients, it became apparent that Glennan could not receive and care for such large numbers of patients and an additional general hospital type facility had to be secured. On 23 November 1944, the Station Hospital at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, was designated Prisoner of War General Hospital #2, for the exclusive use of German prisoner of war patients.^{16/}

The commanding officer and certain key personnel from Camp Forrest Station Hospital were sent to Glennan for indoctrination prior to establishing the hospital as a prisoner of war medical installation. As German prisoner patients arrived from overseas they were shipped alternately to Glennan and Camp Forrest. Gradually, all German patients arriving from overseas were sent to Camp Forrest for processing, and from there were sent to appropriate general or station hospitals. Patients requiring specialized treatment, mental cases, and pulmonary tuberculosis cases were sent to Glennan General Hospital.

Upon the receipt of information from the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations that obviously repatriable prisoner of war patients would no longer be transferred to the zone of the interior and that the influx of other sick and wounded would in the future be greatly reduced, the question arose whether it would be more economical on transportation and personnel to segregate all German prisoner of war patients in need of definite treatment in one instead of two prisoner of war general hospitals. The ever-increasing demand for more adequate hospital facilities for returning United States battle casualties, and the possibilities of expanding the facilities at Prisoner of War General Hospital #2, Camp Forrest, Tennessee, to accommodate 10,000 patients, was brought to the attention of the Deputy Chief for Hospitals and Domestic Operations, Office of the Surgeon General. A study concerning this matter was undertaken by that office and resulted in the swift clearance and transfer of prisoner of war patients from Glennan General

^{16/} War Department General Orders No. 68, 23 November 1944.

Hospital to Prisoner of War General Hospital #2, Camp Forrest, Tennessee. This move called for expansion of the Camp Forrest medical installation without construction and resulted in the designation of that hospital as a Hospital Center on 11 April 1945. This brought about a greatly needed and improved medical administration.

Glennan General Hospital and Prisoner of War General Hospital #2, Camp Forrest, Tennessee, were not only the first hospitals designated exclusively for the care of German prisoner patients, but they were also the first hospitals to be almost completely staffed by enemy medical personnel. With the exception of chiefs of service, executive officer, and key personnel, these hospitals were staffed by German medical officers and enlisted men who were carefully screened to determine their qualifications and cooperation. Thus, two things were accomplished, namely: the United States lived up to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and, at the same time, relieved United States medical personnel for duty with units of the United States Army. Comparable complex hospital arrangements were not necessary for Italian and Japanese prisoners by reason of smaller numbers. Station hospitals and transfers to general hospitals in necessary cases sufficed.

Prisoners of war were furnished the same medical and surgical treatment as was accorded to United States personnel. Any medical or surgical treatment considered necessary by prevailing medical standards was authorized. Those requiring general hospital care were transported in the same manner as United States troops, on regular hospital trains or in pullman cars with the necessary medical attendants. Upon arrival at a port of embarkation, able-bodied prisoners went through the process of disinfection. The act of disinfection was accomplished at the rate of about 500 men per hour and consisted of hot showers with soap, followed by a spray to the hairy parts of the body. All clothing with the exception of leather was packed into a net and placed in a sterilizer for ten minutes at 20 pounds of pressure. Leather goods were sprayed. Upon their first arrival at a prisoner of war camp, prisoners were given a thorough physical examination. At least once a month thereafter they were inspected by a medical officer for the purpose of detecting communicable diseases and vermin infestation. In addition, such special inspections, physical examinations, and laboratory tests as were recommended by the surgeon were given from time to time. As soon as practicable after capture or transfer to a camp, prisoners were vaccinated against small pox and inoculated against typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. Reimmunizations and immunizations against other diseases were performed when necessary and upon the recommendation of the surgeon.

The camp dispensary, under the supervision of the camp surgeon, held the usual daily sick call and gave the same infirmary treatment as afforded by any unit surgeon. Those in need of hospital care were sent to the station hospital. If need of specialized treatment or prolonged hospitalization was indicated, prisoners were transferred to a general hospital. Upon return to duty, these prisoners were marked "light duty" by the medical officer until their condition improved.

considerably to permit full labor required of them. Many of the "light duty" or disabled prisoners of war were utilized as prisoner of war orderlies for officer prisoners. If they could not be so utilized, they were transferred to a prisoner of war camp designated by the Provost Marshal General.

Commanding officers of prisoner of war camps were charged with the responsibility of taking all necessary sanitary and preventive measures to protect and safeguard the health of prisoners of war, the attending officers, and the civilian population. When applicable, the sanitary and preventive measures were those prescribed in AR 40-205 and AR 40-210.

Dental treatment was confined to the treatment of emergency cases, infectious diseases, and the restoration of carious teeth with amalgam, silicate, or cement fillings. The replacement of missing teeth was limited to dentures, and these were constructed, rebased, or repaired only when essential to the health of the patient.

So far as practicable, artificial limbs, eyes, and hearing devices were provided to prisoner of war patients requiring prosthesis. Hearing aids were furnished by the International Committee of the Red Cross upon request.

Medical records were prepared for each prisoner and were kept up to date. All pertinent medical or dental records, including immunization registers, clinical records, Mixed Medical Commission certifications and certificates of direct repatriation executed by general hospitals accompanied prisoners during transfers.

RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

Although the plan for the construction of some prisoner of war camps included a chapel, others did not. Accordingly, a chapel was not always a part of a prisoner of war camp. In the absence thereof, the prisoners exercised ingenuity in converting recreation halls or other buildings in such manner as would allow them to be used as chapels. Prisoner of war craftsmen and artists constructed, painted, and carved church fixtures and ornaments from miscellaneous material. American authorities cooperated in making premises available which could be used as chapels where none was provided.

United States Army chaplains were assigned to prisoner of war camps in so far as they were available. Prisoner of war camps located on regular Army posts, where no United States chaplain was assigned to the prisoner of war camp, normally were able to utilize the services of the post chaplain. For the most part, United States Army chaplains found it difficult to exercise a helpful influence over the prisoners because of their inherent distrust. Their value was principally in assisting and supervising the prisoner of war chaplains in the various camps. In addition to this supervisory work, United States Army chaplains were able to make arrangements with local civilian ministers and priests who spoke the language of the prisoners to conduct religious services for the prisoners.

Although prisoner of war chaplains ordinarily were considered to be protected personnel if they had proper identification, it was soon discovered that, at least in the case of the German Army, there were few Army chaplains who were assigned to those duties. In the case of the German Army, it was found that many German prisoners of war who were ministers or priests in civilian life were assigned to the ranks as ordinary soldiers. Among the German prisoners of war interned in the United States, there were found only nine Catholic priests who were assigned to the German Army as chaplains. Of these nine priests, several were found to be, in reality, members of the Gestapo or other police organizations and their assignment as chaplains constituted a secondary duty. These individuals were not used at prisoner of war camps in this country as prisoner of war chaplains.

In order to furnish ministers of all religious denominations to the prisoners of war from among their own number, in accordance with Article 16 of the Geneva Convention, it was necessary to distribute prisoners of war who had been ministers and priests in civilian life as equitably as possible among the prisoner of war camps. These clergymen were not certified protected personnel. Prisoner clergymen approved

by the camp commanders were given the necessary free time for the performance of their religious work and were paid not more than 80 cents per day from the camp prisoner of war fund. In addition to ministering to the prisoners at the base camps, they were permitted to visit prisoner of war branch camps under guard for the purpose of conducting religious services. In ministering to the prisoners of war at branch camps, they were subject to the same regulations applied to visiting civilian clergymen: (1) they were permitted to discuss only matters pertaining to religious duties; (2) they were accompanied by camp officials inside the camp stockade; (3) they were not permitted to deliver or receive any letter, paper, document, or article from any prisoner; and (4) they were permitted to confer privately with prisoners while ministering to their spiritual welfare only within the view of the accompanying officials.

CANTEENS

In accordance with Article 12 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, canteens were installed in all camps where prisoners might obtain at the local market price food products and ordinary objects. The Convention made it obligatory that the use of tobacco be permitted and, accordingly, tobacco products were sold. Originally, these canteens were separate from any exchange which existed or was established for military personnel outside the compound and were exempt from supervision by the Army Exchange Service. The camp canteen officer was appointed by the commanding officer of the prisoner of war camp and was not connected with any existing exchange. This separation from the existing exchange was originally requested by the protecting power in order to insure that the prisoners obtained a just proportion of the profits of the canteen without any intermingling of the canteen funds with the exchange funds derived from American military personnel. However, as soon as separate records and accounting systems could be developed for the prisoner of war canteens, the divorcement of the canteens from the exchange no longer was necessary, and in June, 1944, Prisoner of War Circular No. 33 was published to place the supervision of the operation of prisoner of war canteens, the procurement of authorized merchandise, and the auditing of the books of the canteens in the Chief of the Army Exchange Service. Although the canteens were operated so far as possible by prisoner of war personnel, supervision of the canteens was undertaken by the exchange officer at the post, if the prisoner of war camp was an installation of a larger post. If there was no Army Exchange officer at the post, a canteen officer was appointed by the camp commander.

The canteens at branch camps were established and operated as branches of the canteen at the prisoner of war base camp to which the branch camp was attached. Canteens at the small branch camps often consisted of merely a box of merchandise collected at the base camp canteen and sold at the branch camp. Originally there were no canteens authorized for general hospitals containing prisoner of war patients. In order to provide certain necessary items for prisoner of war patients, arrangements were usually made to grant patients credit at the regular hospital exchange where hospital personnel or chaplains might procure items for the prisoners, the cost being deducted from the prisoner's monthly allowance. However, the prisoner patients were restricted to the items which were authorized to be sold by prisoner of war canteens. With the establishment of certain general hospitals exclusively for prisoners of war, the establishment of canteens operated in the same manner as canteens at base camps was authorized.

Since the inception of the prisoner of war program, all purchases by prisoners at canteens were made by the use of canteen coupons only. No cash purchases were permitted. The coupons, however, were not

transferable between prisoner of war camps. In the event of a transfer of a prisoner, he was furnished a credit for the amount of unused coupons legally acquired. This credit was accepted by the canteen at the station to which the prisoner was transferred for the issuance of a like quantity of canteen coupons.

As the prisoners' term of captivity in this country progressed and they were paid with canteen coupons for labor performed, the amount of outstanding canteen coupons increased to approximately \$5,000,000 by April, 1945. These outstanding coupons necessitated the maintenance of a large cash reserve by the Army Exchange Service pending their redemption. The prisoners were reluctant to deposit the coupons paid to them in their trust fund accounts. Therefore, in order to enable the Army Exchange Service to eliminate their large cash reserve, a period of validity of two months was placed upon the coupons issued to the prisoners in order to force them to deposit coupons not spent in the prisoner of war canteens. Also, in order to assist the Army Exchange Service in maintaining a check over the number of coupons outstanding and to simplify accounting procedures, it was directed that the canteen coupons could not be issued in denominations of less than one dollar or multiples thereof, and that no loose coupons could be redeemed at any prisoner of war canteen.

Prisoner of war canteens originally were authorized to purchase merchandise and supplies not only from existing Army Exchanges at cost price plus a nominal charge to cover expenses incurred by the Army Exchange but also in the open market. The camp commander was authorized to regulate the price to be charged for this merchandise, which was not to be more than the local market price. In order to control the stock of the canteens which in some prisoner of war camps became most varied and excessive, in June, 1944, regulations were published requiring canteens to purchase all their stock through the nearest Army Exchange.^{17/} Also a list was drawn up of the articles which canteens would normally stock but the commanding general of the service command was authorized to permit the sale of additional articles in appropriate circumstances and purchases from sources other than Army Exchanges also could be made by authority of the service commander.

As certain articles became scarce in the civilian market, it became apparent that this authority of the service commander to authorize purchases outside the channels of the Army Exchange Service would have to be withdrawn and that uniform restrictions would have to be placed upon the items authorized for sale in prisoner of war canteens. Therefore, in November, 1944, a restricted list of items which might be stocked in the canteens was issued and no variations from this list were authorized. Only noncritical and a few essential critical items were included on the list. Early in 1945, manufactured cigarettes, beer, soft drinks, candy, and all food items were stricken from the

^{17/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 33, dated 12 June 1944

authorized list since these items were in short supply in the civilian market. Only essential and nonluxury items were allowed to remain on the list. Tobacco products were limited to smoking tobacco.

In accordance with Article 12 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, profits from the canteens were used for the benefit of the prisoners as a whole. These profits were held in a prisoner of war fund and expended by camp commanders for the benefit of the prisoners to improve their health and general well-being. However, inasmuch as the operation of the canteen was subject to the general regulations regarding the operation of Army Exchanges, for some time it was impossible to utilize the profits from the canteens because Army Regulations required that no dividends be declared from the profits of exchange or canteen activities until all outstanding obligations of the canteen had been paid. This restriction created some hardship on the prisoners in the early days of the prisoner of war program but obviously it was based upon sound business practice.

CENTRAL PRISONER OF WAR FUND

The Central Prisoner of War Fund was organized by direction of the Provost Marshal General, 14 August 1944, at which time a custodian was appointed and directed to open a bank account in a national bank in the city of Washington, D. C., for the safe-keeping of any funds deposited in this account. It was decided at that time that the Central Prisoner of War Fund would consist of funds to be used for the general benefit of enemy prisoners of war as distinguished from any personal funds of such prisoners deposited in their respective trust fund accounts or transmitted through the War Department to other agencies. Actual operation of the fund was provided by Prisoner of War Circular No. 48, dated 30 October 1944, to become effective as of 1 December 1944. That circular should be read in full for a detailed account of the basic provisions regarding the fund.^{18/}

It was provided that the purposes of the fund were to set up camp prisoner of war funds in new camps, to furnish additional capital to camp funds where the working capital or receipts from revenue-producing activities were inadequate to meet the needs of the installations to which such funds pertained, and to pay creditors of former camp prisoner of war funds where such funds no longer existed because of abandonment of camp or transfer of prisoners. It was also provided that money in the fund could be invested.

Administration of the fund was vested in a Board of Directors consisting of the Provost Marshal General, two commissioned officers appointed by the Provost Marshal General, a commissioned officer appointed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and a commissioned officer appointed by the Fiscal Director, Army Service Forces. The original board consisted of the following officers: S. G. Henry, Major General, U.S.A., Chairman; Archer L. Lerch, Major General, U.S.A., Member; B. M. Bryan, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Member; Donald T. Nelson, Colonel, F.D., Member; and Spencer Burroughs, Colonel, C.M.P., Member. Immediate supervision of the fund was vested in a Custodian and an Assistant Custodian, subject to policies established by the Board of Directors. Regulations provided that no expenditures could be made by either custodian without the prior approval of the Chairman of the Board, and that all checks had to be signed by either the Custodian or the Assistant Custodian and one or two countersigning officers appointed by the Provost Marshal General. The functions of the Board consisted of the control of the distribution of money to camp prisoner of war funds, the determination of the size of these funds and purposes for which such funds could be used, the prescribing of reporting and control systems for camp funds, and the supervision over disposal of property belonging to the camp funds.

^{18/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 48, 30 October 1944.

With the exception of funds forwarded to the Custodian from a few camps which were closed prior to 1 December 1944, the Central Fund did not show any growth of consequence until January, 1945, when the excess cash from December operations of camp funds was forwarded. As of 31 August 1945, the Central Prisoner of War Fund consisted of the following:

(1)	Investments:	
	7/8% Treasury Cts of Indebtedness	\$1,500,000
	90/100% " " "	500,000
(2)	Cash	
	Bank Deposit	<u>985,000</u>
	Total Worth	\$2,985,000

EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION

When the first German and Italian prisoners of war were brought to the United States shortly after the outbreak of the war, the major consideration was that of providing maximum security against escape and attempted sabotage. Consequently, the first 150,000 to arrive were housed in 26 prisoner of war camps, all of which were located in relatively isolated areas in the southern and middle-western states where, because of favorable climatic conditions, they could be housed, clothed, and secured at minimum cost to this Government. Prisoners were required to perform necessary work in connection with the maintenance of their camps, and very limited use was made of their labor on other military work where prisoners were located on or adjacent to other military installations. The majority of prisoners, however, remained idle within the camps.

The ratio of guards to prisoners was established at one to ten and the employment of prisoners without guards on military reservations was advocated and authorized in situations in which the prisoners were working under American supervisors. Considerable difficulty was encountered in the application of calculated risk when commanding generals of service commands and post commanders were reluctant to accept the responsibility for modified security for prisoners. The tendency to over-guard prisoners was almost universal. However, as a background of favorable experience developed, and it was found that wholesale escapes and sabotage by escaped prisoners did not materialize, modified security measures soon found more ready acceptance. In many sections of the country, prisoners of war were employed in private agricultural work without guards. In those cases, roving patrols visited work details several times each day, checking with the contractor on behavior and work performance.

Article 34 of the Geneva Convention provided that prisoners of war engaged in work other than that connected with the administration, management, and maintenance of camps were entitled to wages to be fixed by agreement between the belligerents. Pending such agreements, allowances for paid work substantially the same as paid to soldiers of the detaining power were to be paid prisoners of war. In December, 1941, the Provost Marshal General recommended that the daily wage rate for paid labor to civilian internees and prisoners of war be established at eighty cents per day, the substantial equivalent of \$21.00, which was then the monthly pay of an American private. This pay scale was incorporated in the first draft of internee and prisoner of war regulations and, as part of those regulations, was submitted for approval to the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-2, The Adjutant General, The Inspector General, The Quartermaster General, The Judge Advocate General, and the Chief of Finance. No

objection was raised to this pay scale and, when the first regulations came out on 22 April 1942, the provision was included that, when employed on labor other than that connected with the administration, management, or maintenance of the camp, they would be credited at the rate of eighty cents per day. Regulations later issued provided that prisoners would be compensated at the rate of eighty cents per day for performance by them of labor which did not fall into the category of that connected with the administration, management, and maintenance of the prisoner of war camp.^{19/}

By the middle of 1942, at the request of the War Department, the State Department proposed to the enemy powers that prisoner of war enlisted men be paid three Swiss francs per day which approximated eighty cents. After long delays, during which the request was repeated to the enemy governments, a reply was received through the neutral Swiss from Germany that conditions in Germany were such that that government could not pay three Swiss francs, and no indication was given as to what Germany could or would pay, if anything. Italy and Japan were unresponsive to the American proposal. The United States government continued, even in the absence of an agreement, to pay eighty cents per day for paid labor. This amount, of course, was not paid in cash, but originally was credited to the internee's or prisoner's trust account, and later was paid in canteen coupons when the canteen coupon system was established.^{20/} Subsequently, the pay scale was broadened to include, as an incentive to harder work on the part of the prisoners, piece-work rates which permitted a prisoner to be paid up to \$1.20 per day if he completed specific units of work.^{21/}

As American industry began to feel the full impact of the production of essential goods with which to feed, clothe, arm, and supply the rapidly increasing armed forces of the United States, critical civilian manpower shortages developed throughout the country. The intensified program of producing and processing a greatly increased food crop, and of building ships, planes, tanks, and guns soon exhausted the supply of available civilian labor and attention was focused on the rapidly growing prisoner of war population in the United States as a potential supply of emergency labor.

It was realized by the War Department that much could be done to provide partial alleviation of the manpower shortage through the broad use of prisoner of war labor both in essential military work and in private contract work in industry and agriculture. It was then that the War Department adopted the policy of effecting maximum utilization of the labor of all able-bodied prisoners of war who could be required to perform manual labor under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Early in 1943, the entire program of prisoner of war internment as it related to the efficient use of prisoner of war labor was studied by the Provost Marshal General's Office, and the following conclusions were reached: (1) that if prisoner of war labor was to be of real value in adjusting the shortage of civilian labor, it was imperative

^{19/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943

^{20/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943

^{21/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 29, 1944

that prisoners be moved into the areas in which the greatest shortage of civilian workers existed, and (2) that an extensive network of relatively small branch camps would have to be established.^{22/} Both of these measures were taken and the major emphasis changed from security to full employment of prisoners of war.^{23/}

The War Department realized that it was not equipped to determine where prisoners of war might be needed in private work and, in August, 1943, the War Department and the War Manpower Commission executed a memorandum of agreement in which it was stipulated that all requests for prisoner of war labor for use in industry and agriculture would be channeled to the War Department through the War Manpower Commission.

The agreement included the following fundamental precepts:

(1) Prisoners of war whom the War Department found it could make available to other agencies and private employers could be utilized as a source of labor supply.

(2) Prisoners could be employed only on projects determined by the War Department to conform to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and to security regulations.

(3) The War Department, upon request of the War Manpower Commission, would furnish general information as to prospective availability of prisoners of war as a labor supply.

(4) The War Manpower Commission would receive and investigate requests for use of prisoners of war. Such requests as were in accordance with its policies and were approved by it would be forwarded

^{22/} Letter, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, SPMGY (1) 253.5, subject: "Prisoners of War," dated 15 April 1944.

^{23/} The following are directives on development of prisoner of war labor: AGO letter, AG 383.6 (12 Aug 43) OB-S-A-M, dated 14 August 1943, subject: "Labor of Prisoners of War;" AGO letter, AG 383.6 (28 Aug 43) OB-S-A-M, dated 24 August 1943, subject: "Employment of Prisoners of War Off Reservations;" AGO letter, AG 383.6 (23 Sep 43) OB-P-A-MB-A, dated 16 November 1943, subject: "Prisoner of War Labor;" Letter, Office of the Commanding General, ASF, dated 6 May 1944, subject: "Employment of Prisoners of War during the Peak Agricultural and Food Processing Season;" AGO letter, AG 383.6 (5 Jul 44) SPMGA-MP-M, dated 14 July 1944, subject: "Employment of Prisoners of War Off Reservations;" AGO letter, SPX 383.6 (24 Feb 45) OB-S-SPDC-SPMCV, dated 13 March 1945, subject: "Utilization of Prisoners of War in Food Processing Plants;" and TWX to all service commands, dated 24 September 1943.

to the appropriate official of the War Department. This certification would contain the following information: the need for prisoners of war for specific employers, the unavailability of other labor at prevailing wage rates and working conditions, the priority of alternate requests, the man-hours or man-days of work for which prisoners were to be assigned, the place and type of work on which request was made for assignment of prisoners of war, the customary work day and other conditions, and the price to be paid by the employer to the Government.

(5) Upon receipt of the certification of need, the War Department would determine whether it was feasible to make such labor available under the terms provided in the certification. If it was determined to be feasible, the War Department would endeavor to enter into a contract with the employer conforming to the terms set forth in the certificate and substantially in the form attached. In any event, the War Manpower Commission would be promptly advised of the action taken by the War Department.

(6) The War Department would collect from the employer the sum specified in the contract according to such arrangements as the War Department might determine.

(7) To assist in securing the availability of prisoners of war for necessary work (except where prisoners of war were to be employed under jurisdiction of the War Department) the War Manpower Commission would submit recommendations to the War Department with respect to location of camps.

(8) The administration of the foregoing policies for the employment of prisoners of war would be decentralized in so far as practicable by the War Department and the War Manpower Commission.

With the enactment of Public Law 45, 78th Congress, the War Food Administration, through the Agricultural Extension Service, was empowered to negotiate directly with the War Department for the use of prisoners of war for the production and harvesting of essential agricultural commodities. This included the authority to issue certifications of need for agricultural projects without reference to the War Manpower Commission, except that it was required that a copy of each certification of need issued by the Agricultural Extension Service be forwarded to the State Director, War Manpower Commission, who determined and certified to the appropriate service command the priorities of agricultural projects in relation to other projects involving the use of prisoner of war labor.

In accordance with the provisions of the agreement between the War Department and the two certifying agencies, the potential employer was required to place a bona fide order for labor with his local office of the United States Employment Service if the work to

be performed was industrial in nature, or with the County Agricultural Agent of the county in which the labor was needed if farm work was contemplated. When all civilian labor recruitment procedures were exhausted without obtaining the necessary civilian workers, the possibility of utilizing prisoner of war labor was discussed with the prospective employer. If agreeable to the employer, the United States Employment Service or the County Agricultural Agent then issued the certification of need and forwarded it to his respective state director for review and approval. The certification was then submitted to the appropriate service command headquarters, where it was determined whether prisoners of war could be made available. Upon approval by service command headquarters, the certification was dispatched to the commanding officer of the prisoner of war camp from which the labor was to be supplied and it was directed that a labor contract be executed in accordance with the data contained in the certification of need.

In the administration of Public Law 45, the War Food Administration of the Department of Agriculture authorized the creation in each county of a County Farm Wage Board, whose responsibility it was to conduct hearings for the purpose of making findings of fact and recommendations as to the prevailing wage rates paid agricultural workers within each county. The prevailing wage rates as determined by these boards were the rates included in the certifications of need for prisoner of war labor. This procedure led to considerable difficulty for the reason that county farm wage boards were normally composed of farmers of the community who were often impelled to establish or fix wage rates, rather than to encourage testimony upon which to base findings relative to the true prevailing wage rates in the county. Thus, there were many instances in which farmers employing free labor and prisoners of war were found to be paying a higher rate for civilian labor than for prisoners of war. This was found to be true in many cases, even though the work was being performed on a piece-rate basis and relative efficiency of civilians and prisoners could not be considered a factor. In such cases, the War Department, through the appropriate service command, requested rehearings by the County Farm Wage Board, and the issuance of an amended certification of need based on the true prevailing wage rate. There were relatively few instances in which such discrepancies have been found in wage rates certified by the War Manpower Commission for industrial work.^{24/}

The Standard Prisoner of War Contract in use during 1943 and 1944 contained the following major provisions:

(1) The United States government agreed to furnish the contract employer a specific number of man-days of prisoner of war labor during a period of time indicated in the contract.

^{24/} ASF Circular No. 98, 20 March 1945. Section IV, concerns prevailing wage rates for prisoner of war labor.

(2) The contractor agreed to pay the Government for prisoner of war labor furnished under the contract at the rates specified in the certification of need.

(3) The contractor agreed to furnish the materials, equipment, tools, articles and facilities necessary for the performance of the work, and agreed to provide proper supervision of the work.

(4) The contractor agreed to pay for the labor furnished on the first day of each month.

(5) The contractor agreed to maintain conditions of employment in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

(6) It was provided that the length of the prisoner of war work-day would not be excessive, and would not exceed that allowed for civilian workers in the region employed at the same work.

(7) It was provided that the prisoners of war would be allowed a rest of 24 consecutive hours each week, and that no prisoner of war would be used at work for which he is physically unfit, or which is menial, degrading, unhealthful, or dangerous.

(8) It was provided that the contract would have no authority to impose disciplinary measures on prisoners of war.

(9) The contractor agreed to permit any person authorized by the War Department or any representative of the protecting power to have access to the work-site for the purpose of observing conditions of employment.

(10) It was provided that either party had the right to terminate the contract with or without cause, by ten days' notice, except that the Government could cancel the contract without notice in case of breach of any covenant thereof by the contractor.

At the time of signing the contract, the contractor was given an extensive list of instructions to be followed by him in his relationship with prisoners of war, and the psychology of the prisoner of war was explained to him.

Early in 1945, the prisoner of war labor contract was completely revised and simplified. Most notable among the additions to the contract provisions were those dealing with security for payment, and the penalty provision for nonuse of the prisoner of war labor. In the revised contract (W.D., A.G.O. Form 19-19), the contractor was required to provide security for payment for prisoner of war labor in the form of a cash deposit, a bank guarantee, or a surety bond. The amount of the security required was equal to fifty per cent of the gross wage cost to the contract employer for the full-time employment of prisoners to be furnished

under the contract for a full invoice period. The frequency with which invoices were rendered the contractor was discretionary with the service command, except that labor invoices had to be rendered at least once monthly. When prisoners of war were housed in a branch camp, the cost of which was borne wholly or in part by the contractor, the amount of security for payment was partially offset by the amount of the contractor's expenditures for the branch camp (not including the cost of the land). A maximum of seventy-five per cent of the required security for payment could be offset in this manner. The main purpose of the provision was to provide adequate protection to the government against losses due to failure to collect labor accounts. The minimum employment guarantee (penalty provision) required that the contractor pay to the government the sum of \$1.50 per day for each prisoner whose labor was not fully utilized. This provision became effective with the first day upon which labor was performed under the contract. The contractor was exempted from payment of the penalty for nonuse of prisoners when the work stoppage was the result of unusually severe weather or the normal results of such weather, acts of God, or other unforeseeable causes clearly beyond the control of the contractor. The inclusion of this provision in the contract was deemed necessary to prevent the creation of pools of idle prisoner of war labor, and to encourage the contract employer to plan his work to the best of his ability. Without question, this provision was of material assistance in promoting increased efficiency in the utilization of prisoner of war labor.

The control of all prisoner of war labor contracts was originally centralized in the Prisoner of War Division, Provost Marshal General's Office. Because of the unavoidable time-lag resulting from this arrangement, it was found to be impossible to supervise contractual procedures and collection practices used in the service commands. On 9 September 1944, the direct responsibility for the proper negotiation and preparation of prisoner of war labor contracts, and the prompt collection of accounts was transferred to the commanding generals of the service commands.^{25/} The Provost Marshal General's Office continued to exercise staff supervision through periodic visits to service commands and prisoner of war installations by field liaison officers. In accordance with the provisions of the same directive, the distribution of the copies of the labor contract was revised to discontinue the practice of including the Provost Marshal General's Office in the agencies to receive a copy of the contract. The decentralization has done much toward creating a greater degree of flexibility and accuracy.

A wide variety of jobs were accomplished in the field of agriculture with the use of prisoner of war labor.^{26/} Without this emergency supply of labor, it would have been impossible in many cases to tend and harvest vital food crops. Prisoners of war were used widely in the tending and harvesting of cotton in the southern and southwestern states, and in the harvesting of fruits and vegetables in all sections

^{25/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 43, 1944.

^{26/} ASF Circular No. 84, 25 March 1944, Section VI.

of the country.²⁷ Thousands of man-days of labor were performed by prisoners of war in pruning fruit orchards, cleaning and rehabilitating drainage ditches, and clearing land for cultivation. In industrial work, great assistance was rendered by prisoners of war in food processing plants, in the cutting of pulpwood and saw-logs, and in the operation of foundries, quarries, and fertilizer plants. In 1945, prisoners of war were cutting one-third of all pulpwood processed in the mills of the Appalachian district.

The use of prisoners of war in essential work on military installations has long been considered the most valuable work performed by them for the reason that it has been possible to release large numbers of American enlisted personnel from routine, menial jobs for more important assignments elsewhere.²⁸ Also, the use of prisoners of war on military reservations adjusted the shortage of civilian workers necessary for operational duties with the result that it was possible to maintain a higher standard of efficiency in the operation of posts, camps, and stations. Prisoners, so far as possible, were required to fill all jobs connected with the administration, management and maintenance of prisoner of war camps. Work of this type was classified as paid or unpaid labor. Prisoners were not paid for work which was incidental to improving or providing for the comfort or health of prisoners or connected with internal administration of prisoner of war companies, such as kitchen police, latrine orderlies, and fatigue details, and work necessary for the maintenance or repair of prisoner of war compounds, including barracks, roads, walks, sewers, sanitary facilities, water pipes and fences. Paid labor included work performed for all branches of the War and Navy Departments and other Federal agencies, services as orderlies and cooks for officer prisoners, work that requires special training and qualifications, and work in which the prisoner of war was employed full time, thereby being prevented from performing other types of paid work. Prisoners were employed on practically every type of job existing at military reservations. The efficient use of prisoners by the many military agencies on reservations was often regulated by a priority board appointed by the post or installation commander. The board, composed of representatives of the using agencies, included the prisoner of war camp commander, and received from the agencies requests for the assignment of prisoners of war to specified work projects. These applications were investigated by the board, and the essentiality of the work to be performed was considered, together with the availability of prisoners of war with which to man the project. The post commander was thus kept

²⁷ Letter, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, dated 12 October 1944, subject: "Employment of Prisoners of War during the Winter Season."

²⁸ For directives regarding the use of prisoners in military work, see ASF Circular No. 73, Section VI, dated 11 March 1944; ASF Circular 142, Section II, dated 20 April 1945; and ASF Circular No. 213, Section III, dated 9 June 1945.

informed of the manner in which prisoner of war labor was being utilized. The types of work on which prisoners of war were used on military establishments vary so widely that it is not possible to compile a complete list of acceptable projects. The list which follows is furnished only for information and shows the types of projects on which prisoners were successfully used at military installations:

Administrative clerks	Locksmiths
Agricultural projects	Lumbering
Bakers	Machinists
Barbers	Maintenance of runways and taxiways
Blacksmiths	Mosquito control
Brick and stone masons	Motor repair shops and parts
Care of animals	reclamation shops
Carpentry and repairs	Painters and decorators
Clearing brush and other fire hazards	Plumbers and helpers
Clothing and equipment repair shops	Post police
Coal handling	Quarrying
Construction and repairs	Repair work of all kinds
Cooks and cooks' helpers	Road building and maintenance
Dam construction	Salvage and reclamation
Draftsmen	Sanitary fills
Drainage control	Service station attendants
Electricians and helpers	Sidewalk care
Flood control work	Sign painters
Food processing	Sewage disposal plants
Fencing	Sheet metal workers
Firing boilers and water heaters	Shoe repairing
Forestry and reforestation	Soil erosion control
Fruit growing	Stable police
Furniture and cabinet makers	Storekeepers
Gardening	Tailoring and pressing
Grounds maintenance	Teamsters
Hauling	Tractor operators
Hospital Orderlies and technicians	Truck drivers
Incinerator operators	Upholsterers
Janitors	Waiters
Kitchen police for station units	Wash and grease rack operators
Labor in post exchange warehouses	Warehousing
Laundry operators	Watch and clock repairing
	Wood cutting

Because of the great demand for prisoner of war labor in military and private contract work, and because of the limited supply of prisoners of war available, it became necessary for the War Department to establish a system of general priorities to be observed in the assignment of prisoners to work projects. Priority I work was defined as

essential work at military reservations that would have to be performed even though prisoners of war were not available. Priority II work was all work performed on projects certified by the War Manpower Commission or the War Food Administration. Priority III work was described as useful but not essential work at military reservations. It was prescribed that Priority III work could not be engaged in if work of higher priority was available. It became common practice for post commanders to establish backlogs of Priority III work, to be accomplished during the season when the demand for prisoner of war labor in contract work was not sufficient to provide full employment for all prisoners of war.

The Geneva Convention contains certain basic provisions relative to the types of work which may, and may not be assigned prisoners of war. 29/ It was found that almost invariably German prisoners of war were acutely aware of their rights and privileges under the Convention, and objections frequently were voiced by them relative to the type of work they were required to perform. The most common cause for complaint was their assignment to work believed by them to be directly connected with the conduct of the war. A statement of policy issued by the Provost Marshal General's Office prescribed that prisoners of war could be employed in all those occupations normally necessary for the feeding, clothing, and sheltering of human beings as such, even though such work was performed for, or resulted in benefits to, members of the military forces. A "Prisoner of War Employment Reviewing Board" was established for the purpose of considering specific situations in which doubt existed as to the legality of the work under the provisions of the Convention. The Board was composed of representatives of the Secretary of War, The Judge Advocate General, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and The Provost Marshal General. Upon the termination of hostilities in Europe, Article 31 of the Geneva Convention ceased to be applicable to the work of German and Italian prisoners of war and the Employment and Reviewing Board was disbanded. 30/

The relative work efficiency of civilian workers and prisoners of war has long been a debatable subject. It is difficult to establish accurate comparisons because of the widely different conditions under which each type of labor lived and was employed. In general, it may be said that, if the German prisoner of war was to be compared with the average unskilled, free laborer available during war-time for common labor, his labor would be at least of equal value to that of the civilian worker. In many instances, it was proved that prisoner of war labor was of much greater value. The fact that prisoners of war were required to be present for work each day and to perform the tasks assigned added

29/ AGO letter, AG 383.6 (30 Oct 42) OB-S-PMGO-M, dated 10 January 1943, subject: "War Department Policy with Respect to Labor of Prisoners of War."

30/ ASF Circular No. 260, Section I, 6 July 1945.

much to the value of this type of labor. Any such generalizations must take into account not only the quantity of work performed, but the quality of work as well. Many employers indicated that, although prisoners of war did not pick as much cotton, harvest as many onions, etc., the work was performed in a much more thorough and satisfactory manner. Farmers stated that, because of that fact, crop values were much greater than they would have been had the work been done by the type of civilian labor that could be obtained. It was found, from the inception of the prisoner of war work program, that, if prisoners were given thorough training and instruction - if they understood just what was expected of them, and if they were drilled in the "know how" of the job to be done - good results were obtained. It was found by experience that language difficulty reduced work efficiency of the prisoner only in a minor degree for the reason that a large number of prisoners, both German and Italian, had some knowledge of the English language, and could gain some understanding of the instructions given by the work supervisor. Offsetting that slight disadvantage, it was found that German prisoners particularly were young and strong, they were soldiers of the one of the best-trained armies in the world, and they were accustomed to taking orders and to being subjected to rigid discipline. Therefore, it was reasonable for the War Department to expect them to produce at least as much as inexperienced civilian labor. However, it was generally accepted that the work efficiency of prisoners bore a direct relationship to the administrative ability of American officers commanding and operating prisoner of war camps. In both military and private contract work, it was found that the use of properly trained, qualified work supervisors was perhaps the best guarantee of efficient work performance on the part of prisoners. In most instances in which complaint was made of prisoner of war inefficiency, investigation revealed that either no supervision had been provided or the prisoners had found that the supervisor knew nothing about the job to be done. This condition was partially relieved when the War Department published ASF Manual M-811, entitled "Handbook for Work Supervisors of Prisoner of War Labor." Unfortunately, this manual was available only to military users of prisoners. Mention has already been made of the widely different conditions under which prisoners of war and civilian workers lived and worked. One of the greatest deterrents to maximum work efficiency of prisoners of war was that, unlike free American workers, they had no incentive to attempt to maintain high work standards. At best, their earnings amounted to eighty cents a day, which could be used only in the purchase of an extremely limited number of items on sale in the prisoner of war canteens. They were confined under guard when their day's work was accomplished. They were deprived of any semblance of family life. Their future was uncertain. Their incentive to work was based on one thing only - avoidance of disciplinary punishment for failure to work diligently. Because of the absence of incentive, and to promote greater production, the daily minimum task plan was made operative in May, 1944.^{31/} The establishment of

^{31/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 39, 1944.

a daily work task was made mandatory on all work projects on which the work being done could be measured in terms of work units. The plan was first applied to the cutting of pulpwood in Georgia, where prisoners had been producing but one-third of a standard cord per man per day. When it was determined that prisoners would be required to cut a full cord per day, there was considerable resistance offered by prisoners, but the prompt application of the "no work, no eat" policy brought about the desired adjustment and production was immediately increased to meet the task requirement. The task system was then applied to almost every type of work undertaken under contract, and was used to the greatest extent possible on military work. Two incentives were offered the prisoner. The first was the opportunity to earn up to \$1.20 per day if the task was exceeded by fifty per cent. The second incentive made it possible for prisoners to be returned to the stockade when the daily task had been completed by the entire work detail. Needless to say, the latter provision proved to be the more attractive to the prisoners. It was necessary to exercise considerable care and judgment in establishing the daily task. The task had to be possible of accomplishment within the hours of the normal work day. However, if the task was set too low, it resulted in the completion of the work quota at the end of perhaps five hours of diligent work. This resulted in complaints from civilian laborers who felt that prisoners should be required to work longer hours. In enforcing the task system, prisoner of war camp commanders were required to use the following measures to increase work efficiency: (1) adjusting the pay of prisoners on the basis of the number of work units completed, and (2) the use of confinement and restricted diet in cases where prisoners habitually failed to accomplish the task. Generally, the task system operated satisfactorily where camp commanders were diligent in its application.

The following data indicate the total number of man-days of prisoner of war labor performed in military work and on contract work by calendar year from January, 1942, through July, 1945. Reporting procedures did not require a detailed breakdown of contract labor until 1 May 1944. Hence, the figures given for the period 1 June 1944 to 1 June 1945 do not reflect an accurate distribution of labor.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Man-Days</u>	<u>Military Work</u>	<u>Agriculture</u>	<u>Total Industry</u>	<u>Forest Operations</u>	<u>Food</u>	<u>Other</u>
1943	9357830	7891750	1466080				
1944	36096830	28102401	5621849	3372570	1247812	1253064	771694
1945	43015089	31969581	5147894	5897614	2284565	1272191	2346858
Tot*	89469739	67963732	12235823	9270184	3632377	2519255	3118552

*Totals are for 1 January to 31 July 1945 only.

The true story of the value of prisoner of war labor cannot be told without reference to the total amount of money deposited in the Treasury

of the United States from prisoner of war earnings and the total dollar value of all prisoner of war labor performed at military installations. During 1943, total deposits from prisoner of war labor amounted to \$1,479,216.26. For the year 1944, the work of prisoners of war on contract work resulted in the deposit of \$17,780,357.44, and for the period 1 January 1945 through 31 July 1945, \$25,422,220.52 was placed in the Treasury from the same source. Thus, a grand total of nearly \$46,000,000.00 has been realized from the use of prisoners of war in contract work. Using \$4.00 per day as the average rate of pay for civilians on military installations, it is estimated that, in 1943, prisoner of war labor performed at military reservations had a value of approximately \$14,000,000.00. During 1944, prisoner of war utilization at posts, camps, stations, and technical service installations was materially expanded and the records indicate that prisoners of war engaged in that work performed labor worth approximately \$70,000,000.00. For the period 1 January to 31 July 1945, the use of prisoners of war in military work resulted in a saving of over \$99,000,000. Thus, it is estimated that the United States profited through the use of prisoner of war labor in military and contract work to the extent of over \$230,000,000.00. While that sum of money could not possibly be considered as complete reimbursement to the United States for the total cost of caring for prisoners of war in this country, a material contribution toward that end was realized through application of the policy of maximum utilization of prisoner of war labor. In addition to that, it is a matter of record that many of our vital crops would not have been harvested had it not been for the use of that emergency supply of labor. In hundreds of cases, manufacturers and processors of commodities essential to the welfare of our people were permitted to continue operations in the face of critical shortage of civilian workers.

Prior to 1945, all allocations of prisoners of war were made to the service commands and their distribution and utilization was arranged by the commanding general of the service command without reference to the Provost Marshal General. However, early in 1945, the entire procedure was revised. The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion requested that the Secretary of War make available a minimum of 140,000 working prisoners of war for use in agriculture and industry. Arrangements were made by the Secretary of War for the immediate transfer of 150,000 additional German prisoners of war from the European Theater for this purpose. The advent of V-E Day caused the immediate termination of prisoner shipments to the United States after but 25,000 of the 150,000 had been received. In spite of this fact, the War Department made 140,000 working prisoners of war available for contract work exclusive of approximately 15,000 necessary for camp maintenance and administration. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture were asked to submit recommendations relative to the proper distribution of that working force over the labor needs of the nation. Allocations to the service commands for contract work were made

by the Provost Marshal General based on those recommendations. The changing needs of agriculture and industry were studied each month by the War Department, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Food Administration, and the necessary revisions in allocations were made. With the publication of ASF Circular No. 191, 1945, the system of allocations of prisoners of war for military work was revised. The responsibility for determining the needs of military installations for prisoner of war labor was transferred to the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, who thereafter determined and transmitted to the Provost Marshal General the minimum allocations of prisoners for Army Service Forces installations and adjusted these allocations each month if necessary. The recommendations of the Director of Personnel, ASF, were based on personnel requisitions originating with service commanders and chiefs of technical services. Specific allocations were made by the Provost Marshal General to the Navy Department and the Army Air Forces. These allocations were based on the needs of those agencies as expressed by them, and by the availability of prisoners of war. Until late in 1944, both the Navy Department and the Army Air Forces were reluctant to consent to the use of prisoners of war on installations operated by them. It was believed that their security requirements precluded the employment or housing of prisoners of war on Naval or Air Forces installations. However, after a background of satisfactory experience had been developed by the Army Service Forces, the Navy Department and the Army Air Forces initiated vigorous programs of prisoner of war utilization. Although the Navy Department requested an allocation of 30,000 prisoners, it was impossible to provide more than 18,000.^{32/} By August, 1945, a total of approximately 15,000 prisoners were being employed on Air Forces installations.

With the coming of V-E Day, it was immediately apparent that war production cut-backs were imminent. The War Department had emphasized that no civilian worker would be denied work opportunities through the use of prisoner of war labor. In June of 1945, the Acting Secretary of War directed communications to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture informing those officials of the plans being laid for the return to Europe of all German and Italian prisoners of war just as soon as practicable. On 28 July 1945, the Acting Secretary of War advised that the War Manpower Commission and the Agricultural Extension Service conduct extensive campaigns for the recruitment of civilian workers for the jobs filled by prisoners of war.

^{32/} ASF Circular No. 304, dated 14 September 1944, set out the first directive on employment of prisoners by the Navy Department. Reference is made to letter from the Secretary of the Navy on this subject, dated 29 June 1944, to all Bureaus, Boards, and Offices, Navy Department, Commandants of Naval Districts, and Navy Yards.

On 31 August 1945, the Provost Marshal General's Office published a directive requiring that all certifications of need be reviewed by the certifying agency each month and that written notice be given the appropriate prisoner of war camp commander indicating whether the certification was to be continued or withdrawn.^{33/} Service commanders were required by the directive to execute prisoner of war labor contracts on a 30-day basis only. The purpose of the circular was to increase control and flexibility to the point where it could not be said that the continued use of prisoners in contract work was jeopardizing the rights of the American laborer.

Many serious problems were encountered in the development of the prisoner of war work program. Perhaps the most important of these was the attitude of organized labor. Although it was impossible to secure civilian workers from the ranks of organized labor, the unions often sought to prevent the employment of prisoners of war both in contract work and military work. Great pressure was exerted on members of Congress by the unions, and there was an almost constant flow of letters of complaint from labor organizations to the Provost Marshal General either directly or through senators and congressmen. It seemed difficult to demonstrate to American labor that the use of prisoners of war to alleviate shortages of manpower was a contribution to the successful pursuit of the war and, for that matter, to the well-being of their own families.

There was a direct relationship between repatriation and prisoner of war labor for, as prisoners were repatriated, they became unavailable for work projects. With the coming of V-E and V-J Days in the summer of 1945, it became obvious that 1945 was the last year that would see prisoners utilized to any large degree in the United States. There were many demands from the public to get all prisoners out of the country immediately with the coming of peace. Others, persons who relied on prisoner labor or who realized its importance, pressed for its retention. Repatriation and labor cut-backs were thus related, as the rate of the former depended on the rate of the latter to a large degree. As of 31 August 1945, there were hundreds of thousands of prisoners still performing vital labor, there were increasing stories of unemployment of Americans, and demands were being received for both courses of action mentioned above. The War Department agencies concerned went ahead with plans for early repatriation.

Article 27 of the Geneva Convention provides that "Belligerents shall be bound, during the whole period of captivity, to allow to prisoners who are victims of accidents in connection with their work the enjoyment of the benefit of the provisions applicable to laborers of the same class according to the legislation of the detaining Power."

^{33/} ASF Circular No. 329, 31 August 1945.

In order to carry the foregoing provision into effect, it was provided that each prisoner engaged in labor for pay would be considered an employee of the United States for the purpose of disability compensation.^{34/} In the event a prisoner sustained injury arising out of and in the course of labor for pay, not caused by the wilful misconduct of the prisoner or by the intent to bring about injury or death of himself or of another prisoner or by his voluntary intoxication, which prevented him from continuing work for pay, he might be paid at the rate of forty cents per day until (1) he was again able to engage in labor for pay, (2) his repatriation, or (3) his death. Claims for compensation were to be considered by boards of officers subject to review.

The procedure for the handling of claims in the first instance and for their subsequent review was found to be too cumbersome, with the result that it was later simplified.^{35/}

Compensation was paid for all manner of injuries, ranging from the most trivial, where it was paid for only one day, to cases involving loss of limbs, where it was paid until repatriation. In several instances, where prisoners had sustained permanent injuries, they claimed that they were entitled to damages in addition to the compensation provided by the regulations. But the War Department took the position that the compensation provided constituted full compliance with the requirement of the Geneva Convention that prisoners receive compensation "during the whole period of captivity." That the amount of compensation during this period was adequate cannot be questioned. For, while the prisoners received only the equivalent of forty cents per day, they received in addition lodging, maintenance, clothing, and medical care.

Numerous inquiries were addressed to the War Department by contractors for prisoner of war labor and insurance companies regarding the liability of contractors in case of injuries sustained by prisoners while they were engaged in performing labor. Paragraph 38, Section VIII, Chapter 5, TM 19-500, provides that "each prisoner, when engaged in performing work assigned to him, will be considered an employee of the United States for the purpose of disability compensation." Accordingly, contractors were under no obligation to take out compensation insurance.^{36/} The question still remained as to whether prisoners of war could bring court actions against persons or corporations as a result of whose negligence they had sustained injuries. While the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion that prisoners had the right to bring such actions, such a "right" was at best an academic one, for no prisoner was given the opportunity to bring such an action. Still, it is believed that it might be advisable, in order

^{34/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943.

^{35/} Prisoner of War Circular No. 8, 1944.

^{36/} Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, SPJGW 1944-4328, dated 16 May 1944.

avoid future discussion upon this subject, for Congress to enact a law specifically providing that prisoners of war shall have no right to bring actions of any kind in our courts of law.^{37/}

The Italian Service Units were established in order to obtain the maximum labor benefit from Italian prisoners of war. Prior to the establishment of Italian Service Units, there was a directive, dated 24 September 1943, to all service commands, establishing a system of limited parole of selected Italian prisoners of war under which such prisoners could be utilized for work on military installations or for work projects which had been certified by the War Manpower Commission for employment off the military reservation. Under this parole system, prisoners could leave camp in the morning, walk or be transported to their place of work, perform the assigned work, and return or be returned to camp in the evening without guard. Instructions were given that the system be inaugurated gradually and for Italian prisoners of war only. Precautions were taken that they would not be so employed within approximately 150 miles of any coastline or border of the United States or within 50 miles of any large city without specific approval from the War Department. Considerable discretion was left in the commanding officers as to whether they had Italian prisoners who were deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be placed in limited parole status. All military personnel involved in using the parole system were cautioned to avoid incidents which might reflect unfavorably upon the War Department's custody of prisoners of war. In addition, permission was given for Italian prisoners of war to be used on work projects in proper cases under lighter guard than normal. The directive also contained a provision for the establishment of subcamps (later called branch camps or work camps) in areas where their establishment could increase the effectiveness of prisoner of war labor. The prisoner signed an undertaking when placed on limited parole, under which he agreed to wear the identifying clothing issued to him, to carry his prisoner of war identification card at all times, not to escape, to perform honestly and faithfully the work assigned to him, and to dispatch all mail through the internment camp. A prisoner of war identification card was adopted similar to the old form of AGO identification card for Army personnel. It is interesting to note that this card was retained for use by Italian Service Unit personnel when the Italian Service Units were established. Considerable use was made by Italian prisoner of war camp commanders of the limited parole system. On 29 October 1943, a press release was issued publicizing the limited parole system.

^{37/} Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, SPJGW 1945-1845, 9 March 1945.

NON-WORK ALLOWANCES

Article 23 of the Geneva Convention provided that, subject to arrangements between belligerents, officers and persons of equivalent status who were prisoners of war should receive from the detaining power the same pay as officers of corresponding rank in the Army of that power, on the condition, however, that this pay did not exceed that to which they were entitled in the Army of the country which they served. That article continued that such pay should be granted them in full once a month, if possible, and without being liable to any deductions for expenses incumbent upon the detaining power, even when they were in favor of the prisoners. It was further provided that an agreement between the belligerent nations should fix the rate of exchange applicable to such payments and that, in the absence of an agreement, the rate adopted should be that in force at the opening of hostilities. Finally, it was provided that payments made to prisoners of war should be reimbursed at the end of hostilities by the power which the prisoners served.

Negotiations between the United States and Germany, Italy, and Japan were carried on soon after the outbreak of hostilities with a view to an agreement within the contemplation of Article 23.

The United States government proposed to the German government, on a reciprocal basis, that officer prisoners of the rank of first and second lieutenants in the United States Army should be paid \$20.00 per month or its equivalent in German reichmarks, those of ranks corresponding to captain in our Army should be paid \$30.00 per month or its equivalent in reichmarks, and those of ranks corresponding to major or above in the United States Army should be paid \$40.00 or its equivalent in German reichmarks. The United States further proposed that an exchange rate of two and one-half reichmarks to the dollar should be used in computing these allowances. These proposed salaries were to be in addition to rations, which were to be provided free of charge. Germany was slow in replying to these proposals and the Swiss government, on behalf of the United States government, pressed the German government for a reply on several occasions. No acceptance by the German government, except as to the rate of exchange, was received. Although Germany neither accepted nor rejected the proposals, the United States continued to pay German officer prisoners at the proposed rates. In addition, German officer prisoners in United States custody received maintenance, including housing, mess, medical care, and hospitalization free of charge.

The Italian government originally proposed that, on a reciprocal basis, the salary received by officers in the Italian armed forces, if they were not higher than those paid by the United States government to American officers, should be paid to prisoners of war. In reply, the United States government proposed the same allowances for officer prisoners as those proposed to the German government. The Italian government replied to these proposals shortly before its capitulation stating that it preferred that Italian officer prisoners in the custody of the United States receive the full salary paid by the Italian government to officers in the Italian armed forces and that deductions be made to cover the cost of their food and clothing. In its reply, the Italian government stated that it would pay American officer prisoners in its custody at the rates proposed by the United States government but suggested that the salaries be increased in order to enable American officer prisoners to pay for their food and clothing from these allowances. It was further proposed by Italy that the expenses of American officer prisoners' mess should be limited to fifteen lire per day per prisoner, based upon an exchange rate of nineteen lire to the dollar. These proposals of the Italian government were under consideration in The Provost Marshal General's Office when the Italian government capitulated. Italian officer prisoners of war in the custody of the United States government were paid on the basis proposed by the United States government.38/

The United States government originally proposed to the Japanese government that, based on an exchange rate of four yen to the dollar, officer prisoners of ranks equivalent to first and second lieutenants in the Army of the United States would be paid \$15.00 a month or its equivalent in yen; officer prisoners of war of ranks corresponding to captain in our army would be paid \$25.00 per month or its equivalent in yen; and officer prisoners of ranks corresponding to major or above would be paid \$35.00 or its equivalent in yen. These salaries were to be paid in addition to rations distributed free of charge in prisoner of war camps. The Japanese government replied that it was paying American, as well as British and Dutch, officer prisoners of war the same salary as corresponding ranks in the Japanese army, and would have difficulty in applying the American proposals to American prisoners alone. The Japanese government also stated that, if these proposed rates were agreed upon, officer prisoners would have to pay the cost of their food and clothing from these allowances. The Japanese government further replied that, in any event, it desired that the United States government pay Japanese officer prisoners in our custody the same salary as paid to officers in the Japanese army. The United States government accepted the Japanese offer to pay American officer prisoners in Japanese custody the same salary as officers of equivalent rank in the Japanese armed forces with the understanding that the cost of food and clothing would be deducted from these salaries. The

38/ The rates paid to German and Italian prisoners of war were set forth in Prisoner of War Circular No. 7, 1943.

United States government informed the Japanese that it would pay Japanese officer prisoners of ranks equivalent to captain or above in the United States Armed Forces the equivalent of salaries paid by the Japanese government to officers of these ranks in the Japanese Armed Forces, subject to deductions for food and clothing. A slightly higher allowance was made to Japanese officer prisoners of ranks corresponding to first and second lieutenant in our Army because the Japanese pay was not considered adequate to cover the cost of their food and clothing in the United States. It was deemed advisable to pay Japanese lieutenants the slightly higher allowances in order to prevent any claim by the Japanese government that we had failed to perform our obligations under the Geneva Convention.^{39/} Japanese officer prisoners were to be charged for the cost of their food and clothing, laundry service, orderly service, lost, destroyed, or damaged government property, and items not normally furnished to officers of the Army of the United States. The cost of heat, light, and quarters was not to be charged against these officers.

On 20 June 1945, the Provost Marshal General's Office proposed that the monthly allowances of German and Italian officers of all grades be reduced to \$5.00 per month. This proposal was disapproved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on the grounds that such a reduction was inappropriate and of questionable legality and policy, and could subject the government to justifiable criticism. This action of G-1 was approved by the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary of War. This file is interesting and of some consequence as G-1 disapproved the proposal on the grounds of illegality under the Convention. The Assistant Secretary of War approved G-1's disapproving action, but expressly did so as a matter of policy, not of compliance with the Convention. It was the view of the Assistant Secretary that there was substantial doubt that the United States continued to be bound by the Convention following the unconditional surrender of the enemy.

Enlisted prisoner of war personnel, whether or not employed for pay were paid a monthly allowance of \$3.00 until 1 June 1945. This allowance was not allowed pursuant to any treaty obligation or international agreement, but was in the nature of a voluntary grant by our government to enable prisoners to have an allowance with which to buy tobacco and other small items of convenience. On 1 June 1945, the

^{39/} The original rate of pay proposed to the Japanese government of \$15.00, \$25.00, and \$35.00 was set forth in Prisoner of War Circular No. 7, 1943. The agreement with the Japanese government was made effective by its publication in Prisoner of War Circular No. 28, 1944, where the new rates, ranging from \$25.00 to \$128.91, were listed.

policy was changed, and the allowance was discontinued for all prisoners of war except those unable to work because of physical disability. A short time later, it was decided to give a monthly allowance of \$1.00 to all enlisted prisoner personnel who could not work, those able to do only light work, and those prevented from working because of the non-availability of work. With these changes, the Finance Department, U. S. Army, ceased to make payments to enlisted personnel, for it had been further decided as a matter of policy that such payments should be made from camp prisoner of war funds or the Central Prisoner of War Fund.

PRISONER OF WAR ACCOUNTS IN TRUST FUND 218915

The credit remaining to each prisoner after all deductions were made was deposited monthly to his credit in a trust fund account in the Treasury of the United States. This fund was established in April, 1942, by direction of the Comptroller General and was designated as Trust Fund 218915 - Deposits of Civilian Internees and Prisoners of War. The administration of each individual's account was vested in prisoner of war camp commanders subject to regulations prescribed by The Provost Marshal General and last published in April, 1945.⁴⁰ The trust fund account was established at a time when the primary duties of The Provost Marshal General were with regard to civilian internees, and first reference to it are found in the civilian internee regulations. See Appendix B.

In some cases, amounts to the credit of a prisoner with allied countries while under their custody prior to transfer to U. S. custody were paid to the United States in dollars for credit to the prisoners' accounts. In such cases, the funds were deposited in Trust Fund Account 218915 and appropriate entries made on the Individual Pay Data Record of each prisoner involved. In other cases, the Allied Power has furnished The Provost Marshal General with a statement as to the amount to the credit of the prisoner with that power. In this event, the prisoner concerned was informed of the facts, and was given a statement that the U. S. Government assumed no responsibility as to the correctness of the Allied Power's statement, and that settlement would be a matter to be decided by the governments concerned.

Any prisoner was authorized, subject to the camp commander's approval, to withdraw from the trust fund account any amount not to exceed the total of his credit therein, with the further limitation that enlisted prisoners were permitted to withdraw only \$30.00 in any one month for purely personal expenses. Each individual desiring to make a withdrawal was advised that he had to submit a letter of application to the camp commander explaining the reason for the withdrawal. If approved, the camp commander prepared the necessary forms for submission to the local disbursing officer for payment. The disbursing officer then delivered checks made payable to the prisoner involved to the camp commander who caused them to be properly indorsed and delivered

⁴⁰/ Chapter 4, Finance, TM 19-500, 20 April 1945

or mailed to the person for whom intended. Prisoners were limited to one withdrawal during any one month.

In May, 1944, the Treasury Department authorized Italian prisoners of war to withdraw funds from the trust fund account for the purpose of making remittances to Italy for the support of their families. The amount that could be withdrawn by any prisoner was limited to \$100.00 in any one quarter. 41/ The directive stipulated that funds in cover of total remittances from any one camp would be forwarded by the camp commanders to The Provost Marshal General together with remittances lists showing the names of remitters, names and addresses of payees, and amounts to be remitted. As soon as sufficient individual remittances (about 500) were received, The Provost Marshal General's Office prepared combined remittance schedules and forwarded them, together with funds in cover thereof, to the National City Bank of New York for transmittal of funds to the designated payees. From 11 August 1944 to 31 August 1945, 18,160 individual remittances (including those of repatriated Italian prisoners who were authorized to remit the full amount of their credit at the time of their repatriation in accordance with authorization of the Treasury Department given in January, 1945), totaling \$951,374.30 were remitted to payees residing in liberated areas of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Libya, and Tunisia. The first 1,629 remittances, totaling \$69,004.46, were made through the American Express Company whose handling charges amounted to \$1.50 per individual remittance. In October, 1944, arrangements were made with the National City Bank of New York for the handling of those remittances for a charge of 25 cents per remittance. This reduction of handling charges, amounting to \$1.25 per individual remittance, resulted in a total saving for the Italian prisoners of \$20,663.75 up to 31 August 1945.

As of 31 August 1945, no channels had been opened for remittances by German prisoners similar to those arranged for Italians, and it was not contemplated that they would be established by the time German prisoners were repatriated. The Geneva Convention contemplates in Article 24 that such arrangements be made, but conditions in Germany were not conducive to their completion at an early date after V-E Day or prior thereto.

In repatriations of prisoners which have occurred already, accounts in the Trust Fund were settled in various ways.

41/ Prisoner of War Circular 31, 1944

Prior to 1945 the balance to the credit of an Italian was paid in United States dollars just prior to his departure. Upon receipt of a complaint from the Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, that this procedure was creating a black market in U. S. currency in Italy, Prisoner of War Circular No. 5, 5 January 1945, was published requiring each Italian repatriate to withdraw the entire amount to his credit in the Trust Fund for remittance either to himself or to any other individual, bank, or firm selected by him in one of the liberated areas of Italy. Transmittals to these areas had been approved by the Treasury Department and the remittances were handled in exactly the same manner as remittances to relatives of Italian prisoners of war for living expenses of their families.

The first German repatriates were paid in U. S. dollars as in the case of the first Italian prisoners. However, upon learning the American soldiers held prisoner by the Germans were given only a receipt for the balance to their credit at time of repatriation, our system was changed and, instead of paying the prisoner in cash, a Certificate of Credit Balance showing the total amount on deposit to the credit of each individual in the Trust Fund was prepared in triplicate. The original and duplicate were given to the prisoner, who was instructed to present the original to the German Government for payment and to retain the triplicate for his own record.

As of 31 August 1945 no final directive had been published regarding the settlement of trust fund accounts upon repatriation. A directive had been conceived, however, after conferences with other War Department and governmental agencies.

Under the proposed directive, final settlement of each repatriate's account will be made at the installation where he is interned as of the movement readiness date. A withdrawal voucher will be prepared for each prisoner showing the full amount to his credit, signed by the prisoner as a receipt, and presented to the local disbursing officer for payment. No cash will be paid, and, in lieu thereof, the disbursing officer will issue a United States Military Disbursing Officer's Payment Order in the name of each prisoner for the amount due him. The order is to be turned over to each prisoner prior to departure from camp for the port of embarkation.

Prisoners will be instructed to present the payment orders to an Army or Navy disbursing officer after arrival in the country of origin, who will make payments in the appropriate local currency. No orders will be cashed in continental United States.

EDUCATION, RECREATION, AND PRIVILEGES

The War Department was faced with the necessity of providing for the intellectual and moral needs of prisoners - not only from humanitarian considerations, but because that action was dictated by the Geneva Convention. Religious observance has already been treated. The appropriate sections of the Convention are not long, and lend themselves to direct quotation:

"Chapter 4. Intellectual and Moral Needs of Prisoners of War.

Article 16

"Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete liberty in the exercise of religion, including attendance at the services of their faith, on the sole condition that they comply with the measures of order and police issued by the military authorities.

Article 17

"So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war."

The Provost Marshal General's Office prepared several War Department publications to implement these articles of the Convention.

Protecting powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross were authorized to visit and inspect camps, at such times as The Provost Marshal General should approve. If desired, these bodies could hold interviews with prisoners without witnesses. The International Committee of the Red Cross was permitted to foster and encourage recreational and welfare activities at camps, in addition to those already provided by the Army or the prisoners themselves. Where necessary or convenient, the camp commander was privileged to call upon the War Prisoners Aid of the International Young Men's Christian Associations to supplement the recreational work of the International Red Cross Committee. Representatives of the YMCA were permitted to visit camps. 42/

42/ Prisoners of War Circulars No. 1, 24 September 1943, Chapter IX; No. 4, 13 October 1944; and TM 19-500, Chapter 2, Section 8

At the outset, provision was made for classes under prisoner instructors, in subjects approved by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Libraries and reading rooms were permitted to be maintained by prisoners, subject to censorship of the reading material.

This censorship was exercised largely at the camp level. As time went on, however, increasing staff supervision was exercised by the Office of The Provost Marshal General, since quantities of reading material were available from welfare agencies and other sources, and censorship at the camp level was often impractical. Supervision was exercised by directives, correspondence with camps, and extensive liaison with welfare agencies, and the Office of Censorship. Publications which related to military matters or which contained anti-democratic political propaganda were excluded.

The need of educating prisoners became, progressively, of increasing importance and was reflected in additional coverage in the official regulations and directives. Opportunities developed for prisoners to receive further education, subject to certain limitations which were required because of the prisoners' status. At the beginning the prisoners themselves took the initiative, aided by relief societies. Once launched, their efforts were given all necessary aid from the War Department, whether the courses were at elementary, secondary, or collegiate level.

The prisoners selected, from their groups, a director of studies and instructors. The director spoke for the group on all educational matters. The director and instructors were given sufficient free time to carry out their educational work and received 80 cents a day because they could not carry on their duties as such and perform paid labor.

By 1944, other sources of instructions were made available. Colleges and universities, approved by The Provost Marshal General, were allowed to supply books and courses of study; prisoners could enroll in the United States Armed Forces Institute; they could enroll in approved correspondence courses; and, subject to the approval of The Provost Marshal General, lectures by civilian and American military personnel were permitted.

In TM 19-500, still further impetus was given to the education of prisoners. Specific provision was made to encourage the enrollment of prisoners in correspondence courses. A list of approved cooperating universities was

set forth to encourage such courses.

A weekly rest period for prisoners, preferably Sunday, was directed. Where none was possible on Sunday, the next available day was set aside. In no event was a prisoner to go more than nine days without a rest day. Indoor and outdoor space, adequate for various contests, calisthenics, and other recreational activities, was provided. Soccer, tennis, volley-ball, running races, and other sports were always encouraged in free time. Indoor games, particularly table-tennis, were continual pastimes of prisoners in their leisure hours. Equipment was first supplied by the Army or by relief organizations, and was later purchased out of the prisoner of war fund. Sports activities were under the general supervision of the camp commander, and participation on the part of the prisoners was optional.

Permission was given for the publication of camp newspapers by prisoners, subject to censorship by the camp commander. Prohibitions against the dissemination of propaganda were enforced, however, and distribution of camp newspapers beyond the confines of the camp was forbidden. Early in 1945 a national German prisoner of war news magazine, *Der Ruf* (The Call), began publication. It was written and edited by the prisoners themselves as part of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division program.

Prisoners were allowed radio receiving sets, subject to periodic inspection to assure they were not capable of receiving short-wave. After V-E and V-J Days, the restrictions against short-wave reception were lifted.⁴³ They were given the privilege of seeing censored or selected motion pictures. A film circuit, designed to bring to prisoners films which showed the achievements and ideals of American democracy, as well as to furnish good recreation, was organized.

From the first, these diversions were permitted, subject to supervision to prevent the glorification of enemy nationalism. The welfare organizations aided in obtaining plays, costumes, properties, instruments, and music. Costumes which would aid in escapes were avoided. Virtually every camp of any size had a band or orchestra, or both. American dance band arrangements were popular with prisoner orchestras. A circulating library of phonograph records was provided by the YMCA. In connection with singing, some incidents were reported of German prisoners openly

⁴³ A.S.F. Circular No. 258, 5 July 1944, Section IV;
A.S.F. Circular No. 182, 23 May 1945, Section II;
A.S.F. Circular No. 260, 6 July 1945, Section II.

singing the "Horst Wessel" song while marching to work projects to the discontent of surrounding citizens. As a result, singing outside the compounds was forbidden. After V-E Day all singing of Nazi and Fascist songs was prohibited.

Originally prisoners of war in this country were permitted twice a month to receive visitors approved by the camp commander. It was soon discovered, however, that this general regulation in many instances created a job of social secretary for the camp commander inasmuch as many prisoners, particularly Italians, had many relatives in this country who desired to visit the camp. Therefore, in June, 1944, a further restriction was placed upon visitors which permitted only persons related to the prisoner as parent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, wife, or child to visit him.

It was always the policy to permit the camp commander to make the final decision whether any relative should be permitted to visit his camp. Arrangements for the visits were made before the visitor arrived at the camp and the visits were held under the supervision of designated military personnel at the time and place selected by the camp commander. All visitors were required to submit to a search before entering the camp and before departure therefrom. Any article the possession of which was denied the prisoner was deposited with an officer before the visitor was permitted to see the prisoner. These articles were returned to the visitor upon departure. Prisoners were not permitted to deliver to or receive direct from any visitor any letter, paper, document, or article. Each visit was registered, the entry showing the date of the visit, the name of the visitor, his signature, address, and relationship to the prisoner. This register was filed in the 201 file of the prisoners.

On 14 December 1944, a policy was promulgated which had been long before firmly settled: that the War Department would not permit a prisoner to marry in the United States. 44/ This applied to Italian Service Unit members also. The only exception was that a prisoner could marry by proxy a person in the country he was serving at the time of his capture.

This prohibition against marriage was necessitated by the special status of members of Italian Service Units, who came

44/ Prisoner of War Circular No. 53, 1944

into frequent contact with American citizens. Italian Service Units were created to utilize to the maximum the services of Italian prisoners of war, and to accord some recognition to those prisoners who were loyal to the newly-organized co-belligerent Italian Government. ^{45/} They remained prisoners of war but were released from stockades and placed in the custody of American officers in command of the units. Italian officers were assigned to aid in the command of the units. Among the privileges accorded Italian Service Unit personnel were conducted tours in the company of American personnel, dances and social affairs on posts, gatherings arranged by Italian-American organizations, frequent visits from relatives and friends, considerable freedom on their military installations and the like.

A strict prohibition against prisoner marriages was enforced without exception. One of the purposes of the restriction against marriage was to avoid creating in any prisoner the semblance of a right to preferential treatment upon re-entry into the United States under the immigration laws, on the ground of marriage to an American woman. But serious problems arose in this connection, including a few surreptitious marriages, despite the prohibition.

COMMUNICATIONS AND READING MATTER

The original regulations pertaining to prisoner of war communications and reading material were issued on 22 April 1942. ^{45/} These regulations formed a basis for the subsequent regulations which were issued in Prisoner of War Circulars, beginning with Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, dated 24 September 1943, and which were later incorporated in TM 19-500, 5 October 1944. It was found necessary to change the correspondence regulations probably more than any other set of prisoner of war regulations by reason of the various problems which arose involving prisoner of war mail and censorship. The civilian internees were originally permitted to send two letters and one post card per week, which included business letters and letters to neutral legations. In view of the fact that a large number of civilian internees had business interests in the United States about which they wished to carry on correspondence, they were permitted to write two letters and one post card per week and in addition, when necessary, one business letter per week twice the length of an ordinary letter.

^{45/} A.S.F. Circular No. 279, 1944

^{46/} Regulations entitled "Civilian Internee Alien Enemies and Prisoners of War"

Later, as conditions changed, the number of letters which a prisoner could write was determined by his rank. The original regulations required that all international mail be forwarded to the District Postal Censor, Main Post Office Building, Chicago, Illinois, for censorship. On 10 September 1942, the District Postal Censor moved to New York and all international mail which had previously been sent to Chicago for censorship was forwarded to New York. Later, The Provost Marshal General's Office was informed by the Office of Censorship that that office was in a position to censor all internec mail, including domestic English language mail. Accordingly, on 3 November 1942, all civilian internec and prisoner of war mail was forwarded to the District Postal Censor with the exception of mail addressed to officials of any government or relief or aid organization. Also, mail written by prisoners of war then recently captured and mail containing doubtful, suspicious, or objectionable statements were routed through The Provost Marshal General's Office.

The regulations regarding communications and reading material of prisoners of war were based on Articles 36 through 41 of the Geneva Convention. The Provost Marshal General's Office formulated policies and issued regulations governing mail, parcels, books, newspapers, magazines, and telegrams to and from prisoners of war held in the United States. In establishing and enforcing these regulations, The Provost Marshal General's Office coordinated the policy of the War Department with the Office of Censorship, Post Office Department, the State Department, and other government agencies which had an interest in these matters, as well as with relief and welfare organizations. In order to maintain the flow of prisoner of war mail promptly and efficiently, it was necessary to maintain liaison with these interested agencies at all times. On 5 October 1944, TM 19-500 was issued to replace all of the regulations contained in prisoner of war circulars. Even after publication of the Technical Manual, it was necessary from time to time to issue new policy announcements in the form of TWX's and ASF circulars until such time as the new policy could be incorporated in TM 19-500, in view of rapidly changing mail conditions which developed in Europe with the war's advance.

The Provost Marshal General's Office exercised staff supervision over the two prisoner of war directory services, the German Postal Unit at Prisoner of War Camp, Kearns, Texas (later moved to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland), and the Italian

Postal Unit at Prisoner of War Camp, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. 47/ A large volume of mail from and to prisoners of war in the United States was routed through The Provost Marshal General's Office for censorship, comment, explanation, and transmittal to the addressees.48/

The majority of prisoner of war mail consisted of personal letters and cards from and to prisoners of war as individuals. There was no limitation on the number or length of letters or cards a prisoner could receive. International letters and cards upon arrival in the United States were sent to the New York District Postal Censor for censorship. The New York District Postal Censor then forwarded the mail intended for German prisoners of war direct to the prisoner's camp. Later, mail went to the Postal Units for directory service.

Within a period of not more than one week after arrival at the first prisoner of war camp, and in the event of sickness, or transfer from one base camp to another or to a general hospital, the prisoner was permitted to dispatch a card to his home address containing his name, serial number, state of health, and return address.

Regulations issued 24 September 1943 permitted prisoners of war below the rank of general to write one letter and one post card each week. General officers were permitted to write five letters and five post cards each month. Because of the large volume of prisoner of war mail and the difficulties in censorship thereof, the regulations were changed, effective 1 February 1945, to provide for the following: each general officer prisoner could mail five letters and five cards per month; other officer prisoners could mail three letters and four post cards per month; enlisted prisoners could mail two letters and four post cards per month. For this correspondence, prisoner of war stationery was provided by the War Department and its use was required in the case of all normal personal mail. The stationery forms consisted of a letter form and a post card form. The letter form was designed to be easily censored and was printed on sensitized paper with a space for

47/ ASF Circular No. 84, 21 September 1943, Section I, provided for the transfer of the Property Section of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Office of The Provost Marshal General, to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Later, when the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau became a separate division of the Office of The Provost Marshal General, it was located at Fort Meade.

48/ See manual on Prisoner of War Administration.

the writing of the body of the letter on one side only within the space of twenty-four ruled lines. Ruled sensitized post card forms were also provided. The address on letters and cards, as well as the return address of the prisoners, was required to be in specified form and in the space provided on the correspondence forms. The outgoing mail of German prisoners contained the following return address: the prisoner's name, serial number, the name of the base prisoner of war camp without stating the state in which the camp was located, and Box 20, G.P.O., New York, New York. After V-J Day, when the Office of Censorship was abolished, "Box 20, G.P.O., New York, New York" was eliminated from the return address. Outgoing mail of all Italian prisoners contained the following return address: prisoner's name, serial number, Prisoner of War Camp, Fort George G. Meade, Box 20, G.P.O., New York, New York. This return address was prescribed for use by all Italian prisoners of war in order to avoid any possibility of detection in German-occupied Italy that Italian prisoners located at different camps were in different categories. After V-E Day, "Prisoner of War Camp, Fort George G. Meade" was removed from the return address of Italian prisoners of war and was replaced by the name of the camp in which the prisoner was located. The use of Box 20, G.P.O., New York, New York, was intended to insure delivery of incoming mail direct to the District Postal Censor by encouraging the use of that address by correspondents of prisoners, thus avoiding the possible confusion and waste of time which might result from the use of diverse addresses.

After dispatch from the prisoner of war camp, outgoing mail was transmitted direct to the District Postal Censor where it was censored and forwarded to the addressee. With regard to domestic correspondents, prisoners of war were permitted to write only to persons in the United States who were close relatives, to wit: father, mother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, grandfather, grandmother, wife, or child. Similarly, prisoners were permitted to inquire concerning persons located in the United States only if those persons were within those degrees of relationship. Inquiries concerning the location of other prisoners of war were addressed to the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau, and those regarding the location of American civilians were addressed to the local representative of the American Red Cross. Prisoners of war were not permitted to receive or mail registered or insured items.

In the closing phases of the European war, mail channels

in Germany were disrupted and, just prior to V-E Day, The Provost Marshal General received word that no further prisoner correspondence should be forwarded. Instructions to this effect were given on 4 May 1945. 49/

Until 12 June 1945, prisoners were permitted to receive both domestic and overseas parcels. The contents of domestic parcels to the prisoners had to conform to the regulations applied to parcels mailed to American prisoners of war interned in the enemy country which the prisoner served. The items which could be mailed to prisoners in domestic parcels had to conform to a list issued by The Provost Marshal General. Each prisoner could mail one parcel per month to relatives within the United States who were within the prescribed degrees of relationship. After 12 June 1945, prisoners were no longer permitted to receive domestic packages (except new books) unless from relief or aid organizations and approved American educational institutions, or to send domestic parcels. This policy was placed into effect since the prisoners received all necessities from the War Department and were permitted to receive parcels from relief and aid organizations, as well as overseas parcels. Prisoners of war were not permitted to mail packages overseas. 50/

Prisoners who had received no mail from their next of kin for three months or more could send a special "express message" to their families. The forms of these messages were furnished by the International Committee of the Red Cross upon the request of the camp commander. The Apostolic Delegate also furnished a message form to provide delivery of messages of prisoners to their families in Germany and Italy and replies from their families. These forms were furnished by the Apostolic Delegate upon the request of the camp commander. Red Cross express messages were not counted against the prisoner's quota nor were answers to incoming express messages. Apostolic Delegate messages could be sent even though mail had been received. While the Red Cross messages were forwarded by the camp commander to the District Postal Censor, the Apostolic Delegate messages were forwarded direct to the Apostolic Delegate who, in turn, transmitted them to the District Postal Censor. Prisoners were permitted to receive cables and telegrams but they were not permitted to receive telephone calls. Copies of all domestic prisoner of war

49/ A.S.F. Circular No. 279, 21 July 1945, Section V.

50/ A.S.F. Circular No. 216, 12 June 1945, Section V.

telegrams were sent to the District Postal Censor by camp commanders. Each prisoner was permitted to send one cable during his interment at his own expense and could send additional cables or telegrams in the event of an emergency. All cablegrams and telegrams were censored at the camp in addition to censorship by the Office of Censorship.

Prisoners could receive books under the following conditions: individuals were permitted to send books to individual prisoners of war only by ordering new books from, and having them shipped by, a publishing concern, singly or in collections to prisoner of war camp libraries. Books intended for prisoners could not contain any notation or other marking. Domestic books could be sent directly to the appropriate prisoner of war camp and were censored by the camp commander. Until April, 1944, books which arrived at a camp from overseas without evidence of having been censored by the Office of Censorship were forwarded to the District Postal Censor. After 4 April, however, the burden on the Office of Censorship became so great that it was necessary to have the camp commander censor all incoming books except those extremely difficult to translate or books in unusual foreign languages as to which there were no translators available at the camp. Clearly objectionable books could be condemned by the camp commander without reference to the District Postal Censor. Efforts were made to have as much censorship as possible done by camp headquarters in order to lessen the burden of the Office of Censorship and to eliminate expense of shipping and burdens upon transportation facilities.

Current newspapers or magazines published in the English language in continental United States were made available to prisoners. The selection of newspapers and magazines within this category was the responsibility of the camp commander, except that English language newspapers of wide circulation could be disapproved because of the content, as distinguished from restrictions imposed to regulate the number of newspapers entering the compound, after concurrence by The Provost Marshal General.

Foreign language newspapers and magazines published in the continental United States were made available to prisoners upon their approval by The Provost Marshal General's Office, and after examination of the individual issues by the camp commander or his representative. The Provost Marshal General's Office maintained a list of approved newspapers. The censorship of such newspapers and magazines was the responsibility of the camp commander.

Many restrictions were placed upon the writing of letters and cards by prisoners. Consecutive numbering of letters and cards was not permitted, and the entire letter or card had to be written by the same person. Communications could not contain any military information or any quotations from books or other writings. Except for communications to a protecting power or American military authorities, the prisoners' letters could not contain complaints, criticisms of any government agency, or circumstances of capture or of the conditions of the treatment of prisoners. Except in letters to a protecting power or a spokesman's letter to a relief or aid organization, prisoners could not refer to numbers of prisoners. Communications, other than complaints made to protecting powers, containing statements at variance with the facts could be withheld or the false statements excised or deleted by the District Postal Censor. In brief, prisoners were not permitted to write about anything which might be detrimental to the best interests of the United States.

Close liaison was maintained with the Office of Censorship concerning violations of prisoner of war mail regulations. The Office of Censorship furnished the Office of The Provost Marshal General excerpts from mail which disclosed, in addition to security violations, the prisoner's attitude concerning all phases of his internment. These excerpts were frequently sent to the camps where the prisoners who wrote the letters were interned for the information or action of the camp commander.

As a result of the increase in numbers of prisoners and the limited staff of the Office of Censorship, backlogs of over one million letters accumulated in March and October, 1944. In an effort to eliminate this backlog, the censorship of domestic books by the Office of Censorship was discontinued and thereafter accomplished at the camp level on a limited basis.

The censoring of domestic mail was performed by the Office of Censorship, though the Office of Censorship's primary function was the censoring of international communications. This arrangement was terminated immediately after V-E Day as it was no longer considered necessary from a security standpoint that strict domestic censorship be conducted.^{51/} All censorship by the Office of Censorship was lifted 15 August 1945. Thereafter, instructions

^{51/} ASF Circular No. 195, 30 May 1945, Part III; ASF Circular No. 270, 14 July 1945, Section IV

were issued to the camp commanders that all prisoner of war mail would be censored on a unit censorship level, and that the camp commander could exercise his discretion in censoring prisoner of war domestic mail. The strictness with which this mail was to be censored depended upon the conditions which existed at the camp. If the prisoners of war were cooperative and censorship of the mail revealed that the letters were innocuous, a spot check of such mail was considered adequate for future censorship. If the prisoners of war were noncooperative and censorship revealed that the letters and cards were objectionable, their mail was censored more strictly thereafter. At the time the Office of Censorship was abolished, instructions were issued that international mail would be censored on the same basis upon which domestic mail was censored.

In formulating the first regulations issued by The Provost Marshal General's Office with regard to the discipline and punishment of prisoners of war, the general basis was drawn from Articles 45 through 67 of the Geneva Convention, as well as from accepted American judicial principles. At the time when the first tentative regulations governing civilian enemy aliens and prisoners of war were published on 22 April 1942, no enemy prisoner of war had arrived as yet within the continental United States, and the activities of The Provost Marshal General's Office were confined to maintaining supervision over the civilian internees in the custody of the War Department. As a matter of fact, no case had arisen in which formal disciplinary measures had been applied to an interned civilian. None the less, a section entitled "Discipline of Internees" was incorporated in the regulations of 22 April 1942, setting forth the general principles to be followed in imposing disciplinary punishment or in bringing to formal trial a civilian internee or prisoner of war.^{52/} Briefly, these regulations stated that internees were subject to the laws of the municipality and state in which they were located, as well as to the laws and regulations of the United States, including those of the War Department and its representatives. Prisoners of war were stated to be subject to the laws and regulations and orders in force in the Army of the United States. (This provision repeated almost verbatim the similar statement contained in Article 45 of the Geneva Convention.) The 1942 regulations also stated that, for the violation of the civil laws, internees were subject to trial and punishment

^{52/} Civilian Enemy Aliens and Prisoners of War, 22 April 1942, Section XII, pages 46-49

by Federal, state, and local courts. Ordinary disciplinary and police infractions committed by the internees might be dealt with summarily by company or camp commanders, by suspension of privileges, or by confinement in barracks for a period of not to exceed 30 days, and in accordance with Article 54 of the Geneva Convention. The regulations provided further that prisoners of war were liable to trial and punishment by civil and military courts and to summary punishment by commanding officers as are members of United States forces. It is interesting to note that, in these original regulations, mention was made of the power of the camp commanders to impose discretionary disciplinary punishment for periods of 30 days or less under Article 54 of the Geneva Convention. It may also be noted that these regulations provided that violations of civil laws would subject civilian internees to trial by non-military courts, and that prisoners of war might be tried by civilian and military courts. The Provost Marshal General's Office was, at that time, prepared to take the position that civilian internees might be tried by military courts-martial. However, since no case arose during the period civilian internees were held in the custody of the War Department which necessitated a formal judicial proceeding, the choice between civilian and military jurisdiction did not have to be made.

As a practical matter, serious problems of disciplinary action and judicial punishment did not arise until the War Department had terminated its custody of civilian internees, and prisoners of war came into the United States in substantial numbers. The prisoners of war were soldiers, and military discipline and procedures were imposed upon them. No substantial question of prosecuting a prisoner of war in a civilian court has arisen. In accordance with the provisions of Articles 45 through 53 of the Geneva Convention and the principles set forth in the tentative regulations of 22 April 1942, prisoners of war have always been subject to the same form of disciplinary punishment and procedures which were applied to American soldiers, although they remained subject to the jurisdiction of civilian courts under appropriate circumstances.

These principles were incorporated in paragraph 106 of Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, published on 24 September 1943. The final statement of jurisdiction, set forth in paragraph 57, Section X, Chapter 2, TM 19-500, expresses the doctrine as it was worked out over the period of the preceding three years by The Provost Marshal General's Office;

"Prisoners are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the Army of the United States including the Articles of War. They are not subject to the laws, regulations, or orders of the country in whose Armed Forces they served, except as prescribed in this manual. Prisoners are within the jurisdiction of courts-martial and are liable to punishment by the Army of the United States. Prisoners also are subject to the civil laws of the United States and of the state and municipality where interned. If trial of a prisoner is advisable, it will be held before a court-martial and not a civil court, unless there are strong reasons for the opposite course. A prisoner will not be delivered to the civil authorities for trial except upon the authority of the Secretary of War. The Provost Marshal General, after consultation with The Judge Advocate General, will grant or withhold the above authority in the name of the Secretary."

The disciplinary procedures by which prisoners of war may be punished fall generally into two broad categories based upon the distinction set forth in the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention between disciplinary punishments of 30 days or less, referred to in Articles 54 through 59 of the Convention, and judicial suits, referred to in Articles 60 through 67. Disciplinary punishments are generally within the powers of prisoner of war camp commanders, and judicial proceedings, insofar as the punishment of prisoners of war under American jurisdiction is concerned, generally comprise trial by special or general court-martial, although in theory a judicial proceeding might include trial of a prisoner of war before a civil court on a charge for which sentence of more than 30 days might be imposed.

As mentioned above, prisoners of war were subjected to the same disciplinary measures as American troops. Insofar as disciplinary punishment of 30 days or less is concerned, the prisoners were accordingly subject to company punishment under the 104th Article of War 53 and to summary courts-martial proceedings. The power of camp commanders of prisoner of war camps to impose punishment under the 104th Article of War included the power to admonish, reprimand, withhold privileges for not exceeding a week, to restrict the prisoner to specified limits, or to order him to perform hard labor without confinement

53/ For the benefit of Italian and German prisoners of war, selected Articles of War were translated into Italian and German and distributed appropriately.

for the same period of time. In the case of a prisoner of war, the power to restrict to specified limits under Article of War 104 was interpreted to include confinement in the guard house in view of the fact that the prisoner was already confined under normal circumstances to the limits of his compound. With regard to the power to require the prisoner to perform hard labor without confinement for the period of a week, it was determined that only prisoners of war below the rank of non-commissioned officers could be subjected to this punishment. Noncommissioned officers could be ordered to do supervisory work only, and officers, although subject to company punishment under Article of War 104, could not be made to perform any type of labor. The limitations of this power under Article of War 104 complied with Article 27 of the Geneva Convention. In imposing company punishment on prisoners of war, a possible difficulty arose by reason of the fact that, as is the case in imposing company punishment on American military personnel, the prisoner had the right to demand trial by court-martial and refuse company punishment. This right, if utilized, would enable prisoners of war to put camp commanders to considerable trouble in arranging for courts-martial merely by refusing to accept company punishment. However, either by reason of ignorance of prisoners of war of American military procedure or through choice, no instances came to the attention of The Provost Marshal General's Office in which prisoners of war exercised their right to refuse company punishment and demand a court-martial.

Prisoners of war were subject to summary courts-martial proceedings to the same extent as American military personnel, with the exception that, for procedural reasons discussed below, the sentence by summary court of prisoners of war was limited to 30 days in duration. Only prisoners of war below the rank of commissioned officer could be tried by summary court, whereas officers as well as enlisted prisoners were subject to Article of War 104, on the same basis as American soldiers. Summary court procedure was a useful disciplinary method for the reason that the court was empowered to impose a forfeiture of two-thirds of pay and allowances of the prisoner. In other respects, summary court did not extend the types of disciplinary measures which the camp commander was empowered to impose under Article of War 104, although the duration of these punishments could be extended to 30 days. The Judge Advocate General, in a memorandum for The Provost Marshal General, dated 8 April 1944, ruled that trial by summary court-martial of a prisoner of war did not constitute a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Article 60 of the Geneva Convention providing punishment did not exceed 30 days. Accordingly, prisoners could be tried by summary court without

the necessity of notice being given to the protecting power as required in the trial of a prisoner by a special or general court.

Practical difficulties were encountered by prisoner of war camp commanders in attempting to impose punishments for minor infractions by prisoners of war under their powers of company punishment and summary courts-martial. Prisoners of war, normally confined within restricted limits, had only a limited number of privileges, and therefore did not regard in the same light as American soldiers these types of punishments. Experience proved that, in general, the only disciplinary measures which were effective in controlling prisoners of war were restrictions on diet and withholding pay and allowances and, of these two, restrictions on diet was a considerably more effective means. By the summer of 1943, it became apparent that additional disciplinary measures would have to be developed to maintain order among prisoners of war. Particularly in the case of prisoners who refused to perform labor assigned to them and who did not respond to discipline under Article of War 104 or summary court, it was deemed imperative to employ a method of exerting pressure which would result in enforcing compliance by them with legitimate orders. It was the view of The Provost Marshal General's Office that Article 27 of the Geneva Convention empowered the detaining power to require prisoners of war to perform labor, and that reasonable means to enforce compliance could be utilized. To meet this situation, the "no work, no eat" policy was developed, approved by The Judge Advocate General, and published in a War Department letter on 27 October 1943. 54/ This policy was entitled "Administrative Pressure," and authorized the camp commander to withdraw a number of privileges from prisoners of war who refused to obey a lawful order, including the imposition of a restricted diet. The theory of the doctrine of administrative pressure was that it was not a punishment for any act of the prisoner, but was merely a method of inducing him to comply with a lawful order or regulation. Administrative pressure was not a punishment since it was not imposed for any definite period as the result of past action of the prisoners; rather the administrative pressure was continued for an indefinite period, and only so long as the prisoners refused to obey the command. The prisoners, therefore, had the power to cause administrative pressure to terminate at any time by complying with the order violated. In applying the "no work, no eat" policy, compliance

54/ AGO letter, 27 October 1943, subject: "Administrative and Disciplinary Measures."

was not considered to have been obtained until the prisoners not only agreed to discontinue their strike, but also actually engaged in work. If the strike disrupted the normal work program to such an extent that it was impracticable to resume work as soon as the prisoners signified their willingness to work, restrictions on their diet could be continued for 72 hours or until it was practicable to resume work, whichever period was shorter.

When a prisoner refused to perform his work the camp commander immediately placed him on a restricted diet, consisting of not less than 18 ounces of bread a day and all the water he desired, until such time as he was willing to go to work. There was no time limit on the duration of the restricted diet, and it could be continued indefinitely, provided that the medical officer was of the opinion that the prisoner was able to subsist on the diet. Further, the camp commander could, if he wished, arbitrarily lift the restricted diet for any length of time during the period that administrative pressure continued to be applied. Thus, the prisoner could be given a full meal, or a full ration for a day or more, and then placed again on the restricted diet if the conditions which warranted its imposition continued to exist.

Except under the administrative pressure policy, prisoners could not be placed on restricted diet for longer than 14 days without a 14-day interval, and the total period of restricted diet could not exceed 84 days in any one year. These provisions were based upon the limitations to be found in paragraph 25 of AR 600-375, concerning the imposition of a restricted diet upon American military personnel.

Similarly, the pay and allowances of prisoners could be withheld during the period in which administrative pressure was being imposed. Thus, the pay due to a prisoner for work performed in the past could be withheld from him during the period of administrative pressure, and, in those cases when prisoners were performing paid work while administrative pressure was being applied, the current pay of the prisoner could also be withheld. In addition, \$2.00 of the \$3.00 monthly allowance of the prisoner could be withheld, but \$1.00 per month was paid to the prisoner even during the period of administrative pressure, in order that prisoners could purchase tobacco and necessities. In theory, necessities in kind could be furnished to the prisoner in lieu of the \$1.00 per month. Following the termination of the \$3.00 monthly allowance on 27 June 1945, this became the practice.

The monthly allowance of officer prisoners could not be withheld, since reciprocal allowances for officers were demanded for American officer prisoners of war in Germany and Italy. Pay and allowances thus withheld could not be forfeited, but were returned to the prisoners when the administrative pressure was lifted. The power to restrict prisoners to specified limits, as an incident of administrative pressure, included confinement in the guard house.

The imposition of administrative pressure by verbal reprimands, the withholding of privileges, or the imposition of restrictions other than those mentioned, proved, as a practical matter, to be inadequate, and was rarely utilized except in conjunction with the restricted diet and withholding of pay and allowances.

The imposition of administrative pressure was persuasive only and did not constitute a punishment for past actions. Accordingly, the extent of administrative pressure could not be determined in advance, but remained of indefinite duration.

The widest authority to impose disciplinary punishment upon prisoners of war was that granted to camp commanders under Article 59 of the Geneva Convention. The Provost Marshal General's Office took the position at an early date that Articles 54 through 59 of the Geneva Convention reflected the intention of the delegates to grant the power to commanders of prisoner of war camps to impose disciplinary punishments upon prisoners of war of 30 days or less in duration. The need for such authority by camp commanders became obvious since, under existing procedure, it was not possible in some cases to impose punishment upon officer and noncommissioned officer prisoners of war for minor infractions of discipline.

As was discussed above, action under the 104th Article of War was found to be inadequate since prisoners of war were normally restricted to specified limits and had only limited privileges even before they were punished. Under American courts-martial procedure, officer and noncommissioned officer prisoners of war were privileged to refuse to accept trial by summary courts-martial. Noncommissioned officer prisoners of war could demand trial by special court-martial and officer prisoners could demand trial by general court-martial.

The Provost Marshal General's Office, on several occasions during the fall of 1943 and early in 1944, suggested to The Judge Advocate General's Office that sufficient authority existed under the Geneva Convention for providing that all prisoners of war, irrespective of rank, might be tried by summary courts as long as only disciplinary punishment was involved and such punishment was restricted to 30 days. Representatives of The Judge Advocate General's Office did not concur in this thesis for some time, on the ground that enemy prisoners of war were entitled to the identical rights as American military personnel. However, on the basis of a staff study prepared by the then Prisoner of War Division and forwarded to The Judge Advocate General's Office on 30 May 1944, the concurrence of The Judge Advocate General was obtained in the doctrine that the Geneva Convention authorized prisoner of war camp commanders to impose disciplinary punishment not to exceed 30 days in duration on all prisoners of war, irrespective of rank. This action resulted in the publication of the following "Policies Governing Administration of Disciplinary Punishment of Prisoners of War": 55/

"1. Under authority of Article 59 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, commanding officers of prisoner of war camps are authorized to exercise disciplinary powers in respect to prisoners of war under their control.

"2. In the exercise of such disciplinary powers, commanding officers may impose disciplinary punishments upon prisoners of war as authorized by Articles 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War."

The authority of camp commanders granted by Articles 54 through 59 of the Geneva Convention was interpreted to authorize the camp commander to impose, for a period not to exceed 30 days, confinement in the guard house, 14 days of which might be on a restricted diet, hard labor (except in the cases of officer or noncommissioned officer prisoners), and the withholding of any other privilege for a like period. Any two or more of these punishments might be imposed concurrently. In addition, under the provisions of Article 59, the camp commander might order forfeited \$2.00 of the \$3.00 monthly allowance of prisoners

35/ Prisoner of War Circular No. 34, 24 June 1944

below the grade of commissioned officer, and might withhold the remainder or the entire pay and allowances due to the prisoner during the period of his punishment. However, the pay for labor performed of an enlisted man and the monthly allowance of an officer could be forfeited only by court-martial. This was also true with regard to the pay of an officer who had volunteered to engage in labor for pay. The forfeiture of \$2.00 of the \$3.00 monthly allowance was allowed on the theory that this sum was basically a gratuity rather than a legal obligation. The \$1.00 per month was allowed the prisoner in lieu of necessities. After termination of the \$3.00 monthly allowances to working prisoners in June, 1945, this question became academic. Pay of prisoners and the monthly allowance of officers were deemed to be in the nature of lawful claims, and it was decided that their forfeiture could be worked only by a court-martial. Of course, if the punishment imposed was hard labor, the prisoner would receive no pay for the labor performed in compliance with his sentence. Officer prisoners could not be made to perform hard labor as disciplinary punishment.

In view of the fact that the powers of the camp commander under Articles 54 through 59 of the Geneva Convention included almost all of his powers to impose disciplinary punishment under Article of War 104 or by summary court procedure, the use of these latter two measures was discontinued to a large extent by camp commanders. However, summary courts-martial continued to be utilized when it was desired to work a forfeiture of pay or to impose hard labor on a noncommissioned officer prisoner of war.

Articles 60 through 67 of the Geneva Convention contain provisions governing judicial proceedings against prisoners of war. The proceedings which, under American military law, comprised judicial suits within the meaning of these articles were the trials of prisoners of war by general or special courts-martial. The only difference between the general or special court-martial of a prisoner of war and that of an American soldier was that in the former certain additional requirements were imposed by the Geneva Convention. These requirements, insofar as the responsibility of The Provost Marshal General's Office was concerned, consisted largely of the furnishing of requisite notice to the protecting powers and insuring that the rights granted by the Geneva Convention to prisoners of war who were subject to trial were complied with. The first judicial proceeding involving a prisoner of war was the trial by general court-martial of Italian prisoners of war Antonio Farina and four others who were charged with violations of the 93rd and 96th Articles of War upon specifications alleging theft of two

civilian automobiles and the attempted theft of a third. The Provost Marshal General's Office was notified of the charges and specifications on 2 June 1943 and the trial was scheduled for 6 July 1943 at Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Crowder, Missouri. Prior to June of 1943, it had been determined that the Judge Advocate General's Office would maintain supervision over all questions of military law and procedure involved in the courts-martial of American military personnel. The Provost Marshal General's Office, however, was charged with responsibility for furnishing the notice required by the Geneva Convention to the protecting power in all such cases, with supervising the rights of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, and with maintaining liaison with the Department of State and the service command involved concerning these matters. A procedure was worked out at that time which has since been followed without substantial change.

Article 60 of the Geneva Convention requires that the protecting power be notified at least three weeks before trial of a prisoner of war by judicial proceeding (interpreted to mean before trial by special or general court-martial) of the name and rank of the prisoner, the place of imprisonment, the charges and specifications, and the time and place of trial. Accordingly, service commands were required to furnish information to The Provost Marshal General's Office, concerning these details in all cases of prisoners of war scheduled to be tried. Following receipt of this information from the service command, The Provost Marshal General's Office addressed a letter to the protecting power setting forth all pertinent facts in the case. ^{56/} Originally, since the protecting power was the diplomatic representative of a foreign power, this notice was forwarded to the Department of State, which in turn transmitted it to the protecting power. It was found that the delay involved in forwarding such notices through the Department of State made it difficult in some instances to meet the requirement that the notice be given at least three weeks prior to trial. An arrangement, therefore, was made, with the concurrence of the Department of State, in the fall of 1943 whereby this initial notice was addressed directly to the protecting power, and a copy sent to the Department of State.

^{56/} A typical letter of this nature addressed to the Legation of Switzerland, Department of German Interests, 16 February 1945, in the case of prisoner of war, Gunter Hints.

The time required for transmittal was thereby shortened considerably. Correspondence other than this initial notice continued to be addressed to the Department of State and transmitted by that Department to the protecting power, except in a few instances when it was necessary to meet urgent time schedules, in which cases the Department of State was consulted, and permission granted for direct communication. When the protecting power had acknowledged receipt of the initial notice, the original receipted notice was returned to the service command for inclusion in the record of trial, as proof that the provisions of the Convention had been complied with. Following sentence and action by the reviewing authority, a report of the final sentence was forwarded to the Department of State for transmittal to the protecting power. Information was transmitted in a similar manner in the event of an acquittal. If the record of trial was submitted by the reviewing authority to the Judge Advocate General's Department under the provisions of Article of War 50 $\frac{1}{2}$, the final notice from The Provost Marshal General's Office to the State Department was deferred until action was completed under Article of War 50 $\frac{1}{2}$ and the sentence had become final. In cases involving possible death sentence, notice was given following the approval of the sentence by the service command, and a further notice was given after the sentence was confirmed or disapproved by the President. The procedure in death sentence cases is discussed at greater length in following pages.

Article 62 of the Geneva Convention provides that the prisoner of war is entitled to the assistance of qualified counsel of his own choice, and, if necessary, to have recourse to the services of a competent interpreter. 57/ In compliance with this provision, American defense counsel was provided for each accused prisoner of war who was tried by general or special courts-martial. Further, a list of additional American officers qualified to present the defense was furnished to the protecting power at a reasonable time before trial. The list of names so furnished generally provided a choice of four or five competent defense counsels from whom the protecting power, acting on behalf of the prisoner, might choose. In the absence of a designation by the prisoner or by

57/ War Department Circular No. 156, 20 April 1944, Section IV.

the protecting power, the regularly appointed defense counsel and assistant defense counsel served in the case. In a few cases, the accused prisoner requested that another prisoner of war serve as defense counsel. This request was granted provided that the prisoner requested was located within a reasonable distance of the place of trial. A few requests by prisoners of war to transport other prisoners an unreasonable distance within the United States for the purpose of acting as defense counsel were denied. In any event, prisoners of war who acted as defense counsel served only as the assistant to an American officer who was the defense counsel. This restriction was deemed necessary, since the lack of knowledge of American courts-martial procedure by prisoners of war would have disrupted the court proceedings had not an American officer been charged with the defense and been in a position to guide the actions of the prisoner defense counsel.

Competent interpreters were furnished at all trials of prisoners of war by special or general court. Representatives of the protecting power were permitted to attend trials upon request. As a matter of fact, a representative of the protecting powers attended only a very few courts-martial of enemy prisoners of war, an indication that the protecting powers were amply satisfied with the fair trial granted to the prisoners. Although under Article 62 of the Geneva Convention it remained within the discretion of the War Department to bar representatives of the protecting power in cases when the trial was secret, this right was never invoked.

In the fall of 1944, The Judge Advocate General's Office prepared a form entitled "Check List for Records of Trial of Prisoners of War by General Court-martial, as to Compliance with the Geneva Convention." This check list contained in brief form a number of questions to be considered by the trial judge advocate, staff judge advocate, and The Judge Advocate General's Office to insure that pertinent provisions of the Geneva Convention were complied with in the course of the trial. The Judge Advocate General's Office requested The Provost Marshal General's Office to distribute these check lists in every case of the trial of a prisoner of war by general court-martial. Accordingly, The Provost Marshal General's Office made this distribution by inclosing a blank check list when returning the acknowledgment of initial notice by the protecting power.

Following the defeat of Germany, German prisoners of war no longer had a protecting power. Accordingly, it became unnecessary to furnish notice of trials of prisoners by special or general courts-martial. 58/ However, The Provost Marshal General's Office continued, for purposes of the record, to forward to the State Department a report of the sentence and final action of the reviewing authority in all such cases. With respect to Italian prisoners of war, the Italian Embassy replaced the protecting power and the procedure of giving all notices was continued in the cases of the special or general courts-martial of Italian prisoners. With reference to Japanese prisoners of war, the same procedure would have been followed so long as they had a protecting power representing them, if any cases had arisen in continental United States.

The history of the administration by The Provost Marshal General's Office of this group of special and general courts-martial is noteworthy by reason of the following facts. A form for the proper notification to the protecting power of a pending trial under the terms of the Geneva Convention had to be adopted and rapid action taken to meet the time limit provided in the Convention. In no case did The Provost Marshal General's Office fail to meet the deadline. In a number of instances, the notice of a pending court-martial trial was received with but a few hours to prepare the notice and deliver it to the appropriate legation or embassy. In a few instances, the notification of the time of a proposed court-martial was received in insufficient time to allow The Provost Marshal General's Office to prepare the notification and deliver it to the protecting power three weeks prior to the trial. In these cases, it was necessary to telephone or wire the appropriate service command to request that the date of trial be reset and that a new notification be sent to The Provost Marshal General's Office in sufficient time to allow the preparation of a notice and delivery thereof three weeks prior to the new date of trial. In a few instances where time was short, the notification was delivered to the protecting power three weeks to the day prior to the date of trial. In these cases, when the signed acknowledgment of receipt of the protecting power was returned to the service command, it was recommended that the trial not commence until after the hour of delivery to the protecting power, making allowances for time zone differences, in order that a full three weeks notice in

58/ ASF Circular No. 191, 29 May 1945, Section III; ASF Circular No. 236, 23 June 1945, Section VII; and ASF Circular 286, 27 July 1945, Section VII.

hours, as well as in days might be given to the protecting power. In only one instance was The Provost Marshal General's Office cognizant of a general or special court-martial proceeding involving a prisoner of war where the trial had proceeded without proper notification of the protecting power. Appropriate instructions were given to set aside the sentence and proceed in accordance with proper procedure.

Up to 31 August 1945, there were 115 general and 48 special courts-martial involving prisoners of war, the total number of individual defendants being 326. Of these, 277 were German and 49 Italian. The only courts-martial involving Japanese prisoners of war were tried in the Territory of Hawaii where a number of them were interned. Notifications of these trials involving Japanese were forwarded to The Provost Marshal General's Office in order that the notice required by Article 60 of the Geneva Convention might be given to the Swedish Legation, which was the protecting power for Japanese prisoners of war in the Territory of Hawaii. This was necessary because, as the State Department pointed out, the only diplomatic representative of the Swedish government in the Territory of Hawaii was the so-called honorary consul who was an American citizen. It was, accordingly, deemed necessary to have the notice of those courts-martial given to the Legation of Sweden in Washington. Some difficulties were encountered in meeting the three-weeks notice required by the Convention by reason of the distance and the length of time required for communications between the Territory and Washington, but these difficulties were met and solved by various means, including, in at least one instance, settling a new date of trial sufficiently in advance to allow the notice to be given.

The general and special court-martial trials under discussion involved all kinds of charges and specifications. The greatest number concerned offenses committed during or after escapes by prisoners, such as theft of automobiles, clothing, and other property, breaking and entering houses, and similar crimes. Others involved assaults made by prisoners of war upon fellow prisoners; some involved military offenses such as failure to obey the lawful order of superior officers; and a relatively small number of cases involved serious offenses, such as manslaughter and murder. The sentences ranged from a month or a few months in the case of special courts-martial to death sentences in murder cases. A chart was maintained of all general and special courts-martial

involving prisoners of war.

There was no general uniformity in the length of sentences for comparable offenses as, for example, the theft of automobiles during or after escapes. Sentences for this crime ranged from one to five years, throughout the various service commands.

The four murder trials involving prisoners of war are worthy of detailed mention. The first of these was the case in which German prisoners of war, Walter Beyer, Berthold Seidel, Hans Demme, Willi Scholz, and Hans Schomer, were tried at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, from 17 January to 25 January 1944. The charges were for violations of the 89th and 92nd Articles of War, and the specifications were respectively that the defendants unlawfully and riotously assembled at Prisoner of War Camp, Tonkawa, Oklahoma, to disturb the peace, and, having so assembled, unlawfully and riotously assaulted the defendant, Johannes Kunze, and that they, acting jointly and in the pursuance of a common intent, and with malice aforethought, wilfully, deliberately, feloniously, unlawfully, and with premeditation killed Kunze by striking him with their fists and with unknown instruments. At the trial it was brought out that Beyer was the compound spokesman and called an assembly of the compound at which Kunze was accused of treason and was violently and brutally beaten to death. The court found them guilty and sentenced them to be hanged. Article 66 of the Geneva Convention provided that, in the event of a death sentence of a prisoner of war, a communication setting forth in detail the nature and circumstances of the offense would be forwarded by the detaining power to the protecting power for delivery to the enemy power and that the sentence would not be executed until three months thereafter. In compliance therewith, after the confirmation of the death sentences by the President, The Provost Marshal General's Office delivered to the Legation of Switzerland, Department of German Interests, on 9 October 1944, a letter setting forth the charges and specifications and the fact of the confirmation by the President of the sentences imposed by the court and stating that the three-months period which must elapse under Article 66 of the Geneva Convention would begin to run with the delivery of that letter. The letter was delivered personally by an officer of The Provost Marshal General's Office in the company of a representative of the Department of State and receipt thereof was acknowledged by the Chief of the Division of Foreign Interests of the Legation of Switzerland. Accordingly, the original execution date in this case could not be until three

months from 9 October 1944. The Legation of Switzerland, acting for the German Government, then objected that a delivery of a communication setting forth only the charges and specifications did not constitute a communication setting forth in detail the nature and circumstances of the offense. As clearance had been obtained from The Judge Advocate General that the letter which was delivered to the Legation of Switzerland met the requirements of the Geneva Convention, this position was resisted by The Provost Marshal General. After a considerable exchange of correspondence through the State Department with the Legation of Switzerland, it was agreed that the running of the three-months period provided in Article 66 of the Convention would begin with the date of delivery to the Legation of a full copy of the record in the Beyer case. The execution was postponed accordingly. A copy of the record was delivered to the Legation on 25 October 1944 and obviously contained a full statement of the facts and circumstances of the case. Then the Legation of Switzerland protested that it had not fully understood that it was free to communicate the record to the German Government and, after a further exchange of communications, a second postponement was agreed to in order to count the three-months period from 30 December 1944, upon which date the Legation was notified in writing that it was free to transmit a copy of the record to the German Government. Throughout the negotiations in this regard, the War Department, although not agreeing in principle to the German demands, kept in mind the possibility of retaliation upon American prisoners of war in the hands of Germany and was governed by the desire not to give any cause to the German Government to believe we had violated in any way our obligations under the Geneva Convention. For this reason, concessions were made which might not have been made ordinarily.

It might be well to mention here the case of Erich Gauss and Rudolf Straub, who were tried at Fort McPherson, Georgia, for the murder by strangulation of German prisoner of war, Horst Guenther, at Branch Camp Aiken, South Carolina, in which the court imposed the death sentence. This case is mentioned here because negotiations with regard to it paralleled and were carried on concurrently with those in the Beyer case. A notification in the Gauss case similar to the notification in the Beyer case was delivered to the Legation of Switzerland on 17 November 1944, and, following the principle agreed to in the Beyer case, a postponement was ordered so that the execution would not take place until three months from 28 December 1944, which was the date of delivery of a copy of the Gauss case record to the Legation of Switzerland. When the copy of the Gauss record was delivered to the Legation, it was made explicit that the Legation was free to forward it to the German authorities.

There was transmitted to the War Department through the State Department a note from the Legation of Switzerland dated 5 January 1945 reproducing a cable received from the German Legation in Bern which stated that certain American personnel were held under death sentences in Germany and that the German government had deferred execution of their sentences pending receipt of information from the United States government as to whether it was prepared to exchange the United States personnel for the five defendants in the Beyer case. The Secretary of War replied to the State Department recommending dispatch of a protest to the German position on the grounds that the American personnel were condemned on trumped-up charges. This position was communicated to the German authorities through the Legation of Switzerland.

On 10 March 1945, in a note from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Switzerland in Washington, this government proposed to the German government an exchange on a head-for-head basis of eleven American prisoners sentenced to death by courts-martial in Germany for eleven of the German prisoners of war sentenced to death by United States courts-martial. In that proposal, approximately the following language appeared: The American government will agree not to execute the Germans in question until after it has given to the protecting power a further three-months written notice (in addition to written notices heretofore given) of intention to do so, provided the United States receives on or before 5 April 1945 from the German government a similar undertaking. It was stated that the executions in the Beyer and Gauss cases would be postponed to 5 April 1945.

On or about 30 March, communications were sent to the German government through the Legation of Switzerland in Washington and by cable through diplomatic channels in Bern, Switzerland, referring to the proposal mentioned in the previous paragraph and stating that, as no answer was received, and by reason of humanitarian considerations and the disruption of communications in Germany, the time for Germany to reply was extended to 1 May and the executions in the two cases were postponed to 1 May.

Intermediate communications had been received from the German government which were not responsive to the proposals already made by the United States government, and we replied to Germany requesting a direct reply to our proposals.

On 12 April 1945, the Minister of Switzerland forwarded

to the State Department a communication which recited the receipt of a cablegram "from abroad" stating that the German Government was prepared to exchange "the fifteen American prisoners of war under sentence of death for an equal number of Germans under sentence of death. The German Government will postpone for the duration of the exchange negotiations the date of execution of the sentence imposed upon the prisoners of war named in the American proposal, and will advise the Protecting Power in sufficient time should execution of the sentence be contemplated." This was communicated to the War Department on 13 April. A co-ordinated reply was sent to the Minister of Switzerland by the State Department, dated 27 April, referring to the Minister's communication of 12 April and requesting specific information as to "which of the fifteen German prisoners of war whose names were listed in the Department's communication dated March 9, 1945, the German Government wishes to have exchanged. Upon receipt of this information, the United States Government will immediately transport these prisoners as expeditiously as possible to a convenient point on the Swiss-French frontier, where they will be turned over to the Swiss Government for exchange at the same time that the condemned American prisoners will be similarly turned over at the Swiss-German frontier." This position was cabled to Bern on 27 April.

A message from the American Legation in Bern of 28 April stated that, because of communication breakdowns, the German Legation in Bern was unable to communicate with the responsible authorities in Germany the proposal outlined in the last paragraph, but believed it could be assumed that the American Government would postpone the executions beyond 1 May until the question of exchange was settled. It was also reported in that cable that the German Legation at Bern considered German assurances not to execute before the exchange question was settled sufficient reply to the requests of the United States Government to withhold the executions.

In the meantime, on 28 April, instructions were given to postpone the executions in the Beyer and Gause cases indefinitely. A telegram was received by the State Department from the American Legation at Bern on 27 April to the effect that the German High Command had assured that, "for the present," the death sentences against American prisoners of war would not be executed.

A telegram from Bern, dated 3 May, stated that the American Legation in Bern shared the view expressed informally on that date by the Swiss Foreign Office that the forwarding of the proposal to exchange on a man-for-man basis at the Swiss frontier, which was reported undelivered, might possibly jeopardize the lives of American prisoners of war in German custody because the

Germans might reply that they were physically unable to deliver the condemned prisoners of war into Switzerland and that, accordingly, the exchange negotiations must be considered as unfavorably terminated. That telegram continued:

"It would appear that as the matter stands without communication of Department's 1804 to the Germans, the Department still has German assurance that death sentences will not be executed so long as exchange negotiations are in progress."

The eighth of May, 1945, was V-E Day. Germany surrendered. The following day the Swiss resigned as protecting power for Germans in the United States of America. It was soon determined that all of the Americans who had been under sentence of death by the Germans were actually recovered or their recovery was certain beyond doubt. The Provost Marshal General forwarded a transmittal sheet to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, referring to the Beyer and Gauss cases and pointing out that the negotiations for the exchange of the condemned Germans for alleged condemned Americans had failed by reason of Allied military victory over Germany. In that paper, it was recommended that the restrictions imposed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, against the execution of the individuals in the Beyer and Gauss cases and against the presentation to the President for confirmation of any unconfirmed death sentences of German prisoners be rescinded and that instructions be given to The Provost Marshal General to cause the death sentences of the Beyer and Gauss case defendants to be executed. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, returned the paper to The Provost Marshal General through the Office of the Chief of Staff, directing that those prohibitions be removed and that necessary action be taken to carry out the death sentences on or after 1 July 1945, and to cause the death sentences imposed upon certain other German prisoners to be carried out. Upon its receipt by The Provost Marshal General, instructions were given accordingly. The Beyer case defendants were executed on 10 July 1945 and the Gauss case defendants on 14 July 1945.

It is noteworthy that, throughout these trials and the others to be discussed, the German defendants argued that they were within their rights in imposing their own disciplinary punishment upon their comrades whom they thought had violated German law or honor. The press release of the Gauss and Straub executions stated:

"Gause had written the Swiss Legation in Washington, acting as intermediary to the German Government, stressing the fact that he was ready to assume, in Germany, responsibility for the murder which he stated was committed by Straub in his presence. He argued, however, that he was innocent of any wrongdoing as far as American authorities were concerned.

"In a written statement concerning the letter, Army officials said:

"The prisoner, of course, loses sight of the fact that the Geneva Convention makes the laws and regulations in force in the United States Army applicable to him.

"As a German he may have considered murder an ordinary matter, yet he had no reason to believe that the United States had lost sight of the fundamental principle that one man is not at liberty to murder another."

The last quotation is taken from a letter prepared in The Provost Marshal General's Office to the State Department in answer to a statement which the Legation of Switzerland made on behalf of the German government in support of the position asserted by Gause.

Of no historical value but of considerable interest is the fact that, on the day before the Beyer case executions, the Assistant The Provost Marshal General received a letter from Beyer's brother who stated he was an American citizen and who requested clemency for his brother. Undoubtedly, before the negative answer of The Provost Marshal General's Office was received, Mr. Beyer read of his brother's execution.

Two other murder cases resulted in death sentences. The third case in chronological order after the Byer and Gause cases was that in which German prisoner of war, Edgar Menschner was charged with violation of the 92nd Article of War upon the specification that he murdered his fellow prisoner, Hans Geller, at Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, by beating him with an instrument or instruments unknown. He was tried at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, beginning 3 July 1944. The court imposed the death sentence and, as was shown in the above discussion, presentation of his death sentence to the President for confirmation was delayed pending the termination of negotiations with Germany in the Beyer and Gause cases. After receiving from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, the direction to take steps to present this case and

the Fischer case (to be discussed in the next paragraph), the case was presented to the President for confirmation. Menschmer's sentence was commuted by the President on 6 July 1945 to twenty years confinement and he was transferred from the status of a German prisoner of war awaiting death sentence to that of a general prisoner in the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

German prisoners of war Helmut Fischer, Fritz Franke, Guenther Kuelson, Heinrich Ludwig, Bernard Royak, Otto Stengal, and Rolf Wisuy, were tried by general court-martial at Prisoner of War Camp, Florence, Arizona, beginning 15 August 1944, for the murder of Werner Drechsler. This was another case in which the excuse of "German justice" was made, for it appeared that Drechsler had assisted the United States authorities in interrogating prisoners of war. The defendants, who were all German Navy prisoners of war from a submarine crew, recognized Drechsler when he was transferred to their camp and wasted no time in beating and hanging him to death the first night he was in camp. Their trial resulted in the imposition of the death sentence. On 3 July 1945, after V-E Day and the failure of the German attempt to exchange them for Americans, the sentence was confirmed by the President. Appropriate instructions were issued and the prisoners were executed on 25 August 1945 at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After the last executions, the Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, delivered a talk to the German prisoners remaining therein, explaining the reasons for the action of the War Department in this regard. 59/

One German prisoner was tried for murder prior to the Beyer case but the evidence only supported a finding of assault with intent to do bodily harm with a deadly weapon. An Italian prisoner was tried for murder, but the trial resulted in a finding of guilty of manslaughter. In two cases, German prisoners of war were tried for wilful injury to government property which constituted sabotage. In one case, the prisoners put sand in the journal box of a railroad car. This case was interesting by reason of the fact that the prisoner who originally was tried and convicted and sent to the penitentiary proved to be innocent. The true culprit, seeing the predicament of his fellow prisoner, had the decency to confess. He was forthwith tried, convicted, and sent to the penitentiary.

59/ Letter, Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 27 August 1945, subject: "Executions of Prisoners of War" with inclosures.

in place of the mistaken miscreant who was remanded to prisoner of war status. In another case, two German prisoners of war pounded nails into the tires of Army vehicles which were being loaded on freight cars ready for shipment, and were convicted of a violation of the 96th Article of War. One prisoner was given fifteen years for attempted rape of an American Negro girl. There were several convictions for sodomy. Of the total of 306 prisoner of war defendants, 26 were acquitted.

The normal place of confinement for prisoners of war who were convicted by special courts-martial was the guard house at the prisoner of war camp or other military installation. No particular difficulty was encountered in the confinement of prisoners in such guard houses, except that the protecting power in a few instances, in inspecting the camps or installations, complained that conditions within the guard houses were too severe. Corrective action was taken where necessary when such complaints were received.

The majority of prisoners of war sentenced by general courts-martial were sentenced to confinement in the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or to one of its branches. As of 1 August 1945, the total number of prisoners of war in the U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or its branches, was 120 Germans and 18 Italians. In instances in which American soldiers were sentenced to Department of Justice penal institutions for the commission of comparable offenses, German prisoners of war were so sentenced, and, as of 1 August 1945, 29 German and 1 Italian prisoners of war were held in Department of Justice penal institutions. The Department of Justice made an effort to consolidate its German and Italian prisoners into a few of its penal institutions instead of having them scattered in small numbers in various institutions throughout the country. Special instructions were given to the Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, through Correction Division, Adjutant General's Office, and to the Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, regarding the proper disposition and routing of mail, disposition of surplus property, visits by protecting powers and International Committee of the Red Cross personnel, and other related matters. In the case of the Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, instructions were given concerning the disposition of property and closing of files of deceased prisoners of war who were executed therein. Representatives of the protecting powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross made recurrent visits to the Army disciplinary barracks and Department of Justice institutions where prisoners of war were held. On these occasions, it was

requested of the commandant or warden that he show the visiting representatives the treatment that American prisoners in the institutions were receiving, so that those representatives could see that the convicted prisoners of war were receiving treatment identical with that accorded American soldiers and civilians who were convicted of similar offenses. Very little adverse criticism was received from the protecting powers or the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in penal institutions, and surprisingly few complaints were received from the prisoners themselves in this regard. 60/

In general, a prisoner of war who received sentence by a general court-martial and who was confined in a disciplinary barracks or federal penitentiary received no monthly allowance or work allowance while serving his sentence, for the reason that the sentence usually included a clause directing forfeiture of all pay and allowances of the prisoner. However, in a few instances general courts-martial neglected to include such a stipulation in the sentence and merely sentenced the guilty prisoner to a period of hard labor. In two such cases, the prisoners under courts-martial sentences demanded that they be paid their three dollar monthly allowances, even during the period of confinement. In considering this request, cognizance was taken of the fact that prisoners of war who were serving sentences in disciplinary institutions received treatment identical with that of American personnel under the same circumstances. This treatment included, in all cases, the furnishing of minimum necessities, such as necessary toilet articles. It was the view of The Provost Marshal General's Office that there was no necessity for furnishing to the prisoner a three dollar monthly allowance, since this allowance was deemed to be a grant in lieu of necessities. Further, it was not believed that a prisoner of war should or could undertake labor for pay while in confinement under a sentence of court-martial. The matter was referred to The Judge Advocate General. An opinion, dated 28 March 1945, by the Chief, International Law Division of that office was forwarded to The Provost Marshal General. Referring to prisoners of war below the rank of commissioned officer who were under sentence

60/ ASF Circular No. 38, 2 February 1945, Section V, which stated that prisoner of war camps were not to be located on the same post with disciplinary barracks or rehabilitation centers.

of court-martial which did not impose forfeiture of pay and allowances, that opinion stated:

"To state the argument in another form, pay or work allowance is a privilege accorded to certain enlisted prisoners of war for work performed as such. Those prisoners of war sentenced to a disciplinary barrack or penitentiary by a court-martial have ceased to be entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war and have become the equivalent of general prisoners or convicts. Any work done by them is done in the latter capacity, and not as prisoners of war."

The Judge Advocate General's opinion went on to state that the situation was not so clear as to an officer prisoner of war, and expressly withheld opinion, suggesting that the situation in the cases of officers should be taken care of by requesting the court to include in the sentence an express forfeiture of pay.

On the basis of this opinion, The Provost Marshal General dispatched the following telegram to all service commands on 30 March 1945:

"Enlisted prisoners of war who are confined in disciplinary barracks or Federal penitentiaries while serving sentences imposed by courts-martial will not be granted any such work allowance or monthly allowance for the period of such confinement. Allowances will not be granted to such enlisted prisoners irrespective of whether the applicable court-martial sentence provides for forfeiture of pay and allowances. In all trials of prisoners of war officers by courts-martial the Trial Judge Advocate should be instructed to ask the court in appropriate cases for an express forfeiture of pay and allowances."

In April, 1945, the case arose of two officer prisoners of war who were confined at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under sentences of court-martial which had not specifically provided for a forfeiture of pay. The Commanding General, Seventh Service Command, inquired of The Provost Marshal General whether their pay should be continued during their period of confinement. The Judge Advocate General, on 14 May 1945, advised:

"When a prisoner of war has been duly convicted by court-martial and sentenced to confinement, his status as a prisoner of war is in abeyance. During such confinement

he is not entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war, and becomes the equivalent of a general prisoner or convict, except that under Article 42 of the Geneva Convention he is still entitled to make complaints as to conditions of his captivity (FM 27-10, par. 115; TM 27-251, p. 89). An officer prisoner of war confined under the circumstances described is therefore not entitled to receive pay pursuant to Article 23 of the Convention (FM 27-10, Par. 96; TM 27-251, p. 79, called "monthly allowance" in TM 19-500, p. 4.4); and to continue his pay during that period would be gratuitous and improper."

Accordingly, the rule that neither pay nor allowances would be paid to prisoners of war serving general courts-martial sentences, regardless of whether the sentence specifically provided for a forfeiture, was extended to officer prisoners of war.

In the fall of 1944, the Prisoner of War Operations Division, in response to numerous inquiries originating from the camp commanders and transmitted through the service commands, summarized the data concerning the various forms of disciplinary punishment, judicial procedures, and administrative pressure, in the form of a one-page chart entitled "Disciplinary and Control Measures Applicable to Prisoners of War." This chart had no official status as a War Department publication, but was furnished for the guidance of prisoner of war camp commanders as a matter of information, in order to better instruct them regarding their powers to impose disciplinary punishment and administrative pressure. This chart was reproduced at The Provost Marshal General's School and copies were distributed to all service commands.

The normal method of escape adopted by prisoners of war was to steal away from a work detail while the guards' attention was directed elsewhere. Although the greatest number absented themselves in this manner, many other and more ingenious methods were employed. Prisoners with considerable time on their hands had plenty of opportunity to devise unusual methods of escaping and eluding capture. They cut wire fences, dug tunnels, left camps in commercial delivery trucks, hopped trains passing through camps, acquired American uniforms and passed through camp gates, hid in drainage ditches until dark and then crawled

out of camps, forced hospital and guard house windows, climbed on roofs and dropped over compound fences, and jumped off trucks and trains while being transferred. Prisoners frequently attempted to confuse authorities by delaying discovery of their escape or hindering identification of missing prisoners. A favorite trick was to leave dummies made of blankets and pillows in bunks in order to cause escaped prisoners to be counted present at bed check. Many times fellow prisoners answered at roll call for escaped friends so that escaped prisoners would be reported in camp, with the result that search parties hunted for the wrong men.

All escapees were interviewed after their capture. They gave a wide variety of reasons for leaving camp. Most of them were bored with camp routine and hoped only for a few days vacation. Some were contriving to return to their native country, generally by way of Mexico and South America. A few actually reached the Mexican border before capture. Among the "die-hard" Nazis, it was considered a military duty to attempt to escape. The confusion caused and the additional burden placed on the American Army by their attempted escapes was believed, by prisoners, to be a contribution to the enemy war effort. There were prisoners who, impelled by this sense of duty, made repeated escape attempts. Fear of punishment was a motivating factor, for, in some cases, prisoners left camp in an effort to evade punishment for some misconduct. Occasionally prisoners left because of a desire to visit some relative in the United States. This was true more in the case of Italians than Germans. Some prisoners reported that their only interest in escaping was to see something of America of which they had heard much. One reported that he had been informed that, if he was able to experience life in America for two weeks, he would never wish to leave, so he escaped in order to acquire the necessary experience. While away from camp, prisoners generally kept on the move, walking aimlessly about the country, avoiding heavily populated areas and acquiring food by whatever means possible. Only a very few ever succeeded in contacting friends or relatives, although many presented themselves at farm and suburban homes and requested food or water. Some "hoboed" on freight trains, a few hitch-hiked rides and some merely went into hiding, where they remained until hunger forced them out.

In the course of their escapes, many prisoners stole or "borrowed" Army or civilian vehicles. Though the Geneva Convention does not permit judicial punishment for an attempted escape, they were court-martialed for the theft of property taken in the course of, or after, escape. It is interesting to note that Canada interpreted the Geneva Convention in the opposite way, to the effect that, even though property was stolen in an escape, it was all part of the escape and disciplinary punishment was all that could be given. The German Government unsuccessfully argued the same point in several cases involving thefts after escape, but the American position remained firm.

The first recorded escape of prisoners of war interned in the United States occurred on 5 November 1942, when two German prisoners, Karl Luft and Hans Jourat, jumped from a train bearing them from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for internment. The pair was at large two days and was apprehended in the vicinity of Bowling Green, Kentucky, on 7 November 1942. Strangely enough, the duration of their freedom was just about average for all the prisoners who have escaped since. No additional escapes were reported until 18 May 1943, when five Italians escaped from the prisoner of war inclosure at Camp Clark, Missouri. They made a dash for freedom by cutting a hole in the compound fence and stealing two automobiles. They were captured 60 miles from camp on the next day after they had run out of gasoline.

The number of escapes by month was as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Escapes</u>	<u>PW Population as of the First Day of the Month</u>
November, 1942	2	431
May, 1943	7	36,083
June	7	53,435
July	2	80,558
August	8	130,299
September	18	163,706
October	26	167,748
November	11	171,484
December	20	172,879
January, 1944	46	174,822
February	48	177,387
March	28	183,618
April	52	184,502
May	60	186,368
June	93	196,948
July	137	224,863
August	141	243,870
September	81	300,382
October	141	338,055
November	100	360,455
December	109	360,281
January, 1945	107	369,687
February	102	360,996
March	123	365,954
April	106	399,518
May	142	425,871
June	153	425,806
July	133	422,130
August	110	415,919

It is worthy of note that the rate of escape showed an upward trend during the summer of 1944. Undoubtedly, this trend can be attributed to a number of factors: pleasant weather, the seasonal employment of prisoners in agriculture, and the adoption of the principle of calculated escape risk in the interest of conserving guard personnel.

The majority of escaped prisoners were apprehended and returned to military control within 24 hours after their escape. The prisoner who eluded capture for as much as a week was unusual. The most successful escape was that of Guiseppe Delfabro and Sirio Bologna, two Italians who left Prisoner of War Branch Camp, Fabens, Texas, on 3 July 1944 and had not been captured on 31 August 1945. Prisoner of war Rolf Zieschang enjoyed the second longest period of liberty. He escaped from Fort Lewis, Washington, on 31 May 1944 and was apprehended 2 January 1945, when he attempted to cross the border between Mexico and Southern California.

Many agencies participated in the return of escaped prisoners of war to military control: military police, other Army personnel, local police and sheriff's offices, state highway police, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, railroad detectives, customs officials, and ordinary civilians. Not a few prisoners voluntarily returned to their camp, generally because of lack of food. Also, some prisoners, after deciding they had been at large long enough, surrendered to law enforcement agencies or civilians and requested that they be returned to their camps. The policy of requiring all camps to notify, by fastest means, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Provost Marshal General's Office, and city, state, and county police of the escape of prisoners is believed to have been largely responsible for prompt apprehension of most escapees.

The largest escape from the standpoint of number of prisoners involved and by far the most widely publicized was the break of 25 prisoners from the Prisoner of War Camp at Papago Park, Phoenix, Arizona, on 23 December 1944, led by Captain Jurgen Wattenberg, former German U-boat commander. The escape, which obviously was well-planned and which was

the result of the concerted effort of the entire group, was effected by means of a 200-foot tunnel dug under the compound fence. All the prisoners were returned to military control by 28 January 1945, upon which date Wattenberg was apprehended on the streets of Phoenix, Arizona.

During the entire history of the prisoner of war program, there were no reports of attempted sabotage or crimes of violence committed by escaped prisoners of war. The only criminal action committed by escaped prisoners was the theft, previously discussed, of property which would facilitate escape, such as motor vehicles or clothing. No escaped prisoner resorted to violence to resist capture. However, prisoners were frequently shot by guards while attempting to escape, some fatally. A few prisoners died while at large, from drowning, highway accidents, or suicide.

Unfortunately, it was not until 30 April 1945 that the Congress of the United States adopted a statute designed to provide a basis for criminal action against civilians who might aid in the escape of prisoners of war or civilian internees. On that date, Public Law 47, of the 79th Congress, H. R. 1525, was approved, making it unlawful for any person to procure the escape of any prisoner of war or civilian internee or to advise, connive at, aid, or assist in such escape, or to harbor, conceal, protect, or otherwise aid an escaped person of this nature. The maximum punishment under this statute was \$10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both. As of 1 September 1945 so far as The Provost Marshal General's Office was informed, there were no convictions under this statute, but several instances had arisen under which the application of this law was under consideration. Prior to the enactment of the statute, there were a number of cases in which the law could have been applied to good advantage. Outstanding among these were instances in which women aided in the escape of prisoners; for example, drove them away in their automobiles. In at least one of these cases, a conviction resulted under the federal treason statutes for aiding and abetting the enemy.61/

61/ ASF Circular No. 265, 11 July 1945, Section II

MILITARY COURTESIES

In accordance with Article 18 of the Geneva Convention, in addition to the courtesies required by regulations in force in their own armies, prisoners other than officers were required to salute all commissioned officers of the United States Armed Forces. Officer prisoners were required to salute only officers of a higher or equal rank but were required to return all salutes.

Other general rules concerning military courtesies were prescribed consistent with the requirements for our own troops. For instance, when the National Anthem was played or when To The Colors, Escort of the Colors, or Retreat was sounded, prisoners not in buildings were required to stand at attention and face the music or the colors; a prisoner of war in ranks was required to assume a position of attention when addressed by an officer; a prisoner of war in military formation was not required to salute unless he was in charge thereof.

In order that Americans who were prisoners of war of the enemy would be permitted to salute in the manner prescribed by our own Army Regulations, enemy prisoners of war were permitted to render salutes in the manner prescribed by regulations in force in their own armies. In November, 1943, information was received from the Legation of Switzerland to the effect that the salute prescribed by the German Government for members of the German Armed Forces when bareheaded consisted of raising the extended right arm to the height of the eye and placing the left arm on the seam of the trousers, or the so-called "Nazi" salute. Camp commanders were instructed to permit this type of salute. At that time, the German salute when covered was similar to the American salute. However, the Legation of Switzerland later informed the War Department that the German Army salute whether bareheaded or covered consisted of the raised and extended right arm salute. Accordingly, camp commanders were instructed to permit Germans to use this type of salute, although a great deal of criticism was received by the War Department from the general public by reason of our permitting the "Nazi" salute. After VE-Day, a directive was issued that all prisoners would render the conventional right hand salute with elbow bent. The Nazi and Fascist type straight arm salutes were prohibited. 62/

62/ ASF Circular No. 236, 23 June 1945, Section VII.

For the most part United States personnel were loathe to extend to captured enemy prisoners of war ordinary military courtesies. In some instances, camp commanders required enlisted personnel to salute enemy officers. In other camps the ordinary military courtesies were optional. As a result, a great deal of confusion and, to a certain extent, misunderstanding existed in the minds of American military personnel regarding the military courtesies which were required. This uncertainty was reflected in the American press and in letters from the public to the War Department. Therefore, it was necessary to clarify this situation by the issuance of a directive which stated that American military personnel would not be required to salute prisoners nor to assume the position of attention when addressing them. However, American officers were required to return the salutes of prisoners. Also when addressing a senior officer prisoner on official business, American military personnel were required to treat him with courtesy, and, as required by the Geneva Convention, to extend the regard due him by reason of his rank and age. This clarification was effective and very little difficulty was encountered after its promulgation. It was frequently necessary to warn United States personnel against relaxation of discipline and softening of their general attitude towards the prisoners.63/

63/ AGO letter, 17 February 1944, subject: "Violations of Prisoner of War Regulations"; ASF Circular No. 39, 2 February 1945, Part Two.

NEUTRAL REPRESENTATIVES AND WELFARE AGENCIES

The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention contemplated that the enemy prisoners held within a belligerent nation should have the protection of a neutral government which would look after their interests. The functions of a protecting power were to assure that the detaining power followed the standards of internment of enemy nationals established by the Geneva Convention. The protecting power performed this function in two principal ways: first, it made frequent inspection trips to internment camps, and second, it received and gave consideration to written complaints of prisoners of war concerning internment conditions, and took action, where necessary, to bring improper conditions to the attention of the detaining power.

Early in the history of the war, the German government designated the Swiss government as the neutral power which would protect the interests of German nationals in the United States. Italy similarly designated the Swiss government. Japan designated the Spanish government to represent the interests of her nationals. The diplomatic headquarters of these neutral governments in Washington were the offices which actually exercised the functions of the neutral governments in this regard. The Legation of Switzerland, for example, set up a Department of German Interests and a Department of Italian Interests to handle matters pertaining to the nationals of those enemy governments. The contact with the United States government of those neutral diplomatic representatives was made through the Department of State, and any matter pertaining to the War Department action with regard to enemy prisoners came to the War Department from the Department of State and not direct from the protecting power. Accordingly, the relationship between the Provost Marshal General's Office and the protecting powers was a quasi-diplomatic one carried on through the intermediary of the Special War Problems Division of the State Department. This relationship was a delicate one at times, and, considering the many novel and important problems which were raised and met, it was a highly satisfactory one. It was never forgotten that the enemy held the power to take steps of reprisal against many thousands of American soldiers who had been captured and were in the custody of the enemy governments. Accordingly, as the protecting power was, in effect, the representative of the enemy government in this country, its requests and representations with regard to the policies of the United States in the internment of enemy nationals were given every serious consideration. At times the tediousness of answering trivial requests and complaints which the

protecting powers on occasion made or espoused was a burden, but it was always possible to carry through undertakings by reason of the knowledge that the position of American soldiers in the hands of the enemy was being protected.

The most frequent method in which prisoners brought complaints which they had concerning internment conditions to the attention of the protecting power was by writing letters setting forth their complaints. From the outset, The Provost Marshal General issued instructions permitting prisoners of war, particularly spokesmen, to write to the protecting powers and made such correspondence exempt from the personal mail quota of the prisoner. The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention provides in Article 42:

"They shall also have the right to address themselves to representatives of the protecting powers to indicate to them the points on which they have complaints to formulate with regard to the conditions of captivity."

"These requests and complaints must be transmitted immediately."

"Even if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not occasion any punishment."

Instructions were issued to assure that prisoner of war correspondence addressed to the legations or embassies was routed through the Provost Marshal General's Office for processing. This processing consisted of translating the complaint, reading it, taking action where necessary, and forwarding it to the Department of State with the request that it be transmitted to the appropriate legation or embassy. If a prisoner's complaint had obvious merit on its face, a letter was written to the appropriate service command requesting information or corrective action, as the case required. In this event, the fact that such action had been taken was set forth in the letter to the State Department transmitting the complaint. If the complaint was not considered of sufficient importance to take action, it was forwarded without comment. The protecting power, if it considered the complaint to merit its intervention, wrote a memorandum to the Department of State, requesting that the State Department take up with the appropriate military authorities the possibility of corrective action or, frequently, requesting additional information. The State

Department forwarded the memorandum to the Office of The Provost Marshal General who either replied answering the request for information or, acting on the strength of information it had, forwarded it to the service command for proper action. Complaints upon which the protecting powers deemed it necessary to take action varied from important matters of policy such as the handcuffing of prisoners of war during transportation, to almost inconsequential trivialities. Each complaint, however, was received, considered, and disposed of as the case required, and a report was made of the action taken to the Department of State for transmittal to the appropriate protecting power. In the original civilian internee regulations, a procedure was instituted for the processing of complaints and requests of civilian internees and prisoners of war under which any internee having a complaint or request made it known to the company commander who would hear the case and attempt to settle it. If the internee still deemed himself aggrieved, he submitted a statement in writing which was signed and transmitted to the company commander. The camp commander was authorized to appoint a board of inquiry to hear the complaints with a view toward reaching some solution. Complaint reports were forwarded to The Provost Marshal General together with the disposition made and any pertinent comment from the camp commander. If the internee demanded transmission of the complaint or request to the protecting power, it was so stated and The Provost Marshal General's Office complied. Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943, did not perpetuate this elaborate procedure by reason of the fact that prisoners of war were then held in such numbers and their complaints were so frequent that it would be an impossible burden on company commanders. Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 1943, provided that complaints to the protecting power were forwarded by camp commanders through the service command to The Provost Marshal General's Office and that complaints containing false statements would be returned to the prisoners for correction. Later, by reason of delays encountered by forwarding complaints through service commanders, it was provided that written complaints of prisoners should be forwarded direct to The Provost Marshal General. Later, it was provided that a copy of the complaint would be sent to the commanding general of the service command for his information.

Representatives of the protecting powers were allowed and indeed encouraged to inspect all prisoner of war camps. The normal procedure for such visits was for the protecting power representative to notify the Department of State of the proposed itinerary of the trip. This was necessary by

reason of the fact that a Department of State representative accompanied the protecting power representative on all such visits. The Department of State gave notice to the Provost Marshal General's Office of the proposed itinerary and the camps concerned were notified of the impending visit. The representative of the protecting power was free to interview any prisoner without witnesses concerning the circumstances of his internment and other matters. The protecting power made reports of camp conditions to the enemy government which, of course, were not seen by the War Department. However, the State Department representative normally prepared his own report and included in it any comments or observations which the neutral representative had made to him concerning conditions at the camps. Copies of the State Department reports were received by The Provost Marshal General and where necessary were sent to service commanders for corrective action. In some instances, formal memoranda were prepared by the protecting power to the State Department setting forth that in an inspection trip the neutral representative had observed improper conditions at a specific camp or camps and requesting corrective action. Any such memoranda were forwarded to The Provost Marshal General who caused an investigation to be made and corrective action taken within the service command concerned. Frequently, the representatives of the protecting power were able to make suggestions to camp commanders for improvements on the spot and many matters were arranged directly with the camp commanders in this manner.

The protecting power was the agent, as it were, of the enemy Government in the United States. The Geneva Convention contained several clauses which made it possible for agreements to be reached between the belligerents to implement or modify the provisions of the Geneva Convention with respect to certain phases of internment. Also certain special international dealings took place with the enemy government. In these matters, the protecting power performed many important functions. The War Department received through the Swiss representatives, and the ever-present link of the State Department, proposals regarding internment treatment of protected personnel and other subjects, and the War Department, through the protecting power, made proposals concerning the pay and allowances of American prisoners of war in enemy custody. The channels through which these proposals were forwarded were diplomatic channels between the neutral legations and embassies to their respective homelands where the enemy governments still maintained diplomatic relations.

Another duty performed by the protecting powers was in assisting prisoners of war to carry out certain personal business and to dispose of personal affairs. Under the Geneva Convention, for example, the United States, as detaining power, was bound to permit prisoners of war to forward to their homelands such personal documents as wills and powers of attorney. In many instances, such documents were received from abroad through the protecting power and forwarded to the prisoners for execution and returned by the same channels. The protecting powers forwarded to prisoners many hundreds of proxy marriage certificates, information regarding prisoners' families, and kindred personal documents and information.

The protecting powers underwent some changes during the course of the war. The Swiss represented Italian interests until 28 February 1945, and thereafter, beginning 1 March 1945, the Italian Embassy assumed the functions of the protecting power for Italian prisoners. It will be remembered that, after its surrender, a new Italian Government was formed which was recognized as a co-belligerent. Its diplomatic representatives to the United States assumed the protectorate of Italian nationals held by the United States as prisoners of war. In the true sense of the word, they were not a neutral protecting power but they performed their functions much as the Swiss Legation had performed them previously. The representation of Japanese interests was changed from one neutral country to another. Spain was originally appointed and the Spanish Embassy performed the duties of protecting personnel for Japanese nationals until 30 March 1945, when it withdrew. For a short time following that date, Japanese nationals had no protecting power in the United States. On 21 July 1945, the Swiss Government assumed the functions of protecting personnel for the Japanese. In the Territory of Hawaii, the Swedish Government represented Japanese interests throughout the war. It may be noted that the duties of the protecting power for Japanese nationals were relatively light as compared to those of the neutral representatives of the German and Italian Governments, for the comparatively small number of Japanese prisoners of war were unproductive of complaints. Some complaints were received growing out of the internment of civilian internees who were Japanese nationals, as will be set forth later.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is a Swiss private association which endeavors to promote the welfare of war victims, including war prisoners. The Committee has a

Delegation to the United States, located in Washington, D. C. Its purpose, so far as prisoners were concerned, was to insure compliance with the Geneva Convention, and in so doing, it acted independently of the protecting powers. Duly accredited representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross were accorded the right of access and visitation to and inspection of prisoner of war camps at times previously approved by The Provost Marshal General. These representatives were permitted to interview any prisoner and such interview was without witnesses, if so desired. The International Committee of the Red Cross was authorized to assist in the development of recreational and welfare activities at prisoner of war camps. In order to further these activities, this organization specialized in the furnishing of foreign language books, which it was able to collect through its international organization. The furnishing of other recreational equipment was left to other welfare organizations, such as the War Prisoners Aid of the Young Men's Christian Associations. Following visits by Red Cross representatives to the prisoner of war camps, reports were submitted to the Provost Marshal General's Office concerning the physical aspects of the camps, their administration, and the recreational and welfare status of prisoners.

Following V-E Day and the resulting withdrawal of the Legation of Switzerland as protecting power for German prisoners, the International Committee of the Red Cross took over increased duties of inspection of German prisoner of war camps in company with representatives of the Department of State.

Duly accredited representatives of the War Prisoners Aid of the Young Men's Christian Associations were authorized to visit prisoner of war camps subject to the approval of camp commanders to supplement and extend the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross when the latter was unable to furnish recreational and welfare services to the extent necessary. This organization had as many as 12 representatives visiting prisoner of war camps throughout the country. Each representative was assigned a specific area.

Following the visits to the various prisoner of war camps, representatives prepared reports regarding the recreational and welfare facilities of the camp including sports, theatricals, artistry, movies, and religious activities. Another feature of their work consisted of a circulating library of recordings which could be played by the prisoners on recording machines furnished by the War Prisoners Aid.

After V-E Day the activities of the War Prisoners Aid were reviewed and restated. It was agreed that the War Prisoners Aid would reduce its visiting representatives to seven, each of whom would represent a particular area or district of the country. Its representatives welcomed State Department representatives on their visits but, as the State Department could not designate a man to accompany each YMCA man on every trip, in cases where the State Department representative did not make the trip, the YMCA man returned to Washington for the purpose of reporting after each three months' tour. Furthermore, when there was no State Department man, the camp commander appointed an officer to be present with the YMCA representative while he was inside the inclosure. The YMCA continued to supplement the recreational, educational, and cultural programs of base and branch camps by providing books subject to clearance by the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, by increasing its concert and theatrical kit service, by continuing to furnish other recreational and handicraft supplies, and by providing religious films requested by camp chaplains. It was further agreed that certain of the YMCA personnel who were pastors could perform certain functions with regard to strengthening the Christian spirit and faith of the prisoners of war. These functions were undertaken primarily with German prisoners of war but were extended along the same lines to Italian and Japanese prisoners. It was agreed that the YMCA representatives would inform the camp commanders, in so far as possible, as to their activities in the camp, which usually involved a conference with the Assistant Executive Officer at the base camp. As the Assistant Executive Officer was, in effect, a representative of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, this assured coordination between the YMCA activities and Special Projects Division undertakings.

Duly accredited representatives of the War Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference, also were granted the right of access and visitation to the prisoner of war camps upon the invitation of the camp commander. Their function also was to supplement the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross, but their representatives were not permitted to enter the prisoner of war stockades or to talk to any prisoner. They were permitted merely to interview the camp commanders and United States Army chaplains in order to determine the need for religious materials and supplies. Arrangements were made for the shipment of these supplies through the War Prisoners Aid of the Young Men's Christian Associations. After V-E Day, the activities of this organization were somewhat restricted as a result of the large accumulation in the central prisoner of war fund and a more strict interpretation of the term "religious supplies and equipment."

The Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War, Seventh Day Adventist, The Apostolic Delegate, the Duke of Wurttemberg, Don Odo, are additional welfare organizations and individuals who were permitted visitation to the prisoner of war camps for welfare purposes. In addition, at the camp level, the commanding officers and Post Chaplains arranged for local ministers to provide services where no Prisoner of War Chaplains were available.

PROPERTY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 provides that all effects or objects of personal use shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war except arms, horses, military equipment, and military papers. Under the Convention, money in the possession of prisoners could only be taken upon giving the prisoners a receipt therefor. Identification documents, insignia of rank, decorations, and objects of value could be retained by prisoners under the provisions of this article.

It soon became apparent that during the heat of battle American soldiers were unable to differentiate between legally confiscable property and other classes, and were unable to take time to write out receipts for property. It was also apparent that American and Allied souvenir seekers along the line of processing took insignia, medals, watches, cigarette cases, and other personal items which should have been left in the possession of the prisoners. Another factor which added to the complexity of this problem was the nature of the German soldier's *SOLDBUCH*, which, in addition to being an identification document, contained much valuable military information. Consequently, G-2 took up the *SOLDBUCHS* for examination either in the theaters or in continental United States and, it must be reported, was not always successful in forwarding them to the Property Branch, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau, for return to prisoners interned in the United States. The history of the property of prisoners of war is not a particularly happy one, but it is believed that the best possible handling was made of a difficult situation.

Beginning with Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, 24 September 1943, as amended by subsequent Prisoner of War Circulars and TM 19-500, it was provided that property found in the possession of a prisoner might be in one of four classes: (1) personal effects which he would be allowed to retain, (2) personal effects which would be taken from him temporarily but returned as soon as practicable, (3) personal effects that he would not be permitted to retain while interned, including money and any article which may be used to facilitate escape, and (4) articles which he would not be permitted to retain at any time and which might be confiscated.

It was proper under the Geneva Convention, and necessary from the standpoint of security, to search each prisoner of war at the time of his capture and to confiscate all military property or prisoner-owned property that might in any way aid

the prisoner in an attempt to escape. It was also necessary to take up and examine all property that might be of value from a military point of view to assist our army in furthering their tactical operations, subject to the provisions against confiscation of personal items contained in the Geneva Convention. Each prisoner was searched and disarmed immediately upon capture and contraband articles were taken from him, including all equipment issued to him by his government, except clothing. He was permitted to retain his helmet and gasmask in combat zones. Contraband included cameras, binoculars, signalling devices, compasses, and such other articles as might be useful to him in an escape. All military papers, documents, maps, and diaries were retained for intelligence examination. Money was also taken and receipts were given therefor in order that such property could be returned to the owners upon repatriation. All such moneys were forwarded to the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau and stored there pending return to the prisoners.

A receipt was given for each item of personal property in all cases where it was possible to identify the owners thereof. When it was determined that such property was of no military value, every effort was made to locate and return this property to the prisoner who owned it. As previously stated, however, much prisoner property was erroneously confiscated or not properly identified and unquestionably many of the frequent complaints of prisoners or their protecting powers concerning wrongful property confiscation were well-founded. At the Property Section of the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau there remained a vast stock of property taken from prisoners, which was unidentified by reason of not being receipted for at time of taking or being improperly or carelessly tagged so that the identification had become detached. The improper handling was largely done in theaters of operation, but ports of embarkation where prisoners first arrived in the United States were careless in the early stages of the history. 64/

All complaints addressed to the protecting powers by prisoners of war regarding personal property were forwarded through the Provost Marshal General's Office. A complete search was made by the Property Branch, Enemy Prisoner of War

64/ For further particulars, reference is made to Section C, Chapter 3, Prisoner of War Circular No. 1, September 1943 and Section 3, Chapter 2, TM 19-500, 5 August 1944.

Information Bureau, to determine whether or not the prisoner's alleged property was in War Department custody. One of the most frequently recurring types of documents handled was a complaint from a prisoner of war that items of personal property which had no military value were taken from him upon capture. In many instances it was found that the property of the prisoner which he sought to have returned was of interest to G-2 and was confiscated for its use. This was particularly true of SOLD-BOOKS and other papers.

All complaints addressed to the protecting power were routed to the Provost Marshal General's Office, examined there, and were then forwarded to the Department of State for transmittal to the protecting power. In the event that the prisoner presented a claim alleging loss or damage to personal property, that claim was also processed through the Property Branch, Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau to determine if the property was stored there. If the property could not be located, such claims were referred to the Claims Division of the Judge Advocate General's Office for disposition. The Judge Advocate General established the procedure that all claims by enemy prisoners of war for the loss or damage to personal property would be processed by an officer designated by the staff judge advocate of the service command in which the prisoner of war was located at the time of presenting his claim.^{65/}

The first repatriation movements of German and Italian nationals, including prisoners of war and civilians, were undertaken jointly by the Department of State and G-1. All regulations relating to the amount of luggage that the repatriates could take back with them, as well as the kind of personal property permitted, were subject to the control of those interested government agencies. Subsequently, it became the responsibility of the Provost Marshal General's Office to exercise staff supervision over all repatriation movements of prisoners of war. At that time, each service command was instructed by the Provost Marshal General's Office regarding the kind of personal property in excess of that permitted by the regulations to be turned in for salvage. The determination of what property could be taken back by prisoners of war upon repatriation was one involving considerable difficulty of determination. There were two conflicting theories on the subject. The first was that prisoners of war had a limited amount of property on their persons and in their possession when they arrived in the U. S. To ease the conditions

^{65/} Opinion, Office of the Judge Advocate General, SPJGD, subject: "Claims of enemy prisoners of war and interned enemy aliens for damage to or loss or destruction of personal property in the custody of the Government," dated 19 May 1945.

of their internment, they were permitted to buy or otherwise acquire miscellaneous items. Upon return, they should not be permitted to take everything they had acquired, but only certain necessary items. Those items which were left behind were not confiscated but instead were abandoned by the prisoners after having made full use of them. The second theory was that each prisoner had a vested right to every item of personal property which he purchased with his work allowances or which was given to him by relatives or welfare agencies or which he obtained in any other lawful manner, and that, no matter if each prisoner had hundreds of pounds of items, if the United States Government did not offer free transportation for this material back to his homeland, we illegally confiscated his property. Unfortunately, both the Office of The Judge Advocate General and the State Department espoused the latter theory and claimed that the War Department regulations initiated by The Provost Marshal General's Office limiting in any manner the property to be taken back were illegal. The Geneva Convention was cited in support of this theory. This interpretation of the Geneva Convention probably did not take into consideration that the provisions in the Convention against confiscation applied, at least in the opinion of The Provost Marshal General, only to circumstances of capture. This unsettled question continued until preparations were begun for the repatriation of enemy prisoners in the summer of 1945. A sequence of regulations was promulgated liberalizing the regulations on the subject, the last of which was the second edition of War Department Memorandum 580-45, 13 August 1945. 66/ Under this memorandum, enlisted prisoners could take 55 pounds and officer prisoners 175 pounds of personal baggage. An additional 10 pounds of baggage was authorized for enlisted prisoners for the purpose only of taking printed matter sold in prisoner of war canteens and/or distributed by the War Department as orientation material, subject to the limitation that the entire 65 pounds of material could be placed in one barracks bag. Italian Service Unit members could take up to 100 pounds. It was also provided that foot-lockers and suitcases possessed by Italian Service Unit members, either enlisted men or officers, prior to the publication of that memorandum, could be taken with them on repatriation movements if the total weight was within the 100 pound and 175 pound limit for enlisted men and officers respectively. It was provided that written material such as diaries, personal manuscripts, letters, and other items accompanying prisoners

66/ War Department Memorandum No. 580-45, 13 August 1945.

would be censored, packaged, sealed, and marked as sealed prior to leaving, except in the case of Italian Service Unit members. It was further provided that prisoners could mail four-pound parcels of material which they did not wish to accompany them to the extent of four such packages. Although not contained in Memorandum No. 580-45, it was later arranged with the International Committee of the Red Cross that prisoners could address these four-pound parcels to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva in view of the fact that mail channels were not open and that many of the prisoners were uncertain of their home address. The Committee undertook to hold the parcels until the prisoners wrote for them after arriving in their native country. The International Committee of the Red Cross had adopted in 1944 a procedure whereby works of art could be forwarded by prisoners to the Committee for safe-keeping by it until after repatriation. Many prisoners took advantage of this opportunity of forwarding manuscripts, paintings, wood carvings, and other items of this nature.

Under the provisions of the Red Cross Convention, certain personnel described in Articles 9, 10, and 11 were classified as protected personnel and were not to be treated as prisoners of war. Generally this personnel consisted of medical officers, dental officers, administrative officers, nurses, enlisted sanitary personnel, chaplains, and members of recognized voluntary aid societies. In actual practice in this war, it was found that the process of capture and evacuation was so speedy that great masses of prisoners arrived in the United States without any attempt to segregate or give preferential treatment to protected personnel. Further, in many instances the identification documents of protected personnel had been lost, or worse yet, confiscated. The medical liaison officer assigned to the Prisoner of War Division in August, 1943, pointed out the necessity of recognizing the Red Cross Convention, of segregating protected personnel from the mass of prisoners, and of utilizing the services of the enemy medical officers and corpsmen. In November, Prisoner of War Circular No. 6, 1943, was published, followed in the same month by Prisoner of War Circular No. 8, 1943. These were the earliest War Department publications on the recognition of enemy protected personnel. Special forms, WD 131 and 132, were adopted for the classification of officers and enlisted men, and efforts were initiated to distribute protected personnel where needed in medical installations, and with relation to the numbers of prisoners. A screening was undertaken of the identification documents of protected personnel to determine their authenticity.

As the professional ability of captured German medical officers was limited, and as specialists and well-trained medical personnel were in demand in the two prisoner of war general hospitals, the selection and assignment of enemy personnel was based upon the findings made

during screening and upon reports of cooperativeness submitted by United States medical authorities. The correct evaluation of the knowledge and ability of protected personnel, especially officers, was difficult by reason of difference in terminology, in European methods of diagnosis and treatment, and in nomenclature of drugs and their dosage. It was, therefore, imperative that the ultimate screening, evaluation, and assignment be accomplished by competent German-speaking American medical officers. As a whole, the professional quality exhibited by the majority of German medical officers was not as high as that of the American doctor, but sufficient for routine prisoner of war camp station hospital duties. It was difficult to find specialists required in general hospitals among the protected personnel.

During the early stages of the war, captured medical and sanitary personnel were often recognized and accorded the rights of protected personnel on the basis of their own statements or a minimum of documentary evidence. As a result, many prisoners of war were accorded a protected status who were not entitled to this privilege merely because they had a temporary or forged certificate that they were litter-bearers. Evidence indicated that many of these so-called litter-bearers were actually engaged in combat activities at the time of their capture. In order to standardize the recognition of protected personnel it was necessary to have prisoners of war claiming protected status examined by representatives of The Provost Marshal General's Office. Prisoners found not acceptable for certification as protected personnel were treated as prisoners of war. Only Germans possessing a personal "Ausweis" or a service record were certified as protected personnel and their documentary proof was stamped with a seal of The Provost Marshal General's Office. Similarly, Italian prisoners possessing a "Certificato di Identita" were certified.

In order to make the maximum use of medical and sanitary personnel, each individual was required to fill out a classification form. ^{67/} This classification form included not only general personal data but information regarding their medical qualifications, cooperativeness, attitude, and efficiency.

After protected personnel had been certified and classified, distribution among the service commands on the basis of two doctors.

^{67/} War Department AGO Form No. 19-82, for German officers; WD AGO Form No. 19-83 for Italian officers; and WD AGO Form No. 19-84 for enlisted men of both nationalities.

one dentist, and six enlisted medical men per each one thousand prisoners was made. This ratio was established by mutual agreement between the belligerents. Also, a pool was established at Prisoner of War Camp, McAlester, Oklahoma, and later at Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for any surplus protected personnel in this country above the quota established. Personnel from this pool was assigned as required to Glennan General Hospital, Okmulgee, Oklahoma, and to Hospital Center, Camp Forrest, Tennessee.

Prisoners of war claiming protected status as chaplains also were examined by representatives of The Provost Marshal General's Office to determine their qualifications and only those having the proper documents were certified. However, there were very few bona fide chaplains assigned to the German Army and only a handful were among the prisoners of war interned in this country. Therefore, although the ratio upon which belligerents agreed to retain chaplains was one for each one thousand prisoners, in reality it was impossible to meet this quota. As stated above, prisoners of war who had been clergymen in civilian life were necessarily utilized to minister to the religious needs of the other prisoners. Although these prisoners were accorded some privileges in the way of pay for their services at the rate of 80 cents a day from the camp prisoner of war fund and the granting of immunity from administrative or contract labor, strictly speaking they were not entitled to the special privileges of protected personnel.

While protected personnel were not prisoners of war, in the interest of national security and in order to utilize them in the care and treatment and spiritual welfare of their own nationals, they were detained in protective custody in prisoner of war camps. However, whenever practicable, camp commanders were instructed to segregate protected personnel from prisoners of war by assigning them quarters separate from the quarters occupied by prisoners.

Protected personnel were treated in the same manner as prisoners of war except for two types of privileges. First, they were permitted to take walks outside the stockade under guard. Officers were permitted to take these walks daily. Enlisted prisoners of war were permitted to take bi-weekly walks. In addition to these privileges, they were permitted to mail one letter and one post card per week, which was an increase over that permitted ordinary prisoners of war.

The clothing of protected personnel was marked in the same manner as prisoners' clothing except that the letters "PP" were used instead of "PW". Also, personnel performing medical duties in station or general hospitals were required to wear the white uniform prescribed for United States military personnel. This uniform also was marked "PP". In addition, protected personnel were required to wear at all times a Red Cross brassard on the left sleeve of all outer clothing.

At different times throughout the war, the German government made approaches through the protecting power or the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding a proposed mutual agreement supplemental to the Geneva Red Cross Convention to govern the treatment of protected personnel. The German view was one proposing many special privileges for protected personnel, such as special quarters, almost complete freedom, and the like. An agreement was never reached.

REPATRIATION

Prisoners of war are usually kept in captivity for the duration of a war, but under certain circumstances termination of their internment may occur sooner and by various methods, one of which is repatriation. Repatriation means return to the homeland. The Geneva Convention, being a document based upon humanitarian concepts, contemplated that, not only would prisoners be repatriated at the conclusion of peace, but that they might be repatriated sooner under certain conditions. To this end, the Convention provided that the belligerents were bound to send back to their own countries, regardless of rank or number, seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners. It provided that the enemy governments should agree with respect to repatriation procedures for sick and wounded, appoint mixed medical commissions, and contained an annex with suggested standards of incapacity warranting repatriation. The mixed medical commission was to be composed of three members, two of neutral nationality and one of the detaining power, and its duties were to examine sick and wounded and determine their eligibility for repatriation. It was provided that a prisoner himself, his spokesman, his own government, or a relief agency could request the examination of a prisoner by the commission. The Convention also provided for direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country of prisoners who had undergone a long period of captivity. No repatriated person could be utilized in active military service. In addition, the Convention contained a provision for the general repatriation of prisoners with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace. Articles 68 and 75 contain the provisions just discussed.

Repatriation movements, particularly those taking place while the war was still progressing, were delicate operations, and required close cooperation between the War Department, Department of State, neutral protecting powers, and on some occasions, allied governments.

As of 31 August 1945, the repatriation procedures had not yet been put into effect except as herein discussed with regard to sick and wounded and a few special categories. There was never any hospitalization in a neutral country worked out by agreement with the enemy, largely because no neutral country was equipped to undertake such a venture.

In 1943, an agreement was reached between the United States and German governments for the activation, on a mutual reciprocal basis, of Mixed Medical Commissions. No agreement was effected with the Italian or Japanese governments. Accordingly, the Mixed Medical Commission operating in the United States was charged solely with the examination of German sick and wounded prisoners of war.

The Mixed Medical Commission was an agency of international character, as it had Swiss and American membership. The Commission visited prisoner of war installations, examined German prisoners of war who had applied for repatriation, inspected clinical records pertaining to them, and determined their eligibility for repatriation. The Commission was composed of three physicians, two of them were nationals of the protecting power, Switzerland, while the third was a member of the medical service of the detaining power. One of the neutral members acted as chairman of the Commission.

The neutral members of the Commission were a team of visiting medical authorities, carefully selected by the protecting power, screened and approved by the governments of the belligerent powers. They were charged with the selection of eligible prisoner of war patients for either direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country. It was their obligation to perform this difficult task regardless of the political ideology, nationality, race, rank, or number of prisoners of war to be examined. They accomplished their mission within the provisions of the Geneva Convention, in a fair, firm, unbiased manner. The neutral members did not treat or recommend the transfer of prisoner of war patients, but if additional care or treatment seemed indicated, they brought such matters to the attention of the United States member.

The United States member of the Commission was an officer of the Medical Corps of the United States Army. He was carefully selected, screened and approved by the War Department. He was professionally qualified and possessed a thorough knowledge of the German language. He was charged with the protection of the interests of the United States during the session of the Commission. In conjunction with the neutral members of the Commission, he critically reviewed the case histories, physical and laboratory findings, examined applicants personally and, after careful consideration of each individual case, voted for or against repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country.

To assist in the administrative details pertaining to the activities of the Mixed Medical Commission, a Warrant Officer was assigned by The Provost Marshal General as recorder. He was charged with the responsibility of preparing the necessary forms and reports for the Commission.

From November 1943 to June 1944, the neutral members of the Commission were Swiss civilian doctors, residing in the United States, who were approved by both belligerent governments. They were paid twenty-five dollars per diem while on duty with the Commission. The tours of the Commission were of a short duration due to the fact that the civilian neutral members were unable to devote more time to activities pertaining thereto.

In the meantime, arrangements were being made to have Swiss medical officers flown directly to the United States for duty as neutral members. In June 1944 the first group of Swiss medical officers arrived in the United States. Arrangements were made to have the Swiss government provide these officers while in the United States with pay equal to the base pay of a Colonel and of a Lieutenant Colonel, respectively, in the United States Army, and settle their accounts for their expenses while on duty in the United States. The United States agreed to reimburse the Swiss government for such pay, for the actual expenses of these officers while in the United States, including transportation when not furnished by the United States government, meals and lodging, necessary tips, and for the cost of transportation from the United States to Switzerland.

It was necessary to explain to the field the mission of the Mixed Medical Commission and the responsibilities of local commanders in regard thereto. The chairman of the Mixed Medical Commission on its first tour of duty reported that prisoner of war camps and medical installations were ignorant of the mission and purposes of the Commission and exhibited a considerable lack of knowledge concerning the provisions of the Geneva Convention on repatriation and sick and wounded prisoners of war. Directives were prepared and forwarded to all service commands bringing to their attention the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention pertaining to repatriation and instructing them as to the preparations necessary for this mission.

In April 1944, Prisoner of War Circular 25, on the repatriation of German sick and wounded prisoners of war, was published and distributed. This circular explained the composition of the Commission, listed the type of prisoner of war patients eligible for repatriation, set forth the preliminary arrangements necessary at each installation, and gave instructions as to the disposition of forms and records of individuals examined. Despite the publication and distribution of this circular, the Mixed Medical Commission frequently complained of inadequate preparation and poor liaison between camp commanders and hospital authorities. The Medical Liaison Branch of the Prisoner of War Division attempted to clear up these deficiencies through directives and personal conversations on the tactical phone. In addition, three to four weeks prior to the expected visit of the Mixed Medical Commission to a service command, TWX's were dispatched explaining in detail the procedure to be followed and arrangements to be made.

In accordance with Article 68 of the Prisoner of War Convention, the Model Agreement to the Annex of the Convention was used as a guide to determine what cases were eligible for direct repatriation or hospitalization in a neutral country. This was the major difficulty, from a professional standpoint, confronting the Mixed Medical Commission. The Model Agreement was found to be too generalized and its

application depended upon individual interpretation. In an effort to standardize the provisions of the Model Agreement, an agreement between the belligerent powers was reached in March 1944. It was agreed that patients suffering from exudative pleurisy or duodenal or gastric ulcers would be repatriated. Further experiences of the Mixed Medical Commission revealed that other cases of illnesses were not always uniformly judged by the various Commissions. Furthermore, doubts arose as to whether certain illnesses fell in the categories mentioned in the Model Agreement. Actual application of the Model Agreement revealed that in some cases extension of its provisions should be made. In the meantime, neutral doctors serving on Mixed Medical Commissions in the United States, Great Britain, and in Germany, drew up a set of standards to be universally adopted in the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war. In March, 1945, the War Department instructed the U. S. member of the Mixed Medical Commission to apply these standards. Due to the lack of penicillin, insulin, biologicals, and food supplies in Germany, it was recommended that certain modifications be made, especially as to those points pertaining to osteomyelitis, diabetes, typhus and malnutrition. However, the defeat of Germany obviated the necessity of having the revised standards adopted.

In April 1944, through an exchange of notes between the Department of State and the German government, an agreement was reached and the War Department was informed that all prisoner of war patients found eligible by the Mixed Medical Commission for hospitalization in a neutral country would be repatriated directly to Germany. For purposes of record, however, the Mixed Medical Commission in its decisions, continued to classify repatriable applicants as eligible for direct repatriation or for hospitalization in a neutral country.

In order to facilitate the direct repatriation of German sick and wounded prisoners and relieve the Mixed Medical Commission of the necessity of visiting prisoner patients in general hospitals who were unmistakably eligible for direct repatriation, the medical command of general hospitals that had been designated for prisoner patients were given the authority to certify for direct repatriation all German prisoner of war patients who were obviously eligible due to their permanent disabilities. No decisions were made in the case of prisoner of war patients not obviously suitable for direct repatriation under the medical provisions of the Annex. Furthermore, inspection and decision by the Mixed Medical Commission was necessary for all questionable cases and for those cases suitable for hospitalization in a neutral country. Prisoners of war who were not declared eligible by General Hospitals were not precluded from applying for examination by the Mixed Medical Commission.

Prisoners of war who had been rejected by the Commission were permitted to submit applications for re-examination three months after their last examination.

From the activation of the Mixed Medical Commission in November 1943 to its recall in April 1945, 7941 German prisoners were examined; 1015 were found eligible for direct repatriation; 359 for hospitalization in a neutral country (who were repatriated directly to Germany); 576 were temporarily deferred, and 5,991 were rejected.

A total of 1,166 German prisoners of war found eligible for direct repatriation by medical commands of general hospitals were sent back to Germany.

The following is a complete summary of repatriation movements between the United States and Germany.

German SAW & PP Repatriated from - U. S. SAW & PP Repatriated from
United States Germany

MOVEMENT	DATE	SAW	PP	MOVEMENT	DATE	SAW	PP
First	20 Sep 43	106	0	First	Oct 43	14	0
	30 Sep 43	56	0	Second	Mar 44	35	0
Second	15 Feb 44	117	0	Third	June 44	64	0
Third	2 May 44	194	1	Fourth	Sep 44	235	0
Fourth	23 Aug 44	356	100	Fifth	Jan 45	461	0
Fifth	29 Dec 44	694	0		Mar 45	0	77
	7 Jan 45	658	1				
TOTALS		2181	102			809	77

Repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war was not a continuous process. Each movement depended upon special agreements between the United States and German governments, which set forth the place and date of exchange and the number of prisoners of war to be exchanged.

As stated heretofore, no agreement was consummated with the Italian government for the activation of Mixed Medical Commissions. However, with the surrender of Italy and with the status of Italy as a co-belligerent, steps were initiated to formulate a policy on the repatriation of Italian sick and wounded prisoners of war. In August 1944, a policy was established to repatriate all Italian prisoners of war who resided in Allied occupied Italy if found eligible on medical grounds, and subject to security measures, if they were 60 years of age or over, or were between 50 and 60 years of age and had completed

2 years of internment. In December 1944, 1339 sick and wounded Italian prisoners of war who came within the provisions of this policy were repatriated; in April 1945, 245 were repatriated and in June 1945, 220 were repatriated. 68/

Although the Japanese Government was a signatory of the Geneva Convention, it did not ratify the treaty and therefore was not bound by its provisions. On 18 December 1941, the Department of State informed the Japanese Government that it was the intention of the Government of the United States to apply the provisions of the Convention and requested the Japanese Government to express her intentions. On the 4th of February 1942, the Japanese Government replied that she was strictly observing the Geneva Red Cross Convention as a signatory state and that although not bound by the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, she would apply its provisions to American prisoners of war in its power. Attempts were made to initiate steps toward bilateral repatriation moves between the United States and Japan, but failed.

A request was received from Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, Paris, France, on 2 May 1945, requesting that priority for repatriation be given to German prisoners of war possessing coal mining experience. In reply to this communication, a cable was dispatched on 15 May 1945 by the War Department that it was impractical to return coal miners in quantities at that time.

On 20 July 1945 a cable was dispatched by the War Department to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, European Theater, Paris, France, informing him that 49 German officer prisoners of war with coal mining experience would embark for Germany on or about 26 July 1945 and that approximately 2545 German non-commissioned officers and enlisted men possessing coal mining experience would be shipped soon. 69/

68/ ASF Circular No. 52, 12 February 1945, Section VII

69/ German and Italian prisoners of war were processed for repatriation in accordance with War Department Memorandum 580-45 dated 25 May 1945, Subject: "Processing of Prisoners of War and Protected Personnel for Repatriation," and supplemental instructions issued by the Office of The Provost Marshal General. This War Department Memorandum was rescinded by the publication of a revised War Department Memorandum 580-45 dated 13 August 1945, Subject: "Procedure for Processing and Moving German and Italian Prisoners of War and Protected Personnel From the United States to Oversea Destinations." The later directive was broader in scope and provided for moving prisoners in addition to their processing, and contained a separate section for the processing of Italian Service Unit personnel.

On 1 August 1944 secret (now unclassified) letter SPX 383.6 (26 Jul 44)OB-S-SPMGA-M, Subject: Repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War, was published, stating grounds on which Italian prisoners would be returned to Italy. 70/ This letter authorized the return of Italian prisoners of war, subject to the following considerations; (1) Who were 60 years of age or over, or between 50 and 60 years of age and who had completed two years of internment; or (2) Whose family conditions in Italy were of such a nature as to compel repatriation on grounds of compassion.

Written requests for repatriation based on the grounds referred to above were submitted by the prisoner to his commanding officer, who forwarded them through channels to The Provost Marshal General's Office. Each application was considered on its merits. Those applications which were denied were filed in the Prisoner of War Operations Division, and the individual was so informed. Applications approved were forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, for security consideration. Each application denied by G-2 was returned to the applicant. All applications based on grounds of compassion which were approved by G-2 were immediately forwarded to the Commanding General, MTOUSA, for consideration. All applications based on grounds of overage which were approved by G-2 were noted for immediate repatriation. Because of the time consumed in securing clearance from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Commanding General, MTOUSA, a negligible number of Italians have been repatriated under the provisions of the letter referred to above. The first group of Italians returned to Italy under the authority of this letter numbered 105. This casual detachment of Italian prisoners of war embarked at Hampton Roads, Virginia on 19 August 1945 for shipment; approximately 247 more were approved for return to Italy during the month of September 1945.

In accordance with the well established War Department policy of granting preferential treatment to Italian Service Unit personnel, plans were formulated in July 1945 to return to Italy during the months of August, September and October 1500 members of Italian Service Units selected from each unit in the United States. The United States was divided into three zones by service commands with an equal number of Italian Service Units in each zone allocated for these movements. On 12 July 1945 a letter directed service commanders to select and process for repatriation Italian personnel from each unit within their respective service commands in accordance with the quota indicated as follows: 71/

70/ AGO secret letter, 1 August 1944, subject: "Repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War," classification cancelled by AGO letter, 14 July 1945

71/ AGO letter, file SPXMP-M 383.6 (11 July 45) SPMGO, Subject: "Repatriation of Italian Service Unit Personnel"; see also AGO letter, file SPXMP-M 383.6 (26 Jul 45) Subject: "Repatriation of Italian Service Unit Personnel."

First Service Command	9 officers	90 enlisted men
Second Service Command	25 officers	250 enlisted men
Third Service Command	16 officers	110 enlisted men

This group of five hundred Italian Service Unit personnel embarked at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 9 August 1945.

On 27 June 1945 the commanding generals were directed to select and process for repatriation Italian personnel from each unit within their respective service commands. This group of five hundred Italian Service Unit personnel was scheduled to embark on or about 12 September 1945.

Plans were made that a similar AGO letter would be published directing the Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, to select and process for repatriation 500 members of Italian Service Units within his service command. It was contemplated that this group of 500 would embark on or about 12 October 1945.

Almost from the beginning of the administration of prisoners of war in the United States, requests were received from friends and relatives of enemy prisoners held in the United States to parole them into their custody and to permit them to remain in the United States and to become American citizens. A uniform policy against such individual parole into the custody of American citizens was adopted. Requests to remain in the United States were from two categories of enemy prisoners: first, enemy nationals; and second, enemy prisoners of war who were born or claimed to have been born in the United States and who professed to be American citizens by reason of such birth. As to the former category, it was not difficult to establish a policy that all enemy nationals who were captured and brought to the United States as a matter of military necessity for internment would be returned to Europe or to Japan without exception. This was the proper course under the repatriation provisions of the Geneva Convention and the only logical course to follow from the standpoint of national policy. It would have been inconceivable to give to enemy prisoners of war any preferential rights as to entry into the United States for the purpose of immigration and naturalization or any other preferential position simply because they had been captured and brought here as prisoners. The same general policy was adopted with regard to soldiers fighting in the German and Italian armies who were nationals of other countries such as Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and others.

A slightly more complex and much more interesting situation presented itself with regard to enemy prisoners who claimed American birth and citizenship and who desired to stay in the United States on the

strength of that claim. The Provost Marshal General early adopted the view that these persons should similarly be returned under the provisions of the Geneva Convention in order not to give them preferential entry into the United States. Inquiry with regard to such a prisoner was received from a member of the United States House of Representatives and The Provost Marshal General was requested to prepare a reply for the signature of the Secretary of War. A reply expressing the policy that prisoners in this category would be repatriated as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities in Europe was prepared.

In an entirely separate case, an attorney in Brooklyn, New York, wrote The Provost Marshal General stating that he proposed to bring a writ of habeas corpus in a Federal court to contest the detention of an Italian prisoner of war who, it was claimed, was born in the United States and desired to remain here. An answer was prepared in general terms stating the War Department policy as expressed above. However, as it was obvious that the problem was imminent and would arise in the form of a writ of habeas corpus, the matter was presented to The Judge Advocate General. The Office of The Judge Advocate General maintained the position that it would be unjust for the War Department, or any organ of the government, to deny to a person whom it holds in custody the opportunity to prove facts which, if true, would justify his release, or to deny to a person claiming American citizenship the chance to prove that citizenship. Further, said The Judge Advocate General's Office, if a prisoner under these circumstances could prove his contentions and could prove that he was compelled against his will to serve in the enemy army and that he abandoned the service of the enemy at the first opportunity, the United States may, as a matter of law, release him and, as a matter of justice, should do so. The Judge Advocate General suggested an administrative determination by the War Department to hear and determine such cases. In addition, as it was known that The Provost Marshal General did not concur in the view, The Judge Advocate General suggested that the matter be referred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, for the formulation of a policy. The matter was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, whose office studied the matter, recommended a policy, and forwarded the file to the Chief of Staff for approval. G-1 recommended that a policy be established that the War Department could not make an administrative determination in cases of this nature, and that it should be left, as a matter of personal decision as to whether the prisoner should avail himself of judicial determination of the case by way of habeas corpus. Upon approval of this policy, the matter was returned to The Provost Marshal General to prepare a reply to the attorney for the prisoner consistent with that policy.

SEGREGATION AND SCREENING OF PRISONERS OF WAR

The Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, played an integral part in the prisoner of war program in that a certain percentage of all prisoners arriving in this country for internment were transferred from ports of embarkation to certain installations located on the East and West Coast for the purpose of interrogation. Upon arrival of the prisoners at ports of embarkation, representatives of the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, requested each prisoner to fill out a questionnaire. While the prisoners were being processed and deloused, these representatives, by examining the questionnaires filled out by the prisoners, would select a representative group of the prisoners for immediate transfer to their installations. Upon arrival at these installations, the prisoners were interrogated and from the information received from such interrogations were classified into certain groups. Upon completion of interrogation, the prisoners were transferred to permanent prisoner of war camps according to their classification. From information obtained from the prisoners who were interviewed, the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, requested The Provost Marshal General's Office to transfer from prisoner of war camps to G-2 installations many other prisoners for the purpose of interrogation. Similarly, upon completion of interrogation, these prisoners were classified and transferred to prisoner of war camps according to their classification. It is estimated that the influx of prisoners transferred into these installations averaged approximately 600 per month. The significant importance of this part of the prisoner of war program is expressed in the fact that the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, continually interrogated prisoners up until the time they were repatriated. It is a known fact that the results of the interrogation of prisoners of war aided in the successful prosecution of the war against the enemies.

In order to promote harmony as far as possible among the prisoners of war and to obtain the maximum work, various memoranda and directives were issued from time to time concerning the segregation, screening, and interrogation of prisoners of war by the military authorities at the camps.^{72/} Certain camps were established for different classifications of prisoners of war, and prisoners were transferred to these installations by the commanding generals of the service commands upon the recommendation of the camp commanders.

Soon after the first contingent of prisoners of war had arrived in this country for internment, the War Department became aware that some of the German prisoners were not true Germans. Later developments

^{72/} AGO Letter, 6 February 1944, subject: "Prisoner of War Noncommissioned Officers"

proved that many German prisoners were citizens of allied nations who had been forced into either the German armed forces or the many labor battalions or organizations created by the German government. It was soon realized by The Provost Marshal General that the number of German prisoners of war who actually were citizens of allied nations represented a potential source whereby those respective nations could obtain replacements for their armed forces. In cooperation with the various military attaches of the embassies of the allied nations, arrangements were made whereby these prisoners were interviewed and screened and, if qualified, accepted by the military attaches of their respective countries and delivered to the custody of representatives of their countries. As a result of this program, several hundred German prisoners of war of allied nationalities were returned to the custody of representatives of their respective countries prior to the defeat of Germany, and those prisoners were used as replacements in the respective armed forces. Prior to V-E Day, The Provost Marshal General was aware of the fact that the percentage of German prisoners arriving in this country for internment who claimed allied citizenship was increasing greatly. Several months after V-E Day steps were taken to ascertain the names of all German prisoners claiming citizenship other than German as of 1 March 1938. Upon completion of this program, of the total number of German prisoners interned in this country, 4942 prisoners were determined to be of citizenship other than German and either actually returned to their respective countries or prepared to be so returned.73/

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence activities concerning prisoners of war interned in the continental United States were largely within the jurisdiction and control of the commanding generals of the service commands and of counterintelligence agencies.

Intelligence activities in prisoner of war camps were carried on for two distinct purposes, one of which concerned the obtaining of counterintelligence information and positive foreign intelligence. This activity was the concern of counterintelligence agencies, rather than of The Provost Marshal General and the service commands. However, intelligence relating to plans for escape and to plots to commit sabotage or to cause unrest was the concern of The Provost Marshal General and the service commands. Interrogation of prisoners in order to determine their political beliefs was also a concern of The Provost Marshal General.

From the beginning of the establishment of prisoner of war camps in the continental United States, an intelligence file on each prisoner interned in the installation was created and maintained by the intelligence officer of the installation, containing information obtained from the various sources.

Counterintelligence, strategical, and tactical intelligence activities were managed and controlled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, through the Military Intelligence Service.

DEATHS AND BURIALS

The Prisoner of War Operations Division, Provost Marshal General's Office, was given the responsibility of reporting all violent or accidental deaths to the State Department for transmittal to the protecting powers. A change in policy was made when a death report was heard by the enemy over short-wave radio prior to the receipt of a formal report of death through the protecting power. Thereafter, the Prisoner of War Operations Division reported deaths direct to the protecting powers by telephone and preliminary letter. Publicity regarding the deaths was held up pending delivery of this notice to the protecting power. This early notice was followed up by a complete report to the State Department, which in turn transmitted this information to the protecting power.

Regulations provided that deaths resulting from escapes or attempted escapes, foul play, deaths from violent or unnatural causes, including suicides and deaths from unknown causes, would be reported immediately by the camp commander to The Provost Marshal General's Office by telephone. All such deaths were also to be investigated. A complete report was made, and one copy was forwarded to The Provost Marshal General's Office for review. The findings reported therein were summarized and transmitted to the Department of State for the information of the protecting power. The investigation of violent and accidental deaths disclosed a number of cases where the deaths proved to be murder, and court-martial action was instituted which resulted in the conviction and execution of several prisoners. The first of these cases was the Beyer case, in which five prisoners were convicted and executed for the murder of a fellow prisoner. Investigations also disclosed some cases of forced suicide, in which the prisoners took it upon themselves to conduct a "Kangaroo Court" and pass sentence upon members of their own group whom they accused of anti-Nazi tendencies. Prompt disciplinary action in the murder and forced suicide cases brought about a complete stoppage of incidents of this type.

Complete records were kept on all cases of violent and accidental deaths. Final reports of investigation were coordinated by the Prisoner of War Operations Division with the Safety and Health Branch of the then Internal Security Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office in order to develop statistics showing trends of industrial, military, and agricultural fatalities. This detailed information on accidents was used as a basis for furthering safe work practices in the use of prisoner of war labor.

A number of prisoners were shot by guards; some while trying to escape; some in altercations; and some unjustifiably. In the latter

type of instance, the guard usually proved to be a person of inferior caliber. Several directives were issued regarding the screening of guards, 74/ and one was issued regarding trial by court-martial for the shooting of a prisoner in a bona fide escape attempt or other justified instance. 75/

The reporting of normal deaths (or deaths from natural causes) to the Department of State for transmittal to the neutral agencies and the protecting power was a primary responsibility of the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Nevertheless, in certain instances, The Provost Marshal General's Office was requested by the Department of State to furnish a report of investigation of the facts surrounding a death by normal cause. It then became the function of the Prisoner of War Operations Division to direct the commanding general of the service command in which the death occurred to make an inquiry into the facts surrounding the death, if inquiry had not already been made, and to forward a report. Such official report of investigation was forwarded to The Provost Marshal General's Office, and a summary thereof was forwarded to the Special War Problems Division, Department of State, for transmittal to the interested neutral agency.

In their inspection reports, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the War Prisoners Aid of the YMCA, the National Lutheran Council, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference and other agencies concerned with the welfare of prisoners of war made reports of violent and accidental deaths, as well as deaths from natural causes, of which they had been apprised. Such reports, after proper clearance by The Provost Marshal General's Office were forwarded to the protecting powers for transmittal to the enemy governments.

In Article 76 of the Geneva Convention, it is provided that: "Belligerents shall see that prisoners of war dying in captivity are honorably buried and that the graves bear all due information, are respected and properly maintained." In view of this, Article 76, Chapter V, Prisoner of War Circular No. I, 23 September 1943, provided for the honorable burial of all prisoners of war dying in internment. It was also provided that full military honors would be accorded to deceased prisoners and that the caskets could be draped with the decedent's national flag if available and desired by his fellow prisoners. After the defeat of Germany, War Department regulations prohibited the display of the Nazi swastika or fascist flags at any burial ceremonies. Occasionally, the Prisoner of War Operations Division received requests from relatives of deceased prisoners living in the United States that they be permitted to conduct the burial

74/ ASF Circular No. 276, 19 July 1945, Section I,

75/ ASF Circular No. 203, 4 June 1945, Part Three

ceremonies and to provide the final resting place for the deceased prisoner. In each instance, these requests were denied, and the burial ceremonies were conducted as provided for by prisoner of war regulations. Frequently, reports of burial ceremonies were forwarded by the camp spokesman, with photographs of the ceremony taken by the United States Army Signal Corps photographers, examined by The Provost Marshal General's Office, and then transmitted through the protecting power or neutral agencies to the relatives of the deceased in enemy territory.

Tabulation of Deaths of Prisoners of War.

(1) Deaths from Violent or Unnatural Causes:

	<u>German</u>	<u>Italian</u>	<u>Japanese</u>
(a) Suicides	72	9	0
(b) Murders	4	0	0
(c) Homicides	3	2	0
(d) Shootings	40	2	0
(e) Accidental Deaths:			
(1) Falling trees	12	2	0
(2) Motor Vehicle Accidents	43	8	0
(3) Drowning	17	8	0
(4) Miscellaneous*	21	8	0
TOTAL	212	39	0
(2) Deaths from Natural Causes:**	265	66	15
(3) TOTAL DEATHS***	477	105	15

* Various industrial and agricultural accidents.

** Includes deaths from wounds received in action outside continental United States. A large percentage of deaths occurring among the early shipments of prisoners to the United States were of this type.

*** Numbers are approximate through 31 August 1945.

PROOF OF RANK AND STATUS OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

Under Article 21 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 it was obligatory for the belligerent powers to communicate to one another the titles and ranks in either of their respective armies. The War Department was furnished by the State Department with lists of such ranks forwarded by the German and Italian governments through their mutual protecting power, the Legation of Switzerland. After the capitulation of the Axis armies in North Africa, large numbers of German and Italian prisoners were shipped into the United States, and the problem of determining the various ranks, especially of the German prisoners of war, became more complex. It was the policy of the War Department that the grade of the prisoners held by them and made known to the United States at the time of capture would be recognized as their permanent grade until they were repatriated, provided they had proof of their grade or rank.

The determination of the ranks of captured Italian prisoners of war did not present any appreciable difficulty, but the numerous alleged ranks in the German armed forces, and in the many quasi-military German organizations, complicated the situation. It was also discovered or suspected that German commanding officers, a few days before the surrender of the Axis Forces in North Africa, attempted to create non-commissioned officers in "wholesale" lots in order to prevent the capturing powers from utilizing the labor of many thousands of prisoner of war privates. Therefore, it became necessary for The Provost Marshal General's Office to tighten its policy regarding the recognition of German ranks. The German government also attempted to prevent the use of German prisoner of war labor by endeavoring to promote many of their soldiers during captivity. Since the Geneva Convention was silent on the subject of promotion of enemy personnel while in the custody of the detaining power, The Provost Marshal General's Office procured the issuance of a directive which provided that "No evidence of promotion of a prisoner which is received by the War Department after the prisoner has come into the custody of the United States or previous Allied detaining power, will be recognized by the United States as accomplishing the promotion of the prisoner of war." 76/

A later directive, issued on 20 January 1945 listed the ranks in the German army and the respective pay groups of these various ranks as recognized by the War Department. 77/ This circular was made up from the list of ranks which the German government had furnished to the United States in accordance with Article 21 of the Geneva Convention. Instructions were issued as to the determination of the rank or grade of the German soldier which was found usually inscribed on page 1 of

76/ Prisoner of War Circular No. 11, 1943

77/ Prisoner of War Circular No. 7, 20 January 1945

his paybook (soldbuch.) This directive also provided that, in the event that the paybook (soldbuch) was not available to ascertain his grade, other authenticated documents, evidences, or personal papers of the prisoner might be considered. After its publication some German ranks were submitted to The Provost Marshal General's Office which did not appear in this circular. At that time, the policy of the War Department was to submit the alleged rank or title to the Military Intelligence Service for a literal translation and estimate of the equivalent rank. On the receipt of this information, The Provost Marshal General's Office usually accorded the equivalent rank determined to the prisoner of war in question.

After D-Day in Normandy, the United States Armed Forces captured numerous German personnel who claimed various ranks as members of Civilian or semi-military German organizations, such as the German State Railways, German Railroad Surveillance Service, German Border Patrol, German Customs Service, German Merchant Marine, the "Waffon SS" (Armed Elite Guard) and the "Allegemeine SS." When German prisoners belonging to these various organizations were received in the United States, it was found that, in some instances, they had been accorded various ranks as noncommissioned and commissioned officer prisoners of war. After their internment in the United States, The Provost Marshal General's Office determined that these ranks had not been communicated to our government in accordance with Article 21 of the Geneva Convention, and it was decided that these prisoners would be held, treated, and required to perform labor as prisoner of war privates.

It was later discovered that many German prisoners of war claiming noncommissioned officer status had false documents purporting to prove their ranks. On 1 April 1945, a TWX was dispatched to all service commands stating that all German prisoners who claimed noncommissioned officer status must produce proof of their status by a soldbuch or other official document of the German Army or Navy. A screening of many German prisoners of war who claimed noncommissioned officer status pursuant to this TWX disclosed that thousands of them did not have adequate proof of their noncommissioned officer status and, consequently, they were reclassified as prisoner of war privates. All enemy documents which were not deemed sufficient to certify to the rank of the prisoner were invalidated.

Articles 19 through 24 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929 contained general provisions for the identification of enemy personnel entitled to protected status upon capture. The Provost Marshal General took the position that the recognized Red Cross certificates of enemy protected personnel status would be a linen certificate preferably embossed according to Article 19 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention and conforming to samples of such certificates furnished to our government by the enemy governments through the protecting powers.

In the summer of 1943, there was established a Medical Liaison Branch of the Prisoner of War Operations Division with officer personnel detailed from The Surgeon General's Office. It was one of the functions of this Medical Liaison Branch to determine those prisoners of war who were entitled to protected status and to decide whether the Red Cross medical certificates held by the prisoners were authentic.

Under Article 9 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, medical personnel who were functioning as litter bearers at the time of their capture, and who had received special instruction in that capacity, were entitled to protected status provided they had the necessary documentation. However, the War Department took a firm position with regard to prisoners claiming protected status as auxiliary litter bearers because of the likelihood that these certificates were indiscriminately issued by the German military authorities to their regular combat soldiers. As a result, very few German prisoners of war were accorded protected personnel status as litter bearers, and then only when they could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were fulfilling the functions of litter bearers at the time they were captured.

It soon became apparent that documentary proof of many claimants for protection was lacking. Some of the enemy personnel had lost their papers; in other cases documentary proof was confiscated in battle zones, in England, or at ports of embarkation. This action was difficult to control, even if it was a violation of Article 21 (c) of the Red Cross Convention. It unquestionably made the status of prisoners of war claiming protected status uncertain. It also became apparent that many fraudulent certificates were presented as bona fide certificates. It was decided that all documentary proof should be inspected by a competent officer and certified by The Provost Marshal General's Office before protected status could be accorded. A system of inspection of certificates was initiated and a seal to emboss bona fide certificates was established. Auxiliary certificates were not honored since practically every soldier had one.

In July, four medical officers toured prisoner of war installations throughout the nine service commands and approximately 3,500 German prisoners claiming protected status were screened and interviewed. Approximately 1,925 were found to have authentic documentary proof and were certified as protected personnel and their certificates embossed with an appropriate seal and notation. This personnel was assigned to the immediate professional care and administration of German prisoners of war.

Following the invasion of France in June, 1944, and Germany in 1945, approximately 2,500 additional prisoners of war claiming protected personnel status were transferred to the United States. Because of the increased number of wounded prisoners of war also trans-

ferred to the United States and because of the increased demand for qualified protected personnel by installations specifically designated for the care of sick and wounded prisoners, especially the two prisoner of war general hospitals, intensive screening was undertaken to check the documentary evidence necessary for certification. The individual claimants were personally evaluated as to ability, medical knowledge, medical skill, and cooperativeness.

In the screening of medical officers, sincere efforts were made through personal interview to ascertain professional ability and skill. The actual certification as protected personnel, however, could only be accomplished upon presentation of documentary evidence as prescribed by the Geneva Red Cross Convention. In many instances, bona fide physicians and medical corporals had to be rejected as protected personnel because of lack of documentary proof. Due to the dire shortage of protected personnel in the service commands, many rejected protected personnel claimants were utilized in professional duties after they had been screened and had shown the necessary knowledge, skill, and sense of cooperativeness. But their status was that of prisoners of war and not of protected personnel.

As of 31 August 1945, approximately 6,600 officers and enlisted prisoners of war had been screened. Of this number, 459 commissioned officers and 3,372 enlisted men were certified, and 136 commissioned officers and 2,833 enlisted men were rejected as protected personnel.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

At the beginning of the prisoner of war program very little information regarding prisoners of war was published except a few press releases prepared by the War Department. Visits to prisoner of war camps in the United States by representatives of the press were not encouraged, principally because it was believed necessary, in compliance with Article 2 of the Geneva Convention, to protect prisoners of war from public curiosity. All visits to camps by representatives of the press had to be authorized by the War Department and camp commanders were instructed to admit the press only upon notification from the War Department Bureau of Public Relations that the visit was so authorized. In no event were civilian photographers or women reporters admitted in the camps. All photographs had to be taken by military personnel. All copy and photographs, including captions to go with photographs, both for local and national media, were reviewed by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations and the Provost Marshal General's Office prior to publication. Prisoner of war camp commanders could clear for publication without reference to the War Department in Washington only news releases announcing availability of prisoners of war for contract labor, conditions under which prisoners of war worked, details of contracts executed, and information concerning escapes and apprehensions.

Members of the press could not interview prisoners or publish any personal information about individual prisoners except with the specific permission of the War Department. Articles could include descriptions of prisoner of war camps but details of the guard protection system could not be published. Articles and photographs could reveal activities and employment of prisoners both inside and outside the camp but could not contain reference to nationalistic customs and insignia within prisoner of war camps. Representatives of information media were not permitted to travel on prisoner of war trains, although members could write articles about prisoner of war trains from material gathered through interviews with Army officers responsible for the conduct of these trains, subject to clearance by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

As soon as the number of prisoners in this country became substantial, public interest increased proportionately. The mere fact that so little first hand information was permitted to appear in the press tended to intensify public curiosity on the general subject and the Provost Marshal General's Office experienced a steady increase in the receipt of inquiries from members of Congress and the general public regarding all phases of prisoner of war administration. Requests for permission for representatives of the press to visit prisoner of war camps also increased. The first inquiries from the public regarding prisoners of war were concerned primarily with their availability for labor, cost of their labor,

the manner in which they were paid, whether they could be paroled to to the custody of individuals for work or other purposes, and related questions. As the number of prisoners shipped to this country neared the hundred thousand mark, the public became more interested in the general treatment of the prisoners, the type of food they received, the type of quarters given to them, the recreational privileges accorded them, whether they could remain in the United States and become citizens, whether they could marry American women, and whether the persistent rumors concerning their coddling were true.

The majority of the criticism directed toward the prisoner of war program concerned the alleged coddling of prisoners, particularly the "Nazis." Rumors of coddling were persistent throughout 1944 and early 1945 and for a time became a subject for various radio commentators and newspapers of the more sensational variety. Each of these reports was investigated carefully and correct information was disseminated to the public not only through the newspapers but by letters written to individuals by the War Department. In few instances were charges of coddling substantiated.

The public criticism of the War Department's prisoner of war program was based on several factors, and is not without explanation. First, in the early stages, the War Department treated enemy prisoners well - undoubtedly better than the minimum requirements of the Geneva Convention - because that action was our treaty obligation under the Convention, was consistent with American principles, and was deemed advisable in view of the numbers of Americans held by the enemy. The fact of this decent treatment leaked out, and being semi-secret and clothed in mystery, was exaggerated both innocently and in some cases, apparently, maliciously, until it assumed the proportions of "coddling" and "pampering." Possibly a more forthright publicity policy would have avoided much of the criticism, but in the days of 1943 and early 1944 it was deemed proper not to publicize our prisoner of war program in order to protect Americans in German and Japanese hands. A survey of the critical letters shows that many Americans failed to grasp the connection between our decent treatment of Germans and German treatment of Americans, and shows further that the public generally accepted any contortion or exaggeration of fact as true.

In addition to the general criticism from the public regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, some dissatisfaction was experienced regarding the War Department's policy concerning press releases on this subject. The requirement that all local and national news items concerning prisoners of war be cleared by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations resulted in unnecessary delays in the publication of these stories. Several incidents occurred where newspapers which were complying with the Code of Wartime

Practices were scooped by other newspapers who did not abide by this code. This difficulty, together with the War Department's desire to encourage representatives of the press and other media to visit prisoner of war camps and publish articles containing true facts, resulted in a basic change in the public relations policy.

Beginning early in 1945, representatives of local information media were permitted to visit prisoner of war camps upon authorization by either the War Department Bureau of Public Relations or service command public relations officer. The same regulation was applied to civilian photographers representing local information media. Also, at the discretion of the camp commander, women writers and photographers were admitted to any portion of the stockade selected by the camp commander and previously policed, provided proper and adequate escorts accompanied them. In order to remove the delays for clearance which the prior system had incurred, public relations officers of service command headquarters were authorized to release articles and photographs intended for publication in local newspapers or periodicals.

In addition to this change in policy regarding clearance of articles, the War Department made a further attempt to educate the public regarding prisoners of war before the prisoners arrived in any particular locality.^{78/} It was directed that, prior to the establishment of any base or branch prisoner of war camp, an officer familiar with prisoner of war matters would visit the community where the prisoner of war camp was to be located. Newspaper editors, town or city officials, and community leaders were interviewed and appropriate press releases were prepared. The advance officer stressed that prisoners were coming to the community at the request of the local citizens. He attempted to acquaint the public with the status of prisoners while they were in the community, the manner in which they would be housed, clothed, worked, and fed, and that the policy of the United States in the treatment of prisoners was to adhere to the terms of the Geneva Convention which was a part of the supreme law of the land. Also, it was explained that, before a private contractor would be permitted to employ prisoners, the contractor would have to obtain from the War Manpower Commission a certificate that civilian labor was not available.

In addition to relaxing the restrictions on visits to prisoner of war camps by representatives of the press, an active campaign was launched to persuade certain outstanding writers for well known

^{78/} ASF Circular No. 156, 1 May 1945, Section VIII.

periodicals to visit the camps in order to obtain material and prepare articles which would offset the reports and articles prepared by sensationalists merely on the basis of rumors and false reports. Service command and camp officers were encouraged to address local organizations, such as the Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs, in order to present the true facts about the War Department's program.

The Provost Marshal General held a press conference in February 1945, and wrote an article which was published in the American Mercury, in May 1945, to explain the War Department policy with regard to prisoners of war. The American Mercury article was widely read and answered many inquiries which had arisen in the mind of the public.

A review of several folders containing many hundreds of press reports and editorials indicates that criticism reached its high point during December of 1944 when the Germans were making substantial progress in the counter-offensive in France and when the stories of the German atrocities were beginning to be current, but that after the War Department publicity showing the true facts and the steps that were taken to correct improper situations, the public press vindicated the War Department program in the majority of later editorials. Noteworthy among the favorable comment was an editorial which appeared in the Washington Post on 12 July 1945, which was very favorable to the fact that the Provost Marshal General's Office maintained strict adherence to the Geneva Convention. 79/

The Inspector General was called upon to make investigations and reports of specific instances in the prisoner of war administration, such as the mass escapes of twenty-five German prisoners of war from Prisoner of War Camp, Papago Park, Arizona.

The investigating officer concluded that the allegations made by Mr. Winchell and others that prisoners of war were being pampered in the United States were not substantiated by the facts disclosed in the investigation.

The House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, conducted an investigation of the War Department's prisoner of war activities as part of its investigation of the national war effort. The Committee surveyed the situation by means of taking testimony and considering the observations of its accredited and trained agents. Two reports were published by that Committee.

79/ Editorial, The Washington Post, 12 July 1945.

the first being House Report No. 1932, 78th Congress, Second Session, dated 30 November 1944. This report reviewed the War Department's detention of enemy prisoners and made pertinent comments on certain particular camps. Although reporting a few instances in which treatment of prisoners was too good, the Committee concluded:

"The provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929 are obviously being carried out to the letter and it is well indeed that such is the case, since the slightest deviation therefrom on our part would instantly result in more than retaliatory measures on the part of our enemies against American prisoners of war in their hands. Such a contingency must not be overlooked for a single instant."

The Committee also reviewed the facts as closely as it could with regard to the position of American prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy. Later, after hearings at which War Department, State Department, and American Red Cross personnel testified, the Committee published House Report No. 728, 79th Congress, First Session, dated 12 June 1945. This report reviewed the testimony and concluded that confusion existed between prisoner of war camps and political internment camps in Germany and that many people thought that American prisoners of war in Germany were given the same brutal treatment that political prisoners were accorded. The Committee pointed out that the Geneva Convention was, under our Constitution, part of the supreme law of the land which could not legally be abrogated, and continued:

"The State Department has attested that the Army has succeeded in 'adhering very closely to the Geneva Convention.' The Army's own summation, in the words of the Assistant The Provost Marshal General, who is responsible for prisoners of war in this country, is: 'We do not coddle prisoners of war, but we treat them fairly and firmly.'"

"For us to treat with undue harshness the Germans in our hands would be to adopt the Nazi principle of hostages. The particular men held by us are not necessarily the ones who ill-treated our men in German prison camps. To punish one man for what another has done is not an American principle."

"The policy which has been followed has clearly paid large dividends. The Red Cross has declared that the United States Army, by faithfully living up to the Geneva Convention, has enabled Red Cross authorities to demand many things in hard-pressed enemy countries which we might

not otherwise have been able to obtain. Commanders abroad have stated that reports reaching German soldiers to the effect that we are treating prisoners fairly, in spite of what their officers told them, were a great factor in breaking down the morale of German troops and making them willing, even eager, to surrender. So pronounced was this effect that General Eisenhower had safe-conduct passes dropped by the millions over enemy lines, promising treatment in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention. Had these promises not been true, and believed, victory would have been slower and harder, and a far greater number of Americans killed."

PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU

Mission.

Article 77 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 requires, that upon the outbreak of hostilities, each of the belligerent powers as well as the neutral powers which have received belligerents shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war within their territory. Each of the powers are required to inform its Information Bureau of the capture of prisoners giving all information available regarding identity and official address to which families may address mail to the prisoners. The Information Bureau is required to furnish this information immediately to the interested powers. The Information Bureau is also charged with replying to all inquiries about prisoners of war and shall maintain complete records (returns) with respect to interments, transfers, releases upon parole, repatriations, escapes, stays in hospitals, deaths, and other information incident to the administration of individual prisoners. The Information Bureau is further charged with the responsibility of receiving all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, pay vouchers, identification marks, etc., belonging to individual prisoner of war and transmitting them to the countries interested upon the prisoner's repatriation, death, or escape.

Organisation.

War Department Training Circular No. 73, dated 29 December 1941 ^{1/} established the Prisoner of War and Alien Enemy Information Bureaus under the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General. These bureaus were organized as part of the Information Branch, Aliens Division, of The Provost Marshal General's Office. It was originally set up in the National Guard Armory in Washington, D. C., occupying 20,650 square feet of floor space. Its personnel at its inception consisted of seven officers and thirty-three civilians. As the work load increased, personnel strength was increased to a peak of nineteen officers and one hundred seventy-nine civilians on 30 June 1944. Although the maintenance of personnel records was normally a responsibility of The Adjutant General, it was determined that The Provost Marshal General, having been delegated with prisoner of war responsibilities, was the logical office to maintain the Information Bureau. As Theaters of Operations were established in the field, Branch Prisoner of War Information Bureaus were established in the various theaters by the Theater Provost Marshal General.

^{1/} War Department Training Circular No. 73, dated 29 December 1941

Initially, the Information Bureau was organized in four principal sections: (1) the Alien Enemy Section dealing with alien enemies interned under executive orders of the President and those held in theaters of operations under authority of the theater commanders; (2) Enemy Section dealing with enemy prisoners of war; (3) American Military Section dealing with American prisoners of war in enemy hands; (4) American Civilian Section handling the records of American civilians interned in enemy countries.

On 1 July 1942 it became necessary to establish the Property Section to handle the personal property of enemy prisoners.

On 1 March 1943 the Information Branch was moved to the Munitions Building where it occupied space adjacent to the other offices of The Provost Marshal General. On 4 June 1943 the name of the Aliens Division was changed to the Prisoner of War Division, and the Information Branch was designated as the Information Bureau. By this time increased war activities had provided more prisoners of war and it was apparent that further expansion of the Information Bureau would be necessary.

Under authority of Army Service Forces Circular 84, dated 21 September 1943, the Property Section of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau was transferred from Washington, D. C. to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. It became apparent that the Prisoner of War Information Bureau would need to set up directory service for prisoner of war mail which was arriving in larger quantities than had been expected, thus creating a tremendous backlog in the Office of Censorship. On 1 March 1944 a German Postal Unit was established at Hearne, Texas, for the purpose of giving directly service to all German prisoner of war mail including parcel post.

On 1 March 1944 the Italian Postal Unit was established at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, to give directory service to all mail addressed to Italian prisoners of war. This action was taken to relieve the serious backlog of undeliverable prisoner of war mail held by the New York District Postal Censor. Prior to that time the District Postal in addition to censoring all prisoner of war mail had been responsible for its dispatch.

In compliance with Army Service Forces Circular 193, dated 26 June, 1944 ^{2/} the Enemy Section of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau was transferred from Washington to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, as a fourth Class installation under the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General. This action was taken to relieve the situation created by the increasing difficulty in obtaining civilian personnel. The installation was staffed by a detachment of American officers and enlisted men, supplemented by members of the Italian

^{2/} ASF Circular 193, dated 26 June 1944.

Service Unit. In moving the Enemy Section to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, it transferred all informational activities pertaining to enemy's personnel to that point, with the exception of alien enemies which was retained in the Munitions Building in Washington. It was necessary to retain the alien enemy records in Washington in order to keep those records available for ready reference by the Department of State, the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the protecting powers and other interested agencies.

On 11 December 1944, by order of The Provost Marshal General, the Prisoner of War Information Division of which the Information Bureau had been a branch, was abolished. Two divisions were created to handle the Information Bureau activities. The American Prisoner of War Information Bureau became a separate Division for the purpose of handling all information concerning American prisoners of war and civilian internees held by the enemy. The Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau likewise became a separate Division with headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Its activities pertained solely to enemy personnel held by the United States. The original information bureau and the two subsequent divisions at all times maintained the closest coordination with the Department of State, the American Red Cross, and the International Red Cross. Items of general information pertaining to American prisoners of war held by the enemy were disseminated through the medium of the Red Cross Bulletin which was sent monthly to the next of kin of each reported American prisoner of war. The American Red Cross furnished the American Information Bureau with information copies of all inquiries sent and received by the Red Cross pertaining to American civilians who were interned by the enemy. The Department of State furnished the American Information Bureau with copies of all letters, telegrams, and cables received by the State Department concerning American prisoners of war and civilian internees. In the field of enemy information, a complete exchange of information was maintained with the Special War Problems Division of the Department of State, the Swiss Legation, acting as Protecting Power, and the International Red Cross. The War Prisoners' Aid of the Young Men's Christian Association and other relief organizations cooperated by furnishing information both as to American prisoners held by the enemy and as to enemy prisoners.

The huge task of breaking down long lists of names received by cable, preparing individual files and records, obtaining all possible information and disseminating that information to next of kin of the prisoners of war required the installation of labor-saving devices and equipment. Strip files, photostats, addressographs, automatic

typewriters, inter-office communication system and other labor saving devices were developed so that by the time the peak was reached in April 1945 names and information received were reported to the interested parties without delay. From the date of its organization to VJ-Day over 855,000 pieces of mail were dispatched by the American and Enemy Information Bureaus.

Reports to the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power

The Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau was required to report to the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power the full name, and such additional information as would enable the proper identification of an enemy national in United States custody. This normally included name, rank, serial number, location, date and place of birth, and name and address of next of kin. It was found early in the war that name, rank and serial number were not sufficient to enable the identification of German and Italian prisoners of war. In addition, any change of status of a prisoner of war or an interned enemy alien was likewise reported, such as transfer,^{3/} admissions to and discharges from hospitals, ^{4/} in case of death, date, place, and cause thereof. ^{5/} The Bureau also reported to the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power the names of enemy nationals repatriated or exchanged and the names of American nationals, both prisoners of war and civilian internees, who died while in enemy custody or who were repatriated, exchanged, or otherwise returned to United States control.

It also transmitted, through the medium of the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power for delivery to United States nationals in enemy hands, messages, legal documents, certificates of rank, notice of awards and citations, and certificates of protected personnel status.

The full name and identifying information of enemy dead discovered on the field of battle, as provided in Article 4 of the Red Cross Convention, were transmitted. ^{6/}

Reports from the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power

The Prisoner of War Information Bureau received from the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power reports of the capture or apprehension of American prisoners of war and American civilians by the enemy, giving sufficient identification data which

^{3/} WD, FMG Form No. 93, Control Symbol MGA-37, 1 January 1944
"Monthly report of transfer"

^{4/} WD, FMG Form No. 92, Control Approval Symbol MGA-36, 1 January 1944, "Admissions"

^{5/} WD, AGO Form No. 19-48, 14 June 1944 "Death Certificate"

^{6/} Article 4, Red Cross Convention.

normally was name, rank and serial number. Reports as to wounds received, health, welfare, legal documents and death certificates on American nationals dying in enemy hands and reports of dead discovered on the field of battle, as provided in Article 4 of the Red Cross Convention were received by the Bureau, as were reports on camp conditions, conducted as a result of inspections made by representatives of the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power.

While the Geneva Convention specifically dealt with prisoners of war, each of the belligerents involved in World War II agreed to apply the standards of treatment provided for prisoners of war to interned civilians, to extend free mailing privileges to them, and to provide for the reporting to their government as to their status, location and health in the same manner as provided for prisoners of war.

Reports from the Protecting Power were received via the State Department.

Reports from the International Red Cross, particularly those relating to original report of capture, and subsequent transfer, death, replies to inquiries as to the location and welfare of individuals, were received by cable, confirmation copies were forwarded by air mail, or by microfilm sent air mail.

Cables relating to American nationals were sent collect from Geneva, Switzerland. A fund was made available to the United States Military Attache in Switzerland to cover the cost of cables received in Switzerland and originating in enemy countries relating to American nationals. The code name of "PINWAR" was established for the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Cables to Geneva relating to American nationals were sent prepaid, those relating to the enemy were dispatched "collect."

Enemy Prisoners of War

The Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau was charged with the War Department's responsibility under Article 77 of the Geneva Convention with respect to enemy prisoners of war in United States custody. This included their initial report of capture, subsequent transfer, repatriation, death and replies to all inquiries.

Close cooperation was maintained with the Headquarters, Italian Service Units, Department of Justice, Office of The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, District Postal Censor, Protecting Power, International Red Cross, Office of Strategic Services, and State Department.

Upon the transfer of the Enemy Section to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, authorized American personnel consisted of 11 officers,

50 enlisted men, and 2 civilians. In addition, 165 members of an Italian Service Unit, who had been specially selected for their clerical and typing ability, were assigned. As the need for additional personnel arose, eligible Italian officer prisoners of war were interviewed and selected for assignment to the Italian Service Unit Detachment at Fort Meade. As of VE-Day, personnel consisted of 11 American officers, 60 American enlisted men, 4 American civilians, 174 Italian officers, and 118 Italian enlisted men. Italian Service Unit personnel were under the jurisdiction of the Third Service Command for administrative purposes, the Bureau being the using service. The history of the Italian Service Units is covered in the chapter on "Prisoner of War Operations."

Details of Italian personnel, varying in size from 30 to 100, were dispatched daily for night work in the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. Because of limited space available in the Enemy Bureau at Fort Meade and in order to assure maximum production during peak periods, it became necessary to work night shifts at various times by the shuffling of personnel from one duty to another.

A visible alphabetical index of all enemy prisoners of war in United States custody was currently maintained, showing name, rank, internment serial number, and location. A cross-reference file was kept numerically by internment serial number against the name. In addition, a 201-file on each prisoner was maintained. This contained one copy of the basic personnel record, PMG Form No. 2 or 2-1, together with copies of any correspondence relating to the particular prisoner. 7/

The reporting of the initial capture of enemy prisoners of war was decentralized to the European or Pacific Theater whenever possible. The availability of a representative of the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross Delegate in the theater was the determining factor in making reports direct by the theater or in forwarding reports to Washington where they were cabled to Geneva, Switzerland.

The procedure for reporting enemy prisoners of war to the International Red Cross and Protecting Power varied somewhat according to the theater of capture. Name, rank, internment serial number, date and place of birth, and name and address of next of kin were communicated either by list, microfilm or cable. The name, rank

7/ WD, PMG Form No. 2, 9 December 1941, "Basic Personnel Record (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)"; and WD, PMG Form No. 2-1, 11 March 1944, "Prisoner of War Preliminary Record." PMG Form No. 2 was a fingerprint card similar to that used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Form 2-1 was similar to PMG Form 2 except that the top of the face of the form carried detailed biographical and military data.

and serial number of German and Italian prisoners of war was insufficient to enable identification by the respective governments. For all prisoners of war in custody in continental United States, PMG Form No. 2 was executed in triplicate. One copy remained in the camp files where the prisoner of war was located, one copy was sent to the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau, and one copy was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation which was charged with the responsibility of apprehending escaped prisoners of war in continental United States.

In order to provide for a more expeditious handling of large numbers of prisoners of war where time and facilities did not permit the processing of prisoners on PMG Form 2, thereby facilitating the receipt in Geneva of their names, a form was developed known as 2-1 which could be filled out by the prisoners themselves. This form was designed so that several copies could be microfilmed at one time by exposing the first two lines of the form which contained all the essential information to report his capture to the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power. A copy of this film was made available to them for this purpose by the Theater Provost Marshal and constituted the initial report of capture. 8/ This film was sent air mail to Switzerland and there cabled to the German government. A copy of this was also sent to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Washington, where the name of the prisoner of war was recorded.

Upon the transfer of a prisoner of war from the theater to custody in Continental United States, initial rosters giving essential information were prepared by the camp receiving new prisoners of war. This information was recorded in the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

Records of transfer within continental United States were likewise reported to the Bureau and locator records corrected accordingly. In addition, reports of gains and losses were reported by the camps and as a further check, quarterly rosters were submitted.

In March 1944, the German Postal Unit, at Prisoner of War Camp, Hearne, Texas, and the Italian Postal Unit, at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, were established, in cooperation with the Office of Censorship, to relieve the serious backlog of undelivered prisoner-of-war mail held by the New York District Postal Censor. Prior to that time, the District Postal Censor, in addition to censoring all prisoner-of-war letter mail, had been responsible for its dispatch. The censorship of parcel post mail was, and is, the responsibility of the prisoner-of-war camp commanders. The Postal Unit originally was operated by approximately 300 German commissioned and noncommissioned

8/ Direct reports of initial captures were made by the European and Pacific Theaters.

prisoners under the supervision of American officer and enlisted personnel. In July 1945, it was transferred to Fort Meade, where the two units now function as part of the Enemy Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Beginning on 1 July 1945 the German Postal Unit was operated by 100 Italian Service Unit members, and the Italian Postal Unit was operated by 63 Italian Service Unit members, all under the supervision of 15 American military personnel. At the close of September arrangements were being made to replace the Italian personnel by German to permit the repatriation of the Italians.

Since their inception, the postal units have furnished directory service for all foreign mail and parcel post received in the United States addressed to German and Italian prisoners of war, and the activities of the District Postal Censor have been limited entirely to the censorship of mail. To date, the German Postal Unit has processed 10,609,220 letters and 62,022 bags of parcel post (each bag contains approximately 11 parcels). The Italian Unit has processed a total of 3,553,060 letters and 22,295 pieces of parcel post.

When the German unit was transferred to Fort Meade, it was operated by Italian Service Unit personnel. In October, 1945, in accordance with the program to repatriate all Italian Service Unit personnel as soon as practicable, both units were operated by German Prisoners of War.

All money found on enemy prisoners of war at the time of capture was taken from them and placed in an envelope with the name of the prisoner and his internment serial number placed on the outside of the envelope. These envelopes were forwarded to the Enemy Bureau where they were stored pending disposition at the time of repatriation.

All property of deceased or repatriated prisoners of war was forwarded to the Property Section. Disposition was effected by turning over to the International Red Cross delegate such property as was permitted to be returned to the next of kin.

Large quantities of unidentified property and money taken from prisoners of war were forwarded to the Property Section for disposition. Many inquiries from prisoners of war relative to property and money taken from them were handled and disposed of with a view of returning to the owner all identified property. Property considered as contraband, such as articles of military equipment, including compasses, field glasses, cameras, and weapons were turned in for salvage.

Reports of hospitalization were furnished the International Red

Cross and the Protecting Power.9/

All burial records of enemy dead, made by the Memorial Branch, Office of The Quartermaster General, were routed through the Bureau, so that the name, date and place of burial could be communicated to the belligerents concerned through the International Red Cross and the Protecting Power in accordance with Article 4, Red Cross Convention. All deaths of prisoners of war occurring while in United States custody were likewise reported and a copy of the official I. R. C. death certificate, showing date and cause of death and place of burial was forwarded to the International Red Cross and Protecting Power. 10/ The names of 129,635 German prisoners who were killed in action or died in United States custody were thus transmitted.

Transfers of prisoners of war from United States custody to the custody of allied governments were recorded.

Upon the collapse of Germany, the Swiss no longer represented Germany as the Protecting Power. Reports continued to be submitted to the International Red Cross as before.

Communications were received from various countries, relative to prisoners of war and civilian internees. These were answered under prisoner of war frank.

The names of 1,969,027 enemy personnel were recorded and an estimated additional 350,000 Germans were unreported in the European Theater as of VJ-Day.

American Prisoners of War

The American Prisoner of War Information Bureau maintained all records and handled all correspondence relative to all United States military personnel and all other United States nationals in enemy hands.

The Military Section, American Prisoner of War Information Bureau, was charged with the War Department's responsibility in connection with American military personnel in enemy hands, which included all members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine, held as prisoners of war.

In general, the mission of the Section was to receive information relative to American prisoners of war and to disseminate that information to the next of kin and appropriate government agencies,

9/ WD, FMG Form No. 92, Control Approval Symbol MGA-36, 1 January 1944, "Admissions"

10/ WD, AGO Form No. 19-48, 14 June 1944 "Death Certificate"

and to answer all inquiries in regard thereto.

The procedure for the reception, recording, and dissemination of information on United States prisoners of war in enemy hands required close coordination with the following agencies: Casualty Branch, Adjutant General's Office; Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department; Casualty Section, Marine Corps; War Shipping Administration; Office of the High Commissioner, Philippines; American Red Cross; State Department; Federal Communications Commission; Post Office Department; International Red Cross Delegate in Washington; Office of Censorship; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands; Memorial Branch, Office of The Quartermaster General; and the Apostolic Delegate in Washington.

The International Red Cross at Geneva, Switzerland, reported by cable the name, rank, serial number, and location of each American prisoner of war held by the enemy. The Prisoner of War Information Bureau duplicated this cable and forwarded copies to the various services concerned for division of duties pertaining to Prisoner of War Information Bureau. 11/ The Adjutant General, and other Government agencies, who identified the prisoner of war, changed his status from that of missing in action to prisoner of war; notified the next of kin of that fact and forwarded to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau a copy of such notification. Upon the basis of this notification giving the name, address of the next of kin, the full name, rank and serial number of the prisoner of war, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau then advised the next of kin as to how communications should be addressed, how personal and tobacco parcels could be sent, and such other information as became available with regard to health, location and other matters of general interest relating to the prisoners of war. 12/

A general information circular relating to Germany and to Japan were inclosed in the first letter to the next of kin. 13/

In order to provide a ready reference for the purpose of answering telephone inquiries which could be easily duplicated, a visible filing system was devised on which the names of all American prisoners of war in enemy custody were recorded alphabetically as received.

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- 11/ Division of duties pertaining to Prisoners of War Information Bureau, the Adjutant General, and other Government Agencies.
- 12/ ASF Mailing Instructions - Germany, revised 1 April 1945, form 25-33444-30M; FMGO Prisoner of War Information Bureau Mailing Instructions - Japan (civilian internees) revised May 1944, form 24-84229 ABC-12M; and form 24-84228 ABCD-25M - Japanese Prisoners of War.
- 13/ ASF Information Circular #10 - Germany, revised 1 April 1945 25-33445-30M.
ASF Information Circular #11 - Japanese, revised April 1944 24-81456 ABCD-5M; ASF Information Circular #11-C - Japanese, revised April 1944, 24-81456-ABCD-2,500.

The color of the strip indicated the detaining power, and, as new information was received, necessary additions were made to the strip. Information contained on a strip indicated the name, rank, serial number, prisoner of war number, branch of service, present location, wounds, and the date of last information. This master list was duplicated photographically, copies being furnished to the Red Cross, Chief Postal Censor, Theater Commanders and other interested agencies. Lists and reports received in the office from the Protecting Power, International Red Cross, from the Theaters, World Y. M. C. A., the Vatican, and other agencies relating to prisoners of war were checked against this master list.

This list served the purpose of checking all incoming correspondence written about persons who were prisoners of war or were believed to be prisoners of war.

A 201-file was maintained on each identified prisoner of war which contained all information ascertained while a prisoner of war. Upon return to United States military control, the 201-file was transferred to the particular service concerned for inclusion in the individual's file.

The work of the section being of a casualty nature, General Allen W. Gullion, The Provost Marshal General, having in mind the emotional stress suffered by the next of kin of an American prisoner of war, particularly from the time they were first notified of missing in action to the receipt of the report that they were prisoners of war, directed that all correspondence with the next of kin be as personal in character as possible. General Archer L. Lerch, the successor to General Gullion as Provost Marshal General, reiterated this policy; consequently, individually typed letters to the next of kin of American nationals in enemy hands were used exclusively, with the exception of change of status notification forms which were used from February 1943 to V-J Day. 14/ The need for the prompt dissemination to the next of kin of information relative to prisoners of war, the tremendous increase in the number of prisoners, coupled with the War Department's policy of promptly reporting enemy prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention, presented acute personnel shortages during peak periods.

In an effort to keep the work of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau on a current basis, officers and civilian personnel from other offices within the Provost Marshal General's Office were from time to time loaned temporarily to the Bureau.

Employees of the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau put in over 16,000 hours of overtime during the period prior to V-J Day. Considerable Sunday work was accomplished by the loan of employees from other offices within the War Department. Volunteer

14/ Change of Status notification form 24-63094-ABCD

work was performed by relatives of prisoners of war for which no compensation was paid. As military operations against Germany were intensified, the personnel situation became so acute that it became necessary for the American Military Section to work on a twenty-four hour schedule, utilizing 100 specially trained Italian officers, who were members of an Italian Service Unit at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, two nights a week.

In order to simplify censorship difficulties both in the United States and in enemy territory, a special correspondence form to be used in corresponding with prisoners of war was developed and distributed through postal channels. 15/ This form was used for communicating with all Allied nationals in enemy hands.

The sending of parcel labels to the next of kin constituted a major function of the office. The Foreign Economic Administration granted a special license known as GPW-2 which permitted the next of kin to send certain designated articles to American prisoners of war in enemy custody.

A limitation of one eleven pound parcel every sixty days was imposed. The Prisoner of War Information Bureau acted as the control agency, issuing parcel labels to the designated next of kin every sixty days. 16/ This label was transferable at the option of the next of kin.

On a reciprocal basis, parcel labels were issued to British, Canadian, Dutch, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war, whose next of kin resided in the United States. The procedure, briefly, was that upon certification to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau by the National Red Cross Society of the country involved that a certain person was a bona fide prisoner of war in enemy hands, that the next of kin resided in the United States, or that through inability the next of kin was unable to send a parcel from his or her home country, parcel labels privileges were relinquished and transferred to a person in the United States, who would act as next of kin.

By special arrangement, the Canadian label for Canadian prisoners of war having next of kin in the United States was sent to the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau, whereupon an American label was reissued in lieu thereof.

As a result of arrangements made with tobacco manufacturers, the Office of Censorship and the German government permitted parcels containing tobacco products only to be sent direct by the manufacturer

15/ WD, FMG Form 112, 1 December 1944, "Prisoner of War Post".

16/ Parcel Mailing Instructions, Form 25-11825-20M, revised 1 August 1944, Label, F.E.A. License "G-PW-2-1", issued to the next of kin.

to American prisoners of war without censorship examination. The tobacco manufacturers agreed to sell their products at cost and the Treasury Department required that no tax be paid. The issuance of tobacco parcels was limited to one tobacco parcel containing 5 cartons of cigarettes or its equivalent in other tobacco products every 30 days. The content of the package was later doubled so as to permit the sending of six cartons of cigarettes or its equivalent in other tobacco products every 30 days. In order to effect a control in mailing tobacco parcels a label known as GWP-2-Special, with an order to the tobacco company attached was issued.^{17/} This arrangement remained in effect until the cessation of hostilities with Germany on 8 May 1945.

Books were permitted to be sent to American prisoners of war.^{18/}

The Japanese government consistently refused to grant safe conduct for vessels carrying next of kin parcels, relief supplies, and mail to American prisoners of war held by them. Arrangements were made to ship next of kin parcels and relief supplies on the Gripsholm which had been chartered from the Swedish government to carry civilian repatriates to and from Japan. Two such shipments were made via this ship.

After lengthy negotiations by the State Department, an arrangement was concluded with the Japanese government whereby relief supplies for American prisoners of war in the Orient were picked up by the Japanese at certain points in Russia.

The Office of the Chief Postal Censor was furnished the name, rank and location of every reported American prisoner of war or interned civilian. Incoming mail originating in enemy territory was checked against these names. Where incoming mail was received from persons not reported in enemy custody or a change in camp location was indicated or wounds were mentioned, it was forwarded to the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau where a record of the name, rank, prisoner of war number and camp location was made and the record of the Adjutant General or other service changed to indicate a change of status from missing in action to that of prisoner of war and before the communication was forwarded to the addressee. In the case of wounds, the communication was photostated and a copy placed in the 301-file of the individual.

The Office of Censorship was advised of all deaths or liberations of prisoners of war reported in enemy custody.

Recommendations for promotions, awards and decorations made by the senior American officer in various German prisoner of war camps effecting American prisoners of war were received via the Protecting Power and forwarded to the appropriate office for action.

^{17/} Tobacco Mailing Instructions, PMG Form 028, 1 March 1945.
^{18/} Program for the Distribution of Books to Prisoners of War issued by Chief Postal Censor, 3 March 1943.

Data on treatment and physical condition and camp rosters were received from the Protecting Power. This information was checked against existing records and the next of kin advised.

Following the policy of The Provost Marshal General to make available to the next of kin all information about an American prisoner of war, all shortwave radio programs originating in enemy territory and mentioning American prisoners of war were monitored by the Federal Communications Commission. The names were recorded and checked against the prisoner of war records and the next of kin advised by telegram of the text of the message.

Reports on camp visitations by representatives of the Protecting Power, International Red Cross and World Y. M. C. A., were digested. These reports covered adequacy of food, quarters, clothing, medical facilities, camp sanitation, recreation facilities, religious and educational opportunities. Maps were maintained showing known locations of all prisoner of war camps for the dissemination of this information to the next of kin. The camp locations were also sent to the theater commander for his information and guidance.

Machine record cards were maintained on every prisoner of war showing his name, rank, serial number, branch of service, detaining power and camp location. This card was made in duplicate from reports received from the International Red Cross; one copy of the card remaining in the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, the other copy being sent daily to the theater from which the prisoner was captured so that a roster of the men at each particular camp would be available.

All reports of violent deaths of American prisoners of war in enemy hands, court martials and sentences while a prisoner of war, were recorded and made available to the War Crimes Commission.

Communications were received from prisoners of war through the International Red Cross or the Protecting Power relative to allotments, insurance and change of beneficiary. These matters were referred to the particular government agency concerned for appropriate action.

Captured enemy documents relating to American prisoners of war were translated, digested and made available to interested agencies.

Notification of awards of decorations and citations were forwarded to the State Department for transmission to the prisoner, as were certificates of rank, and protected personnel status.

The complete files of the Wehrmachtsaufkundsstelle für Kriegsverluste und Kriegsgefangene (Information Center for War Losses), located at Saalfeld and Meiningen, Germany, was captured intact with

all German operating personnel by American troops. This establishment maintained records of both Allied and German personnel; it transmitted casualty reports through neutral channels to Allied governments. This office performed identical functions with the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. The Departments concerned with records and personal effects were reopened 23 April 1945 under the supervision of The Adjutant General, F. T. O., employing German personnel to complete unfinished work. The records were then sent to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau where they were checked against existing records and the necessary corrections made. German hospital records, death records, and reports of initial capture relating to American prisoners of war were thus received and processed.

Claims for labor performed by American prisoners of war while in German or Italian custody, and money taken from them at time of capture were referred to the Claims Section, Judge Advocate General's Office for processing.

Copies of expeditionary force messages and other messages from liberated prisoners of war were routed through this office so that change of status from prisoner of war to return to military control could be made. 19/

Because of an almost total lack of communication from the Orient, an arrangement was concluded with the Japanese government by the American Red Cross and the International Red Cross whereby each American national in Japanese custody would be permitted to send one 25-word message to his or her next of kin in the United States at government cost. These messages, originating in Japan were sent via International Red Cross facilities to the American Red Cross, where they were turned over to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau for delivery to the addressee. The cost of these messages was borne by the War Department for Army personnel, the Navy Department for Navy personnel, and the State Department for American civilians.

Information was made available to the American camp leaders in prisoner of war camps operated by the enemy, through the medium of the Prisoner of War Information Bulletin and distributed by the Protecting Power, as to pay and allowances, allotments, purchase of bonds, family allowances, government insurance, commercial insurance benefits under the Soldier and Sailors Relief Act, taxes, powers of attorney and promotions of prisoners of war. 20/

Reports of burial of American personnel dying in enemy hands or discovered on the field of battle (TOTENLISTS) were routed through the Memorial Division, Office of The Quartermaster General.

19/ Western Union Expeditionary Forces message form.

20/ POW Information Bulletin, Revised April 1944, issued by POW Information Bureau, Washington, D. C.

As a result of military operations in Germany, approximately 85,000 American prisoners of war were in German custody at one time or another. Of this number officially ascertained to have been prisoners of war, 1,744 died while in custody.

The total number of deaths of United States military personnel in Japanese hands, as of 1 October 1945, as reported by the International Red Cross, was 6,585. Failure on the part of the Japanese to furnish proper food was responsible for a large number of these deaths. 21/

Next of Kin Meetings

During 1944 and 1945 certain officers assigned to the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau were detailed to attend meetings held under the auspices of the American Red Cross as guest speakers. These meetings were attended by next of kin and relatives of American prisoners of war and civilian internees in enemy hands. Because of the nature of these meetings many next of kin and relatives of those members of our Armed Forces who were in a missing in action status at the time also attended. In February 1945 a nationwide tour by air of 10 repatriated American prisoners of war and 2 escapees from the Japanese was organized by the Army Air Force. A representative of the American Prisoner of War Information Bureau accompanied this tour as guest speaker. Thirty cities throughout the United States from coast to coast were visited and approximately 125,000 people attended these meetings. The purpose of these meetings was to bolster the morale of the home front by explaining to relatives of American nationals in enemy hands the function of The Provost Marshal General's Office in disseminating information and the maintenance of records pertaining to enemy-held American nationals. Much good was accomplished as evidenced by the thousands of letters which were received by the Bureau after these meetings. A conservative estimate of the total number of people who attended all meetings held by the American Red Cross at which a representative of the Provost Marshal General's Office was present would be 150,000.

The American Civilian

The Civilian Section, American Prisoner of War Information Bureau, was charged with receiving reports from the International Red Cross and Protecting Power on American civilians in enemy hands, the dissemination of such information to the next of kin in the United States and interested government agencies, the issuance of the initial mailing instructions, 22/ and parcel labels to the next of

- 21/ Deaths- American Prisoners of War - Japan, based on U.S. Cables.
22/ ASF Mailing Instructions - Germany, revised 1 April 1945, form 25-33444-30M; PMGO Prisoner of War Information Bureau Mailing Instructions - Japan (civilian internees) revised May 1944, form 24-84229 ABC-12M; and form 24-84228 ABCD-25M- Japanese Prisoner of War.

kin, answering all inquiries relative thereto, and advising the next of kin of their repatriation, liberation or death.

Notification to the next of kin of death or liberation of civilian employees of the government was made by the government agency concerned. In the case of all other interned civilians, notification was made by the Civilian Section, Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

In the Philippine Islands, a considerable number of American nationals remained at large, either with guerilla forces or were never apprehended by the Japanese. Upon their return to United States jurisdiction, their next of kin in the United States were advised of that fact.

Up to and including VJ-Day, 18,350 cases of American civilians in the hands of the enemy were handled.

The matter of ascertaining the next of kin of persons claiming American citizenship and interned as such presented many difficulties. It was necessary to consult the passport application files of the State Department as it was found that in many cases persons claimed American citizenship as a matter of convenience; consequently there existed no next of kin in the United States.

The names and identifying information of foreign nationals liberated by the United States Forces were compiled and forwarded to the State Department for transmission to the particular government concerned.

On account of an almost total lack of communication between American civilians in enemy custody in the Orient and their next of kin in the United States, a plan was worked out with the Signal Corps and the State Department whereby upon the liberation of an American civilian from Japanese custody, the next of kin would be entitled to send a twenty-five word message and to receive a reply thereto at government expense.

Over 2700 messages were sent to liberated American nationals in the Philippine Islands.

Information as to the internment and date of liberation of American civilians in enemy hands were communicated to the Social Security Board, Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance, for their guidance in the payments and discontinuance of payments of dependency benefits.

In general the same service was performed for American civilians interned by the enemy as was performed for American prisoners of war in enemy hands.

Alien Enemy Section

At the outbreak of hostilities each of the belligerents promptly interned enemy nationals found within their respective countries. The reporting of alien enemies detained under Presidential Proclamation and subsequent order for permanent internment or release after a hearing initially constituted the work of the Information Bureau.

Initially every alien enemy ordered interned for the duration was processed on FMG Form No. 2 (Basic Personnel Record) the same as a prisoner of war, including fingerprints and photographs, front and profile view. A personal file (201) was opened for each civilian internee, which contained one copy of the Basic Personnel Record together with all orders and correspondence pertaining to the case. This Basic Personnel Record was prepared in quadruplicate. One copy was placed in the 201 file of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, one in the fingerprint file, one remained at the camp where the internee was held and one was sent to the Department of Justice.

In addition to alien enemies ordered interned for the duration, cases involving enemy civilians captured by our forces were also handled by the Alien Section of the Information Bureau. This included several thousand Japanese civilians captured in Saipan, Tinnian and Guam and other occupied areas in the Orient. The total number of cases handled as of VJ-Day was approximately 54,000. In addition the names of all Japanese aliens in war relocation centers were likewise recorded and reported to the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross.

In addition an alphabetical file was maintained and kept current on flex-o-line strips, showing the name of the internee, his internment serial number, location, status and occupational classification as determined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles published by the U. S. Employment Service.

The country of origin of civilian internees was indicated by the color of the strip, blue for Germany, green for Italy, and yellow for Japan.

A numerical strip file, using the internment serial number, cross referenced against the name, was also maintained. Lack of personnel and increased volume of work compelled the abandonment of the occupational classification in the strip file, as well as the numerical strip files. Upon the transfer of custody of our civilian internees in continental United States from the Army to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, the fingerprint classification file of each internee was discontinued and a copy was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for inclusion in the general finger-print files of that office.

The fingerprint files on all enemy prisoners of war were likewise transferred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, inasmuch as that Bureau was charged with the apprehension of all escaped enemy prisoners of war within continental United States.

The procedure for the reporting of interned alien enemies was as follows: the name, date and place of birth of the internee, the name and address of the next of kin, and his present location was cabled to the International Red Cross, copies of this information being made available to the Protecting Power.

Inquiries as to health, status and welfare of internees were replied to giving available information.

Reports of transfer from one camp to another were made to the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross. Cables were sent collect to Geneva, each of the belligerents having made arrangements for the transmission from Geneva of messages concerning their own nationals. Reports of death were likewise cabled, these included the name, date of death, cause of death, and were followed by an official death certificate where death occurred in United States and while in United States custody. The personal effects of the deceased were disposed of to the next of kin where possible, otherwise, they were turned over to the representatives of the Protecting Power or the International Red Cross for transmission to the next of kin. Close liaison was maintained with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Department of Justice.

The Japanese American Branch, Office of The Provost Marshal General and the Headquarters, Western Defence Command, were assisted in establishing the identity and location of Japanese civilian internees, and in determining their exclusion status.

RE-EDUCATION OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

Early in 1944 representatives of the War Department and the State Department exchanged opinions informally concerning the advisability of undertaking discreet measures toward the creation among German prisoners of war in American custody of the maximum possible understanding of and sympathy for American traditions, institutions, and ways of life and thought.

The War Department recognized the presence of 370,000 German prisoners of war in the United States as an unprecedented opportunity to develop in the German citizenry a nucleus of democratic thinking and respect for America. To force propaganda upon the prisoners would have been illegal under the terms of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. However, Article 17 of the Convention provided that "So far as possible, belligerents shall encourage intellectual diversions and sports organized by prisoners of war." It was decided that if selected media for intellectual diversion were made available in the camps the curiosity of the prisoners concerning the United States and its institutions would provide the means for their re-education.

On 30 March 1944 the Secretary of State, in a letter to the Secretary of War, suggested that a program be established under the control of the military establishment for the reorientation of German prisoners of war. 1/ The Secretary of War replied to the Secretary of State concurring in the suggestion of the latter and stating that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and The Provost Marshal General, as the representatives of the War Department on the Interdepartmental Board on Prisoners of War, would meet with the other members of the Board and seek to arrive at mutually agreeable recommendations for such a program and its early implementation. 2/ Both Departments agreed that the program should receive no publicity.

While the project and methods for its implementation were under consideration by the Interdepartmental Board (composed of representatives of the State, Justice, Navy, and War Departments) the Office of the Chief of Staff in a memorandum to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, directed that such a program be established

1/ Sec'y of State ltr, file no. SWP, 30 March 44, re: Establishment of a re-educational program among German prisoners of war.

2/ Sec'y of War ltr, file no. WDGP 383.6, 8 April 44.

under the jurisdiction of The Provost Marshal General and directed that a "highly capable officer be recommended to organize and direct it." 3/ The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, directed the Morale Services Division to select such an officer, and directed The Provost Marshal General, in collaboration with the Director, Morale Services Division, to prepare a program for the reorientation of German prisoners of war.

A staff study recommending policy and procedure for the reorientation program, based on recommendations of the Interdepartmental Board and on the survey of camps, was submitted by The Provost Marshal General on 23 August 1944 to the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. This staff study was reviewed by a subcommittee of the Interdepartmental Board, and approved with certain recommendations. The staff study and the recommendations of the subcommittee were forwarded by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, to the Chief of Staff for approval. The Deputy Chief of Staff approved the staff study with the recommendations of the subcommittee on 6 September 1944.

Meanwhile The Provost Marshal General had established the Special Projects Branch in the Prisoner of War Division, to operate the program as approved. In September this Branch (composed then of seven officers) was moved to New York City as a class IV installation so that libraries, publishers, motion picture producers, and New York offices of welfare agencies and the Office of War Information would be accessible.

The objective of the program had by now crystalized sufficiently to permit its definition in more practical terms. The prisoners would be given facts, objectively presented but so selected and assembled as to correct misinformation and prejudices surviving Nazi conditioning. The facts, rather than being forced upon them, would be made available through such media as literature, motion pictures, newspapers, music, art, and educational courses. Two types of facts were needed: those which would educate the Germans concerning the power and resources of America and its democracy; and those which would convince them of the impracticality and viciousness of the Nazi position. If a large variety of facts could be presented convincingly, perhaps the German prisoners of war might understand and believe historical and ethical truth as generally conceived by Western civilization, might come to respect the American people and their ideological values, and upon repatriation to Germany might form the nucleus of a new German ideology which will reject militarism and totalitarian controls and will advocate a democratic system of government.

3/ AC/S memorandum, file no. WDGA 383.6, 22 May 44, subject: "Reorientation of German Prisoners of War."

Procurement and Training of Personnel

The most pressing problem facing the new Branch in September 1944 was the procurement of qualified personnel. Within the Branch, a large variety of talents and special abilities were required: men with experience in the motion picture industry, former journalists, experts on both German and American literature, officers with previous experience in prisoner of war camps, and former educators. For most of these vacancies an officer was needed who could read and write German fluently. Nine field grade officers were needed to supply each service command with a liaison officer highly qualified to administer the program throughout a large area. A company grade officer was needed for each base prisoner of war camp who spoke German fluently, who had a college education, preferably in liberal arts, and who had imagination and good judgment. The success of the program, it was recognized, depended largely upon the abilities of the man administering it to the prisoners themselves. It was decided that this officer should be called the Assistant Executive Officer of his prisoner of war camp.

Initially an attempt was made to procure 150 qualified officers by reviewing special files made available by the Adjutant General's Office and requesting individuals by name. It was discovered, however, that a large percentage of German speaking personnel had been absorbed by Allied Military Government and Military Intelligence. As a result, very few officers were procured by individual request. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, therefore, ordered the three major commands to supply a certain quota of qualified personnel. The German language qualification was listed as a preference but not as a requirement. Subsequently, the Army Service Forces supplied 60 officers, the Army Air Forces 50 officers, and the Ground Forces 40 officers. Of this number, only about 30 per cent were determined to be qualified for assignment, even after reduction of the qualifications to a minimum practical requirement. The few officers previously procured by examination of their records proved, as a general rule, to be superior to the officers selected from a blanket shipment by the major commands.

The officers thus procured were ordered to the Branch Office in New York City on temporary duty. After an initial screening, these officers were trained at orientation conferences designed to teach them about the German people, National Socialism, prisoner of war camp administration, and methods for implementation of the program. Officers rejected were returned to their original commands and officers retained were assigned either to the Office of The Provost Marshal General or to service commands.

The first orientation conference was held at the Branch Office in New York City, 16-26 October 1944, and was attended by officers procured by individual request. Three conferences were held at

Fort Slocum, New York, 16-29 November 1944, 13-23 December 1944, and 22 January - 2 February 1945, to train the successive groups of officers received from the three major forces. A fifth conference was held at Fort Slocum 14-25 May 1946 to train additional assistant executive officers and enlisted assistants to the assistant executive officers, supplied by the service commands.

Each student at the orientation conference was required to complete a personal history statement and a pretest. These forms were used as the basis for initial screening of the students. Each student was assigned an advisor, an officer of the Division. A rating sheet was filled out by each advisor, covering the general qualifications of his student advisees. At the close of each conference students were given a comprehensive examination and were required to submit a hypothetical staff study concerning reorientation of prisoners of war. At the close of the conference a board of advisors met to review the qualifications of each student and to select an assignment commensurate with his abilities.

Officers and civilian specialist of the Division presented lectures and conducted discussion and seminar groups at all conferences. Subject matter covered by the orientation conferences was as follows:

1. Administrative, intelligence, and security clearances
2. Mission and background of the program
3. German history
4. Education in Germany
5. German Army
6. Educational activities in prisoner of war camps
7. Field problems
8. Review of publications
9. Book procurement
10. Prisoner of war chaplain activities
11. Prisoner of war intelligence activities
12. Der Ruf and camp newspapers
13. Staff functions and visiting organizations
14. Films as a medium; Nazi film propaganda. The following films were shown: Hitler Junge Quex, Der Grosse Koenig, Baptism of Fire, Triumph des Willens, and Atrocity Bulletin as contained in Combat Bulletin No. 53
15. Public relations
16. German propaganda
17. Psychology of the prisoner of war
18. Psychology of the Germans
19. Orientation and attitude of the United States guard personnel
20. Other media (art, music, theater, radio)
21. We or They? Ideology of the two worlds
22. V-E Day problems and their carry over
23. Introduction to staff study

24. Role of the State Department in the orientation program
25. Prisoner of war administration
26. Security of prisoner of war camps

As a part of the program, conducted tours were made to typical prisoner of war camps in the vicinity to acquaint the prospective assistant executive officers with a prisoner of war camp. The officers in charge of these groups usually had had previous experience in prisoner of war camps.

Intermediate orientation programs of one week's duration were conducted occasionally within the Division to orient officers who reported for duty in small groups. Each new officer reporting for either temporary or permanent duty filled out the personal history statement and completed the initial pretest. He was told about the functions of the Division and a kit of training material was issued for his study. After this preliminary processing, interviews were arranged with Branch Chiefs and other key personnel of the Division. It was the responsibility of the interviewing officers to cover all material that had been presented at previous orientation conferences. At the conclusion of the intermediate training and after a staff study had been submitted and a comprehensive examination taken, the trainee was interviewed by a board of officers to decide on a suitable assignment.

The Division procured and trained a total of 262 officers and 111 enlisted men for assignment to service command headquarters, prisoner of war camps, and to its own staff. Of 25 officers reporting for the First Orientation Conference, four were assigned to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, 17 were assigned as assistant executive officers at prisoner of war camps and four were rejected as unsuitable. Out of the total of 126 officers that reported for the second conference, 28 were rejected and 98 were accepted for assignment to service command headquarters and prisoner of war camps. Of this total of 98, eight majors and one captain were assigned to service command headquarters and six officers of company grade and one field grade officer were assigned to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division. Forty-six officers attended the Third Orientation Conference; 15 officers were rejected, and 30 were accepted for prisoner of war camp assignments and one officer was assigned to the Division. Of 28 officers attending the Fourth Orientation Conference, two were assigned to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, and the remaining 26 were assigned to the service commands. Forty-nine officers and 113 enlisted men attended the Fifth Orientation Conference. Of the 113 enlisted men, two were rejected as unsuitable for assignment and the remaining 111 were returned to the service commands for assignment as assistants to the assistant executive officers at prisoner of war camps. Out of the total of 49 officers, four were retained by the Division for a special screening assignment and one was assigned to the staff.

The Factory

As early as August 1944, the decision was made to create a special camp where specially selected prisoners of war would be detained and assigned work for the purpose of assisting, in the most practical sense, the re-education program. This camp came to be known to all personnel concerned as the "Factory." This name indicated its purpose: to help in the manufacture of essential materials.

A former Civilian Conservation Corps camp, with a capacity for 150 men, located near Van Etten, New York, was selected as a site for the Factory and officially opened on 31 October 1944. This camp was designated a class I installation, under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Second Service Command. Two officers, assigned by the Second Service Command and approved by the Director, Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, were responsible for the security and chief administration of the installation. The Prisoner of War Special Projects Division was responsible for the job assignment of each individual prisoner. A representative of the Division was charged with the supervision of all Special Projects activities. The jobs carried out by the prisoners were designated as class IV activities. One officer was assigned as compound commander. He was also called Assistant Executive Officer as a matter of form, although his functions were not always similar to the functions carried out by assistant executive officers in other camps.

In order to provide a more accessible and a more favorable geographic location, the Factory was transferred to Rhode Island on 1 March 1945. The new installation chosen was Fort Philip Kearney, a former Coast Artillery Post and part of the Harbor Defenses, Narragansett Bay, located within the First Service Command.

The Factory began operation on 1 November 1944. A small group of prisoners who had been observed carefully for many months in different camps and who were cleared by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, became the spearhead of the organization to be established.

Factory prisoners included both officer and enlisted ranks. In the early days some difficulties between the two groups were encountered, but these were dissipated by their realization of their program. The officer prisoners, all of them lieutenants with the exception of one major, were instrumental in bringing about a basis for mutual work by considering others their equals, and by renouncing their Wehrmacht rank. After a few weeks a program existed, jobs were assigned, and long range plans were made for the future. The morale was high and provided a real basis for concrete production.

It should be emphasized that the prisoners volunteered for their new assignment and that they did not receive any promise of special

treatment or early repatriation. They were treated "firmly but fairly", governed themselves democratically as far as possible and within the provisions of existing regulations. The camp spokesman had a free hand to deal with infractions through his committee of governors. No major infractions occurred, however, and there were no escapes or attempted escapes. The prisoners described their morale and willingness as the "Van Etten Spirit", which later became the "Kearney Spirit."

It had been agreed that the prisoners would undertake, under guidance and supervision, translations into the German language of program aids and materials, including the editing and production of a prisoner of war magazine for periodic circulation to all camps. Based on this premise, the following main jobs were established.

1. Continuous review and analysis of prisoner of war camp newspapers
2. Review of Office of War Information material prepared for distribution in Germany and material prepared by other government agencies for psychological warfare purposes
3. Review of films and recordings produced by commercial and government agencies
4. Review of miscellaneous prisoner of war publications, such as camp newspapers, song books, and daily news summaries
5. Review of material in regard to prisoner of war camp security and the elimination of subversive activities
6. Independent study and advice regarding postwar conditions in Germany and reconstruction of Europe
7. Organization of a special experimental educational program for the benefit of the prisoners detained at this installation
8. Review of music and plays

The organization, which averaged 85 prisoners of war, was divided into the following main sections: Film Section, Translation Bureau, Administration, Review Section, Camp Newspaper Section, and national prisoner of war magazine, Der Ruf.

The chief functions of the Film Section were to review films and transcribe radio programs, translate synopses for films, recommend the use of films and radio, and to study postwar policies in regard to films and radio.

The Translation Bureau, staffed with prisoners with a thorough knowledge of several languages, translated materials created by the different sections of the Factory, detailed correspondence, and pamphlets prepared by Office of War Information and the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division.

The Camp Administration Section was headed by the Camp Spokesman who was responsible for the general supervision and welfare of

the prisoners. He was assisted by a clerk-typist and an engineering technician who was responsible for inspections and recommendations in regard to maintenance of camp facilities. An acting prisoner of war first sergeant supervised the camp maintenance detail, a group of prisoners who did not participate in the special activities but who had a chance to avail themselves of any facilities provided by the camp. This group never consisted of more than ten per cent of the regular camp overhead. The Director of Studies supervised extra-curricular activities, organized the study of the English language and assisted the Compound Commander in maintaining liaison with the different sections of the Factory.

The Review Section analyzed, evaluated and made recommendations concerning all materials submitted by interested government agencies and the branches of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division.

The Camp Newspaper Section was charged with the continuous review of all camp newspapers (65 as of October 1945), recommendations and information as to the contents and editorial policy of camp papers, and the gathering of material of interest to the S-2 (Intelligence) sections in the various prisoner of war camps.

Der Ruf

The original staff study which served as a basis for the re-education program stated that: "Prisoners are now asking for materials that deal objectively with United States history, institutions, traditions, and ways of life. Because more than 85 per cent of the prisoners are unable to use the English language, there is need to provide literature--that relies on German. It is believed that prisoner work projects will be helped rather than hindered by the program." On 7 September 1944, The Provost Marshal General was authorized to initiate and supervise the publication of a bimonthly magazine, consisting of eight pages, with the title Der Ruf. 4/

This magazine would enable prisoners to keep in touch with one another's problems. For this reason, letters and contributions from the prisoners to the editors were invited.

The purpose of the magazine was to further the intellectual diversion program by giving German prisoners of war realistic news of all important military and political events, a true picture of the German homefront, educational articles, entertainment, and a clear understanding of the American way of life.

For the first two weeks the Der Ruf section of the Factory was busy preparing dummies and recommending general policy for the paper.

4/ ASF letter, file no. SPX 383.6 (7 Feb 45)OB-S-SPMGY-M, 8 February 1945, subject: "National German Prisoner of War Magazine "Der Ruf."

It was intended from the beginning that the Office of The Provost Marshal General should supervise and provide liaison with the print shop and other agencies outside of the Factory. It was not anticipated that the contents of this magazine should be interpreted as voicing official American opinion or policy. The nature of the magazine itself, however, made it necessary to coordinate all plans with G-1 of the War Department General Staff, the Department of State, and the Office of War Information. A conference held between representatives of the War Department, the State Department, and the Office of War Information on 22 March 1945, presided over by The Provost Marshal General, resulted in the establishment of continuous liaison between the three agencies and the officers directly responsible for the supervision of Der Ruf.

The policy of the paper, as established by the officers delegated by The Provost Marshal General to supervise this project and the prisoner of war editors, was to create a prisoner of war magazine for the broadest audience possible, to provide exact news of all important military and political events and postwar problems, and to print news from the homeland and good reading material in order to foster realistic thought and constructive interests and feelings, stimulate the desire for real cultural expression among the prisoners and to reflect their point of view as far as possible, give prisoners moral support and open a larger intellectual horizon for their benefit, make prisoners conscious of the tasks which await them in the future and to foster traditions based on the principle of right, independent thinking, decency, personal freedom, and in a broader sense--the Four Freedoms.

The first issue, together with 500 advertising posters, was distributed about 6 March 1945 to all prisoner of war camps. Instructions on how to handle the magazine had been sent to all prisoner of war camps two weeks previous to the date of publication. The reaction of the prisoners to the magazine varied greatly. At this time several camps were still under the influence of Nazi groups who used every means to prevent the distribution of Der Ruf. The Nazis, who asked for violence against the paper and its readers, exposed themselves clearly to the camp authorities and were usually recognized and classified accordingly.

The great majority of the camps received the magazine enthusiastically. It was soon discovered that the 11,000 copies printed for the first issue and sold for five cents each in the canteens, were not sufficient.

Those prisoners who were on the "neutral" side were often driven by curiosity to purchase the paper, while a minority, already known as cooperative, began to organize effective groups to advertise and protect Der Ruf.

It was realized by all concerned that Der Ruf provided an excellent means to determine the attitude of the prisoners in the

light of the re-education program, and that this magazine might be of great value to the camps if properly utilized by the assistant executive officers. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a continuous survey, the results of which were published in a 19-page mimeographed pamphlet, What They Say About Der Ruf. This pamphlet covered reactions to the first five issues.

Since it was impossible to allow the editors to "go after" news and information themselves, it was essential to provide them with the best available background and reference data. The Office of War Information became the main source for the procurement of material. This agency offered to cooperate in every way and often made special efforts to procure special items.

Prior to receipt of the first issue, the camp commander, assistant executive officer and exchange officer of each German prisoner of war camp were properly introduced and oriented to the forthcoming publication. 5/

Printing of the first issue, 11,000 copies, commenced on 29 February 1945 at Recruiting Publicity Bureau, The Adjutant General's Office, Governors Island, New York. By 16 March 1945, nine camps had already requested an increase amounting to 2,576 copies. On 11 April 1945, 55 out of a possible 134 camps requested an increase amounting to 15,728 copies. Requests for increases continued. After issue number 15, 75,000 copies of each edition were printed.

At this point something should be said relative to the operating expenses and profits. Up to and including the eleventh edition, the average unit cost was four cents. The average unit cost of issues 12 to 16 was lower, amounting to two and a half cents. Thus, the average unit cost of issues 1 - 16 inclusive, was approximately three and a half cents. Since the magazine retailed at five cents a copy, and past experience showed that approximately 90 per cent of each edition sold, the solvency of the magazine was apparent.

The decision to sell the magazine rather than to give it away was reached after several conferences. It was pointed out that the prisoners would become suspicious if they were given a periodical free of charge, and that it would be impossible to maintain the qualifications of a magazine by and for the prisoners unless the prisoners themselves were also made responsible financially.

It was decided to publish an English translation of each edition of Der Ruf so that War and State Department officials who could not read German would be supplied with an English version. Approximately 500 copies of the English edition were mailed to the War Department, service commands, camp commanders, and assistant executive officers. In many ways this was a mistake. Misunderstandings arose because of the fact that no magazine can be translated into another language and still mirror the original.

Camp Publications

The publication of camp papers was encouraged at conferences and through directives and field representatives. All camp publications were forwarded to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division in accordance with paragraph 49e, TM 19-500. Every copy was carefully analyzed, lists of editors and contributors prepared, and bimonthly reports issued. These reports were based on the findings of the Factory as well as those of officers of the Division, who were in a position to coordinate findings with other elements (S-2 reports and Field Service reports), and to make recommendations to the camps. 6/

From January until the late Fall of 1945 there were published periodically about 80 camp newspapers or bulletins. A survey conducted in March 1945 revealed that:

1. Approximately 25 were Nazi
2. Approximately 3 were anti-Nazi
3. 1 religious - Christian
4. Approximately 8 violent Nazi
5. Approximately 7 neutral, with straight entertainment value only

This picture soon changed. In some cases a slow transformation of editorial policy, as a clear indication of pressure exerted from below by readers of Der Ruf, became apparent even before V-E Day. The first reprints of original articles of Der Ruf began to appear in many camp newspapers, and editors wrote to Der Ruf asking for guidance and material and offering their cooperation.

The following is a summary of camp newspaper reports based on carefully conducted analyses of every article, and again representing a cross section of camps:

1. Lagerzeitung, Prisoner of War Camp, Algona, Iowa. "In April 1945 this newspaper was completely nonpolitical. It printed stories about sports and camp life and poems. A report on this paper of 9 August showed that the paper was printing articles which fitted the purpose of the re-education program. For example, this issue printed The Fatherland - A Story About Leonhard Frank, a tale about a German father who lost his son in World War I and consequently became a pacifist. A leading article in this issue, called What We Have to Learn by Prisoner of War Rolf Bernegau says: 'We must learn to understand other people and think internationally. Only in this way can we return to the community of nations.'"

6/ Camp Newspaper Report prepared by Factory, Fort Kearney, Rhode Island.

2. Atlanta Echo, Prisoner of War Camp, Atlanta, Nebraska.
 "In May 1945 this camp paper was nonpolitical. The July issue contained a series of quotations from Thomas Mann's Achtung Europa, an article about the Fourth of July in the history of America, and an article called Topic of the Times by Prisoner of War Stoermann, which contained the following: 'We will not put our head into the sand, but decisively break with the past and start from a new point believing in a future of security, freedom, and self-determination.'"
3. Lagerstimme, Prisoner of War Camp, Atterbury, Indiana.
 "As of April 1945, this camp paper was nonpolitical. The August 14th issue contained a favorable article about Der Rief, and an article about a prisoner's experiences in a concentration camp, and an article called Where Do We Stand?, by Prisoner of War Weber. This latter article stated, 'German propaganda was intended to create hatred against certain foreign countries and succeeded in this purpose. On the other hand, the propaganda on the American side did not have the same effect since the democratic education of the Americans taught them to have their own individual opinions.'"
4. Die Bruecke, Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.
 "In April this paper contained Nazi propaganda, such as the symbol of the werewolf and sentences like 'the eyes of the Fuehrer are stern and severe.' The August edition of this paper, with new editors, had an article on the revival of labor unions in Germany, and an open letter to the Camp Commander from the editorial staff which requested permission to have American lecturers visit the camp and present talks about the land and the people of the United States."
5. Lagerfackel, Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Butler, North Carolina.
 "In May this paper was mostly nonpolitical. In August this newspaper presented an article about the experiences of a prisoner in a concentration camp, and an article called We Must Never Forget by Prisoner of War Merth. The latter article contained the following statement: 'We must never forget that prisoners were murdered by fellow prisoners because they were not Nazis. There are still prisoners of war who try to intimidate the anti-Nazis. We will not forget them and we will judge them sooner or later, not by murder but by democratic methods.'"
6. Der Aufbruch, Prisoner of War Camp, Camp Crowder, Missouri.
 "No paper was printed in this camp until July 1945. The July 29th issue of this paper contained a very positive

reaction to the Why We Fight film series, an article which condemned the racial ideas of the National Socialists and an article called Free Press or State Press? by Prisoner of War Harder. This latter article illustrated the differences between a free press as found in America and a state press as was found in Nazi Germany."

7. Deutsche Woche, Prisoner of War Camp, Fort Lewis, Washington.
"In April this paper contained hidden Nazi propaganda. The July 28th issue, under new editors, contained the following article: The Faults of National Socialism by Prisoner of War Zwiauer which stated: 'We should make sure that there is no militaristic or violent solution of any questions or problems. Never again should wars decide questions; they will only create new difficulties.'"
8. Der Querschnitt, Prisoner of War Camp, Opelika, Alabama.
"This paper contained undesirable propaganda in April. The June issue reprinted the entire Constitution of the United States, and an article called America, the Land of Freedom and Hope which dealt with the Declaration of Independence and an appeal, 'Take Part in the Lectures on Democracy,' which were to take place shortly."
9. Lagerspiegel, Prisoner of War Camp, Fort Riley, Kansas.
"In April this paper carried Nazi propaganda. The August 11th issue had an introduction which stated that, 'The present issue is dedicated to the investigation and understanding of democracy.' There was also an article called, Cooperation from a branch camp which attacked all prisoners who are still defending Hitler and asked for cooperation for a democratic Germany."
10. Heimat, Prisoner of War Camp, Camp White, Oregon. "In April this paper was nonpolitical. The July issue contained a very favorable article about Der Ruf, an article called, The Other Potsdam by Prisoner of War Becker, which explained the new peaceful spirit of Potsdam which must arise; and an article called, The Political Responsibility of the Christian Church by Prisoner of War Pastor Griesheimer which stated, '.....and so, the Christians must fight for a lasting righteous and peaceful community of all nations.'"

To give more proof of the effect of Der Ruf and the re-education program in general on the camp publications and camp population, it should also be pointed out that many papers sponsored the teaching of the English language and that in many cases camp newspapers actually were instrumental in bringing about democratic elections in the camps for the removal of non-cooperative spokesmen.

A survey of 80 camp newspapers completed in the Fall of 1945 revealed that the political attitude of the camp newspapers had changed to:

1. 24 democratic tendency
2. 32 nonpolitical
3. 18 strongly anti-Nazi
4. 3 religious - Christian
5. 1 camouflaged Nazi
6. 2 militaristic

(Some of the papers mentioned above did not exist or were not included in the March 1945 report.)

The following Nazi tendencies of camp newspapers were discouraged:

1. Use of Nazi symbols, slogans, or catchwords
2. Titles of camp newspapers in emulation of well-known Nazi papers, such as, the Voelkischer Beobachter or the National Socialist News.
3. Eulogies of military or political heroes, living or dead
4. Glorification of Kameradschaft to promote political solidarity
5. Celebration in print of the Morgenfeier--Nazi pagan rite
6. Elaborate commemoration of political holidays and party festivals
7. Representations or adaptations of the insignia of the SS (Schutzstaffel), SA (Sturm Abteilung), Hitler Youth, Todt Organization and other party organizations
8. Nationalistic military propaganda, especially in the form of distorted news reports
9. Pan-German propaganda, when prisoners of other nationalities were interned in the same camp
10. Pseudophilosophical articles, based upon the persecution theme, attempting to justify German aggression and brutality
11. Quotations from Bruno Brehm, Hans Watzlik, and other disapproved authors
12. Pseudoscientific articles on biology or anthropology, propagandizing the "Master Race" myth.
13. Self-pity in any form, including complaints about living or working conditions
14. Use of terms such as "Lagerfuehrer" or "Lagerfuehrung", which arrogated authority to prisoners of war
15. Disparaging statements, explicit or implicit, about the United States or our allies, or about our foreign relations
16. Attempts to bestow an official character upon the paper, such as interpretations of the Geneva Convention in an effort to challenge the legality of disciplinary measures taken by the camp commander, or to undermine the success of his work projects

The following points, summarized here briefly, were recommended as a guide to what is desirable in prisoner of war camp newspapers:

1. Camp publications should be considered as a medium for self-education as well as a source for factual information.
2. Editors should be impartial and objective and let the rest of the prisoners judge for themselves what is right and wrong.
3. Reprints from German communiques should be balanced with reprints of Allied communiques.
4. Reprints from the works of certain authors should be encouraged.
5. Forums within camp newspapers should be fostered to provide a camp newspaper speaking for the majority, and to coordinate educational activities with the publication as a matter of policy.

In June 1945 it was decided to publish a clippingsheet for all German prisoner of war camps:

1. Several camp newspapers contained only poorly written articles or entertainment rather than constructive ideas. Material was needed to stimulate and guide these papers.
2. Most camps had no knowledge of what prisoners in other camps were thinking. Thus the Nazis argued that "prisoners in other camps think as we do." There was no concrete evidence to contradict this statement.
3. Branch camps, particularly those widely separated from base camps, had no camp paper at all.

Discussions concerning the clippingsheet were held with the prisoners at the Factory. It was decided that these prisoners would recommend articles from the various camp papers which were suitable for reprints in the clippingsheet service. They would also translate the most valuable feature stories obtained from the Office of War Information. It was thought at this time that the basic policy should be to utilize as much material from camp newspapers as possible. In this way the prisoners in one camp would learn that other camps besides their own were interested in the gradual spreading of constructive, democratic ideas. The title Die Auslese (The Selection) was recommended by the prisoners for this clippingsheet and accepted by The Provost Marshal General.

The following general principles were established as a guide for the selection of articles:

1. Destruction of Nazi doctrines and practices. There was a wealth of material available pertaining to this subject ranging from eyewitness accounts of former inmates of

concentration camps to effective criticism of the true aims of Nazi "Kultur" policy. The best items were selected and included in Die Auslese.

2. Emphasis on the positive aspects of pre-Hitler Germany. This included quotations, suppressed by the Nazis, of such famous authors as Schiller, Goethe, Heine, and Thomas Mann.
3. New democratic tendencies. Articles on what must be done to re-educate the German youth.
4. American democracy. This included articles by German prisoners and by well-known American authors. One such article by a German prisoner explained why it was a good idea to study American history. Articles by Americans included excerpts from the writing of Abraham Lincoln and Carl Schurz.

It was decided to send ten copies to each base camp. If a camp needed more copies it could then reproduce the material that was most appropriate to its needs.

The first issue of Die Auslese, 2,000 copies, was distributed on 21 July 1945. Successive issues followed approximately every two weeks thereafter.

A tabulation of the reprinting of articles from Die Auslese in camp newspapers during the months of August and September 1945 revealed a growing influence. First reports from the camps also indicated the popularity of Die Auslese. Several camps requested more copies. Reports from the field also indicated that a good deal of material from Die Auslese was being used for public address system broadcasts.

Educational and Review Functions

Implicit in the general mission of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division from the first was the guidance of educational activities in prisoner of war camps. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention, prisoners were permitted the privilege of pursuing intellectual diversions. This was generally interpreted as including educational activities, cultural or vocational. It was recognized that this presented a great opportunity for democratic indoctrination. In order to achieve such a result, however, it was necessary that an educational program be fostered in the camps, and that selected educational facilities and materials be made available to the prisoners. The following educational functions were developed by the Provost Marshal General's Office:

1. Supervision of classes conducted in camps
2. Selection, procurement, and censorship of textbooks and other reading material
3. Establishment of suitable liaison with educational facilities, civilian and military, in the United States

4. Procurement of civilian lecturers
5. Development and distribution of special instructional aids

German prisoners of war generally manifested the normal German respect for education. A great proportion of the prisoners realized that the period of their captivity represented an opportunity for education. Camp schools, organized by prisoners, had sprung up long before the inception of the re-education program. These schools ranged in their subject matter from the elements of reading and writing up to advanced technical studies of graduate quality. Prisoner faculties, with the consent of American authorities, issued certificates and diplomas. Certificates testifying to prisoners having completed educational work equivalent to the German Gymnasium and certificates of eligibility for civil service positions in the German Government were issued. Through diplomatic channels the German Government requested and received permission to set up in various camps boards of examiners recognized by the Reich Ministry of Education, whose function it was to administer these examinations in an official capacity.

The prisoner of war educational system, which thus sprang into existence, might be described as consisting of schools of various levels existing independently at various camps and maintaining some liaison with the Reich Ministry of Education. No coordinated supervision of these educational activities by American authorities was planned before the inception of the re-education program. Each camp ran its own school, subject to the general supervision of the camp commander. The only central contact for the schools was in Germany, although the assistance rendered to camp educational programs by visiting welfare agencies in the United States constituted some liaison in this country.

Since some of the schools had actually achieved enrollments worthy of universities, and since so large a proportion of prisoners was interested in educational activities, centralized American control of these activities was desirable. So long as there was no effective control of their faculties in terms of American policy and so long as their relationship to educational authorities in Germany was being strengthened rather than weakened, there was great danger that the camp schools would constitute actual centers of National Socialist instruction and propaganda within the very borders of the United States. After the universities in Germany had closed because of the Allied invasion, there was actually a possibility that the only pro-Hitler educational institutions functioning anywhere in the world would be in the United States.

For these reasons, a very careful plan was made for the assumption of control over these schools, which provided that (a) prisoners would be aided by American authorities in the organization of classes, emphasis being placed on "basic" courses; (b) a prisoner director of studies was to be chosen carefully, paid for his services

and made responsible for camp educational activities; (c) qualified teachers were to be chosen; (d) American educational institutions were to assist prisoners in setting up their educational programs by means of a system of sponsoring universities; (e) prisoners were to receive permission to enroll in certain courses offered by the United States Armed Forces Institute; (f) prisoners were to have permission to enroll in approved correspondence courses offered by American universities.

The control ultimately established was highly effective-- indeed it can be said that the reorganization of prisoner education along a democratic slant was evoked rather than compelled, and proceeded without serious friction or disturbance. The gradual collapse of German educational authority and the substitution of American control was accepted with something akin to enthusiasm by the prisoners. By V-E Day, it was possible to make a drastic revision of classes in prisoner of war camp schools in terms of three objectives: (1) elimination of all courses preparing for official government positions, (2) discouraging of courses which were of no particular value to the Intellectual Diversion program, (3) stress on a minimum essential program consisting of basic courses in the English language, history, geography, and other subjects conducive to a democratic view of the world. It should be noted that this drastic limitation of prisoner educational activities was motivated in part by the necessity for coordinating the Intellectual Diversion program with the work program. Most prisoners had only a limited amount of time to devote to studies and every effort was made to ensure that this time would be spent on studies which would provide a solid democratic background. The collapse of Germany made this procedure logical from the point of view of the mission, and acceptable in general to the prisoners, who had been made acutely aware of the role that America was to play in world affairs. Since American policy was veering toward the deindustrialization of Germany, technical courses lost their possible usefulness, and since no German Government existed, German civil service courses were no longer valid. On the other hand, the desire to know English, to know American history, to acquire information about the democratic forces which had defeated National Socialism, had received a new impetus.

The provision of suitable textbooks and reading materials for prisoners of war was determined in terms of the general development of the educational program. The sources from which prisoners obtained textbooks were varied. The International Red Cross and the War Prisoners Aid of the Young Men's Christian Associations served as collecting agencies, bringing books from Europe and purchasing German books in America which were sold or donated to prisoners. Assistance also came from the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the Lutheran Commission for Prisoners of War. The German Government also provided a series of Soldatenbriefe, elementary but fairly sound textbooks, designed for the use of the German

Armed Forces. A small trickle of textbooks and reading materials was received from other sources. Until the work of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division was organized, much of the material was unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, some of the textbooks furnished by the visiting agencies were antiquated, and second, many of the texts being of German origin contained propaganda and ideologies incompatible with reorientation.

The problem of textbooks was closely allied with the general problem of reading materials for prisoners of war. Very early it became apparent that the Division would have to exercise censorship functions over reading materials entering prisoner of war camps. Prior to the establishment of the Special Projects Branch, Prisoner of War Division, the selection of reading materials for prisoners of war had been determined by availability, the judgment of local camp authorities, and censorship as exercised by the District Postal Censor. The Basic Staff Study included the recommendation: "That, in connection with his responsibilities under this program, there be vested in the Provost Marshal General the right of censorship of all materials from a domestic source that may be used in connection with this program." The review functions assigned to the Office of The Provost Marshal General by this arrangement included approval of books, newspapers, and magazines, as well as the examination of relevant correspondence between prisoners of war and the welfare agencies. The District Postal Censor retained jurisdiction over shipments of books and other reading materials from abroad.

Two difficulties arose concerning censorship. First, with a necessarily limited staff, the Division could never hope to handle directly the great volume of material flowing into the camps; second, censorship of materials entering the United States from abroad had already been vested in the Office of Censorship, whose objectives were different from those of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division. The Office of Censorship served many government agencies, had to apply various standards, and often had to admit otherwise undesirable books for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information.

Two things, therefore, needed to be done: (a) develop a technique of staff supervision whereby the limited personnel available could become familiar with and pass upon all reading materials flowing into the prisoner of war camps, and (b) maintain a careful liaison with the Office of the District Postal Censor. Fortunately, from August 1944 until June 1945, the Division was stationed in New York, so that library facilities, the warehouses of the War Prisoners Aid, the foreign branch of the Office of War Information, and the Office of the District Postal Censor were easily accessible. Fortunately also, the Division included among its officer personnel and its civilian employees persons thoroughly versed in German literature and familiar with German education. Officers of the Field Service Branch were directed to examine camp libraries and, where

possible, to send lists of books in the camp libraries back to the Division for examination. Recommendations for the removal of unsatisfactory items were subsequently made to the camps. Liaison was established with the War Prisoners Aid of the Young Men's Christian Associations, with the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and with the International Red Cross, all of whom received requests from prisoners for books, so that prisoner requests could be submitted to the Office of The Provost Marshal General for review before being filled. In many cases representatives of the office visited the warehouses of these agencies and examined the stocks of books designed for shipment to prisoners and requested the withholding of certain items. Directives were prepared for issue by the Adjutant General as Prisoner of War Special Projects Letters to effect a more adequate censorship of reading materials at the camp level. One of the earliest of these directives consisted of a list of undesirable authors. Succeeding directives were concerned with individual books known to be dangerous. A further step in the direction of more adequate control of reading matter was the general encouragement given to camp authorities to consult the Division about the problems of reading for prisoners of war and to report to the Division any pertinent data. The resulting correspondence served not only to orient camp authorities, but also to increase the knowledge of the experts in the Division. This correspondence gradually subsided in the Summer of 1945 since the flow of German books decreased with the exhaustion of stocks available in the United States and with the cutting off of supplies of German books from overseas.

By June of 1945 effective control of camp reading materials had been achieved. This was greatly enhanced by close cooperation established in April 1945, with the Office of the District Postal Censor. The approval of Mr. Byron Price was obtained for the Office of Censorship's applying to incoming German books the standards set forth in the directives of the War Department. By June 1945, a large catalogue of approved and disapproved German books, including both general reading matter and textbooks, had been accumulated so that inquiries from camps, from welfare agencies, and from other government departments could be answered quickly. Textbooks for use in classes conducted by prisoners of war were handled in general on the same basis as recreational reading. Reports of textbooks used in the camps were obtained and studied in the Division, and appropriate recommendations were made to the field. In general, however, no effort was made in the early stages of the program to direct in detail the instruction carried on in the camps. The educational level, the personnel, and the local facilities of the various camps differed so much that the details of organization were left to the supervision of the assistant executive officers at the camps. It was felt from the very beginning that a limited staff should concern itself more with counseling and the formulation of general policies than with the minute implementation of these policies. The assistant executive officers and their assisting enlisted personnel who attended conferences conducted by the Division were indoctrinated in

the educational principles that were to prevail in the camps. After they arrived at their stations, counseling by the Division was always available through the channels of official correspondence. Particular attention was paid to the proper choice of the prisoner director of studies, a report about whom had to be submitted to the Office of The Provost Marshal General. The purpose of this report was to prevent this important function from falling into the hands of a pro-Nazi prisoner of war. In many cases, assistant executive officers had to proceed slowly--especially while the program was still classified--to remove courses and instructor personnel tending to defeat the program. But with the control of textbooks with a guided choice of prisoner directors of study, and with additional literature made available to the prisoners, a general improvement in the kind of instruction found in the camps became evident. By the end of May 1945, the National Socialist viewpoint had disappeared from the teaching of history, biology, and other subjects where it could conceivably be relevant.

More negative measures, however, would never accomplish the mission; they would merely prepare the ground for its accomplishment. Accordingly, at the same time that censorship measures and increased supervision were inaugurated, the Division began to lay plans for positive indoctrination. At all times it remained the policy of the Division to deal in truth and to allow the prisoner, so far as possible, to discover gradually for himself the values which it was desired he learn. Accordingly, certain obvious methods of re-educating the prisoners were not used until relatively late in the program. For instance, it had been decided as early as October 1944 that civilian lecturers on topics dealing with democracy and allied subjects should be made available to the camps. Their actual introduction into the camps was delayed until the Summer of 1945. In part, this delay was due to difficulties in securing proper clearance for the admission of lecturers into camps; but it was also felt that obvious propagandization at a point in the development of the program where the prisoners were not ready for it might hinder the program. By the end of November 1945, 55 lecturers had been approved and were delivering regular lectures at prisoner of war camps.

An over all scheme was devised whereby great quantities of educational and literary materials charged with sound anti-Fascist doctrine would be made to flow into the camps. One such medium was Buecherreihe Neue Welt. The books in this series, it will be noted, were in part simply works of good literature by authors whose integrity and rightmindedness were beyond doubt. Some of them--and this is significant and was intentional--were authors whose works had been banned in Germany. Prisoners, hungry for reading material, quickly overcame their prejudice, bought the books, liked what they found, and generally began to open their eyes. 7/ In the selection

7/ "Reactions to Buecherreihe Neue Welt", mimeographed pamphlet prepared by Branch Office, PMGO, New York.

of recreational and educational books furnished by the War Prisoners Aid as reprints especially published for prisoners of war, it was possible to make recommendations for the publication of desirable books. These were sold in camp canteens and did their work. It was felt, however, especially as the whole ethos of Nazism was beginning to crumble, that to rely entirely upon general materials available to the reading public in the German language was insufficient. The Division undertook, therefore, the preparation of publications specifically designed for the accomplishment of the mission. The first such work to be made available was the Kleiner Fuehrer durch Amerika. Originally the booklet was designed as a pamphlet to be given to prisoners arriving in the United States and to be read by them enroute to their places of internment. Unavoidable delays in publication and the stoppage of further shipments of prisoners to the United States made it impossible to issue the booklet in this manner. Since it contained a complete, brief description of the geography, natural resources, history, and institutions of the United States, it was made an item of issue for every prisoner of war. Its reception was good. Those prisoners who, by previous education or through extensive reading since their arrival in the United States, already had acquired a good general knowledge of America, found it an attractive souvenir. But for many others it represented a basic text for study.

A further venture of the same kind was the publication of three pamphlets expressly written for the program by Dr. Howard Mumford Jones, a prominent Harvard Dean and president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,

Eine Einfuehrung in das Amerikanische Schulwesen
(A Brief Survey of American Schools)

Eine Einfuehrung in die Amerikanische
Verfassung und Verwaltung
(An Introduction to American Government)

Kurze Geschichte der Vereinigten Staaten
(A Brief History of the United States)

These pamphlets served not only to give the prisoners information about America, but because they were printed with both the German and English text, served also as a valuable aid in the study of the English language.

The Jones pamphlets appeared during the Summer of 1945 and coincided with an extensive program of English language instruction which had received increased emphasis after V-E Day. It became a matter of policy to use the English language wherever possible in dealings with the prisoners and to teach as many prisoners as possible to speak, and in a measure to read, the language. This was accomplished through a technical manual prepared by experts for

use in English language classes in German prisoner of war camps-- TM 30-1506, TM 30-1506A, TM 30-1506 B, TM 30-1506C, TM 30-1506D, and TM 30-1506E. The successive portions of this English Language Manual were distributed throughout the Summer and Autumn of 1946. The supply was scarcely sufficient to meet the demand. It should be noted that in this case, as in the case of all the above listed publications, prisoner response was excellent.

Along with the encouragement of a flow of educational and recreational reading in the German language, an effort was made to interest as many prisoners as possible in material published in English. By arrangements with the Infantry Journal, good English books of sound political character were sold in camp canteens. This medium was especially effective in reaching the more intelligent and better educated prisoners. Books made available through the welfare agencies also included large quantities of books in the English language.

In general, prisoners were allowed to subscribe to American periodicals, when subscriptions could be obtained for them. The distribution of the better American newspapers was limited only by the inability of some publishers to accept subscriptions during a time of great newsprint shortage. The most popular paper among the prisoners of war was the New York Times, largely because of its uncensored publication of German as well as Allied communiques. Having access to American newspapers and seeing in them the practical application of freedom of the press, even in time of war, was of great benefit.

The case of German language newspapers published in the United States was not so simple. Censorship of foreign language newspapers was originally a function of the Legal Branch of the Prisoner of War Operations Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office. This responsibility was transferred to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division in March 1945. As requests for approval of a foreign language newspaper were received from camps or publishers, sample copies were examined and the Department of Justice consulted. Many of these papers were openly or covertly in sympathy with National Socialism. To check the possible bad influence of such publications on prisoners, there was at first issued a list of approved foreign language publications whose entry into the camps was permitted. However, the making of decisions concerning the admissibility of certain German papers was fraught with great difficulty, because when the condemnation of a paper would come to the attention of its publisher, in many instances he would seek to bring pressure to bear upon the War Department to have his paper approved. The result was that by the end of the Summer of 1945, the list of approved papers had no consistent standard, some papers having been admitted because of genuine merit, or at any rate relative innocuousness, and others having been admitted simply because their exclusion would have created embarrassment for the War Department. It was decided

accordingly to abandon the effort to have a list of acceptable foreign language papers, and instead to indoctrinate camp commanders in simple standards of censorship on the basis of which individual issues might be excluded or subscriptions cancelled. This apparent relaxing of standards was justified by the inadequacies of the existing list and by the fact that the general policy of the Division was so far as possible to move away from restrictive censorship. This change in policy became effective early in the Fall of 1945, by which time the flow of positive literature into the camps had become sufficient to counteract any possible leak of undesirable propaganda into the camps through foreign language newspapers.

An important positive medium of re-education was the introduction into the camps of materials furnished by the Office of War Information. Intimate liaison with this agency had been established at the very beginning of the project. By the Spring of 1945, materials from the Office of War Information were moving into the camps. Much of this reading material had to be held back for some time because of its positive, direct appeal. At an earlier stage of the program, it would have been rejected by the prisoners at sight. But at the time when it was introduced, it was welcomed because it gave more information about the very things that the program had gradually been unfolding to them. Office of War Information material went to the prisoners as long as the program operated. In some instances material was translated and republished especially for distribution to German prisoners of war.

An additional educational aid furnished by the Office of War Information was a series of 35 film strips together with lecture materials. These were furnished to Italian and Japanese, as well as German, prisoner of war camps. The scripts sent to the German prisoner of war camps were in both the English and German languages. These film strips depicted and emphasized American life, customs, and institutions. They were very useful also in assisting the teaching of English.

Selection of American universities to assist prisoners of war in furthering their educational programs by making available books, film strips, educational films, slides and other training aids, and by offering advice in the choice of textbooks and in the organization of courses, was begun in the Summer of 1944. The American Council on Education was requested to select colleges and universities and to interest them in the program. These institutions varied from the largest universities down to junior colleges. In addition, 14 universities were selected to provide correspondence courses for prisoners. Two denominational institutions, a Lutheran and a Catholic, were included in this group. The results obtained from this cooperation were extremely varied in character. In some cases difficulties of communication with prisoners caused a lack of interest in the relationship on both the part of the prisoners and

the sponsoring institution. In other cases valuable assistance was given. Eventually, camps were sponsored by 98 educational institutions.

Correspondence courses were enrolled in by relatively few prisoners; on 1 May 1945 approximately 600 prisoners were enrolled in correspondence courses with 14 universities. The cause of this lack of enthusiasm can be traced to the fact that the courses were almost invariably available only in the English language. United States Armed Forces Institute courses, enrolled in by prisoners, totaled 357 by 2 November 1945.

German self-teaching courses were also encouraged in the camps by the publication of textbooks in philosophy, American history, sociology, and World history by the War Prisoners Aid. Selection of the texts to be reprinted was made in cooperation with the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division.

The Film Program

In accordance with the stipulations for "intellectual diversion" in the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war confined in camps within the continental limits of the United States were permitted to rent films from various commercial distributors of 16 millimeter entertainment films prior to the inception of the reorientation program. These motion pictures were selected by prisoner of war camp spokesmen from catalogues made available by the commercial distributors. Nazi-indoctrinated camp spokesmen made excellent use of this opportunity to persuade their fellow inmates of the truth of Nazi propaganda which had insinuated the senility of the American people, rampant gangsterism in the United States, the corruption of the United States Government and the debilitating effects of democracy and the American way of life. A preliminary investigation of motion pictures shown in prisoner of war camps disclosed that among others the following films were exhibited: Lady Scarface, Millionaire Playboy, Playgirl, Reno, Seven Miles From Alcatraz, Petticoat Larceny, Parole, Dead End, Little Tough Guy, Boy Slaves, Legion of the Lawless, Wolf Man, Too Many Blondes, Swing It Soldier, Highways by Night. All of the above motion pictures obviously would be detrimental to efforts of engendering respect for the American way of life.

The antidote was selection, to make available for exhibition to prisoners of war only films which reflected the American scene without distortion and which fostered respect for our democratic institutions.

Catalogues of 16 millimeter motion pictures, listings of Office of War Information documentaries, and data on existing educational motion picture material were compiled and procedures set up for the reviewing of these films. Since it was the purpose of the reorientation program to foster and create in prisoners of war attitudes of

respect for the American way of life, the criteria established tended to eliminate all those motion pictures which did not directly or indirectly promote these principles. Prisoners of war were to be indoctrinated in a painless manner, if possible, and the film medium was considered especially suitable for the purpose. Here was "entertainment" in its purest form, yet bearing the message of the free American way of life. Films glorifying gangsterism or dealing with prison life and prison escapes; ridiculing any member of the United Nations; misrepresenting the American scene by stress on plutocratic or other distorted aspects; the so-called "hot" musicals; depression and slum pictures; films containing racial slurs; depictions of strife between capital and labor; the so-called "blood and thunder" cowboy pictures; and films of the unrealistic Hollywood scene were to be disapproved. To be selected and approved would be good "entertainment" films with a more truly reflected American scene as background; pictures on family life and those based on common human experience; dramatic films and those containing wholesome comedy of a universal character; good musical films; adaptations of fine stage plays (classic or modern); realistic "action" pictures with Western or Northwestern contemporary or historical background; documentary films and travelogues on America; and American film histories and biographies.

At the time of the program's inception, the fortunes of war for Germany were still considered favorable, and the prisoner of war temper precluded the utilization of films which were too obviously propagandistic. Such pictures as the Army indoctrination series, Why We Fight, Army Signal Corps Combat Bulletins, Confessions of a Nazi Spy, The Moon is Down, Tomorrow the World, Watch on the Rhine, The Hitler Gang, Hitler's Children, and other films of strong anti-German content were still undesirable. Attendance at motion picture shows in prisoner of war camps was to be voluntary. Prisoners of war would have stayed away from films of this type.

Later, the deterioration of the German effort and the gradual dawning on the German mind that the war was lost made it possible for The Provost Marshal General to employ motion pictures charged with increasingly heavy indoctrination content.

Long before final decisions were made concerning organization of film bookings and distribution, a backlog of approved motion pictures had been accumulated. For each film reviewed a short synopsis was written, marked "APPROVED" or "DISAPPROVED", and filed under the name of the appropriate production or distribution company. Simultaneously, for the purpose of avoiding duplication, listing was made of 16 millimeter films already rented by prisoner of war camps directly from motion picture distributors. A systematic survey was instituted in all prisoner of war camps to ascertain the status of theater facilities and condition of projection machinery in order to estimate future requisitions. This survey was conducted by the nine service commands, and took approximately 60 days to complete. It

disclosed that camps were using all varieties of standard and nonstandard projection equipment, rented from film distributors, loaned by Signal Corps Film Libraries, and sold or rented by the Film Bureau of the Young Men's Christian Associations. When projectors broke down, parts were difficult to obtain, and sometimes could not be procured at all. The obvious solution to this problem was to employ only standard projection machinery for which spare parts were available through the Signal Corps.

A further purpose of the survey was to estimate attendance, the intensity of interest by prisoners for film shows in general, the type of films preferred, and what facilities were used under various climatic conditions.

In order to ascertain the most efficient manner in which films could be put on exhibition for prisoners of war, a survey of the motion picture field was instituted. Starting in September 1944, the film distribution methods and organization of various War Department agencies and commercial distributors were studied. The number of prisoner of war camps, the type of facilities, the availability of operating funds, the number of trained projectionists, and the general prisoner interest in the exhibition of films needed to be ascertained. At the time of the survey there were 130 prisoner of war base camps and approximately 243 branch camps in operation in the nine service commands. The total prisoner strength was 322,000. An increase in prisoner strength was anticipated.

Improvised theaters, mess halls, barracks, dayrooms, or recreation halls were utilized for exhibition of films. In the South, during the summer, the climate permitted outdoor showings. Fortunately, film projection facilities in the majority of prisoner of war camps were of the 16 millimeter size, 35 millimeter film stock being highly inflammable. Sixteen millimeter film is made of non-inflammable safety stock which does not require the use of fireproof projection booths or film storing facilities.

No matter what distribution plan was finally decided on, the problem of film raw stock, which was high priority war production material under control of the War Production Board, had to be solved. A preliminary estimate (which subsequently proved to come close to actual footage used) was that approximately 2,500,000 feet of 16 millimeter size would be required.

Based on this survey, an initial report containing methods that might be employed in the routing and distribution of films for prisoners of war was made on 25 September 1944.

On 5 October 1944, a preliminary plan for the distribution of selected films for prisoners of war was prepared, containing the best features used by commercial film distribution agencies. This plan called for selection and censorship by The Provost Marshal General of all films to be used on the prisoner of war circuit, and distribution

by existing commercial agencies with branch offices and repair facilities in key cities in the United States. Bookings and accountings were to be handled by a central New York office utilizing civilian personnel, with an experienced head booker in charge.

The War Department decided, however, that no civilian organization should be utilized as long as Army agencies existed which, in some manner, paralleled the projected activities of The Provost Marshal General's circuit for prisoners of war. Therefore, on 11 October 1944, a meeting with the Chief Signal Officer was called, the Signal Corps being the established operator of films for United States Army personnel. At this meeting, which was attended by officers from the staffs of the Chief Signal Officer and The Provost Marshal General, the conclusion was reached that the Signal Corps was not in a position to handle the distribution of films for prisoners, such activity being in violation of Army Regulations 210-390, paragraph 2, which stipulates that entertainment films will be distributed by the United States Army Motion Picture Service.

Thereupon, another meeting was called on 15 October 1944, this time including members of the United States Army Motion Picture Service. It was decided at this meeting that the United States Army Motion Picture Service was not authorized to conduct the actual distribution of films. If the United States Army Motion Picture Service were to select a Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer film for American troops stationed in the United States, the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer distribution agency would circulate it using its own facilities.

Because of these obstacles, the original operational plan was ordered examined with a view toward utilizing a civilian agency to handle the booking and distribution but having the Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund, defray the cost of film purchases. This plan would permit prisoners of war to attend exhibitions free of charge. The cost of operation would still be borne by the prisoners themselves, from allowances received for labor in the work program.

The plan was discussed with the Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund on 21 October 1944 but was disapproved on 25 October 1944 after a careful study. The Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund, favored a plan which would require prisoners to pay an admission fee, using films as an incentive to the work program. Prisoners would have an additional outlet for money earned and a further incentive to make more. The plan was accordingly reformulated. The use of a civilian agency was still contemplated.

On 14 November 1944, a meeting was held in Washington attended by representatives of Army Service Forces Control Division, The Chief Signal Officer, the United States Army Motion Picture Service, Army Exchange Service and The Provost Marshal General's Office. The employment of existing Army agencies was urged and the suggestion that distribution be handled by The Chief Signal Officer was reopened.

However, because of a shortage of man-power The Chief Signal Officer was not prepared to handle such distribution at once. A compromise was agreed upon: The Provost Marshal General would utilize the civilian distribution agency for two or three months, after which the Signal Corps, having acquired proper personnel, would take over. The Army Service Forces Control Division approved this compromise on 16 November 1944, but later decided against any civilian agency being involved in the distribution of films to prisoner of war camps.

On 20 November 1944 another meeting was held in Washington between The Chief Signal Officer, the Director, Special Services Division, Army Service Forces Control Division, and the Assistant The Provost Marshal General. Because the Signal Corps was still confronted with an acute shortage of manpower and the original directive for the establishment of a prisoner of war film circuit called for earliest possible implementation, it was decided that The Provost Marshal General would distribute films with the advice of The Chief Signal Officer and other Army agencies. As a temporary expedient civilian personnel would be employed as bookers and for office work.

Immediately, interviews were conducted with experienced civilian personnel and recommendations for key men were received by The Provost Marshal General from United States Army Motion Picture Service, the Signal Corps and other agencies.

Operational procedures for the implementation of the above decision were submitted for approval on 4 December 1944 to the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces. 8/

On 11 December 1944 approval of this operational plan was received from Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, with certain exceptions which permitted camp commanders to rent approved films from local distributors. Because the wording of the approval was ambiguous, another conference was held with members of Army Service Forces Control Division and The Provost Marshal General's Office to clarify its meaning. The main point for decision was the extent to which The Provost Marshal General would be engaged in the "operation" of film distribution, the policy being that his office, as a staff agency, should be involved in no other than policy making activities. It was decided that The Provost Marshal General would hire civilian personnel, procure office space at the Signal Corps Stock and Shipping Branch and would requisition any equipment needed.

On 12 January 1945, after further meetings, another reversal of decision was decided upon. The Provost Marshal General would

8/ PMG memorandum, file SPMGY, 4 December 1944, subject: "Motion Pictures for Prisoners of War."

limit himself strictly to the establishment of policies and the selection and evaluation of films to be used on the circuit; The Chief Signal Officer would employ the personnel for the operation and distribution of the films.

Unofficial discussions with heads of the New York offices of various motion picture producers soon turned up a problem which was to become a factor in retarding the implementation of the program. The producers believed that the War Department was engaged in providing "entertainment" for war prisoners at a time when maltreatment of Allied prisoners by Germany was being discovered. Understandable reluctance to cooperate was expressed by all film producers who prided themselves in having fought Nazism by means of their films. Since the program was classified, they could not be told of the actual motives for the film program.

On 15 January 1945, The Provost Marshal General requested the Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces, to address letters to the heads of all motion picture companies asking their cooperation in furnishing their product for exhibition to prisoners of war. General Styer complied. The purpose of the program was sufficiently hinted at to make clear that the War Department was not interested in merely "entertaining" war prisoners. Answers were not received immediately from all film companies, especially from those who were still unconvinced of the worthiness of the War Department's purpose. Another difficulty which arose was the fact that some of the largest motion picture producers, such as Warner Brothers and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, had never reduced their negatives to 16 millimeter size for commercial purposes, and were reluctant to become involved in this complicated process.

On 18 January 1945 a draft for a Prisoner of War Circular entitled "Motion Pictures for Prisoners of War," was submitted to all agencies concerned. Various changes were suggested by the Signal Corps, Army Service Forces Control Division, and the United States Army Motion Picture Service.

On 9 February 1945 a meeting was held, resulting in the decision that United States Army Motion Picture Service, not The Provost Marshal General, would contract for the film. The Signal Corps, on the other hand, would employ Army personnel rather than civilians in its Distribution Branch. Details of the Prisoner of War Circular were decided on and a draft submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces.

On 14 February 1945, a directive was published designating three agencies to handle the dissemination of films in the following manner:

1. The Provost Marshal General was to establish policy and select films.

2. The United States Army Motion Picture Service upon the request of The Provost Marshal General, was to negotiate contracts and purchase required films from motion picture producers and distributors.
3. The Signal Corps, upon receipt of film prints from film laboratories, was to book and distribute them, utilizing the film libraries of the nine service commands as subsidiary distribution offices.
4. The Chief Signal Officer was to be responsible for all operational activities, including the training of projectionists, the furnishing of projection equipment, spare parts and repair facilities.
5. The Provost Marshal General's Office was to channel to The Chief Signal Officer requests from prisoner of war camps for motion picture projection equipment, to be paid out of camp funds. 9/

Meanwhile, the motion picture producers still needed to be convinced that furnishing the requested films to the War Department was desirable and patriotic. On 26 and 28 February and 1 March 1945, meetings were held by officers of The Provost Marshal General's Office with the War Activities Committee of the Motion Picture Industry and New York representatives of all major motion picture companies to negotiate for films selected for the prisoner of war circuit. These meetings finally succeeded in convincing the motion picture executives that the War Department was engaged in a worthy though still secret activity in connection with films for prisoners of war. The first list of selected Twentieth Century-Fox films was submitted and the United States Army Motion Picture Service proceeded with negotiations and the drafting of contracts for their rental. Copies of contracts were submitted to the Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund, the Chief Signal Officer, and the motion picture producers involved.

On 5 March 1945, The Provost Marshal General's orders for Warner Brothers and Paramount films, both features and shorts, were placed through the United States Army Motion Picture Service.

Additional features having been reviewed, orders for Columbia and Universal features and shorts were placed on 8 March 1945.

By 13 March 1945, Radio Keith Orpheum features and shorts were added to the list of films ordered. Altogether, requests for 74 features and 84 shorts had been placed by the middle of March 1945. These included documentaries from the Motion Picture Bureau of the Office of War Information.

Continuous efforts were made to obtain commercial features with superimposed title strips in the German language, a few of which had been prepared and stock-piled for future use by the Office of War

9/ WD, Prisoner of War Circular No. 10, 14 Feb 45, "Motion Pictures for Prisoners of War."

Information in occupied German territories. Several consultations with laboratory technicians representing New York laboratories and the representatives of the motion picture company disclosed the technical complications connected with the problem of converting 35 millimeter feature films with superimposed titles into 16 millimeter size. First, the original 35 millimeter negative, which is greatly treasured by every producer, would have to be reduced to 16 millimeter; then the 35 millimeter negative of the superimposed titles would have to be reduced to 16 millimeter size and then superimposed by means of an intricate optical process to make a combined 16 millimeter negative from which prints could be struck off. A complicated hand process was involved, the German-made equipment for the mechanical process having broken down from overuse. To prevent further loss of time in setting up the film circuit, it was decided that the original English versions would serve the purpose if German synopses could be read prior to exhibition of the films.

By 15 March 1945, most of the synopses required to introduce the films to a non-English speaking audience were written, translated into German, mimeographed and distributed in sufficient quantities to all service commands for transshipment to prisoner of war camps. These film synopses not only explained the main story of a picture without giving away any "surprise ending" it might have, but served as additional carriers of such indoctrination material as could be gracefully fitted into its format. Thus, in connection with American historical and biographical films, effective material was woven into the synopses to establish the historical background of a given character or event, or related to the evolution of American democratic institutions. Audience reactions from prisoner of war camps subsequently indicated that these synopses aided materially in making motion pictures understandable.

To prepare the field for the film circuits, service commanders were asked to screen all available prisoner of war film projectionists and to redeploy them in such a manner as to provide each camp with a sufficient number to keep the circuits moving. Service Command Film Libraries furnished Signal Officers to train projectionists in commands lacking such technicians.

Simultaneously, service commands were notified that no contracts were to be made between prisoner of war camps and individual commercial film distributors for the procurement of entertainment films after 1 March 1945. The continuation of independent rentals was authorized until notification of starting date of the film circuit was received from the Chief Signal Officer. Later, an exception was made for special films, such as educational and religious films, which could be procured from various commercial sources and from the Motion Picture Bureau of the Young Men's Christian Associations.

When prisoner of war camp commanders were notified that after the establishment of the new circuits prisoners would be required to

pay 15 cents admission fee, objections to this charge were presented to The Provost Marshal General. It was argued that under existing procedures camp prisoner of war funds paid rental fees to commercial distributors, bringing the pro rata amount to as little as two or three cents per prisoner. However, The Provost Marshal General decided that prisoners of war should not be favored by attending motion picture shows for less money than it cost United States troops.

Original plans called for simultaneous activation of the circuits in all nine service commands. Slow print delivery from film laboratories, however, necessitated a modification in these plans, and in order to speed up the exhibition of desirable pictures within the scope of The Provost Marshal General's reorientation program, the circuits were activated as follows: in the Second Service Command, circuits started 14 May 1945; in the First and Fifth Service Commands, 21 May 1945; in the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Service Commands, circuits started 28 May 1945 and in the Third and Seventh Service Commands, circuits started 18 June 1945.

Seven months before the actual film circuits were placed in effect (on 2 November 1944), List Number One of selected motion picture programs for German prisoners of war was distributed to all service commanders as a guide for their independent selection of films to avoid future duplication.

By the middle of October 1945, when the saturation point was reached for films which could be used in the film program, 115 feature pictures, 115 shorts and 28 two-reelers had been acquired for the circuits. From 5 to 7 prints of each film were required, making an approximate total of 690 feature film prints. Of the 115 features a certain number were, of necessity, "pure entertainment" films because of the limited availability of motion pictures containing suitable orientation material. Approximately 50 features contained a high charge of reorientational content within the scope of The Provost Marshal General's program. The following are enumerated as examples of useful films exhibited on the circuits: Abe Lincoln in Illinois, Adventures of Mark Twain, Adventures of Tom Sawyer, A Wing and a Prayer, Back to Bataan, Courageous Mr. Penn, Captain Eddie, Destroyer, Eve of St. Mark, G. I. Joe, God is My Co-Pilot, Going My Way, Guadalcanal Diary, Gung Ho, Happy Land, King of Kings, Land of Liberty, Madam Curie, Marine Raiders, Objective Burma, Roughly Speaking, Sign of the Cross, Song of Bernadette, So Proudly We Hail, Story of Alexander Graham Bell, The Human Comedy, The Purple Heart, The Seventh Cross, The Sullivans, Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo, Union Pacific, Wells Fargo, and Young Mr. Lincoln.

The above films impressed the German prisoners of war with American might in the various theaters of war, and engendered respect for American statesmen, inventors, technological achievements, the spirit of the pioneers, the dedication of the American homefront, and the character of American men and women in situations that required ingenuity and courage.

To test the prisoners' desire for German-made films versus the American product, two old German films, Ein Prinz Verliebt Sich and Schubert's Fruhlingstraum were included in the circuits. Prisoners, without exception, expressed great preference for the American films.

After V-E Day, it became evident that the loss of the war had made Nazi-indoctrinated ideas highly questionable to the prisoners themselves. The Why We Fight series, atrocity films, and other more propagandistic films were, therefore, added to the circuit after V-E Day. Such "entertainment" films as The Seventh Cross were also added as postV-E Day experiments. The two-reeler series This is America and Office of War Information documentaries and newareels were valuable in various degrees from the point of view of reorientation. An attempt was made to attach these important documentaries and shorts to the "pure entertainment" films, so that each program, taken as a whole, would carry some aspect of reorientation. Following is a list of the documentaries used after V-E Day:

Office of War Information Documentaries: - Cow Boy (The factual de-romanticized activities of the riders of the Western ranges, in contrast to impressions gained from the many bad, cheaply-made, "blood and thunder" Western melodramas to which prisoners had been exposed before the inception of the film circuits.) Swedes in America (The successful integration of Swedish character and achievement in the life of America. By inference, it proves that all nationalities made their important contributions.) Steel Town, Pipeline, The Autobiography of a Jeep, Power and the Land, Sand and Flame (The story of glass production), Harvest for Tomorrow, T. V. A., and Library of Congress.

This Is America series: - Guam Salvaged Island, Rockefeller Center, Aircraft Carrier, They Fight Again (The rehabilitation of disabled veterans, employed by war factories), Arctic Passage, Medicine on Guard, and The Battle of Supply.

The "pure entertainment" film was also extremely effective as a propaganda carrier. The American film has greatly impressed peoples in all countries with the high standard of living enjoyed by United States citizens. Films in this category were The Birth of the Blues, The Great Victor Herbert, Rose Marie, Presenting Lily Mars, Music for Millions, Holiday Inn. They depict the development of the American musical idiom, the extensive popular use of classical music and incidents in the lives of great composers and performers. Such films as A Man to Remember, Christmas in July, Cow Boy and the Lady, His Butler's Sister, The Aldrich Family, The Clock, and Our Neighbors The Carters, show both humorous and serious aspects of American family life, the great variety of nationalities inhabiting the United States, and the manner in which happiness is pursued (with a dash of Hollywood exaggeration). One effect achieved is the simple, visual impression of life in the American metropolis, the country town, and the farm.

Many prisoners, convinced of the might of German technical superiority, have expressed their surprise at the techniques, artistry, balance, and judgment that went into the making of How Green Was My Valley, the simplicity and acting of A Man to Remember, the photography, miniature work, superimposition and transparency techniques in Lost Horizon, and the originality in story construction of Flesh and Fantasy.

Many of the one-reel shorts selected dealt with American sports: Tumble Bugs, Modern Vikings, Ball Tossers, Human Fish, All Sails Set, King Soccer, Swim-Capades, Furlough Fishing, College Champions, Hedge Hoppers, Tennis Rhythm, Ice Capers, King of the Fairway, Viking Champions, Training Police Horses, Hunting Dogs, Pigtail Pilot, Cloud Chasers, Fighting Fish, Ski Gulls, Harness Racers, Fisherman's Paradise, and Track Meet Thrills. The animated cartoon also was a source of amazement to prisoners, its production techniques still being somewhat of a secret, no other country having achieved a successful series of such films.

On 8 May 1945, the following telegram was sent to all service commanders: "German prisoners of war will be shown available 16mm and 35mm films of German atrocities and conditions in German prisoner of war camps in Europe. Use of local War Department theaters is authorized for exhibition, without charge, of commercial newsreels or Army newsreels containing this subject. Special performances for prisoners of war authorized..... Films will be precensored by prisoner of war camp commanders. Entertainment films will not be exhibited on same program as atrocity pictures."

Some of this atrocity footage was subsequently utilized in the special film entitled Germany Awake, produced for The Provost Marshal General.

In April 1945, the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department General Staff, directed that all German prisoners of war held in the United States be required to see a specially prepared film depicting atrocities perpetrated upon persons forcibly detained within Germany and territory formally occupied by the German Armed Forces. The following production guides were given the Chief Signal Officer:

1. The film should be in two reels, running approximately twenty minutes.
2. Emphasis of accusation should be against the Nazi Party and the principles of National Socialism.
3. In the selection of Signal Corps footage, typical examples of the worst atrocities available should be included.
4. Narration should point out that German prisoners of war in the United States had been treated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

5. A running commentary in the German language was to be supplied, documenting each incident shown with a description of the circumstances, the location, the name of the installation, and the approximate date.

The film, subsequently entitled Germany Awake, was approved by The Provost Marshal General in its final form on 14 September 1945. Because of production delays and the fact that various Signal Corps clips containing atrocity footage had already been exhibited to German prisoners, this documentary film then had to be brought up to date. A German announcement was written to be read to the prisoners of war prior to each exhibition of the picture, relating the film to the war crimes trials in Germany.

Effective religious motion pictures had much to contribute to the reorientation program. The two Hollywood classics, King of Kings and Sign of The Cross, were included in the initial circuit and other films such as Song of Bernadette and Going My Way, were added when they became available. A series of religious films was reviewed at the Motion Picture Bureau of the War Prisoners Aid of the Young Men's Christian Associations. Nine subjects were approved and authorized to be made available by the Young Men's Christian Associations directly to prisoner of war camps. It was recommended that these pictures, wherever possible, be shown on Sundays only. The approved religious films were The Story of the Prodigal Son, Man of Faith, A Woman to Remember, A Certain Nobleman, A Child of Bethlehem, Beyond Our Horizon, We Too Receive, Who Is My Neighbor, and No Greater Power.

In cooperation with the Signal Corps Distribution Division, the Provost Marshal General's Office devised and issued an "Attendance Record Form" to be filled out by the appropriate officer in each prisoner of war camp after each motion picture showing. This form recorded the attendance, gross receipts, and provided space for remarks regarding the audience reaction to the film. The form served as a financial report for the Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund, and was used for the purpose of accounting and pay film distributors their 33-1/3 per cent according to contract. 10/

Since The Provost Marshal General's film circuits had been established solely for German prisoners of war, requests from service commanders to extend the showing of these films to Japanese and Italian prisoners were disapproved. This policy was stated in a telegram to the commanding generals of all service commands. Commanding officers of Italian and Japanese prisoner of war camps were authorized to continue procurement of films from private sources.

In spite of previous directives, requests continued to be received from service commanders to make post theaters available for

10/ WD AGO Form R-5043, 5 May 1945, Control Approval Symbol MGX-67.

the showing of 35 millimeter films to prisoners of war. On 7 July 1945, service commanders were informed: "Prisoners of war will not be authorized to use post theaters after activation of the film circuit for prisoners of war. Specific approval will occasionally be given to attend showings at post theaters when a film of special reorientational value is distributed on the United States Army Motion Picture Circuit, and when that picture will not be put on the film circuit for prisoners of war." These requests by service commanders resulted from a War Department regulation that post theaters which did not show a certain minimum attendance per month were to be closed. This would mean cutting off United States Army Motion Picture Service films to United States troops. For reasons stated above, The Provost Marshal General adhered to his decision of disapproving post theaters for prisoners of war, but brought the morale factor involved regarding American troops to the attention of the Director, Information and Education Division and the United States Army Motion Picture Service, recommending that steps be taken to reduce required minimum attendance figures for United States troops at post theaters.

However, an exception was made in permitting 16 millimeter motion pictures to be shown prisoners of war in War Department theaters which did not operate a 35 millimeter program and where no other suitable facilities existed for exhibition of films to prisoners. Emphasis was again placed on the provision that prisoners and American personnel, other than prisoner of war guards, should not occupy the theater at the same time.

In certain service commands, there existed a lack of trained prisoner of war film projectionists despite the directives that a sufficient number of technicians were to be trained for the purpose. To prevent interruptions of established film circuits, permission was given to employ trained United States personnel as film operators. The Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund, fixed the rate to be paid to United States technicians as the same paid the operators of projectors in War Department theaters. Service commanders were notified of this decision in a telegram as follows: "On 26 July 1945 authority is granted to utilize American personnel as motion picture projectionists for films on the prisoner of war film circuit. Payment for services of American personnel will be made in accordance with paragraph 6, Prisoner of War Circular No. 10, February 1945. A rate of \$1.25 for the first show and 50 cents for every additional show the same day will be effective."

Financial responsibility for damaged prints needed to be established as films damaged beyond repair had to be replaced by new prints ordered through United States Army Motion Picture Service from the original distributors. On 30 July 1945, the Chief Signal Officer and The Provost Marshal General agreed that the Signal Corps Distribution Division would notify the Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund of damaged film prints, the prisoner of war camp responsible for damage and the amount involved. Damage was to be charged to the camp fund of the responsible prisoner of war camp.

To provide visual aid material for lectures on the American way of life, camp commanders were invited to purchase standard Signal Corps 35 millimeter Film Strip and Slide Projectors (Keystone Model), from prisoner of war camp funds. Film strips obtained through the Office of War Information and other sources, were made available to prisoner of war camps on 15 August 1945. Accompanying lecture material was furnished in German translations as running commentary to film strips. 11/ As of 1 November 1945 approximately 169 projectors were delivered to prisoner of war camps for this purpose.

From the inception of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division to 1 November 1945, approximately 450 motion picture features had been reviewed, of which 116 were included in the circuit. Total admissions to 30 September 1945 were 3,152,010, averaging ten films seen by every German prisoner in the United States. Total gross receipts by 1 November 1945 amounted to \$473,070.75, with a net for the Custodian, Central Prisoner of War Fund, of \$315,170.25. Film rentals paid for the same period to 14 commercial film producers and distribution agencies were \$157,690.25 (five cents out of every 15 cents admission fee). In evaluating these figures, consideration should be given to the fact that it was not until the middle of June 1945 that circuits had begun operation in all service commands, and not until the middle of September 1945 that all base and branch camps were receiving films.

Public Address Systems - Radio

Meanwhile, consideration was being given to the use of radio. Meetings were held with representatives of the Office of War Information to determine how the facilities of that organization could be adapted to the needs of the program. Prisoners could not listen to the short-wave programs that the Office of War Information was beaming to Europe since, for security reasons, they were forbidden to operate any short-wave receiver. An investigation was made to discover what United States radio stations broadcast German language programs, but only a few such stations were discovered and their programs were extremely limited.

Meanwhile, prisoners were encouraged to listen to the best programs they could hear on standard radio sets. A list of the best programs available was published in Der Ruf. Several of the service commands circulated lists of the best radio programs to the camps. Reports indicate that the most popular programs were semi-classical music, classical music, jazz, and newscasts. For the most part prisoners seemed to dislike the advertising on the American radio. However, there can be no doubt that the variety of news commentators and the opportunity to hear the quality of American orchestras,

11/ ASF letter, Prisoner of War Special Projects Letter No. 14, file no. SPX 383.6 (21 Jul 45)OB-S-SPMCK-M, 22 July 1945, subject: "Film Strips for Prisoners of War."

classical, semi-classical and jazz, did impress the prisoners considerably. After V-J Day prisoners were permitted to listen to short-wave broadcasts and were able to hear the many Office of War Information short-wave broadcasts as well as the Allied controlled radio stations that were broadcasting from Europe.

After V-J Day another attempt was made to procure public address systems. The Chief Signal Officer stated that he had no objection to the procurement of public address systems for prisoners of war. However, War Department Circular 214, dated 17 July 1945, specifically prohibited the purchase of public address systems from nonappropriated funds unless approval was first granted by the Director, Special Services Division (Priority Liaison Officer), Headquarters, Army Service Forces. This delayed procurement since purchases for prisoners would necessarily be financed by nonappropriated funds.

Eight recordings of the German version of Norman Corwin's On a Note of Triumph were procured from the Office of War Information and circulated to several service commands. These recordings proved to be especially effective. 12/ Approximately 1,000 musical recordings, many with spoken interludes about American life, were distributed to the Eighth Service Command, which had the greatest number of public address systems and strongly emphasized public address programs.

Many camps utilized articles and stories from the various publications put out by the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division. The greatest drawback to the use of public address system programs was the lack of a centralized control. The Division did not organize this medium because of the fact that the war was over before very many camps acquired public address systems.

Music, Art, and Theater

Music, art, and theater were considered from the beginning of the re-education program as the "minor media." Because of the relatively short period of time that the prisoners of war would be in America and the lack of experienced American personnel, it would not have benefited the program to concentrate heavily on them. However, there were definite problems in relation to each that had to be solved. Nazi propaganda was being spread through militaristic folk-songs and marches, through carvings and paintings with swastikas and such Nazi slogans as "Blood and Honor" and through pseudotheatrical presentations. Almost nothing was being done to stop this propaganda. This was chiefly because the majority of the American personnel in prisoner of war camps knew nothing about music, art, and theater, nor how the Nazis used these media. In those prisoner of war camps where American personnel attempted to dictate what they wanted in regard to the arts, the results sometimes gave a poor and distorted impression of American culture. For example, in one camp the commanding officer

12/ "Prisoners' Reactions to On a Note of Triumph" prepared by Branch Office, PMGO, NY.

brought in a group of photographs used to advertise American movies of the cheapest sort and instructed a prisoner of war artist to copy these pictures on the walls of the officers' club. Consequently a familiar saying of the prisoners in the camps was, "America has no culture. Why do you want to destroy Germany, the seat of all culture?"

The first step was to prevent the spreading of Nazi propaganda. Assistant executive officers were instructed to monitor all prisoner of war concerts and plays and to watch closely over all art work. They were told how the Nazis utilized music, art, and theater to serve their propaganda.

It was obvious that one of the best ways to show the German prisoners how false their racial supremacy ideas were would be to let them compare the quality of a so-called "Aryan" performer with a Jewish or Negro performer. Also if the German prisoners could hear the quality of American symphony orchestras and performers they might lose a little of their supreme belief in Germany as the seat of all culture. A list of recommended recordings was circulated to all prisoner of war camps and an attempt was made to impress the prisoners with the fact that music is universal and not national as the Nazis proclaimed, and to show them the high standards of American orchestras and performers. A music pamphlet about American symphony orchestras entitled "Music in America" was published and distributed to all camps in October 1945. In a mimeographed note that was included with each shipment it was stated that "The purpose of this pamphlet is to acquaint the German prisoners with the benefits of a democratic way of life as revealed in the cultural growth and freedom of expression in American symphony orchestras. The pamphlets should be placed in camp libraries and reading rooms. Pamphlets may be also included in record albums. Excerpts from the pamphlet may be published in camp newspapers or read over public address systems in connection with public address system programs. The pamphlets should also be used in connection with English classes."

Field Service

Before the inception of the re-education program, the former Prisoner of War Division sent officers to service command headquarters and prisoner of war camps to conduct liaison concerning the work program and general camp administration. It was decided that the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, because of its unusual mission, should conduct its own liaison, using officers who spoke German fluently and whose training or general background might qualify them as specialists in re-education. Accordingly, a Field Service Branch was established in the Division.

Field Service officers visited service command headquarters and prisoner of war camps to assist Special Projects officers at these installations with the implementation of the program by clarifying

policy, by helping to solve special problems and by making recommendations for the initiation of any projects previously neglected. Upon returning to the Division, they conferred with the Division staff and reported concerning special camp problems or requirements and the general progress of each of the projects sponsored by the Division. Field Service officers frequently found themselves in the position of having to explain the Division to the field and the field to the Division.

Originally Field Service officers made detailed reports on each camp and service command, addressed to the Director. No report was made to the camp commander because it was believed that the officers could accomplish more if they were not regarded as inspectors. However, by July 1945 it became apparent that oral recommendations made by a visiting company grade officer were sometimes not seriously received by camp commanders. The practice was, therefore, established of making reports on the scene of the visit addressed to the camp commander and requesting the correction of any deficiencies noted. Camp commanders were obliged to forward these reports to The Provost Marshal General through the service command headquarters with a statement as to what action had been taken to correct the deficiencies.. Matters of special interest to the Division were transmitted informally by the most expeditious means available, if important, and otherwise covered in a conference upon the officer's return to Washington.

One of the major difficulties encountered by Field Service officers during their field trips was the resistance with which prisoner of war camp commanders met recommendations concerning segregation. The Provost Marshal General constantly stressed the need for segregating subversive Nazi elements from all other German prisoners of war. Existing regulations permitted a certain amount of discretion on the part of service commanders and prisoner of war camp commanders with reference to the segregation of German prisoners of war. This discretion had resulted in the retention of strong Nazi leaders at unclassified prisoner of war camps to assist in maintaining external camp discipline. It was essential that Nazi control in as many prisoner of war camps as possible be eliminated even if the removal of subversive Nazi leaders from unclassified camps would for a short while interfere with camp discipline. Segregation, in order to be effective, had to be carried out by intelligence officers and by assistant executive officers in the field. Where this was done, outstanding opponents of the program were uncovered and segregated. This enabled the great rank and file of German prisoners of war to become subject to the impact of the Intellectual Diversion Program. Such efforts toward segregation resulted in giving anti-Nazis the chance to take their proper position as leaders in the camps.

An opinion frequently encountered in the field was the statement made by camp commanders that the Intellectual Diversion Program interfered with the work program. It was repeatedly emphasized at all

training conferences and in official statements of the Division that the work program had priority and that the Intellectual Diversion Program must not interfere with the maximum employment of German prisoners of war. It was believed, however, that individual German prisoners of war who actually or potentially opposed the Intellectual Diversion Program were at the same time actually or potentially opponents of the work program. It was never felt that the aims of the two programs were so different that the same individual could favor one and oppose the other. Wherever recommendations were made for the transfer of individual German prisoners of war to a segregation camp, it was believed that their transfer would materially benefit not only the Intellectual Diversion Program but also, and particularly, the work program.

Field Service activities would have been more effective if more Field Service officers could have been employed. By 1 November 1945, after one year of Field Service operation, hardly any camp had been visited more than twice and at least half the camps were visited only once. Between 1 January and 1 June 1945, six Field Service officers traveled a total of 82,641 miles in visiting 118 prisoner of war base camps and 29 branch camps. After this period, Field Service officers were required to conduct screening operations for another special project and their visits declined in number.

The Italian Program

In November 1944, The Provost Marshal General indicated the necessity of applying the Intellectual Diversion Program to Italian as well as German prisoners of war. It was decided that reorientation of the Italians would be confined to the encouragement of intellectual diversion until such time as authority was received for establishing an Italian program that would parallel the German program. In December 1944, an Italian specialist was appointed to the Specialist Group of the Division.

On 11 December 1944, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, recommended to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, that consideration be given to having the Commanding General, Italian Service Units institute a reorientation program among personnel of Italian Service Units. The Commanding General, Italian Service Units, after studying the activities of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division, recommended that The Provost Marshal General be charged with the direction of reorientation for Italian prisoners of war and Italian Service Units, and that his own headquarters assist in the program only by recommending any action which would be applicable to Italian Service Units.

On 29 December 1944, The Provost Marshal General was directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands to institute a program for the reorientation of Italian Service Units in cooperation with the Commanding General, Italian Service Units. On 25 January 1945,

The Provost Marshal General was directed to apply his program to Italian prisoners of war as well as to Italian Service Units. The Italian specialist visited all Italian prisoner of war camps and the major Italian Service Unit installations between 14 February and 19 March 1945, to study the problem of reorientation.

On 19 March 1945, the State Department requested a delay of the Italian program until such time as the status of Italian prisoners of war could be clarified. Meanwhile, reading materials which promoted the re-education of Italians were distributed to Italian prisoner of war camps. No further re-education of members of Italian Service Units was effected by this Division.

Religion

A comprehensive religious program already had been in full operation in most prisoner of war camps prior to the establishment of the re-education project. This religious program was successfully carried forward by American chaplains whose work was supplemented by auxiliary prisoner clergymen of both major faiths. Regular services were conducted for Catholics and Protestants. Bible study classes were organized and successfully conducted, choral groups formed, and in many camps open forum discussions took place. Attendance at all religious gatherings was purely voluntary.

The chaplains also acted as special services officers and assisted with the procurement of recreational material, musical instruments and many other items of personal interest to prisoners of war. They were also instrumental in establishing prisoner of war libraries.

Incidental to their religious work and activities, many chaplains concerned themselves with the secular education of the prisoners and assisted them in the organization of classes. Quite a few of the chaplains personally conducted some of these classes and lectured on American history and kindred subjects. As a result of this activity in both the religious and secular fields, a foundation was laid for a more comprehensive program for the reorientation of prisoners of war.

In view of the fact that religion must play a basic role in the re-education of prisoners of war, it was recommended that a chaplain be assigned to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division for the purpose of coordinating the religious and secular work at the camp level toward the achievement of a common objective. It was believed that such an assignment would provide service command chaplains as well as camp chaplains with a source of information, material, and practical suggestions, and that the Provost Marshal General's Office would be afforded a closer liaison with the Chief of Chaplains' Office concerning prisoner of war work in general.

A chaplain was assigned to the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division on 6 November 1944. It was his duty to evaluate the religious problems of prisoner of war camps by conducting liaison with the Chief of Chaplains' Office and the Office of the Service Command Chaplains, to furnish information to chaplains concerning sources of religious books, magazines, and periodicals, and to review foreign language religious publications. Frequently he visited chaplains in prisoner of war camps to assist them in their problems.

In February of 1945, the Division Chaplain completed files of all prisoner of war clergymen within the continental limits of the United States. These files contain the name, serial number, rank, denomination and political disposition of each prisoner of war clergyman. With the concurrence of the Chief of Chaplains and with the authorization of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, a series of Prisoner of War Chaplains' conferences were successfully conducted for the purpose of orienting prisoner of war camp chaplains in the Intellectual Diversion Program. Approximately 110 chaplains attended these conferences. The conferences were held as follows:

First, Second and Third Service Command
20-21 February 1945, at Chicago, Illinois

Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Service Command
27-28 February 1945, at Chicago, Illinois

Eighth Service Command
6 - 7 March 1945, at Dallas, Texas

Fourth Service Command
20-21 March 1945, at Atlanta, Georgia

Ninth Service Command
5 April 1945, at Fort Douglas, Utah

Reports by Field Service officers clearly indicated that there was a definite upward trend in religious life and activity among prisoners of war. This was supplemented by statements of American chaplains in all service commands that church attendance rose from 45,033 in October 1944 to 85,338 in February 1945, an increase of approximately 80 per cent. There may have been three basic reasons for this increase:

1. The collapse of Nazi Germany
2. The fact that ardent Nazis were segregated, thus relieving adverse pressure on the religious-minded prisoners
3. The need of personal spiritual comfort and consolation and the realization that life devoid of true Christian religion is empty and without purpose.

The majority of American chaplains assigned to prisoner of war work spoke the German language. There was, however, a shortage of American chaplains in prisoner of war work. This was due to the fact there was a great need for additional chaplains for overseas assignments. In many camps, however, where the chaplain was unable adequately to cover his field because of distances and the great number of branch camps, civilian clergymen were employed to assist in the work. These men devoted such of their time and energy in supplementing the chaplains work.

Summary

The history of the Division constituted a continuous fight to overcome circumstances and to reconcile unique problems to Army regulations or verbal directives from higher echelons and other government agencies. An unusual missionary spirit developed spontaneously among the officers administering the program, both in the Provost Marshal General's Office and in the field, which enabled them to overcome a multitude of difficulties. The challenging nature of the program probably contributed to this drive and spirit of the staff.

Such a concentrated effort was necessary mainly because the program itself had no precedent either in military or civil history, and because the nature of the mission was unrelated to normal military functions. Furthermore, the program was initiated very late in the war. There was an immediate requirement for German-speaking personnel, but Military Government and intelligence agencies had absorbed most German-speaking officers long before this project was started. The lack of precedents created obstacles because existing regulations had been prepared without consideration of this type of activity.

The program was initially classified secret because it was feared that Germany might intentionally misunderstand its scope as a pretext for severe retaliation against American prisoners of war. It was also believed to be undesirable to give the German prisoners of war any knowledge of such a program at a time when Nazi elements in the camps had sufficient power to sabotage the War Department's efforts. V-E Day dissipated both of these dangers and steps were taken to declassify the program entirely. On 12 June 1945, after receipt of authority for the declassification, The Provost Marshal General released its story to the press. Declassification simplified the jobs of all officers concerned with the re-education. The cooperation of all military personnel and civilian agencies was more easily secured when they could be told what was being accomplished.

While the program was secret, the War Department was constantly under attack for its failure to re-educate German prisoners of war.

Many such criticisms emanated from prominent journalists and radio commentators as well as from members of Congress. In several instances the Director of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division conferred off the record with the authors, told them of what was being done and of the classification, and persuaded them to discontinue their attacks. Many letters were addressed to the War Department, the State Department, and even to the President by private citizens who strongly urged that a re-education program be initiated. The fact that a precedent has been established for this type of obstructive orientation will obviate the necessity for secret classification of any future program.

No agency was established within the Division to evaluate the success of the program in the camps. It was believed more important to occupy the available personnel in the concentrated attempt to guarantee success, and to measure the results later. Field Service officers checked the effectiveness of policy and materials so that there was no danger of the Division using all its force to proceed in wrong directions. Had a greater number of Field Service officers been provided, it would have been desirable for them to complete surveys of the psychological changes of the prisoners during the time of their detention.

No evaluation, of course, could have anticipated the final practical success of the program. A synthetic approval of democracy might have been reported by evaluations made while the prisoners were detained, but might have disappeared before it could become effective in the reconstruction of Germany. It is believed that the accomplishments of the program which have become apparent from casual observation will have strong potentiality for endurance. It is believed that this quality of endurance was due to the lack of pressure and to the fact that prisoners were influenced by truth rather than propaganda, so that they came to feel that they themselves were making the new decisions and not that a foreign ideology was being forced upon them.

The success of the program in changing the attitude of prisoners of war to a respect for America, its institutions and its government, and to disillusionment concerning German militarism and National Socialism has been demonstrated in many ways. In several German prisoner of war camps, prisoner representatives have been chosen by secret ballot. By November 1945 almost a million dollars had been donated by prisoners from their meager allotments to the International Red Cross for relief of all Europeans who had suffered from the war. The increased popularity of Der Ruf, which was progressively potent in denouncing the Nazis, was a definite indication of the changing political attitude. Sober and indignant reactions to motion pictures of the atrocities committed in concentration camps indicate that most prisoners were surprised and disillusioned by this evidence. The fact that practically all reorientation media were purchased

voluntarily by the prisoners indicates their positive reception of these materials. Practically all camps report a great interest in America and in democracy.

Many political enemies of National Socialism and even former inmates of Nazi concentration camps were forced into the German Army, surrendered to the American Army at their earliest opportunity, and eventually were imprisoned in America with the rank and file of German captives. To win these prisoners to an appreciation of democracy could not be considered as an accomplishment. The fact that a petition was signed by 1391 prisoners at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, calling on the German people to make peace with the Allies in February 1945 was not as impressive as the American press led the public to believe. Fort Devens was a special camp where anti-Nazis were segregated. It was an impressive fact, however, that Der Ruf and Buecherreihe Neue Welt sold well at Camp Alva, Oklahoma where the worst Nazis were interned.

The final report on the success of the Prisoner of War Special Projects Division in accomplishing its mission probably will be discovered in intelligence reports emanating from Military Government agencies in occupied Germany during the next few years. It is to be hoped that Military Government authorities will make the best use of the nucleus of a democratic Germany which they will find among the German citizens who were prisoners of war in America.

PART IV

MILITARY POLICE

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

Military police duties in the first World War were performed by all types of units, hastily organized as necessity arose for specific duties, without any special organization or technical training. Personnel performing those duties were not required, as a rule, to have special qualifications, but were generally selected on a basis of physical fitness and availability for handling a situation immediately at hand. Although many plans were formulated and many recommendations were made aimed at avoiding errors of omission and commission observed on all hands, no machinery was set up to prepare qualified personnel for the particular jobs that would be required of military policemen.

The Bandholtz Report, published in April 1919, included a history of the Provost Marshal General's Department, AEF, which detailed its shortcomings and submitted a proposed Act of Congress creating and organizing a Military Police Corps. 1/ This proposal showed the need of a permanent separate corps and set up the mechanics for an organization which would both train military police for peace-time duties and anticipate the need for rapid and efficient expansion should another emergency arise.

Apparently based upon World War I experience, a directive for the future organization of a Corps of Military Police, based upon a General Staff mobilization plan, was promulgated by the Secretary of War 24 July 1924 outlining the general functions of the Corps, "to be established on the outbreak of war if the President so directs," and assigning to it a rather comprehensive job: 2/

2. The general functions of the Military Police Corps will be:

(a) In the Theater of Operations, to enforce all police regulations, to maintain order throughout the area or areas occupied by the organizations to which they have been assigned, to protect the inhabitants of the country and their property against violence and prevent excesses of all kinds, to enforce traffic control, to supervise the travel of military and civilian personnel, to supervise the feeding of the civilian population when necessary and authorized, to apprehend deserters and absentees, to collect all stragglers and

1/ Brig. Gen. Harry Hill Bandholtz, PMG AEF 27 September 18 - 5 August 19

2/ (AG 322.999 Military Police Corps (7-12-24) (Misc) M-C)

hand them over to their organizations, to relieve combat organizations promptly from the custody of prisoners of war; in conjunction with interior guards established by combatant units to protect railroads, telegraph and telephone lines from damage by the native population, to keep hostile inhabitants in order and to carry out their disarmament, to cooperate with the Military Intelligence police in the execution of counter espionage measures. In addition to the duties pertaining to general military police, The Provost Marshal General of the Theater of Operations is charged with the reception, care, disposition and security of all classes of prisoners. He makes records of prisoners of war and collects the records and tags taken from the enemy's dead as required by the law and usages of war.

(b) In the Zone of the Interior, to protect sensitive points on railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, wharves, docks and bridges of special importance to the federal government, to guard government plants, storage depots, terminals and other government interests and agencies, to quell outbreaks and uprisings that occur within the confines of the property being guarded, to assist the Department of Justice in carrying out alien enemy proclamations, and to guard prisoners of war; when authorized federal agencies fail, to enforce the Interstate Commerce laws, insure the transmission of mails, prevent the introduction of liquor on Indian reservations, and when state agencies fail, to insure domestic tranquility in case of draft or similar riots; all to the end that all combat troops will be freed from such duty in the Zone of the Interior upon the outbreak of hostilities.

War Department Basic Field Manual Volume IX set forth certain recommendations regarding the organization of the Provost Marshal General's Department in case of war. 3/ Many such plans and policies were drawn up, but none of them resulted in the establishment of adequate ground work prior to mobilization during the emergency period preceding the second World War.

Under the National Defense Act of 1920, a Military Police branch in the Officers' Reserve Corps was set up, and some 150 Reserve officers, many of whom had had military police experience in World War I, were assigned to it. The branch was further

3/ War Department Basic Field Manual Volume IX dated 31 December 1937

augmented to a peak of 300 in 1925 by the assignment from time to time of newly commissioned Infantry Reserve officers to the Military Police Reserve; apparently more to complete a "paper organization" of reserve units than with any regard to professional qualifications. 4/ No special training was given or offered these MP Reserve officers and they usually trained as infantry. Even those who had MP experience or training were not as a rule employed in military police work when they were called to active duty with the mobilization in 1940 and 1941, but were assigned indiscriminately to reception centers and training camps and to various other duties.

Such military police duties as were required in the peacetime Army, both in the United States and in overseas possessions, were performed by the temporary detail of officers and enlisted men from various arms and services, and by a few regularly constituted and organized military police units. The commanding officer of each post, camp or station was responsible for the conduct of military personnel on pass to communities in the vicinity of his installation, and men were detailed as military police as need required, often on the same basis as the installation's interior guard. There was no uniformity of organization, doctrine, training or procedure. Some personnel were on special duty, some on part-time assignment and some more or less permanent. There was no coordination of activities, no central directing authority higher than corps area or service command, no permanent organization, and almost no personnel, either commissioned or enlisted, who had received any special training in military police functions and duties.

Such was the situation which confronted the newly appointed Provost Marshal General in August of 1941. 5/ He was "charged with the administration of all matters within the jurisdiction of the War Department relating to control of aliens and with such other duties as may hereafter be prescribed."

The Corps of Military Police was established 26 September 1941 for the duration of the emergency, to merge the scattered details employed on garrison military police duty into a homogeneous body and prepare for the anticipated expansion of military police requirements and duties should this country become involved in war. 6/ The corps was to include all tactical military police

4/ Records of Reserve Division, AGO

5/ Letter TAG, 370.81 (7-31-41) OD, dated 31 July 41, appointing The Provost Marshal General

6/ Letter AGO, AG 320.2 (9-26-41) MR-M-A, dated 26 Sept 41

units, Zone of the Interior MP units, and those military units and detachments, including all enlisted men habitually performing military police duties, which were part of the War Department overhead or functioning in corps areas and department service commands.

There were but three military police battalions and four military police companies in the Army when the CMP was established. The first additional activation took place in January 1942, under an authorization on 2 January for 51 battalions, the number considered necessary for internal security purposes. 7/ Additional requirements developed for military police battalions and companies in conjunction with planned overseas operations, so in August 1942 the War Department Troop Basis was amended to provide for 85 battalions, and this was further amended from time to time until a total of 106 battalions had been authorized. 8/

Between 27 September 1941 and 30 June 1943 a total of 530 military police units of various types were activated in the United States. 9/ Of these, 310 were later disbanded and 151 were moved overseas. They included MP Battalions, MP Companies, PW Escort Guard Companies, Post, Camp or Station MP Companies, MP PW Processing Companies, and Criminal Investigation Detachments.

Activations took place as rapidly as officers and men were available. For the most part the earlier battalions, particularly those intended for duty in the continental US, were activated by the commanding generals of service commands. Much of the commissioned personnel of the battalions activated early in 1942 consisted of Reserve officers of other branches called to active duty without either refresher training or military police background of any kind. Generally speaking, the battalions activated in 1942 were neither adequately equipped nor trained. Security requirements compelled their use on a functional basis to such an extent that little time or opportunity was had for specialized training, even had qualified instructors been available. It was not until the fall of 1943, with the establishment of a unit training center at Fort Custer, Michigan, that uniformity of training was obtained. 10/ Most of the battalions trained at

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- 7/ Ltr AGO, AG 320.2 (1-1-42) MR-M-C, dated 2 Jan 42
Ltr AGO, AG 320.2 (12-31-41) MR-M-C, dated 10 Jan 42, and amendment AG 320.2 (2-6-42) MR-M-C, dated 13 Feb 42
- 8/ AG 320.2 (5-5-42) MR-M-SP, 6 May 42; (6-22-42) MR-M-SP, 23 June 42; (7-2-42) MR-M-GN, 4 July 42; (7-4-42) MR-M-GN, 7 July 42; (8-15-42) MR-M-SP, 19 Aug 42; (11-10-42) MR-M-SP, 12 Nov 42; (12-2-42) OB-I-SP-M, 10 Dec 42.
- 9/ Tabulation on activations, disbandments, and movement overseas of Military Police units. Chart XII
- 10/ Letter TAG, AG 320.2 (11-23-42) OB-I-SP-M, 25 Nov 42

Fort Custer were destined for overseas duty and were provided with qualified personnel and equipment.

Staff Supervision

War Department staff supervision over military police activities was exercised by the Military Police Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office. Operations overseas were the responsibility of theater commanders, and in the United States, of commanding generals of service commands and the Military District of Washington.

The Military Police Division was organized 1 August 1941. Originally it consisted of 3 sections, each of which handled different phases of military police training and organization. It was re-organized 17 February 1942 with the following branches or sections: The Military Police Board, The Provost Marshal General's School, Equipment Branch, Mail & Records Section, Training and School Section, a Personnel Section to handle procurement and records of officers, and an Assignment, Transfer and Promotion Section. This organization was retained until 3 July 1942, when the Assignment, Transfer and Promotion Section was merged with the Personnel Section, and an Office Service Section was added. In August 1942, staff supervision of the Military Police Replacement Training Center, which had been activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, was added to the functions of the Division. An Instructor Observer group was added to inspect the training and personnel of newly activated military police units. At the same time, the Military Police Replacement Training Center was removed from direct control of the Military Police Division, although the Division still acted as liaison agent between it and other War Department agencies. In June 1943, the Instructor Observer group was replaced with an Inspection Branch, later to become the Advisory-Liaison Branch, and in August 1943 the functions of the Personnel Branch were transferred to the newly organized Military Personnel Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office. No further major change occurred until July 1945 when the Doctrine Section and Enforcement Section were established as separate branches because of their increasing duties. As of 1 September 1945, the Military Police Division consisted of the Training, Plans and Operations, Organization, Advisory-Liaison, and Enforcement Branches, and the Military Police Board.

The Plans and Operations Branch maintained close liaison with other War Department Agencies, particularly with regard to operational plans and military personnel. It made plans and recommendations as to the type, number, and use of military police required in overseas as well as in domestic operations. During the period

of demobilization, it made recommendations and selections of units to be inactivated, as well as those to be retained in the various categories of the War Department Troop Basis.

The Organization Branch prepared tables of organization and equipment, and tables of allowances, for military police units in which the Army Service Forces had primary interest, and made recommendations as to types of clothing, equipment, and weapons required by military police in their various duties. It also represented the Provost Marshal General on various technical committees.

The Advisory-Liaison Branch, had its origin in the Instructor Observer Group, later known as the Inspection Branch. 11/ Originally located in the Provost Marshal General's Office in Washington, it was moved out of Washington in August 1943, and located at The Provost Marshal General School, Fort Custer, Michigan, and in October, 1944, moved with the School to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. This move was undertaken as a result of the attempt by the War Department to remove as many installations as possible from the Military District of Washington. The Branch inspected Army Service Forces military police units selected for movements overseas, for compliance with the War Department publication "Preparation for Overseas Movement" (POM). It made periodical inspections of other Army Service Forces military police units in the United States, and made recommendations to improve their efficiency. These inspections included checking on compliance with training programs, methods and doctrine, and discussing with organization commanders matters of personnel, equipment, training, and organization.

The Military Police Board was activated under Army Regulations 190-10, 26 January 1942. 12/ Like the Advisory Liaison Branch, it operated from the same station as the Provost Marshal General School. The Board planned, prepared, and assisted in the production of training films and film strips; prepared field and technical manuals, training bulletins, and visual training aids; made service tests of military police equipment; and conducted research and made recommendations for the improvement of military police equipment and operating procedure. 13/ Among its more outstanding achievements were the development of vehicular radio systems for posts, camps and stations in the United States and initiating the development of the grenade, hand, riot (CN), M25, commonly known as the "baseball" grenade. The commissioned personnel assigned to the Board normally consisted of five members and five associate members, most of whom were experts in one or more phases of work carried on by the organization. Its operating procedure was similar to that of boards of other arms and services.

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- 11/ The Advisory-Liaison Branch operated from the same stations as the Provost Marshal General's School
- 12/ The Military Police Board operated from the same stations as the Provost Marshal General's School
- 13/ Projects of Military Police Board from 1 Jan 42 to Jan 45

Promulgation of Doctrine and Policies

Prior to the organization of the PMGO and the organization of a Military Police Division within that office on 1 August 1941, there were no plans for the initiation, formulation and processing of War Department policies or doctrine for the CMP, or for the preparation and processing of training literature and training aids. Because of the lack of advance planning, military police doctrine was almost nonexistent. Such doctrine as there was, covered only the use of troops as military police in domestic disturbances and the duties of military police with tactical units. It was necessary not only to revise and make current meager existing doctrine but also to prepare entirely new doctrine for a new corps in a greatly expanded army to meet the swiftly changing needs of a new type of warfare.

The mission of the Military Police Division of The Provost Marshal General's Office included the following: procurement of trainer and operational personnel; promulgation of doctrine and policies; publication of training programs; preparation and distribution of training texts; activation of training units; establishment of training centers; establishment of service schools; inspection of the accomplishment of training, assist trainers, and bring existing problems to the Washington level.

Late in 1941 a Training Branch was organized in the Military Police Division of the Office of The Provost Marshal General and a Doctrine Section, organized early in 1942, was specifically charged with the development of military police doctrine and the supervision and preparation for publication of training literature and training aids such as technical and field manuals, training film and film strips, graphic training aids and other training media.

Prior to the establishment of the Doctrine Section, FM 29-5, "Military Police," was published 8 December 1941 under the direction of G-1, WDGS. This manual superseded Basic Field Manual, Vol II, 31 December 1937, and served as a basis for the development of future War Department doctrine and policy for the technical training of military police personnel. FM 29-5 indicated in detail that: the MP must first be a well-trained soldier and an outstanding example of discipline and soldierly appearance; he must have the stature, aggressiveness, tact, maturity and judgment to handle any situation involving our own or foreign troops or civilians; he must be taught how to accept and enforce authority; he must be trained technically in traffic control, town patrolling, handling prisoners of war, criminal investigation, and conduct and authority.

The field of military police requirements for training was thoroughly explored, so far as knowledge of requirements existed at

that time, and it was decided that the main functions of the Corps should be treated in separate manuals. A primary difficulty was a lack of published material upon which to predicate the doctrine required by the new corps. Most of the material formulated in World War I was found inadequate for World War II.

The following manuals were projected and approved for publication by the Director of Military Training, Army Service Forces: FM 19-5 "Military Police," to be a revision of the then extant FM 29-5 "Military Police" and outline the basic principles and the broader duties and functions of the Corps; FM 19-15 "Domestic Disturbances," FM 19-20 "Criminal Investigation," to set forth the basic principles and operation techniques for military investigators; FM 19-25 "Occupational Military Police," to set forth the basic principles of the use of military police in occupied territory of the enemy; FM 19-210 "Traffic Control," to treat the subject in accordance with the new doctrine being developed in the field; and TM 19-250 "Military Police Records and Forms."

Only three of these projects had been completed up to 1 July 1945 -- FM 19-5 "Military Police," FM 19-20 "Criminal Investigation," and TM 19-250 "Records and Forms" --but changing conditions and requirements resulted in the publication of several other field and training manuals on military police doctrine. Extensive studies were made of military police operations on maneuvers at home and in theaters of operations, in towns and cities, at posts, camps and stations, in prisoner of war camps, and in combat, and new doctrine was prepared on the basis of these studies. The current publications, with dates of publication, are:

FM 19-5,	Military Police, June 44
FM 19-10,	Military Police in Towns and Cities, Jan 45
FM 19-15,	Domestic Disturbances, July 45
FM 19-20,	Criminal Investigation, April 45
TM 19-225,	Sabotage, February 45
TM 19-250,	Military Police Records and Forms, May 44
TM 19-275,	Military Police on Railroad Trains and in Railroad and Bus Terminals and Stations, Jan 44
TM 19-500,	Enemy Prisoners of War, Oct 44

WD Pamphlet 27-4, Military Executions, June 44

The Military Police Division of the Office of The Provost Marshal General supervised production of a score of training films, film bulletins and film strips primarily for military police use, including:

TF 19-1360,	Handling Prisoners of War
TF 19-1920,	Riot Control
TF 19-2032,	Guarding Against Sabotage
TF 19-2034,	AWOL and Desertion
TF 19-2036,	Control of Individuals in the Field
TF 19-2092,	Military Police Town Patrolling
FB 152,	Combat Firing with Hand Guns
FB 164,	Controlling German Prisoners of War
FB 167,	Traffic Control in the Normandy Invasion
FB 193,	Evacuation of Civilians
FB 202,	Traffic Control in the China-Burma-India Theater
FS 19-1,	Preparing and Reading a March Graph
FS 19-2,	Police Riot Clubs
FS 19-3,	Thompson Submachine Gun Firing
FS 19-4,	Preparing and Reading a Circulation Map
FS 19-5,	Manual Signals for Traffic Control
FS 19-6,	Military Traffic Signs
FS 19-7,	Riot Control Formations

In order that doctrine might be revised as better techniques were developed it was essential that the collection and distribution of information on military police operations important to the morale and leadership of the military police be continuous. Sources of such information included: Combat Analysis Files Section, TAGO; Military Intelligence Division, GS; unit histories, after-action reports, observers' reports, letters and interviews. A detailed list of technical information desired by The Provost Marshal General was prepared for the use of Intelligence officers engaged in interviewing military personnel returning from the active theaters in order to obtain all types of information which might affect military police doctrine. This information of the various theaters of operations, headquarters, ASF, the Command and General Staff School, and the divisions and other agencies of the PMGO, notably The Provost Marshal General's School, the Military Police Board, Advisory-Liaison Branch, and the Military Police Training Bulletin. The Military Police Training Bulletin was supplied with material and data for illustrating military police operations for the information and guidance of the personnel of the GMP, and nearly 10,000 copies were distributed monthly.

In addition to doctrine in the form of manuals and visual aids, the PMGO prepared and disseminated numerous letters, circulars and memoranda which generally outlined War Department policies for the enforcement of military discipline and the conduct of military personnel.

Because the activation of a large number of military police units came almost simultaneously with the authority for the activation of the CMP, the ground work for training had not been laid. The need for Mobilization Training Programs (MTP's) was urgent, and the immediate need was a program outlining wide basic military training for enlisted personnel, followed by basic technical training, team and unit training, and advanced training. These phases of training were to be covered by a series of three programs: 19-1, unit training; 19-2, replacement training; and 19-3, advanced training.

On 13 January 1942, MTP 19-1 was published in mimeograph form. This program was designed especially for personnel assigned to or designated for Military Police Battalions (Zone of the Interior), and provided for five weeks of training in all the specific tasks to be assigned this type of unit as well as all the basic training necessary to convert the trainee into a soldier able to take care of himself and his equipment.

Between January and June 1942, 65 MP Battalions and 10 MP Companies (ZI), four MP Companies (PCS) (Post, Camp and Station), and 42 MP Escort Guard Companies were activated. Practical application at the training centers and the activation of these new-type units made the original MTP 19-1 obsolete. On 6 May 1942 a new MTP 19-1 was published, giving more complete instructions on each subject to be covered and added schedules for Military Police Escort Guard Companies, Military Police Tactical Units, Post, Camp, and Station Companies, ZI. This program provided for a training period of 13 weeks as against the five weeks provided for the original program.

During the next 12 months, with modifications by local training commanders, the 13-week program proved satisfactory, but experience gained by trainer personnel during this period and results obtained as evaluated from reports from overseas theaters and service commands indicated that more time should be spent on basic military police subjects and practical work, so the program was revised in May 1943 increasing the training week from 44 to 48 hours with a reallocation of time devoted to the various subjects and the addition of a detailed schedule of driver training for ZI Military Police Companies.

In order further to improve the training during the basic phase, MTP 19-101 and MTP 19-101A were published in December 1943. The former superseded MTP 19-1 and was published to incorporate a standard six weeks basic military training period for all ASF units, as set forth in MTP 21-3 (tentative) 1 August 1943, and a 17-weeks basic military police unit training program to conform with all ASF unit training programs. Also a new section was added to cover the basic phase for Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Companies which were being

activated in the latter part of 1943. MTP 19-101A provided for the training of units found to be substandard after their first six weeks' training, and provided that this phase of training be extended up to 26 weeks.

On 1 May 1944, Army Service Forces published an MTP 21-3, superseding 21-2 (tentative), which set forth revised training standards for all ASF enlisted personnel. Up to this time MTP's numbered 19-1 or 19-101 were designed and used for unit training and the 19-2 or 19-201 programs for replacement training. In order to standardize all ASF programs the "1-series" was designated to cover replacement training, and "2-series" unit training and "3-series" advanced unit training. Under the revised plan, MTP 19-1 was published 1 June 1944 to supersede all preceding MTP's covering both military police unit and replacement training. This program separated the 17-week training period into six weeks of basic military training uniform for all services in ASF, eight weeks of basic technical training, and three weeks of team or unit training.

The MTP 19-2 series was originally designated to provide a guide for replacement training, and the first MTP 19-2 was published 7 April 1942, one day prior to the activation of the MP Replacement Training Center at Fort Riley, Kansas. 14/ This program outlined 13 weeks of combined basic military, basic technical, and basic technical and specialist training for the inductee who came direct from the reception center earmarked for the CMP.

On 1 March 1943, ASF published MTP 21-1, setting forth minimum requirements in the various administrative and supply subjects common to all services in the ASF. In order to comply with these requirements and to incorporate the experience gained in the first year of operation of the MPRTC, a new MTP 19-2 was published 1 March 1943, which reduced the basic training period for the inductee to 12 weeks. Later revisions of the MPRTC programs were published as 19-201 in November 1943 and 19-201 (tentative) in February 1944. The latter again increased the period for replacement training from 12 to 17 weeks to provide for more applicatory work by the trainee. Then, in connection with the publication of MTP 21-3 by ASF and MTP 19-1 on 1 June 1944 for replacement training, a new MTP 19-2 was published 1 July 1944 setting forth separate six-week schedules for the basic unit training of all types of military police units, ASF.

In November 1942 the Military Police Training Center was established at Fort Custer, Michigan. 15/ At this time many of the

14/ Ltr AG, AG 353 (2-19-42) MR-M-C, dated 15 Mar 42
15/ Ltr AG 320.2 (11-23-42) OB-I-SP-M, dated 25 Nov 42

units which had been activated and trained in the various service commands were being scheduled for overseas shipment. The units trained under improvised programs prepared by local commanders until publication of MTP 19-1, 6 May 1942, were in most cases ready for an advanced program. On 20 December 1943 such a program was published as MTP 19-3, providing 13 weeks of advanced unit training, with the program broken down into separate 13-week schedules for each type of MP ASF unit and consisting mainly of field training under simulated combat conditions, integrating the application of the basic military, technical and unit training previously prepared under MTP's 19-1 and 19-3 or their equivalents.

This program was revised and published as a new MTP 19-3 on 15 June 1943 with slight readjustments in allotment of hours to the various subjects, the major addition being a section setting forth the primary mission of each type of unit in detail.

Procurement of Trainer and Operational Personnel

Upon activation of the Corps of Military Police 26 September 1942, all posts, camps and stations in the Army were required to submit to The Adjutant General the names and grades of all officers and enlisted men who had been doing military police work as a principal duty and the units then being utilized as military police. These personnel and organizations were made the nucleus of the Corps and were automatically ordered into that branch. 16/

For the 27 Military Police Battalions (Zone of the Interior) activated in January and February 1942 the battalion commanders came from the Regular Army, 80 percent being furnished by the Chief of Infantry and 20 percent by the Chief of Cavalry. Battalion executive officers and plans and training officers, also from the Regular Army, were obtained by transfer from the 701st, 702nd, and 703rd MP Battalions, already in existence as a result of the automatic transfer to the CMP of units performing military police duties. The training of these units was then accomplished under the guidance of these officers.

Officer personnel, both training and operational, was procured by several means. Reserve officers from all branches, principally infantry, were called to active duty and assigned to the CMP. Former Reserve officers were reappointed and assigned. Commissioned veterans of World War I were requested to apply for reappointment

16/ Ltr AGO, AG 320.2 (12-31-42) MR-M-C, dated 10 Jan 42, and amendment AG 320.2 (2-6-42) MR-M-C, dated 13 Feb 42

direct from civilian life. 17/ The PMG was authorized to recommend for appointment 100 officers from civil life without military experience but with backgrounds and experience as criminal investigators, and later many civilians with little or no military experience but possessing qualifications which appeared to be desirable for certain types of military police work were commissioned. The procurement was later extended to include applicants with outstanding civilian qualifications who had served during World War I as noncommissioned officers 18/, and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army who had had eight years consecutive service, four of them in a noncommissioned grade. From these sources 1395 officers were procured up to June 1942.

CMP officers were later obtained by sending officer candidates from existing military police units to the Cavalry OCS at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the Infantry OCS at Fort Benning, Ga., who, upon graduation, were commissioned and returned to the CMP for duty. For the specialist training necessary for military police officers the Office of The Provost Marshal General prepared a program of branch technical subjects to be taught at these schools and sent military police officers to the schools as instructors in these subjects. The establishment of the Military Police Officer Candidate School in July 1942 obviated the necessity of relying upon the other service schools, and this became thereafter the primary source of military police officers. 19/

From time to time, also, officers were transferred to the CMP from branches where overstrength existed. An example of this was the transfer of a large number of officers from CAC barrage-balloon units which were no longer needed on the West Coast and had been deactivated. By 31 December 1943 the officer personnel of the CMP had grown to 8116, by the end of 1944 to 8757, and by 1 July 1945 to 9003.

A serious shortage of officers was a continuous problem of the CMP. In December 1942 the ratio of officers to enlisted men in the corps was 3.9 percent, as compared with the ratio of 7.5 percent in the Army as a whole. By June 1943 the ratio of the corps had dropped to 3.1 while the rest of the Army increased to 7.8 percent. As of March 1945 the ratio in the corps was 4.6, compared with an overall ratio in the Army of 11 percent.

17/ Ltr TAGO, AG 201.6 (1-2-42) MB-A, dated 2 Jan 42.

18/ 1st Ind, AGO 210.1 (1-15-42) RE-A, dated 24 Jan 42, to Memo from ACofS, G-3, PMG

19/ Ltr file SPTRS PMG OCS (5-15-42) Hq. Services of Supply, subject: "Officer Candidate School" to the PMG.

Procurement of CMP enlisted personnel was initially accomplished by the automatic activation of Services of Supply military police units from organizations already functioning, by the assignment of fillers from the various components of the Enlisted Reserve, by transfer from other arms and services, and by assignment from reception centers and basic training camps. Fillers for the Military Police Replacement Training Center, subsequently activated at Fort Riley, Kansas, and later moved to Fort Custer, Michigan, were selectees shipped direct from reception centers.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining static personnel in service command military police units because of frequent calls for cadres and because other branches preparing for overseas duty were being filled with general service personnel. Untrained limited service personnel were then transferred into military police units. In one instance a single Escort Guard Company suffered an 800 percent turnover in personnel.

The first military police battalions activated were supplied with fillers from the overflow of divisions and other sources under control of service commands wherein activation took place, and many undesirables were disposed of by transfer to the CMP. Attention was called to this fact and an attempt to remedy the situation was made when The Adjutant General published an order setting forth certain minimum qualifications to be required of any man to be transferred to the CMP. 20/ This resulted in the acquisition of some higher grade men, but fell far short of eliminating the problem.

Development of Military Police Units

When the Corps of Military Police was established in 1941, the following tables of organization for military police, which had been prepared by the Chief of Infantry, were in effect:

7C-2,	Infantry Headquarters and Military Police Company, Triangular Division, 1 October 1940
7-7,	Military Police Company, 1 November 1940
7-55,	Military Police Battalion, 1 November 1940
7-125,	Military Police Battalion (Zone of the Interior), 1 November 1940.

20/ WD Memo 615-73-42 dated 30 Dec 42

- 7-126, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Military Police Battalion (Zone of the Interior), 1 November 1940
- 7-127, Military Police Company (Zone of the Interior), 1 November 1940
- 7-217, Infantry Company, Prisoner of War Escort, 1 May 1940.

Because of changing conditions and the additional duties assigned to military police following entry of this country into the war, it was necessary to design new tables to encompass the entire military police field. These tables provided for specialized military police units of various sizes and types, each to be armed, equipped, and trained to do its particular job. The table numbers were changed from the "7" (Infantry) series to the "19" (Corps of Military Police) series. On 1 April 1942, the following tables of organization, the first of the series for military police units prepared by The Provost Marshal General's Office, were published:

- 19-7, Military Police Platoon, Infantry Division
- 19-17, Military Police Platoon, Mountain Division
- 19-27, Military Police Company, Motorized Division
- 19-35, Military Police Battalion, Field Army
- 19-36, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Military Police Battalion, Field Army
- 19-37, Military Police Company, Army Corps
- 19-47, Military Police Escort Guard Company
- 19-87, Military Police Platoon, Cavalry Division

Military police battalions and separate numbered companies were organized for such internal security missions as guarding installations vital to the war effort against the possibility of fifth-column or airborne attacks. On 1 May 1942, revised tables of organization for the military police battalion (ZI) and its components were published under the new numbers 19-55, 19-56, and 19-57. Separate numbered companies were also organized under T/O 19-57. The battalion strength was increased from 16 officers and 436 enlisted men to 29 officers and

720 enlisted men, and a medical detachment was added. The amount of transportation was greatly increased in order to make the battalion or separate numbered company a highly-mobile striking force suitable for use in any emergency. This was regarded as particularly necessary in the zone of the interior because of the absence of National Guard units, which were in Federal service.

As the basis for a military police unit organized, equipped, and trained to perform normal military police functions at posts, camps, and stations in the zone of the interior, and at fixed and semi-fixed installations of communications zones, Table of Organization 19-217, Military Police Company, Aviation, Post, Camp, or Station, was published on 1 May 1942. This unit contained patrol sections, both dismounted and motorized; a desk and record section; a traffic and gate section; and a criminal investigation section. The table of organization was such that additional sections could be added as required to carry out varying requirements. For example, if the duties of the gate section or town patrol section were particularly heavy, the company could be provided with additional desk and record sections, and dismounted patrol sections. The War Department Staff restricted use of this table to overseas units. Military police units at posts, camps, and stations in the zone of the interior were consequently organized as service command units from bulk allotments of personnel.

It was evident in early 1942 that a special military police unit would be required to process prisoners of war. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention (1929), prisoners of war were required to give certain essential information to the capturing power. This information was obtained by questioning, photographing, fingerprinting, and physical examination. To meet this need, Table of Organization 19-237, Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company, was published 11 August 1942. The function of this unit was to receive, search, and process prisoners of war, make permanent records and reports, and furnish required information to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau of The Provost Marshal General's Office. The company was so organized that each of its three platoons could operate independently. One of these companies was normally attached to each army.

A revision of Army Regulations 310-60, 23 August 1945, provided for the consolidation of tables of organization and tables of equipment into combined tables of organization and equipment. The new regulations also provided that the commanding general of each of the three major commands would be responsible for the preparation of these tables of organization and equipment for units assigned to his command. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, was assigned the responsibility

of preparing these tables for military police units assigned to divisions, corps, and armies. The Provost Marshal General retained the responsibility for preparation of the following tables for Army Service Forces units; 19-55, 19-56, and 19-57, Military Police Battalion and components, and separate numbered company; 19-217, Military Police Company, Aviation, Post, Camp, and Station; 19-47, Military Police Escort Guard Company; and 19-237, Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company. Although the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, was assigned responsibility for the preparation of tables for military police units assigned to the Army Ground Forces, The Provost Marshal General retained the authority to review these tables and to make recommendations for any changes that he considered necessary. However, the final responsibility of deciding whether or not these recommendations would be accepted, was vested in the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

As the war progressed, it was found necessary to develop several new types of units to accomplish specific missions. Mountain divisions, light divisions, armored divisions, and airborne divisions were all found to be necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. Tables of organization for military police platoons to function with these new divisions were published as follows:

19-97, Military Police Platoon, Airborne Division,
5 September 1942

19-177T, Military Police Platoon, Light Division,
1 July 1943

19-117, Military Police Platoon, Armored Division,
15 September 1943.

To provide theater commanders with the means of building a military police unit to meet the requirements of any specific installation, both as to personnel and equipment, Table of Organization and Equipment 19-500, Military Police Service Organization, 22 April 1944, was published. This was a cellular table of organization and equipment intended to group personnel and equipment into composite military police units to facilitate administration and economize in overhead, and at the same time provide properly-organized and equipped units to meet overseas military police requirements.

Composite military police units had a wide range of application and were utilized to advantage at ports of debarkation, general depots, branch depots, and other communications zone installations. There were included in this table three sizes of criminal investigation teams which were organized and assigned to theaters of operations in accordance with their individual requirements.

Each team was provided with individual equipment for the investigator and a small amount of organizational equipment. It was not deemed advisable to include therein specialized crime-detecting equipment due to the small size of the unit, the resultant waste of equipment when several sections were assigned to one theater, the different requirements in each theater, and the additional personnel that would be required for its care and maintenance. It was decided, therefore, to establish in theaters having a requirement for modern crime-detecting equipment, a criminal investigations laboratory containing the necessary scientific equipment for the solution of difficult crimes. All overseas theaters were notified of this decision and advised to request the establishment of such laboratories when the volume and type of criminal investigations conducted would justify such a request. As a result of this action, criminal investigation laboratories were established in most of the major theaters.

Military Police tables of organization and equipment were revised from time to time as the war progressed. On 30 June 1945, the following tables of organization and equipment were in effect:

- 19-7, Military Police Platoon, Infantry Division, 12 September 1944.
- 19-17, Military Police Platoon, Mountain Division, 4 November 1944.
- 19-35, Military Police Battalion, Army, 19 August 1943.
- 19-36, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Police Battalion, Army, 19 August 1943.
- 19-37, Military Police Company, 19 August 1943.
- 19-47, Military Police Escort Guard Company, 25 November 1943.
- 19-55, Military Police Battalion, 2 November 1944.
- 19-56, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Police Battalion, 2 November 1944.
- 19-57, Military Police Company, 2 November 1944.
- 19-77, Military Police Platoon, Corps, 1 August 1944.
- 19-87, Military Police Platoon, Cavalry Division, 30 September 1944.

- 19-97, Military Police Platoon, Airborne Division,
1 August 1944.
- 19-217, Military Police Company, Post, Camp, or Station/or
Military Police Company, Aviation, 26 January 1945.
- 19-237, Military Police Prisoner of War Processing
Company, 18 November 1943.
- 19-500, Military Police Service Organization, 22 April
1944.

To coordinate military police and provost marshal functions within large units and installations, provost marshal sections were included in the following tables of organization and equipment:

- 55-110-1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
Major Port (Overseas), 20 November 1943.
- 55-120-1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
Medium Port (Overseas), 13 May 1944.
- 100-1, Headquarters, Corps, 19 January 1945.
- 200-1, Headquarters, Army, 26 October 1944.

The activities of these staff sections included the following: recommending plans, policies, and regulations pertaining to the organization, training, equipment, procedures, and operations of all military police in the command; supervising the establishment and operation of those military police installations and agencies within the purview of the installations or unit commander; and coordination, within the limits prescribed by the commander, of the operation of the military police.

Military Discipline "Off Post"

Control of the conduct of military personnel while "off post", always an important consideration of the Army, became a much more serious and difficult task with the rapid expansion of the Armed Forces. Primarily, the problem was that of exercising disciplinary control over military personnel while on pass, furlough, or leave, especially in large centers of population, and also while traveling to or from their stations.

The commanding generals of service commands (designated as corps areas until 1942) were charged with the responsibility of

controlling the conduct of military personnel within the geographical limits of their service commands other than at posts, camps, and stations (a direct responsibility of post commanders), and in maneuver areas exempted from their control. 21/ Where needed, provost marshals were appointed by the service commands to direct discharge of the details of this responsibility. In some cases, officers were appointed provost marshals in addition to their other duties, but in large centers of population, the provost marshal's assignment was usually a full-time one.

For several months, during the early phases of the mobilization period, military police units and detachments of the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces were used extensively in the enforcement of military discipline. As these units were withdrawn, or as service command personnel became available, this duty was transferred to service command units and detachments.

The military police company, aviation, post, camp, or station (T/O & E 19-217), was designed primarily for military police duties in towns and cities. Because of its flexibility, achieved by the addition or omission of component parts, it could be built to a size and type to fit almost any requirement. The War Department, however, early in 1942, restricted its use to overseas requirements. Consequently, military police engaged in these duties in the United States were organized into military police detachments within service command units. A weakness of this arrangement was that the military police detachment had no fixed organization, but was merely a part of the service command unit. There was a tendency, in many instances, to vary the assignments of personnel within the service command unit, with the result that military police functions were not always performed by the same personnel, or by personnel with military police training.

As a step toward coordinating their disciplinary programs, the War and Navy Departments entered into an agreement, effective 15 December 1942, under which both Army military police and Navy shore patrol personnel were directed to take corrective measures, including arrest, if necessary, in the case of any member of the Armed Forces committing a breach of the peace, indulging in disorderly conduct, or any other action reflecting discredit upon the services. 22/

At the end of June 1945, there were 10,640 military police engaged in the enforcement of military discipline in the United States.

21/ WD letter, file AG 320.2 (9-5-41)MB-C-M, dated 4 December 1941, Subject: "Military Police"; and WD Circulars 77, 1943 and 134, 1945

22/ War Department Circular 380, 1942

Of these, 7,239 were on duty in towns and cities, and 3,401 were policing railroad stations and trains. The latter was a duty in which the Army had had no experience prior to the present emergency.

As early as May 1941, the Interterritorial Military Committee, representing the American railroads, reported to the War Department a series of complaints from both the traveling public and the railroads, concerning misconduct of soldiers on trains. The complaints included cases of intoxication, annoying passengers, damaging and defacing railroad equipment, and general obnoxious behavior. This misconduct, occurring in some instances in the presence of officers or noncommissioned officers, who often ignored it, continued to increase as the number of traveling military increased.

The misconduct resulted in the publication of a War Department directive that military police be assigned to trains carrying large groups of military personnel on furlough. ^{23/} Although some improvement followed, the problem was not solved. In July 1942, an agreement was made between the Association of American Railroads and the War Department to provide for free transportation of military police assigned to duty on passenger trains. ^{24/} In September 1942, the War Department directed the commanding generals of service commands to assign military police to passenger trains where the need existed. ^{25/} These military police were instructed to report all cases of misconduct by military personnel, and in the more aggravated cases, to make arrests. In cases of arrest, it was directed that the offenders be removed from trains at railroad stations where military police were on duty.

In December 1942, The Provost Marshal General's Office organized an inspection group of 30 officers to travel throughout the United States observing the conduct of military personnel and inspecting military police operations on trains and in railroad and bus stations. Six months later the inspection procedure was reorganized to provide for closer liaison with headquarters of the service commands, railroad representatives, civil police, and the Navy's shore patrol. The inspectors conducted classes in the detachments furnishing train guards. While traveling, they discussed with guards on duty the problems which they encountered and also assisted them, if necessary, especially in cases involving officers.

One of the serious problems affecting military police operations on trains was the lack of uniform procedure among the service commands.

^{23/} WD letter, file # 250.1(7-15-41)MB-A-M, dated 26 Sept 1941,

Subject: "Military police on furlough fare train movements".

^{24/} Agreement between the American Association of Railroads and the WD.

^{25/} SOS Memorandum No. 5190-1-42, dated 24 Sept 42, subject: "Military Police assigned to Public Carriers".

These differences included variations in uniform of military police, uniform required of traveling personnel, submission of reports, and interpretation of regulations, particularly on the control of liquor. Frequently, when a soldier was guilty of a serious breach of military discipline, he was under the influence of liquor. The problem was to curb the excessive use of liquor by members of the Armed Forces and, at the same time, not deprive them of privileges accorded civilians. The differences in interpretations of such regulations, by commanding generals of the several service commands, resulted in rules and regulations which varied widely as the traveler proceeded from one service command to another.

In the early stages no attempt was made to coordinate activities of the Army and Navy other than the authorization for joint jurisdiction. Violators resented corrections by members of another service much more than by a member of their own. Accordingly, it was arranged to have joint patrols of military police and shore patrolmen assigned on certain trains. Despite the variations in the operating procedure of the Army and Navy, the plan worked well; and, as time passed, these variations were gradually reconciled. These differences included methods for the control of liquor, reporting of uniform violations, and the mechanical procedure of patrolling trains. By June 1945, joint operations with the shore patrol were being carried on in the majority of service commands, although in some where the preponderance of traveling service personnel was Navy, trains were policed by shore patrol exclusively, while military police were assigned to those with a preponderance of Army personnel.

One of the disadvantages of joint patrols was the difference in ratings of Army and Navy personnel. Shore patrolmen were all petty officers, whereas only a small proportion of military police were of comparable grades. The Provost Marshal General at different times attempted to secure higher ratings for military police on trains and town patrol duties, on the theory that such ratings would be an asset in the exercise of authority, especially in cases involving officers and noncommissioned officers. ^{26/} These recommendations were disapproved by the War Department. ^{27/}

Service Schools

With the procurement of a large number of officers from diverse sources, most of whom had had no recent military training and some none

^{26/} ASF transmittal sheet, file SPMGM (16) 221.01 dated 20 April 1945, subject: "Grades and ratings for military police."

^{27/} ASF transmittal sheet, SP GAS 221 MP (20 Apr 45)-32, Comment No. 2 on the subject of grades for military police.

at all, the necessity of a service school for the training of instructors and operational military police officers became imperative.

Such a school was established 19 December 1941 and opened 15 January 1942 in an area formerly occupied by the Adjutant General's School at Arlington Cantonment, later designated as South Post, Fort Myer, Virginia. 28/ Its mission was to provide a six-weeks' course of instruction that would qualify officers already well-grounded in military subjects in the technical subject of military police work. For this purpose four departments were established: Military Law, Traffic Control, Police Methods, and Criminal Investigation. The faculty consisted of 29 carefully selected officers chosen on the basis of their particular military as well as civilian backgrounds, from the Regular Army, National Guard, and Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineer, Military Intelligence, Quartermaster and Armored Force Reserves.

The first class of 215 officers, a majority of whom had held commissions during World War I, began work 2 February 1942. A second class, similar in character and equal in size, but of nine weeks' duration, opened 6 April 1942. These were the only courses given at Fort Myer.

With the growth of the CMP and the demand for additional officers came the necessity for increased facilities, both in housing and training. The PMJ School was activated at Chickamauga Park, South Post, Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, 19 June 1942, occupying a newly completed Prisoner of War camp, and four separate schools were established; Refresher School for recommissioned officers; Advanced School for officers with military police experience; Investigators' School, covering both criminal and loyalty investigation; and Officer Candidate School, to provide new junior officers.

To cope with the increase of subject matter and number of students to be taught, the school found it necessary to increase its staff and faculty, increase the number of academic departments and increase the types of schools to fit the different categories of officers and specialists to be trained. Young CMP officer candidates who had been sent to the Cavalry OCS at Fort Riley and the Infantry OCS at Fort Benning were added to the staff and faculty upon graduation, and specialist instructors were acquired by transfer and appointment from civil life. Three officers and five enlisted men were borrowed from the Infantry School at Fort Benning to assist in getting the school started and several officers were sent to Fort Benning for special research in training techniques. Basic, Weapons, Tactics, Law and

28/ WD letter AG 352 (9-27-41)MR-M-C, dated 10 Dec 41.

Administration, and Physical Training departments, whose primary mission was to give broader training in their specific fields, were created.

The new combined schools sprang almost immediately into full growth when the new Provost Marshal General's School Center opened 4 July 1942. In place of the original class of 215, there appeared an Officer Candidate School of 1,000, Advanced and Refresher Schools for officers numbering 600, an Investigators' school enrolling 200 officers, and a number of specialist students assigned by the Office of Civilian Defense. During the period 6 July to 29 November 1942, when the school was moved to Fort Custer, 611 candidates in five Officer Candidate School classes had received commissions in the CMP, seven Refresher classes had graduated 1,383, and six advanced classes had completed courses for 373.

Because so many of the officers in the refresher course had had no association with things military for many years or had come fresh from civil life, it was found necessary to increase the original six weeks' program to eight and later to 12 weeks, to cover adequately all the subjects necessary to make them efficient MP officers. This was finally reduced to six weeks when officers with at least basic military background were received.

Both at Fort Myer and Fort Oglethorpe training areas and facilities left much to be desired, though at both places, the school was able to complete its immediate mission. Range firing while at Myer, for example, necessitated a three day bivouac at Fort Meade, Maryland. The ranges at Oglethorpe were of a temporary and supplementary nature, and there was no provision for combat firing. Both at Myer and in the early days at Oglethorpe it was necessary to borrow weapons for instruction and range practice from other installations. Charts and other graphic aids had to be improvised and hand-made, and were not always of the quality or in the quantity desired. Procurement of sufficient qualified instructors was a difficult problem, due principally to the fact that many of the subjects to be taught were new to the military service, there were few or no texts available, and few of the instructors had sufficient military or teaching experience. To alleviate this situation, a new Department of Instructional Methods was established to teach officers how to teach.

Again it was decided to increase the size and training scope of the school, and on 20 November 1942, the Provost Marshal General's School Center was established at Fort Custer, Michigan, which was to include not only the Provost Marshal General's School from Oglethorpe, but also the Military Police Replacement Training Center, moved from Fort Riley, and a new Military Police Unit Training Center. 29/

29/ WD letter, AG 320.2 (11-23-42) OB-I-SP-M, dated 25 Nov 42, subject: "Establishment of Provost Marshal General's Training Center."

The move was accomplished in time to continue instruction 5 December in the current courses at the school and to start work in the Unit Training Center and Replacement Training Center.

Many of the disadvantages experienced at Fort Oglethorpe were eliminated at Fort Custer. Adequate barracks, mess halls, classrooms, training areas and ranges were sufficiently close to eliminate loss of time by motor movement or bivouac. By this time sufficient weapons were available. A complete reproduction department, with a silk-screen plant, enabled the production of almost any type of instructional chart or graphic training aid, and adequate wood-working, metal-working, sign-painting and other shops were able to provide almost everything needed in working models of weapons, blackboards, sand tables, terrain boards and special devices of various kinds. All the outdoor facilities described on page 620 were available without loss of time and the only limiting factor was the long period of extreme cold weather and snow.

The Provost Marshal General's School was set up with school headquarters, three administrative divisions and nine academic divisions. The administrative divisions included Operations, Publications and Instructional Methods. Operations acted as a switchboard to synchronize instruction schedules and facilities to provide maximum economy of time and facilities. It provided a full time-table, planned well in advance for each class but sufficiently flexible to meet emergencies and disruptions arising from inclement weather or other uncontrollable conditions; and so arranged schedules that no two classes wanted to use the same facilities at the same time. Publications handled all reproduction work, such as mimeographed schedules, lesson plans, syllabi and lecture texts, the processing of charts and graphic training aids, the editing of all school literature, and the publication of the MP Training Bulletin, a monthly publication distributed to all active units of the CMP at home and abroad. Instructional Methods conducted training courses for newly-assigned instructors, covered with trained observers actual instruction classes, exercises and demonstrations, and made recommendations for improvement in methods of instructions.

The academic divisions, each supervised by a field officer as department chief, were assigned groups of subjects related either by character or purpose, and while each provided as thorough instructions as possible in the subjects under its control, each stressed teaching methods to assist the students in passing on their knowledge to future commands. The nine academic departments and their subjects were:

Department of Basic Instruction -- Grounded students in the basic duties of the soldier, infantry drill, sanitation, hygiene, military courtesy, discipline, customs of the service, marches and bivouacs, defense against chemical warfare, identification of aircraft and armored vehicles, map and aerial photograph reading, morale and special services.

Weapons Department -- Dealt with the practical rather than theoretical aspects of weapons used by MP units, with a minimum of time on lectures and a maximum on demonstration and practice, organized into four instructional teams: Group A, M1 rifle and carbine; Group B, submachine gun, pistol and shotgun; Group C, light, heavy and calibre .50 machine guns; Group D, 60 mm. mortar, bayonet, grenades, moving ground and air target marksmanship, and technique of rifle fire.

Department of Tactics -- Instructed in offensive and defensive tactics of small units, organization and employment of tactical units up to the battalion, hasty field fortifications, cover and concealment, scouting and patrolling, night operations, employment of small arms, camouflage, combat and counter-intelligence, communications and the importance of team work, estimate of the situation, combat orders, movements of units under varied conditions, defense against mechanized and air attack. Advanced students were given additional instructions in staff duties and practical exercises in staff procedure and functions.

Department of Police Instruction -- Provided instruction in the fundamentals of military police work; CMP organization, from the company to the PMOC; techniques of town patrol and circulation of control in the field, riot control; relations between MP and civil authorities; and prisoner of war administration.

Department of Military Government (Later combined with Department of Law and Administration) -- Created to prepare officers and enlisted men for duty in occupied territories, it covered principles of military government as applied by our own and other countries; history and political structures of territories expected to be brought under American military administration; practical liaison and coordination with all units of the commands; study of foreign police organizations.

Department of Traffic -- Traffic control in the zone of the interior and combat zone, from the broad planning phase of the movements of large units to intersection control by the MP privates; effective convoy operation; economical use of available roadnets; communications.

Department of Criminal Investigation -- Covered principles of investigative work and practical training in report writing, observation and description, surveillance, fingerprint identification, technique of raids, interrogation, preservation of evidence, document examinations, laboratory techniques, and investigative photography.

Department of Law and Administration -- Dealt with all the aspects of military and civil law which a Military Police officer must know: jurisdiction, legal latitudes of authority and obligations; powers of arrest, search and seizure; disciplinary application of military law; military aid to civil authorities; federal court procedures; courts martial; laws of evidence; and, under "administration", instruction in the keeping of all the records required in the company and kept by the personnel adjutant.

Department of Physical Training -- Furnished a working knowledge of hand-to-hand combat, self-defense and aggressive control in personal encounter under "Judo" or "Jiu-jitsu"; first aid; body-building exercises; riot club; and handling armed and unarmed prisoners.

Each of the academic departments was prepared to give, and did give, appropriate courses of instruction in its special subjects to the various categories of students attending the school, officers, officer candidates, and enlisted specialists, each class as a rule requiring a different treatment of the subject matter.

With the exception of the courses in Military Government, classroom instruction constituted approximately 50 per cent of the courses, in order to verse the student thoroughly in the more technical aspects of military police work. The remainder of the course was presented by demonstrations and practical student participation, in the laboratory for the investigator courses and in the field for the general MP courses. Training films, film strips and other graphic aids were used in inclement weather and in all cases where the subject could best be presented by that method.

Training Facilities

The history of military training in the Corps of Military Police and in the Provost Marshal General's School was one of continuous growth up to V-E Day and frequent change. Started as the Provost Marshal General's School at Fort Myer, Va., in January 1942, the installation was moved to Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., where it became the Provost Marshal General's School Center and expanded in June of that year, then to Fort Custer, where it became the Provost Marshal General's

Training Center, in November 1942, then to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in September 1944, when it was again designated as the Provost Marshal General's School, and finally to Camp Bullis, a dependency of Fort Sam Houston, in March of 1945. While at Fort Custer the Center also included the Military Police Replacement Training Center and the Military Police Unit Training Center, and during the calendar year 1943, 46,497 men completed training in separate courses for officers, officer candidates, enlisted specialists, enlisted replacements and units in training.

At Fort Myer, the first location of the Military Police School, with only 215 officers in each class, facilities were reasonably adequate, although there were no training areas or ranges available, and the two classes at this location had to be transported either to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, or to Fort Meade, Maryland, for the necessary outdoor training and firing.

At Fort Oglethorpe the training areas, although adequate and well suited to outdoor exercises, were located in some cases at considerable distances from the barracks and classrooms, involving a waste of instructional time. A rifle range adequate for .30 calibre instruction was available, but at a distance of 1.5 miles from the school. Limited transportation facilities made reaching it difficult. There was no range suitable for practice with the submachine gun, shotgun or pistol, or for combat firing. Barracks were used as classrooms, and not until just before the school was ready to move were adequate classrooms erected. Reference materials were scarce, when available at all, and most of the training aids had to be improvised. There were no facilities for the production of charts or visual aids. The mimeograph was used extensively in the reproduction of texts and syllabi. Before the school was moved a reproduction plant had been gradually developed to the point where production of a limited number of training aids was possible. The school was compelled to borrow weapons from other installations and organizations on the post and considerable time passed before sufficient weapons were obtained for efficient instruction. For example, it was necessary to instruct classes of 100 or more men in the submachine gun with only four weapons.

In its early days military police training suffered the same handicaps in lack of equipment for training purposes then prevalent throughout the Army. The training aids that were later developed and reproduced with War Department approval covered only the general subjects common to all arms and services. The size of the CMP and its large number of technical subjects made preparation by

the War Department of training aids on purely military police subjects prohibitive, so it was necessary for the corps to develop its own aids and reproduce them as best it could. Continuous improvisation by individual trainers and the ultimate acquisition of reproduction equipment resulted in a remarkable array of training aids.

It was not until the establishment of the Provost Marshal General's Training Center at Fort Custer in November 1942, when all the training activities of the Corps of Military Police, with the exception of unit training in widely scattered units throughout the country, were centralized at one spot, that a really adequate and comprehensive program of training could be accomplished.

The facilities and training aids were set up with great care and provoked much favorable comment from inspecting officers from various headquarters. These consisted of a review field, two obstacle courses, two bayonet practice courses, a small-bore range, ranges for rifle, carbine, light and heavy machine guns, pistol, shotgun and 60 mm mortar, a live grenade range, a demolition area, an anti-personnel mine and booby-trap area, a traffic intersection control course, seven bivouac areas with sanitary facilities, four field sanitation demonstrations, a range-estimation course, a jungle course, a simulated ship for landing-net practice, a tactical field training area of one and a half square miles, and a complete village for street fighting and combat courses.

A complete reproduction plant, greatly expanded from the nucleus brought with the School from Fort Oglethorpe, was established, equipped to turn out mimeographed or multilithographed material in any quantity. A silk-screen plant made possible the production of almost any type of instructional chart or graphic training aid which any of the installations at the post required. Adequate woodworking, metalworking, sign painting and other shops provided almost everything needed in working models of weapons, blackboards, sand tables, terrain boards and special devices of all kinds. Among the instructional aids were "Maxville", a complete industrial city in miniature covering 15 by 20 feet, and a complete miniature model PW stockade and camp, 16 by 16, both used in practical instruction.

The only limiting factor to training at Fort Custer was an initial shortage of suitable classroom buildings, remedied in August of 1942, and the long period of extremely cold weather and snow.

In October 1944, when the Provost Marshal General's School was moved to Fort Sam Houston, the Unit Training Center was closed and the Replacement training was moved to Camp Robinson and elsewhere, the school took with it all the movable facilities it had acquired, and again found itself happily situated as far as housing, training areas, ranges and other physical requirements were concerned. Limiting factors there were confined principally to the necessity of traveling some 18 miles to reach the ranges, bivouac and maneuver areas, and that the "Traffic City" control course, demolition areas, obstacle courses, and the village for street fighting and combat courses had to be rebuilt.

Courses of Instruction 29a/

During the three and a half years covered by this report the courses of instruction at the Provost Marshal General's School were changed several times to meet changing conditions and demands. New courses were added from time to time to fulfil specific requirements and others were discontinued, either because the need for them had been met and sufficient personnel had been trained, because a change in War Department policy had made certain types of units or Military Occupational Specialty categories no longer necessary, or because it was found, after thorough trial, that the subject matter of a certain course could better be combined with that of another.

Each of the nine academic departments of the school handled its appropriate part of the curriculum in its own way, conducting its own tests and grading each student. Each student's grades were assembled by the Office of the Director of Training and a composite picture of his progress was available up to the time of the graduation of the class.

In all, there were 16 courses for officers, one for officer candidates, and five for enlisted specialists, varying from three weeks in several of the officers' courses to 17 weeks for the Officer Candidate School. Two representative courses are listed below:

PO-1, MP Officers' Basic Course -- A twelve-weeks' course to train officers transferred from other arms or services and MP OCS graduates with six months or more field duty in the basic duties and functions of military police officers. Instruction covered map and aerial photograph reading, organization of the Army and C&P, military law and administration, small arms weapons training, military police tactics and staff functions, train and town patrolling, vice control, traffic control, riot control, and orientation in criminal investigation, a total of 598 hours. Twenty-one classes between 29 May 1943 and 1 January 1945 graduated 363 officers, with 19 non-graduates.

29a/ A complete summary of all the courses given at the Provost Marshal General's School is contained in the history on "Military Police during World War II" on file in the Historical Division, ASF, and in the Office of The Provost Marshal General.

PO-2, MP Officers' Advanced Course -- An eight-weeks' course to train officers to function as battalion and separate company commanders and staff officers, with emphasis on planning and supervision. Instruction covered map and aerial photograph reading, weapons training in rifle, carbine, pistol, submachine gun, machine gun, bayonet and grenades, military police tactics and staff functions, riot control, internal security against sabotage and espionage, military law and administration, traffic planning, control and enforcement, and orientation in criminal investigation techniques. Classes 1 through 18 (31 Jan 42 to 24 Sep 43) were of 8-weeks' duration, then expanded to 12 weeks through class 26 (28 Aug 43 to 7 Dec 44) then again contracted to eight weeks from 9 November 1944 to 6 March 1945, when it was discontinued. Twenty-nine classes between 2 February 1942 and 6 May 1945 graduated 1510 officers, with 246 non-graduates.

Officer Training

Training of officers had to be given top priority in the program of the CMP. Mobilization plans called for the almost immediate activation of 51 ZI MP battalions. 30/ and there were no trained officers to command them or act as instructors. The nucleus of the corps consisted of those officers who had been doing military police work throughout the country at various posts, camps and stations, many of them on a part-time basis and in addition to other duties, and the officers of the three MP battalions and four MP companies which comprised the peace-time CMP. To augment this nucleus, authorization was given the PMG to have commissioned from civil life the necessary officer personnel for the Corps. 31/

Beginning December 1941 applications for commissions were solicited from former World War I officers, former Reserve officers, enlisted men of the Regular Army with eight consecutive years of service, four of them in a noncommissioned grade, and non-commissioned veterans of World War I who possessed outstanding civilian qualifications. These categories were later extended to include civilians without military experience but otherwise qualified, as law enforcement officers, investigators and lawyers. Boards of officers screened the applications and invited in for personal interviews those whose records appeared to indicate they would meet the requirements. The boards' recommendations were forwarded to the AGO and commissions were issued. Upwards of 50,000 applications were screened by the boards and approximately 4000 applicants were commissioned in the CMP, 1293 of them by June 1942. The officer

30/ WD letter, AGO, AG 201.6 (1-2-42) HB-A, dated 2 Jan 42

31/ WD letter, AGO, AG 320.2 (1-1-42) HR-M-C, dated 2 Jan 42

personnel was further augmented by the calling to active duty of such Reserve officers from the combat branches as had not already been called and transferring them into the CMP.

Few if any of these officers had had any recent military experience, many of them none at all, and none of them had had any training in military police work.

The first class of 215 officers, a majority of whom had held commissions in World War I, began work 2 February 1942. A second class, equal in size, and similar in character, opened 6 April 1942, but for this class the course was increased to nine weeks. Only two classes were trained at Fort Myer.

When the PMC School was moved to Fort Oglethorpe plans were made to accommodate 800 officers at a time and provide training for three categories of students -- a Refresher School for re-commissioned officers, an Advanced School for officers with military police experience, and an Investigators School which covered both ~~legality~~ and criminal investigation work. The School was further departmentalized at that time by the creation of departments of Basic Tactics, Weapons, Physical Training and Law and Administration, each concentrating on broader training in its specific field.

During the period of 6 July to 28 November, when the PMC School Center was moved to Fort Custer, seven Refresher classes had graduated a total of 1183 officers and six Advanced classes had graduated 373.

The time allocated to the courses had proved satisfactory except for the Refresher classes. The original six-weeks' course was extended to eight and later to 12 weeks, because it was found that not enough time had been allowed to cover adequately all the subjects necessary to bring up-to-date officers who had had no contact with things military for 20 years and others, fresh from civilian life, although perhaps highly qualified in law or investigation, who could not be expected to absorb basic military and technical MP subjects in less time. The Refresher course was finally reduced to six weeks when it was found that officers were being assigned for training who had already received, either at the school or through actual experience, a basic military background.

On 20 November 1942 preparations were made to move the school to Fort Custer, Michigan, and the move was accomplished in time to continue instruction on 5 December.

In March 1943 the last Refresher class, No. 15, entered the school, and when it completed its course this program was discontinued and a new 12-weeks' Officers Basic Course was substituted. The first class in this course, designed for officers recently transferred from other branches of the Army, started work 21 May 1943.

Officer students were organized for administrative purposes into provisional companies. Instruction was conducted by the nine academic departments of the school, each contributing appropriate portions of its special curriculum in its own way. Students were considered on duty from reveille to taps, and for many months a two-hour supervised study period five nights a week was obligatory, except on those nights when night problems were held.

Officers completing the Refresher, Advanced and Basic courses were sent after graduation to all the service commands for assignment to every type of military police units. Officers who came originally from MP units were sent to the school on temporary duty and returned to their units upon completion of the course.

Officers graduated from the courses cannot be considered as outstanding or the reverse by virtue of their training there alone. All had backgrounds that before attending the school had proven them generally capable or incapable. Indicative of the generally high calibre of student officers, however, is the fact that of a total of 9926 who attended the School in all courses, only 799, or 8.06 per cent, failed to graduate. Failure to graduate did not necessarily indicate academic failures in the case of officers; some were due to sickness and some to transfers before completion of the course.

Officer Candidate Training

In March 1942, 100 officer candidates selected from existing MP units were enrolled in a special class at the Cavalry Officer Candidate School at Fort Riley and 95 were graduated and commissioned 30 May, the only class to attend that school. Some 150 more officers were later obtained by enrolling an average of 10 officer candidates in each class conducted during April and May 1942 at the Infantry OCS at Fort Benning. In addition to the basic OCS courses offered at the Infantry and Cavalry schools the FMGO prepared a program of branch technical subjects and sent officers to the schools to conduct classes in them. This method of training officer candidates was eliminated by the establishment of the Military Police

Officer Candidate School as of 1 July 1942. 32/

The first class of the Military Police Officer Candidate School was enrolled at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, 4 July 1942, with 100 candidates. Its mission was to train these specially selected enlisted men in basic military and military police subjects and qualify them for commissions as second lieutenants in the CMP.

A 12-weeks' course was prepared. It included such basic military and branch technical subjects as Weapons, Tactics, Traffic, Law, Administration, Police Methods, Criminal Investigation, and Physical Training. It was found that the 12-weeks' program did not provide sufficient time to train the candidates in all the matters a military police officer is required to know, and the course, under a directive affecting all ASF officer candidate schools, was increased to 17 weeks. 33/

The overall training program remained basically the same from the inception of the school, though the subject matter of branch technical subjects was considerably revised to keep abreast of developments in doctrine and procedures.

During the first part of 1942 the activation of a large number of MP units created a demand for trained MP officers far greater than the supply. Since Military Police units offered a limited field from which Officer Candidate School candidates could be selected, candidates were drawn from all branches of the service. An effort was made, however, to select men who had been doing military police work or whose civilian experience was such that they were potentially qualified as MP officers. This condition gradually remedied itself with the activation of more Military Police units and the opening of the Military Police Replacement Training Center.

The academic program was handled by the nine departments of the PMG School, each department supplying such appropriate portions of its curriculum as applied to the instruction of officer candidates and as could be crowded into the 17-weeks' schedule.

The 17-weeks' course called for 890 hours of instruction, averaging 52 hours of instruction per week, and included, by academic departments; 89 hours of basic instruction, including eight hours of night problems, 183 hours of Weapons, 157 hours of Tactics, including 11 hours of night problems, 85 hours on Law, Administration and Military

32/ SOS letter, file SPTRS PMG OCS (5-15-42), subject: "Officer Candidate School."

33/ Memo S350-29-43 ASF, 25 May 43

Government, 60 hours on Traffic, including four on night problems, 48 hours on Police instruction, 25 on Criminal Investigation, 81 on Physical Training and First Aid, 24 on Instructional Methods, two hours on Infiltration Courses, six hours on Medical instructions, 69 hours on physical conditioning and drill, and 57 hours on ceremonies, orientation, and "reserved for commandant."

In the military police technical subjects, such as fingerprinting, report writing, law and administration, where a minimum of field work was necessary, instruction was largely carried on in classrooms by lectures and conferences. Subjects involving tactics, traffic control, town patrol, riot control and the like were taught in the classroom until the subject had been sufficiently outlined and then the candidates were taken into the field for application and field problems. Whenever possible, field and combat conditions were simulated.

Educational procedure consistently followed the mechanics of instructions outlined in FM 21-5. Instruction was centralized and all instructors were members of the school staff. Administration was a separate function handled by officers who did not act as instructors. Extensive use was made of training films, film strips, graphic charts, working models of weapons, terrain boards, sand tables, and similar aids.

Frequent tests were given to students to obtain a continuous check on their progress. Instruction in each subject was concluded by a test, and where the course was of longer duration in respect to hours allocated, tests were given at the conclusion of each phase of instruction.

Supervision and inspection on instruction was continuous. Experienced officers observed and contributed suggestions and constructive criticism. Administrative company commanders attended classes with their companies to observe the aptitudes and progress of their candidates. The Department of Instructional Methods continually checked on the mechanics and techniques of instruction.

Candidates were considered on duty and under observation day and night, and a high standard of discipline was maintained at all times. Two hours of evening study in a supervised study hall was mandatory five nights a week, and the instructors generally kept themselves available for evening instruction. The OCS students were organized as a battalion and members of the senior class rotated in command positions.

The first 19 OCS classes, between July 1942 and October 1943,

followed 12-weeks courses; with the 20th and subsequent classes the course took 17 weeks. The first class had a quota of 100; from the 2nd through the 19th the quota was increased to 200; the 15th through the 19th Classes had quotas of 100, and all subsequent classes had quotas of 50.

Classes were enrolled and commenced approximately every three weeks. This method of staggering classes maintained a strength of 800 to 1000 candidates in training. Between 1 July 1942 and 30 June 1944 a total of 3340 candidates were graduated from the MP OCS and commissioned in the CMP. The total of nongraduates for the same period was 719. Graduates were generally earmarked for overseas duty but were first given three months' duty at home, either in the Leadership School of the MPRTC, as a training officer of the RTC, or with a service command unit.

Due to the high preliminary requirements and the quality of training at the OCS, officers commissioned in the CMP were, on the average, highly qualified to hold commissions. If during the course a candidate showed particular inaptitude or lack of leadership he was recommended for dismissal by the instructors or administrative company commanders, examined by the Faculty Board and either adjudged a non-graduate or permitted to finish the course.

Every candidate for commission enrolled in the OCS was theoretically, and in most cases actually, endowed with a specialized background. Failure to graduate could in nearly every case be attributed to improper selection.

Training of Enlisted Men

Individual training of enlisted personnel in the CMP was confined during 1942, 1943, and 1944 to the schooling of investigators and military government specialists. In January 1945, an Enlisted Train and Town Patrol course and an Enlisted Security course were added.

The first course to become a part of the curriculum of the Provost Marshal General's School was the Military Police Investigators Course later designated as PE-1, which opened its first class on 6 July 1942. ^{24/} Between that date and 1 January 1945, 2550 students were trained and graduated. Its mission was to train specially selected enlisted men for investigative work, both in personnel security and loyalty checking and in investigating

^{24/} WD letter, AG 220.63 PM Gen Sch, dated 13 June 42

crimes involving or against military personnel.

Prerequisites for the course included a college education, preferably legal, experience in police work or in conducting investigations of a legal or criminal nature, and outstanding ability, personality and discretion. The original course of instruction included: basic military training, physical training and first aid, weapons, Army orientation, military law and administration, military government, police methods, counterintelligence procedures, and investigative methods.

Classes numbered through 13 (6 July 42 to 20 October 43) were of eight weeks' duration, then the course was expanded to ten weeks with the enrollment of class 14 on 4 October 1943. Demand for investigators in October 1944 was such that an attempt was made to crowd the course into four weeks, and one class was put through, but this was not sufficient time to include essential instruction and subsequent courses have required six weeks. Under the ten-weeks' program, covering a total of 456 hours of instruction, 49 hours were devoted to basic training, 46 to physical conditioning, first aid and judo, 18 to police administration, procedures and internal security, 28 to weapons training with pistol, shotgun, submachine gun and grenades, six to military government, three to combat counterintelligence, 49 to law and administration, jurisdiction, search and seizure, court procedure and laws of evidence, ten to Army orientation, and 247 hours to the details of criminal investigative procedure. This included lectures, demonstrations, laboratory work and field work and covered: observation and description, surveillance, interrogation, undercover work, report writing, specialized shooting, scientific criminology, preservation and handling of evidence, sabotage methods, raids, crime scene search, technique and mechanics of arrests, narcotics, lock studies, fingerprint identification and other related subjects.

A special course for Air Force enlisted personnel, known at first as the Military Police Special Investigators Course and later as the AAF Investigators Course, was organized in December 1942 35/ and continued through 20 August 1943, with seven classes of 135 men each and a total of 854 graduates. This was an eight-weeks' course and followed substantially the same program.

The third group to be trained was the Occupational Military Police, later designated Military Government Enlisted Course. 36/

35/ SOS letter, SPTRS 353 (AAF)(11-2-42), dated 2 Nov 42

36/ SOS letter, SPTRS 352 (PMG)(5-26-43), dated 3 June 43

The course was activated at Fort Custer 11 January 1943 37/ and continued through 16 November 1944, graduating 21 classes with a total of 1703 students. Its mission was the training of specially qualified enlisted men for the policing of occupied foreign territories, and prerequisites for attendance included college graduation, the ability to speak, write and translate at least one foreign language, having traveled or lived in a foreign country, and an age limit of 30 years.

This was an eight weeks' course totalling 364 hours of instruction, divided into 53 hours of basic training, 35 hours on criminal investigation, eight on law and administration, 32 on physical training, 54 on police training, 18 on tactics, 50 on traffic control, 55 on weapons training, eight on Army orientation, and 51 hours to the details of military government. This included the history of military government, rules of land warfare, proclamations and ordinances, arrests, searches and seizures, tribunals, public relations and propaganda, backgrounds of major Axis powers, and problems of military government.

Except for the quality of the personnel attending the courses for Enlisted Investigators and Military Government, all of the factors, both favorable and otherwise, discussed under "Service Schools" and "Training Facilities" were present.

The quality of the personnel to be trained was in practically all instances much higher than average. In those few instances where students fell below average it was generally due to the fact that authorizing agencies did not screen sufficiently close the qualifications of men selected for training according to War Department quota letters.

For purposes of administration, the classes were organized as provisional companies, and the academic program was handled by the nine departments of instruction, each contributing appropriate comments of its subject matter to furnish well-rounded courses.

Enlisted men graduated from courses of instruction at the PMG School were on the average highly qualified to perform the duties for which they had been trained. Reports from overseas theaters and service commands lead to the conclusion that justification for the

37/ SOS letter, SPTR 352.11 (PMG)(12-28-42), dated 4 Jan 43

schooling given the enlisted investigators may be found in the results of investigations conducted by them of subversive and criminal activities, pilferage and black-market operations. Most of the graduates of the school were used as sergeant investigators with Counter Intelligence Detachments and teams in foreign theaters

It is not known how many, if any, of the enlisted men graduated from the Military Government course were ever used as occupational military police. Because of their high calibre a large percentage of them subsequently attended OCS and after being commissioned many of them found their way into the Military Government or Civil Affairs divisions as officers. Some of the remainder may have been picked up from replacement centers or elsewhere and used on AMG teams overseas, but so far as is known there was no organized movement to use these specialists in jobs for which they had been trained.

Replacement Training

Replacement training of military police personnel was commenced in April 1942 with the activation of the Military Police Replacement Training Center at Fort Riley, Kansas, for the purpose of training inductees in basic military subjects and preparing them in branch technical subjects sufficiently to produce qualified soldiers and military policemen for loss replacement. 38/

The Replacement Training Center was opened with two training battalions, the 26th and 27th, organized as complete T/C units. In September 1942, the 28th Training Battalion was activated and in October the 29th was added. In accordance with the move to assemble all MP training installations at one training area, 39/ the Center was moved to Fort Custer, Michigan, one battalion at a time as each completed its cycle of training, the first on 5 April 1943 and the last 31 May 1943. At Fort Custer a fifth battalion, the 30th was activated 15 May 1944, bringing the strength close to 5000.

Between April 1942 and October 1944, when it was discontinued, approximately 42,000 trainees passed through the Center. Of these, 218 were sent to Officer Candidate School, 1662 to specialist schools, 3601 were transferred to AGF, ASF or AAF units, 5572 were transferred to replacement depots and ports of embarkation, and 309 died or were discharged. Some 1048 others remained until the Center was closed, as training cadres, overhead, etc., then were sent to Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Fort Lewis and other replacement centers.

38/ WD letter, AG 353 (2-19-42)MR-W-C, dated 15 March 42

39/ WD letter, AG 320.2 (11-23-42)OB-I-SP-M, dated 25 Nov 42

These figures are indicative rather than complete, since they account for only 12,410 of the trainees. No breakdown of output figures is available for eight months of 1942, for January and February of 1943, or for April and May 1944.

The training of enlisted Military Police after November 1944 was accomplished by and for the AGF at Camp Robinson, Arkansas, with two-weeks' courses in branch technical subjects furnished approximately 100 enlisted men a month. These men were all taken from the Infantry, ASFTC, and had all completed the 17 weeks' basic course. The PMIO detailed 14 officers to accomplish this training and prepared the training programs.

In this connection it should be pointed out that until 1944 men trained at the MPRTC were used only as loss replacements in overseas units. None of these trained men were available for any MP units in this country or for the activation of new MP units. As a consequence, well-trained military police were diverted to other branches, while the majority of military police units could not get men trained as military policemen.

Training was carried on under the provisions of MTP 19-2, published 7 April 1942, one day prior to the activation of the Center, which outlined a 13-week program of basic military, tactical, technical and specialist training for inductees received direct from the reception centers. The first period of five weeks was devoted mainly to close order drill, discipline and courtesy, and preliminary instruction and range practice in rifle, pistol, revolver, shotgun, submachine gun, light and heavy machine gun, bayonet, hand grenade and riot club. Instruction in these subjects was carried over into the second eight-weeks' period, during which military police subjects were stressed, including military law, criminal investigation, traffic control and police procedures. The original 13-week program was increased under MTP 19-201 in November 1943 by four weeks, the last three of which were devoted to basic team training which included much field work and extensive tactical maneuvers and maneuvers.

Basic military subjects, consuming about 70 percent of the training period, were decentralized to the companies, and instruction was carried on by qualified company officers under the supervision of company commanders, battalion staff and regimental S-3. Branch technical instruction was conducted in a centralized manner by technical instructors attached to S-3, and was standardized and uniform.

Extensive use was made of slides, film strips, training film, and skits written by the instructors for GI actors illustrating

visually and vividly the situations brought out in the instruction. Whenever possible, the entire phase of explanation, demonstration, application, discussion and critique was carried on out-of-doors. Military discipline and courtesy, neatness and bearing were stressed at all times; troops were moved with precision to show the appearance of seasoned, well-disciplined men; and trainees were considered as under training in all their activities from reveille to taps.

No officer personnel was assembled from existing MP battalions, service commands, graduates of the officer courses at the PNG School, and MP graduates from the Infantry and Cavalry OCS. The enlisted training cadre came from the Cavalry Replacement Training Center at Fort Riley.

Trainees were received directly from the reception centers and were attached unassigned to the battalions. Many of them were incorrectly classified for military police training, due to short stature and limiting defects. A considerable number were completely unsuited by lack of education. For nearly a year one complete company was made up of men who had to be taught to read and write and who could not complete even basic training in that time. Repeated complaints of the quality of men being sent to the Center finally resulted in an order from The Adjutant General's Office setting forth certain minimum qualifications for men earmarked for the CMP. 40/ This did some good, but by no means eliminated the problem since many undesirables continued to be received.

Most of the officers had had recent experience in military training or military backgrounds, regular or reserve, which fitted them for their jobs, and instruction conducted by company officers was, on the whole, excellent. As the organization grew, the officers' staff was augmented mainly from the MP OCS graduates who showed greatest promise as instructors. Those officers detailed as Assistant S-3 (Plans and Training) officers and instructors in technical subjects, unfortunately, had no background of experience in those subjects, so were forced to teach almost entirely from reference material.

The enlisted cadre, recruited from existing MP units and the Fort Riley Cavalry Replacement Training Center, was for the most part a well-trained and competent unit. The military police were used as line or field noncommissioned officers and assistant instructors, while the former cavalry trainees were employed in administrative

40/ WD Memorandum 615-73-42

capacities. As time passed and the strength of the organization increased, and as it became necessary to replace enlisted cadres, trainees who had shown particular aptitude and intelligence were held over and used to augment the cadre. Some of the best instructors were developed through this channel, because their work and capabilities had been constantly observed over a period of 17 weeks and continued repetition of the same instruction to class after class of trainees thereafter eventually qualified them as experts.

At Fort Riley, when the Replacement Training Center had only two training battalions, the barracks, day-rooms, mess halls and other physical facilities were of the best and contributed greatly to high morale. When two more battalions were added small mobilization-type buildings were erected to house the trainees, far below the quality of the permanent buildings but not sufficiently so to lower morale to an appreciable extent. Lack of class-room type buildings frequently made it necessary to use barrack buildings and warehouses for instruction, which did not contribute to highest efficiency. After the move to Fort Custer adequate housing facilities eliminated these troubles. Range facilities at both stations were excellent. At Fort Riley there were sufficient outdoor training areas to accommodate two battalions, but not enough for four; at Fort Custer there was plenty of room. At Fort Riley the best natural facilities were available for training in traffic control, for field and combat exercises, for bivouacs and night problems. The situation at Fort Custer required that many facilities and training aids had to be improvised.

With four battalions at Fort Riley the Military Police Replacement Training Center was carrying a capacity load, considering housing and training facilities, and when a fifth was activated after the move to Fort Custer that station about reached its capacity limit. The officer and enlisted cadre was by that time so experienced and had been through so many training cycles that several additional battalions could have been staffed simply by providing the necessary increase in officer personnel.

References, texts and manuals were available in sufficient number. Training aids were at first scarce and it was necessary to improvise, especially those used in technical instruction. Considerable ingenuity and ambition were displayed in the manufacture of blackboards, sand tables, terrain boards, wooden working models of weapons, elaborate devices to teach trigger-squeeze, and in the preparation of charts and the development of camouflaged

uniforms and equipment.

Approximately 80 percent of the training was conducted outdoors, and as far as possible under simulated field conditions. On marches, when planes were available, troops were bombed with bags of flour; CN was employed and gas masks were used. Night alerts required an entire battalion to move into bivouac for the rest of the night. Night problems employed opposing forces, and put into practice all previous instruction in cover and concealment, scouting and patrolling, fire techniques, security and tactics. Night demonstrations elaborated on security and involved night sounds, movement and observation.

Instruction was conducted eight hours a day, six days a week, with additional night work on marches, demonstrations, blackout problems, maneuvers and bivouacs. Also, one two-hour night class was held each week for the enlisted cadre and a similar period for officers. Instruction procedure generally followed methods outlined in FM 21-5, TM 21-250 and TF 7-295, the lesson outlines breaking this down by time periods to assure proper use of explanation, demonstration, application and discussion.

Every instructor was supervised by his company commander during the entire period of instruction. Battalion staffs supervised closely and sat in on some part of each period, and representatives of S-3 spot-checked all instruction. It was extremely rare that any period of instruction missed supervision, and, to insure that no instructor undertook a period of instruction without adequate preparation, all were required to have an outline of the matter to be covered with them at all times during instruction, usually in the form of notes on 3" x 5" cards. Three field officers, all former commanders of training battalions with a thorough knowledge of subjects and methods, were a part of the S-3 staff and made training inspection a constant activity.

Unit Training

Though as soon as they were activated the T/O MP units of AGF combat organizations automatically became parts of the CMP, the Office of The Provost Marshal General had no jurisdiction over their organization, composition, personnel or training, except insofar as it assisted in drafting the tables of organization and equipment for them and furnished proposed Mobilization Training Programs for their basic and technical training.

Military Police units were assigned to divisions, corps and armies on the basis determined by the need in each theater. Ordinarily each combat division had its MP platoon, each corps an

MP company and each Army an MP battalion, but each of these tactical MP units was trained at the scene of its activation in accordance with the ideas of its local commander, so that training methods and results varied widely. The only additional function of the Provost Marshal General in connection with this training was the supplying of doctrine later included in Field and Training Manuals and the training of some of the officers. Some enterprising division commanders sent officers detailed or earmarked for MP duty to the Provost Marshal General's School for specialized instruction and other graduates of the school eventually were assigned to combat outfits. The school furnished training for 206 AGF officers in the Advanced Course between August 1942 and July 1944, and 464 CMP officers were sent to AGF organizations during the same period.

For the most part, the training of combat MP units was accomplished by themselves, on the job and while engaged in functional duties. Representatives of The Provost Marshal General detailed to observe field maneuvers of some of the larger units, had opportunities to make suggestions intended to improve the field efficiency of the MP units they observed in simulated action.

Considered as CMP personnel and organizations when they were first activated, a considerable number of Air Forces military police units, then known as AAF Ground Squadrons, later as Military Police companies (Aviation), were formed to furnish local security for AAF establishments as these were opened.

Officers and enlisted personnel were trained at several camps located in the South and, until these forces were absorbed bodily into the Air Corps, The Provost Marshal General furnished staff supervision and training teams of officers for their instructions. Later, in June 1943, a six-weeks basic Military Police course for AAF Guard Squadron officers was offered by The Provost Marshal General's School. A total of 366 Air Corps officers were trained. As early as December 1942 a 13-weeks' course for AAF enlisted investigators was established at the school and between that date and August 1943, 854 were graduated.

Except for the officer and enlisted personnel training at the Provost Marshal General's School, after the transfer of the AAF MP units to the Air Corps in May of 1943, the training of the military police (aviation) was carried on by their own personnel under AAF supervision at Camp Berkeley, Texas. Between 1 January 1942 and 1 July 1945, a total of 214 CMP officers had been assigned to duty with the AAF.

During the early part of 1942 the organization of the then numerous Army Service Forces Military Police units activated in

widely separated locations throughout the country resulted in a poor state of training, for several reasons: the FMGO was unable to control or supervise training; units were too widely scattered to allow centralized supervision; installations and service commands used the units for functional duty and training was incidental and haphazard; training facilities and supervisory staffs were lacking at most installations; training lacked uniformity; and as a rule, a poor type of trainers and trainees were assigned to or transferred into units.

It was not until November 1942 that the Provost Marshal General's Unit Training Center at Fort Custer, Michigan was established. 41/ Thereafter most of the units formed in this country were activated and trained at this Center, though because of the limited capacity of Fort Custer it became necessary to activate some units at sub-activation centers at Camp Maxey, Camp Swift, Camp Gordon and Camp McCain. Teams of four officers each were sent to these camps to supervise the activation and training. All of these units were subsequently sent to Fort Custer for refresher training prior to shipment overseas.

Unit training was greatly improved as a result of this centralization. Basic military training was conducted by company line officers and technical MP training by company officers experienced in military police duties and graduates of special officers' classes at the PMG School. Enlisted specialists were trained by the PMG School or those of other branches. Visual training aids were employed whenever practical. Discipline was strictly enforced at all times and field or combat conditions were simulated whenever possible during training, with the final two weeks' training conducted in a bivouac area under field conditions. Frequent inspections by the Inspection or Advisory Liaison Branch of the FMGO were made to determine the state of training and readiness for overseas shipment.

While every post, camp and station in the country had its own MP unit, varying in size from platoon to battalion strength, according to its own immediate needs, and the reception centers and training camps in operation prior to Pearl Harbor all organized MP units as a matter of functional necessity, it was not until January 1942 that any uniform training program was ready, and MPP 19-1 was issued in mimeographed form. This was designed specifically for MP ZI battalions, and provided for basic and technical training in all the tasks forseen at that time for this type of unit. A revision

41/ WD letter, AG 320.2 (11-23-42) OB-1-SP-M, dated 25 Nov 42

of MTP 19-1 in May 1942 added training for MP Escort Guard Companies, AGF tactical units, MP companies (Aviation), MP companies (post, camp and station), and ZI companies.

In May 1943 MTP 19-1 was again revised and in July 1944 MTP 19-2, the program still in use in 1945, was published. This outlined training requirements for all types of military police units, adding also Prisoner of War Processing companies and Criminal Investigation platoons and sections. Six weeks of the program were devoted to basic training under MTP 21-3, except when screening showed the full period to be unnecessary; seven weeks were devoted to basic technical training under MTP 19-1; and from three to eight weeks were devoted to training under MTP 19-2, depending on the time available.

In the early stages of training, facilities for unit training were almost everywhere inadequate and in many cases wholly deficient. In many cases, especially with units located in former CCC camps, proper ranges were not available and training aids lacking.

Those units which had an opportunity to train at the PMG Unit Training Center at Fort Custer, and those which went through a refresher course there, had the advantage of all the facilities of the PMG Training Center and the PMG School and the supervision of experienced instructors. The Staff of the Provost Marshal General's Unit Training Center consisted of officers who had had considerable prior experience either at the PMG School or the MP Replacement Training Center, and who made up the regimental and battalion staffs. The Company commanders and company officers were those permanently assigned to the units. Some difficulty was experienced because many of the company officers did not have sufficient training backgrounds to handle company training efficiently, so it was necessary that the regimental and battalion staffs carry a great burden of the instruction as well as conduct nightly officer and noncommissioned officer schools to prepare company cadres for the following day's instruction.

Specialists outside the Corps of Military Police or the Army, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation or state police officers were called upon to aid in the training of GI units. There was no authorization for a permanent enlisted overhead which could be used as assistant instructors or demonstration troops. When these became necessary, as in the Escort Guard Company unit training program, special courses of instruction were provided at special officer and noncommissioned schools conducted four nights a week. The lack of experienced training officer personnel assigned to units upon activation and scheduled to go overseas with them led to the adoption of a practice extremely detrimental to the units -- that of transferring green officers into units about to be shipped in order to

retain as instructors of new units the officers who had gone through a cycle of training.

Generally there was insufficient time for completing unit training during the period from the program's inception in September 1941 to June 1944. In some instances it was even necessary to place units on extended field service with enlisted men who had not completed basic training. The Unit Training Center was established to make up deficiencies, and whenever possible, units in need of additional training were assigned there. Training time was lost when units in training were required for post fatigue details or other duties or when enlisted filler personnel was late in arriving.

Personnel proved the principal stumbling-block to adequate unit training, particularly in 1942 and 1943, in spite of an order which specified minimum qualifications for men to be trained for military police. (2) Personnel selected was not always competent for the performance of MP duties, even with training, for a sense of individual responsibility is essential for such work. Varying levels of training among personnel made it necessary at times to provide basic training for all or a major part of a unit before advanced or technical training could be undertaken. Changes in personnel policy, resulting in frequent turnover, proved handicaps in the unit training program.

Another serious problem at the outset was that of supply. Prior to the activation of units there were no UTC T/E's, with the result that sufficient weapons and vehicles were not available to carry on proper training, and it was some time before this situation could be corrected.

Field and class work in the UTC program was carried on within the framework of each unit's T/O, with unit officers acting as instructors under supervision of the UTC staff. Four training regiments were organized, each consisting of two or more training battalions. Training schedules, coordination of areas, ranges, and other facilities were functions of UTC S-2. Functional training programs were organized according to the particular unit's duties. Educational procedures were established in current MTP's and as designed for each functional unit as follows:

MP Battalions (ZI) -- Week-end convoys provided training in town and traffic control. An instance of field training is cited from Fort Ord, where three companies of the training battalion were assigned to active guard duty at aviation plants and, by rotation,

(2) WD Memo 615-73-42, dated 30 Dec 1942

one company was kept on intensive training during a seven-month period in 1942-43.

Post, Camp and Station Company -- During the unit training period Post, Camp and Station companies at Fort Custer UTC received practical experience with the station Military Police and some units worked with the Michigan State Police. Classes in the principles of town patrol and traffic control were supplemented by field observation and experience in nearby cities and leave centers.

Prisoner of War Escort Guard companies devoted an increasing amount of time to special instruction and after late 1943 received practical experience in their duties.

Prisoner of War Processing companies were given extensive functional training, including 288 hours of processing prisoners. Each company section was trained in its function and ten complete platoons were formed, one platoon processing another, with the objective of attaining a speed of one PW a minute. During their training approximately 2500 German PW's were processed by the 161st and 162nd PWP Companies.

Criminal Investigation Sections, during their period of training at the UTC, were assigned to work with the Michigan State police. Each man was assigned to duty with a state trooper and his work was observed by his own company officers, by UTC staff instructors, and by the director of training of the state police, the later furnishing a written report on each man. To provide varied experience, assignments were often changed from one part of the state to another.

In September 1942 an Instructor Observer group was organized in the PMGO to inspect the personnel and training of newly activated MP units, and in June 1943 this became the Inspection Branch, later known as the Advisory Liaison Branch. The Branch inspected ASF units selected for overseas service for compliance with the POM directives, and made periodical inspections of other ASF MP units serving in the United States, making recommendations to improve their efficiency. These inspections included compliance with training programs, methods and doctrine, and discussing with organization commanders matters of personnel, equipment, organization and training.

When the PMG School was moved from Fort Custer to Fort Sam Houston in October 1944 and the PMG UTC was discontinued, unit training had already practically ceased and the large majority of

units needed overseas had already completed training and had been shipped.

Unit training activities from January 1941 to July 1944 in the zone of the interior are shown in the following table:

TYPE OF UNIT AND NUMBER TRAINED

	ZI Bns	EG Cos	PC&S Cos	ZI Cos	PWP Cos	Total
Received units training at Ft Custer UTC	10	210	11	12	4	247
Revd Unit Trng elsewhere in ZI	90	104	8	13	6	221
Recd Refresher Trng at Ft Custer UTC	<u>15</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u> </u>	<u>50</u>
	115	343	20	30	10	518

DISPOSITION

	Bn's	EG Cos	PC&S Cos	ZI Cos	PWP Cos	Total
Overseas	35	27	18	10	4	94
Zone of Interior	28	32		1	2	63
Disbanded	37	255	1	14	2	311

A P P E N D I X

PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

	<u>HEADQUARTERS PMGO</u>		<u>CLASS IV INSTALLATIONS 1/</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Offi- cers</u>	<u>Civi- lians</u>	<u>Offi- cers</u>	<u>Civi- lians</u>	<u>En- listed</u>	<u>POW</u>	
31 Jul 41	5	2					
31 Dec 41	39	64					
30 Jun 42	130	363					
31 Dec 42	168	341					
30 Jun 43	183	329					
31 Dec 43	177	314					
30 Jun 44	175	352	112	76	41	150	906 ^{2/}
31 Dec 44	166	312	127	86	51	216	958
30 Jun 45	191	345	139	99	87	374	1235
31 Dec 45	184	251	117	59	163	234	958

- 1/ Class IV installations were those located outside the Military District of Washington. See organization Charts for location.
- 2/ Information on personnel in Class IV installations prior to 30 June 1944 not complete.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES





CHART III

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES



* UNDER ARMY SERVICE FORCES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS

CHART IV

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES




CHART V

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL




CHART VI

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL




CHART VII

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

